



# PROGRAMMA

A Newsletter for Graduates of the General Program of Liberal Studies

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## The View from 318

Many years ago, in what already seems like a previous incarnation, I recall "preparing" for a seminar on Pascal while digging up my septic tank. It was a cold, gray, November day; the earth appeared unprepared ever again to yield up anything but the contents of septic tanks. It had been a long time since I had last read Pascal, and my ruminations upon his themes, brought back to mind by a recent few hours with the text, were not exactly fertile, given the exigencies of my situation.

The inevitable complications arose, as they do with all domestic obligations. This was "real" life! What had Pascal to do with all this? Finally, in exasperation, I said to myself: Either Pascal has something to say to me, here and now, or else he has nothing to say to me ever; in the latter case, what he has to say is frivolous, and what he and all the other auctores have to say to me from within the safe and sanitary sanctuary of their bound pages is utterly epiphenomenal.

This vignette came to mind recently as I read one reply to the questionnaire we sent out with the last issue of Programma. It ran as follows: (My apologies to the alumnus involved, whose prior permission to publish the following excerpt I have not been able to request. Consequently, he shall remain anonymous):

Item 1 - My present field of work is:

Reply - "Hand shovelling muck in a soda mine."

Item 2 - I would rate my level of satisfaction in my work as:

Reply - "Excellent."

. . . . .

Item 6 - If I had it to do over again, I would: a) Major in the General Program; b) not major in the General Program.

Reply - Major in the General Program

Tell us why.

"I like to think about the best of classic things."

This reply gave me more encouragement perhaps than any one other item which has "crossed my desk" since I became Chairman. It was not just that I, too, had decided that I wanted to think about the best of classic things, even while shovelling muck, but also that here was a living example of what we claim to be the ultimate merits of "our" case. For one way of putting what we think we are doing in the General Program of Liberal Studies is that we are trying to offer "the best of classic things," not promising fun and profit at the end, but simply more of the same human condition. We do Pascal and the others because they are worth doing in themselves, whenever and under whatever conditions they can be done, and not because they lead to profitable and muckless occupations.

To Life! With all its best of classic things, and all its muck and mire. And to the General Program, and more muck-moving graduates.

May the blessings of this season be abundantly yours.

  
John Lyon  
Chairman

PROGRAMMA (the Greek word meaning "public notice") is published toward the end of each academic semester by the General Program of Liberal Studies for its graduates.

Faculty Editor: Linda C. Ferguson

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Editor's Notes:

This issue of Programma marks my first as editor. It features the traditional "View from 318" and the now traditional plea for contributions. The publication of Programma is an active attempt to nurture the scholarly, spiritual, and social sense of community in which the General Program has come to take great pride. It is with optimism that I report 56 responses to the survey in the July, 1978 issue. The majority of those responses came accompanied by contributions, mostly monetary, but other types as well: contributions of moral support and of suggestions for contents of Programma. The spring issue will include a complete listing of respondents, and survey results, along with messages and comments, as space allows.

Included in these pages are profiles, self-drawn, by three professors teaching with us this year for the first time. They offer their introductions to you as another means of maintaining a thread of continuity in the common experience of the General Program. Their varied backgrounds and viewpoints refresh and enrich us. Of special interest in this issue is the article by Professor William Frerking who serves to co-ordinate our faculty seminars; this article articulates our continuing effort to deal with the problem of history and its particular position in liberal studies. Professor Frerking's article will be of special interest to the alumni who indicated that history should receive greater emphasis in the program. Moreover, this article is valuable to those of us now grappling with the "history problem" in the department, since it recounts so clearly the positions we have considered to date.

Since I have assumed responsibility for the editorship of Programma, a number of possibilities for future issues have been brought to my attention. In addition to scholarly articles and departmental news by faculty members, it has been suggested that more space be devoted to articles and compositions by alumni. Please feel invited to submit essays, poems, or scholarly articles which you believe appropriate for the General Program community. Other proposals for Programma content include a series of book reviews for recommended readings, and a series of alumni profiles. I look forward to hearing from you.

