



PROGRAMMA

A Newsletter for Graduates of the General Program of Liberal Studies

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THE VIEW FROM 318

Novum et Veterum

Settling accounts at the end of any significant term is never an easy process, and is often painful. It is not easy, for one has not the instruments with which to weigh and measure out the fine distinctions that must be made if things are to approximate "being settled." It is painful, for, unless one is extraordinarily impervious and egotistical, one has come to a more acute awareness of one's own shortcomings, outright failures, and general random blunderings. Having been on semi-public display for the past half-dozen years, and now being about to "retire" into semi-private seclusion (office hours will be kept in the South Cafeteria: I refuse to retreat to the monastic underground beneath the Library once more), I must confess to being acutely aware of many shortcomings, failures, and blunderings.

But "settling accounts" can also be a pleasant and rewarding process, for the books may balance, after all, and one may indeed be in the black. One can even look to several positive achievements. But, pleasant or unpleasant, this is not the place to settle accounts, except for those immensely important but otherwise unnoticed accounts from which one leaches out capital regularly and surreptitiously. Periodically such accounts should be pointed out, and their owners publicly thanked for their generosity which alone makes the entire process solvent. Let me move to such owners and accounts now.

First among those from whose accounts I have borrowed, stand my wife and children. I have borrowed more than they suspect from them. "Have patience, and I shall repay thee all!" Next might come some of my colleagues whose time and advice I have borrowed all too freely, and "with interest.": Fred Crosson, Walter Nicgorski, Steve Rogers, Bob Burns, Bill Frerking, Bob Fitzsimons, and Katherine Tillman would stand among the foremost here. In a very special category comes Mary Etta Rees, my secretary. I owe her a very particular debt of gratitude, for, day in and day out, she has had to put up with the strains which filter through me and this office. She has been as conscientious, capable, and consistent as anyone could hope a secretary would be. And she has been more than a secretary. She has been a full human being, sharing my and our concerns for students, giving advice on familial matters, even offering her lake lot as a refuge for a weary and dispirited Chairman, filtering out criticism, etc. To friends who happen to be alumni I also owe a special debt. Tom Wageman, Dick Clark, Tom Booker, Tom Campbell, ought to be named,

and must stand for many others who are nameless here. Student assistants Tim Reilly, Doug Cox, Rick Spangler, Kevin Caspersen, John Scanlon, and Anne Wagner did yeoman's service over the years. Then the categories blur: students, alumni, staff, administrators, mentors, friends of various persuasions - many, many have I touched in my need, and virtue has gone out from the hems of their garments, as it were. To all - my deepest appreciation and thanks. Cor ad cor loquitur.

After this, my last article for "Programma" as Chairman, the view from 318 will belong to Walt Nicgorski (as of September 1, 1979). I shall take the privilege, Janus-like, of looking backward and forward from this terminus, assuming that it is both ad quem and a quo, in some fashion, for us all, and not just for Walt and me.

Initially, let me congratulate Walt on his new position, and the Program on its good fortune. He is a fine man, the right man for the position now. And, among other qualities that he possesses, he is more diplomatic than I. May his years as Chairman be prosperous and rewarding!

The faculty has been most supportive over the past six years. The Chairmanship is a lonely and thankless position without such support. Not that any Chairman should expect automatic acquiescence in his decisions: I have learned much from my opponents. But such learning is possible only when the ambience of Charity surrounds and upholds the arena in which contention takes place. And the faculty have been charitable with me.