With best wishes for 1979,

Linda C. Ferguson  
Assistant Professor  
General Program of  
Liberal Studies

REVEREND E. GERARD CARROLL

I came to teach in the General Program in August of this year, 1978. I am a priest of the diocese of Ardagh and Clonmacnois, Ireland, and I was ordained in Rome on the 5th of March, 1966. I presume it is rather difficult to understand how these two separate events are joined one to the other: how an Irish priest ordained in Rome for an Irish diocese ends up teaching in the General Program of Liberal Studies in Notre Dame, Indiana. Well, I'm sure greater mysteries have been encountered, greater miracles have happened.

The journey that led to here started with my doctorate in theology in Rome, which I finished in 1969. I then went to the University of London where I studied music for three years, and in 1974 I received the degree of Bachelor of Music. I was appointed then to the Archdiocese of Dublin for two years, during which time I worked in Trinity College where I qualified as a Ph.D. research student in seventeenth century French studies, especially French spirituality. My research work brought me eventually to Paris where I have lived for the past two years, during which time I attended the Ecole des Hautes Etudes.

Such is the bare outline of my life; so far so good. Being interested in the particular work being done in the General Program, and being enthusiastic about teaching in an American university, I applied for a position and got it. How I got it, I don't know. But, as I said above, there have been greater miracles; and I prefer to say that I am happy to be here rather than give a reason why. I do my share of seminar teaching together with a shared responsibility for the Origins of Christianity course. In all honesty I must say that it is a wonderful experience for me to teach in the General Program of Liberal Studies.

STEVEN CROCKETT

While I was at Earlham College majoring in music I was very enthusiastic about the fine arts of this century, especially the music of Stravinsky, Bartok and Webern. There were moments in their works which, in my naivete and enthusiasm, I thought of as revelations of transcendent worlds. In 1965 I went to the University of Chicago to work on a Ph.D. in musicology. I hoped graduate study would help me persuade others these transcendent worlds were indeed to be heard in modern music and to say what was in these worlds. I soon saw that if there were moments of transcendence in music, they would be related to similar moments in other matters. So I left the music department and joined the Committee on General Studies in the Humanities, under whose umbrella I took courses in anthropology, popular culture, history of culture, philosophy and literature, while continuing to take courses in music theory and the music of this century and singing counter-tenor in the University's Collegium Musicum. I even began to study mathematics informally, because I became friends with a young mathematician who taught me some of the extraordinary things he'd learned.

After I received my A.M. in General Studies, I became a Ph.D. student in Chicago's Committee on the History of Culture. I hoped to write a dissertation on melancholy and the music of the English madrigalist, John Wilbye. I had a notion that music could help cure melancholy, not by being jolly, but by revealing transcendent worlds which were too vast for melancholy. I wanted to write about Wilbye because, paradoxically, his transcendent music seemed to cure the very melancholy his texts expressed.

In 1970, I went to St. John's College in Annapolis to teach. While I led seminars and several music tutorials, I also learned and taught the four years of mathematics in the College's curriculum. (Now I am teaching a segment on Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometries in the General Program's Natural Science sequence.) After leaving St. John's in 1977, I taught high school mathematics at The George School, a Quaker boarding school near Philadelphia. During the summers of 1976 and 1977, I taught at St. John's College's Graduate Institute in Santa Fe, and during my first summer there, I became friends with Walter Niegorski of the General Program and with him led one of the Institute's seminars. I learned much from Walt about the General Program of Liberal Studies.

I am no less naive and enthusiastic about Stravinsky, Bartok and Webern now than I was 15 years ago. But I suspect now that the transcendent moments in their music may be but the ear's bright images of the great conversions and revolutions which are the subjects of almost all the books read in the Program. And in no works are these turnings-around more palpable and learnable than in the great works of mathematics. They may yet show me the nature of what I hear at times in music.

JAMES M. WEISS

It is, in a sense, ironic that I should be writing an autobiographical statement just now, since I am also currently finishing research on the origins of the biography and autobiography in the Renaissance. But it is pleasantly ironic since, like the humanists, I can take for granted readers both eruditus and pius, a rare occasion in any age, but one quite common in General Program circles, if my first months here are any indication.

In one way, my arrival to teach in the General Program was like a homecoming. My first teaching was at the University of Chicago, in the Western Civilization curriculum which goes back to Mr. Hutchins' days, and thus to the origins of all Great Books programs. Thus I first learned to teach by conducting seminar discussions which treated major works without benefit of lectures or secondary texts. While my own interests in questions of religion and culture took more concrete shape, I was also able to teach seminars about them in the University of Munich during the mid-1970's. Thus, when a senior asked me during my interview last Spring whether I anticipated difficulty adjusting to seminar teaching, I had to confess I might have difficulty adjusting to any other kind.

Intellectually, too, the General Program provides an atmosphere congenial to my interests in theology, modern historical consciousness, and periods of cultural transition, issues which all require an interdisciplinary approach. While these pursuits arise from a concern about the world and the tradition around me, I limit them to the Renaissance and Reformation periods when I do scholarly work. Erasmus, both the man and his work, have consistently claimed my attention for his intergration of the disciplines as the basis of educational, scholarly, and moral reform programs. (Yes, the General Program had ancestors even before Mr. Hutchins.) Professionally I work on the implications of his program for theological method, but personally I am fascinated by his much-misunderstood survival in a world which had gone corrupt when he was born and crazy by the time he died.

My most recent research, however, has involved a major result of the modern historical consciousness, the interest in individuality, familiar to GP'ers from readings in Burckhardt. For the past five years, I worked on the origins of modern biography, both as a research fellow of an ecumenical institute in Mainz and as a lecturer in an institute of humanist studies in Munich.

Inevitably, life in the Rhineland gives one an interest in wines and life in Bavaria a love of the mountains. The laws and the landscape of Indiana make it difficult to share these with the students, although Dr. Sloan and I are organizing some cross-country ski weekends for venturesome GP'ers this winter. As a native South Side Chicagoan, however, I also have an abiding interest in urban architecture. And so, I will repay my "GP Homecoming" with another of my own when I have the seniors up to Chicago in Spring to see with their own eyes what Ed Cronin has been boasting about all these years.

## THE NATURE AND VALUE OF HISTORY

The faculty of the General Program have just completed a series of faculty seminars on the topic of the nature and value of the discipline of history. Knowing the interest in this topic among our alumni, we thought it might be worthwhile to share with the readers of Programma a brief account of the readings for these seminars and of some of the reflections of the participants on them. The General Program faculty understands its seminars as occasions for the common exploration of topics of interest to us as a faculty, without expecting to reach common definitive conclusions on all or even many of the questions under discussion, and our seminars on history conformed to this pattern. For this reason, and because of space limitations, I shall often confine myself in what follows to suggesting only what the chief questions or issues were which arose in our investigation, although from time to time, and especially toward the end, I shall offer some personal reflections as to the directions in which answers to some of these questions may lie. Readers of this piece may wish to read for themselves some or all of the works we used as the bases for our discussions, and are in any case invited to share their thoughts on these matters with the Editor of Programma.

Building on suggestions made by colleagues John Lyon and Michael Crowe (who might themselves formulate the following distinctions somewhat differently), we may find it useful to distinguish three senses of 'history': 1) 'history' in the sense of the past, or more precisely, in the sense of a temporally ordered series of past human actions, together with their causes, circumstances, and consequences, which are somehow significant for the purposes of the historian (what these purposes are or should be will be suggested in the several accounts of history we shall be considering) -- in this sense someone may be said to be "studying medieval history;" 2) 'history' in the sense of an account or representation in human language of (some portion of total) history in the first sense -- in this sense someone may be said to be "writing a medieval history;" 3) 'history' in the sense of that discipline whose business it is to study history in the first sense, and which generally embodies the results of its study in a history in the second sense -- in this sense someone may be said to be "specializing in medieval history." Our question is: What is the nature and value of history in the third sense, i.e., of the discipline of history? Dealing with this question, however, involves talking about history in the other two senses as well. In what follows, the sense of 'history' intended at a particular point will hopefully be clear from the context, or will be made clear by an explicit specification.

As some readers may know, history as a discipline is absent -- on principle -- from the curriculum of St. John's College (Annapolis and Santa Fe), one of the original, and still one of the very distinguished, representatives of the Great Books approach to undergraduate education. We thought it would be good, then, to begin our seminars with a discussion of "History and the Liberal Arts," a lecture given on June 5, 1953 at Annapolis, by Jacob Klein, in which that founding father at St. John's sets out his reasons for thinking that history, or rather, history as it is currently practised, ought not to be part of an undergraduate curriculum. The qualification is an important one. For Klein allows that the two kinds of history known to the ancient world, viz., genealogical history, the history which is concerned to offer an explanation of the present state of affairs by tracing its salient features back to their origins, and pragmatic history, the history which seeks to draw ethical or political lessons for the future from "mistakes and failures or from exemplary

actions in the past," are legitimate intellectual enterprises. It is, rather, against history as it is currently practised in the academic world that Klein sets his face. This history he finds to be informed by a worldview which is generally called historicism (Klein himself does not use this term), and of which the following are some salient features: Not only does human history show no overall pattern or purpose, but it is even impossible to find any common substantive elements (except of the most trivial nature) present in all its periods. One can only see it as a (meaningless) succession of "cultures," each with its own "values" in art, ethics, religion, etc., "values" which are more or less incompatible with those of other cultures. Moreover, man is entirely a product of his particular culture. There is no universal human nature, but the values, aspirations, and thoughts of men are wholly determined by their cultures, and hence are as incompatible and incommensurable as those cultures themselves. In particular -- and this is perhaps the most radical claim of historicism -- a man's conception of truth, and of how truths can be established, is entirely a product of his "culture." Hence men will differ in their understanding of the nature of reality as widely as they do in other respects, nor can any "objective" standard of judgment be established here anymore than in any other case. Now this worldview, and the modern way of doing history based upon it (whose origins Klein traces back to the eighteenth-century Italian philosopher of history Giambattista Vico, who is thus one of the archvillains in Klein's reading of modern Western intellectual history), must be completely rejected, Klein holds, by any teacher or practitioner of the liberal arts. For (and at this point Klein's argument was usefully elaborated for us by our then colleague, Mark Jordan, himself an alumnus of St. John's) the obvious consequence of historicism is a thoroughgoing skepticism, whereas the liberal arts have always been understood, and must be understood, as the arts of the mind directed toward the discovery of truth. They therefore presuppose what historicism denies, viz., the intelligibility of the world and the capacity of the human mind to grasp that intelligibility by methods which at least in their essence are independent of cultural conditioning and hence, are objective. And one might add that an educational program founded on the reading of great classical works from all periods as sources of both insight and objective intellectual skills could scarcely be approved by a historicism which could never see such works as offering anything more than a testimony to the ideas and values of the "cultures" (each fundamentally incompatible with each other and with our own) from which they sprang.

Most of our subsequent readings and discussions related in one way or another to the theme of historicism. While Klein attacks historicism for being untrue, the next two authors we examined attack it, respectively, for being destructive of human vitality and for leading inexorably to human despair. With that same penetration, at times brilliantly sarcastic, which characterizes so much of his work, Friedrich Nietzsche argues in The Use and Abuse of History (tr. by Adrian Collins, Indianapolis, 1957) that that "scientific" historicist history on which his own nineteenth century so prided itself was in fact the product of, and when enforced on others as part of a so-called "education," was the cause of a kind of contemptible "living dead" man, a man who, utterly incapable of creating, being confident in, and committing himself to values springing from his own life energies, was nothing but a bloated bag stuffed with the disjecta membra, utterly unassimilated, of all the human cultures which, as a "historian," he had come to "understand" and feel "sympathy" for. If history is to serve the

growth of human vitality and civilization, it must be done either as monumental history, a history glorifying the achievements, suitable for one's own imitation, of great men of the past, or as antiquarian history, a history uncovering one's roots in a particular culture, tradition, people, locale in such a way as to enable one to "come home" to one's past and there find support and strength, or as critical history, a history passing judgment on some aspect of the past in the decisive and passionate rejection of which one's commitment to one's own opposing values is fortified. But here, as so often in his works, Nietzsche's despairing picture of the human condition comes to light. For a careful reading of his work makes it difficult to avoid the conclusion that he thinks none of the three "life-giving" ways of doing history can be carried out without falsifying -- and grossly falsifying -- the subjects with which they deal. Man, for whom the truth is ultimately enervating and destructive, must, if he is to live, create for himself life-giving fictions. Can there really be no other salvation for man from the evils of historicism?

In our third reading, The Myth of the Eternal Return (tr. by Willard R. Trask, Princeton, 1974), the contemporary scholar of comparative religious Mircea Eliade argues that when history is conceived (and this is how historicism conceives it) as a meaningless succession of events revealing no transcendent pattern which gives significance to the temporal flow, then it becomes intolerable to the human spirit, for that spirit cannot live without meaning. Ancient man, Eliade argues, generally conceived history as cyclical, and as manifesting periodically, on the temporal and human plane, transcendent patterns and realities: the New Year festival is a manifestation or "re-presentation" of the creation of the world, the festival for the purpose of insuring agricultural fertility has as its mythical model the marriage of a god and goddess, and so on. In this way critical moments in man's temporal existence are given transcendent meaning. Among the Hebrews' unique contributions to the world was a conception of history, which Christianity of course inherits, which is not cyclical but linear, but which still has a transcendent meaning, since it is the working out of the Will of a personal God Who guides history from a beginning, through a middle, to an end which is somehow the goal of, and will in some way give meaning to, the whole of time. Historicism, rejecting both these conceptions of history, leaves modern man confronted with the "terror of history," that is, abandoned to the intolerable vision of history as a succession of events in time, many of which bring to man evil, suffering, and death, and which together reveal no meaning whatsoever, and so make man's temporality unbearable for him (for it is not its pain, but the conviction of its meaninglessness, which makes evil insupportable to the human spirit).

It must surely be the case that a Catholic university has as it were a kind of institutional faith that that kind of transcendent meaning which the Judaeo-Christian tradition believes history to possess does indeed exist. In his address to the General Program faculty and students on the occasion of the opening of the current academic year, our chairman John Lyon, while acknowledging this to be so, argued that at least much of history's transcendent meaning must lie hidden from us in this life, that much of the past, in its concrete particularity, will resist subsumption under any of the patterns of significance we can discover in our present state, and that the honest acceptance and unflinching contemplation of this

fact is salutary. But then of course Christian teaching itself gives us no reason to suppose we can know much in this life about the detailed meaning of history; the faith, however, that that meaning (which we shall one day see) exists, is itself enough to overcome the "terror of history." There can be no doubt, then, that a Christian finds his ultimate deliverance from the historicist view of the past in the way Eliade suggests. But many of us were now wondering whether there could be some way of doing history which was free of historicist presuppositions, which, contrary to Nietzsche's suggestions, could nevertheless produce an objective picture of the past free of falsifications, and which could be seen already to have value in itself, within as it were the "human sphere," quite apart from its openness to the possibility of the revelation of a transcendent meaning in history. For an answer to our question we turned to Metahistory (Baltimore, 1973), the recently published work on the nature of history by the contemporary philosopher of history, Hayden White. And there we found, seemingly to our collective surprise and (though in some cases qualified) chagrin, that the answer offered to our question was a resounding and uncompromising "No!" One hesitates to attempt to summarize in a few lines the complex and difficult argument of the opening section of this book. But in its bare essentials White's view is the following: There is no such thing as an "objective" human past which is "there" and which it is the historian's task to discover and then describe. Of course there has been before us in time a set of "brute" and more or less "physical" events -- e.g., the fall of the Bastille -- whose occurrence and chronological sequence can indeed be objectively established. But beyond this -- and almost the entire content of a work of history concerns what is beyond this, i.e., consists in the ordering of these brute events into larger, but already subjectively constructed, historical "facts" (e.g., "the French Revolution"), and in their interpretation and explanation -- beyond this chronological sequence of brute events, one's history is the product of one's prior presuppositions and viewpoints by which the brute events are ordered, related, integrated. These presuppositions and viewpoints differ from one historian to the next, and furthermore -- and here is White's radical claim -- there can be no choice whatsoever of one set of presuppositions and viewpoints over the others as more adequate to the past "as it really was." For every fundamental historical point of view can only be judged from some other fundamental historical point of view, and so in the end the historian's choice of point of view is simply arbitrary. According to White, investigation reveals that at least since the nineteenth century these fundamental historical frameworks have been aesthetic in character -- though this fact has been unknown to the historians themselves and their readers. But whatever historians have thought they were doing, in fact all that a historian can do is to construct, out of the chronological sequence of brute events, a story, i.e., a narrative essentially literary in character. White recognizes four fundamental forms of historical story corresponding to the four literary tropes (metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, irony) which underlie them. None of these stories, which not infrequently contradict one another, can be said to be objectively true, or objectively truer than any other. The value of history, then, is not to be sought in its providing an objective record, interpretation, and explanation of the past. Rather, a work of history has value insofar as it is a good expression of one or some combination of these fundamental aesthetic points of view which are among the basic constituents of our humanity.

We found White's work stimulating, not only because of its brilliance and novelty, but precisely because it expressed views so diametrically opposed

to most of ours, and we decided to invite him to Notre Dame to give a lecture, meet with the General Program faculty, and visit some of our classes. He proved to be a scintillating lecturer, and a provocative and fascinating conversationalist. Nevertheless, after acknowledging White's many insights, and his very considerable contribution to the contemporary discussion of these matters, one can only observe that a theory which cannot in the end draw any distinction between writing a history and writing an historical novel (or indeed whatever exotic elaboration on the chronological sequence you please) is after all manifestly untenable. In fact,\* his philosophy of history is only a kind of extreme form or extension of historicism, but a historicism now turned back upon itself, and claiming that even the historian's reconstruction of the past is strictly determined by his own presuppositions, presuppositions which cannot be defended as "objectively more valid" than any others, and that therefore there can no more be an objective reconstruction of the past than there can be an objective truth or value in any other area of human thought or experience. No adherent of the liberal arts and of the ontology and epistemology they presuppose, can embrace such a view of things, for the reasons we have suggested. And quite apart from this, it is scarcely to be supposed that White offers a plausible description of the historian's enterprise, which after all involves the painstaking use, day after day, of methods of research and interpretation whose whole purpose is to enable him to be sure that his work is not a mere historical novel, but a true and objective reconstruction of the past. To conclude from the facts that the difficulties in reconstructing the past are often enormous (far be it from us to deny this), that historians disagree with one another as to the truth, and that the account of the past of one historian can always be criticized by another historian with different presuppositions -- to conclude from these facts that therefore there is no historical truth is, like all forms of skepticism, at bottom simply puerile. It can and must be denied that we must accept as equally valid mutually contradictory accounts and interpretations of the same sequence of past events. But denying this does not require us to deny that the past is an enormously rich and complex tapestry, that the whole of it can scarcely be captured by any one historical work or any one historical mind, that therefore there is much room for different accounts of a particular past, but accounts whose differences are complementary rather than contradictory. Nor need we deny that these differences may in part be of an aesthetic character. For indeed, there are aesthetic qualities in a work of history, and we can thank White for offering such a thorough and painstaking account of their nature. But these qualities are present not because a work of history is a piece of fiction, but because, like fiction, its subject is man and his actions, and because these actions, even in real life, reveal among other patterns some which are best grasped and represented through literary forms.

We began our seminars with the question: What is the nature and value of the discipline of history? By the conclusion of our investigation it can be seen that a better formulation of this question would be: What way

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\*and ironically, from our point of view, since we had originally turned to White hoping to find an alternative to historicism.

of doing history is valid and of value? At least in the view of this writer, none of the authors we read suggested an answer to this question which was not either false or at least incomplete. But through a consideration of the inadequacies of the theories presented in the readings, one might attempt to sketch the broad outlines of a correct and complete answer to our question, as follows: The kind of history which would be reconcilable with the liberal arts, and which itself might be a liberal art, would be a history which was free of historicist presuppositions, and which was capable of admitting that its goal was the discovery of the truth about the past, and that it had the tools to enable it, though only with toil and always with the risk of error, to come closer and closer to that goal; a history which was, perhaps, fundamentally genealogical in character, but which was open to the discovery of those meanings in the past sought by, e.g., pragmatic, monumental, antiquarian, and critical history, so long as those meanings could be seen in the historical flow without falsely representing it; and a history which, finally, involved no presuppositions which ruled out the discovery, in and above history, of a transcendent meaning, insofar as that could be seen, or at least known to exist, through the natural human reason, or through faith. And the value, or rather, values of this enterprise would be those which have been alluded to throughout this piece, and so would range from the fixing, in a verbal icon, of the human past, a past which is of necessity of interest to man as a part of his temporal form of being, and which he would not have perish in forgetfulness; to an enrichment, through an understanding of the past, of a life possessed in the present and stretching out toward the future; to glimpses, momentary and obscure, of the glory of the eternal, diffracted and made visible through the prism of time. That a conception of history such as this is not often defended by contemporary philosophers of history is perhaps a sign of the times. In any case, those committed to the type of education which the General Program embodies have found it necessary before now, and with reference to other fields of human inquiry, to pursue with courage, in Klein's phrase, "a rather narrow and steep path hardly visible from the highways of contemporary learning."

William P. Frerking

CHICAGO AREA ALUMNI SEMINAR

On Saturday, January 20, 1979, several faculty members of the General Program of Liberal Studies will be in Chicago to lead the second of our alumni seminars. We shall be doing a section of Augustine's Confessions, in the Doubleday Image Edition, edited by John K. Ryan. All Chicago area alumni are invited, as are their spouses, children, and friends. The same invitation stands, of course, for any other General Program of Liberal Studies graduates who can be in Chicago on January 20th.

We did The Confessions when, as it were, we were children, and were struck, it is to be expected, by the more ephemeral episodes. Let us return to Augustine now, in the middle of the journey or wherever we may be, and see if we can do more justice to the substance of the account.

Thanks to the good services of Tom Wageman (GP, 1956) we shall be meeting once more in rooms 6611 and 6612 (The Metropolitan Club) of the Sears Tower. The doors will be open at 3:30, and coffee will be served then. The seminar will begin promptly at 4:00 and will run until 6:00. There will be a social hour after the seminar, at which modest comestibles and libations will be served.

Total cost for the seminar will be \$18.00 per person. This includes coffee, soft drinks, and snacks before and during the Seminar, and cocktails, wine, and beer during the social hour. It also covers gratuities, tax, and other expenses.

We definitely wish to encourage the attendance of your spouse, children who are reaching intellectual maturity, and friends. However, we will accept no reservations after Friday, January 12. All registrations received after that date will be returned, as will any registrations in excess of the capacity of the rooms. Please make your check out to the General Program of Liberal Studies - \$18.00 per person. We encourage an early response, since the number of places available at the seminar is definitely limited.

Professors Crowe, Frerking, Sloan, and Lyon will be on hand to lead the seminars. We look forward to seeing you there.

With best wishes for you and your work, I am,

Sincerely,

  
John Lyon  
Chairman

\*The selection recommended, which total slightly over 100 pages, are the following:

Book I	chapters 1-7
Book II	complete
Book III	chapters 1, 4-7, 11-12
Book IV	chapters 1-3
Book V	chapters 1, 6, 7, 13, 14
Book VI	chapters 1, 3-7, 11-16
Book VII	chapters 7-21
Book VIII	complete
Book IX	complete

If you do not have a copy of The Confessions and wish us to send you one, please add \$3.50 to your check and we will mail you a copy.

We ought to know ourselves better, those of us who profess a quite peculiar vision of the incarnational in an academic setting. Please help us carry on the conversation we have tried to initiate. Send us a paragraph or so suggesting what difference the General Program of Liberal Studies has made in your post-graduate life. We distinctly need such observations from you if we are to refine our course of studies and articulate our purposes with any great measure of effectiveness.

By the way: We were delighted to hear from one alumnus who had pledged a generous contribution to the Campaign for Notre Dame, designating his gift explicitly for the General Program of Liberal Studies. It appears that the Development Office does not have an effective mechanism for informing academic departments of such promised benefactions. Since the generous and thoughtful support of our graduates is of distinct importance to the General Program of Liberal Studies as well as to the University, we ask that when you make your pledge to the Campaign for Notre Dame you consider dropping us a note letting us know of your action.

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I would like my old friends and teachers to know where I am and what I am doing these days.

Name \_\_\_\_\_

Class \_\_\_\_\_

Present Occupation \_\_\_\_\_

City \_\_\_\_\_

I would like to contribute the enclosed amount\* \_\_\_\_\_

to help with the publication of PROGRAMMA.

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_  
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\*Make checks payable to PROGRAMMA, Linda Ferguson, or, PROGRAMMA, John Lyon