When one looks out over the past six years, it is obvious that much has been accomplished, and a few items might bear mentioning. We have worked steadfastly at the elaboration of defensible principles for liberal education, and have tightened up our ship, leaving fewer loose ends dangling about the deck. We have come closer to agreement on the appropriate balance between mutually necessary elements of the Program: a common, integrated course of studies and private careers and scholarly interests. We have designed and published a brochure with enough "class" to last awhile, the first printed publicity for the Program, I believe, since 1952. We have founded a good journal, Programma, and renewed contact through it with nearly a thousand graduates of the Program. We have begun a series of alumni seminars in Chicago, tending toward the same end (more of this item later). We have initiated a music component in the Program which continues to grow in importance and interest. We have disestablished a graduate program (History and Philosophy of Science) which demanded energies disproportionate to its

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Faculty Editor: Linda C. Ferguson

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value, without prejudice to either graduate teaching as such or an alternate graduate program more cognate with our undergraduate work. We have kept student enrollment even, despite a 33% decrease in the enrollment of the College of Arts and Letters since 1974. We have survived the loss of Willis Nutting, Ivo Thomas, and in another fashion, Fred Crosson. We have survived a change of Deans, Provost, and maids, and may even yet survive the Campaign for Notre Dame. And we have secured tenure and promotion for Mary Katherine Tillman and Phillip Sloan, and contract renewal for William P. Frerking.

But there have been many battles lost along these last six years. We have failed to agree among ourselves upon a "Statement of Principles" which would set forth our vision of the Program in the context of this University, yet celebrate our individuality. And this failure will haunt us at many junctures, and weaken us most seriously at all sessions where hard bargaining with those outside the Program is necessary. We do not seem to have been able to convince the Administration that it is counter-productive professionally and debilitating humanly to be expected to live by a "doubled standard," being the General Program of Liberal Studies and a program of diverse professional specialties at the same time, doing our own common, undergraduate teaching and beating the specialized, graduate-oriented researchers and publishers at their own game.

Moving further along the "battles lost" column: "The Campaign for Notre Dame" has passed us by with all the unapproachable hauteur with which our U-2's used to pass by Semipalatinsk before 1960. In terms of endowed chairs, or faculty development funds, just as with the removal of Fred Crosson to an endowed Chair in Philosophy, we have not been positively or consciously slighted. We simply have not been adverted to.

What does one do when one has been "inadverted to"?

Finally, we have lost a most promising faculty member, and a vital teaching position - being cut back from 11 to 10 faculty this year. We are periodically perceived as failing to fit the molds, ready-cast in the shops of academic Madison Avenue, which pass current at a given time for shaping greatness.

Tantae mollis erat

But, so much for all that. To turn to more pleasant topics: We are announcing now that our next seminar for graduates of the General Program of Liberal Studies will be held January 12, 1980, in Rooms 6610 and 6613 of the Sears Tower, in Chicago. Several faculty members will be there to lead discussions of sections of Augustine's Confessions. Though registration forms will be mailed out in early December, please let us know now of your interest and intention concerning the Seminar. Anyone who can be in Chicago January 12 is welcome. The cost will be approximately \$20,00 per person, and will cover modest comestibles and libations. The session will begin at 4:00 p.m.

On a slightly different tack, let me ask for a readers' response on a most symbolic, if not significant, issue. There is a case to be made for changing the name of the Program. Part of that case would consist of the allegation that the name is seriously misleading. This allegation can be put simply.

The "offending member" of the title is the modifier "general." Many

times in the past few years, for instance, parents of actual or prospective General Program students have, with inverse praise, suggested that a program which has survived 29 years with as nondescript a name as "the General Program of Liberal Studies" can't be all bad. For programs of general studies have come to be known as the academic dumping grounds for students who either don't know what they want to do, or else simply can't do much of anything.

The most obvious change to make would be to remove the initial modifier and call ourselves the "Program of Liberal Studies." This might also preserve the greatest continuity with the past. But it would be a highly unimaginative change. It might be good if we could devise a more truly descriptive title, one which would specify the humanities, the great books, and the liberal arts as the common matter of our concerns.

What do you think? Let us know, let us know soon, and let us know why.

As for myself, I have a sabbatical for the coming semester, courtesy of the University. If I am to be of use to others in the years to come, I need time alone, to rejuvenate my soul for the next decade's work. And, of course, I need time to refurbish the household of my mind for re-entry into the world of research and publication, and, indeed, teaching. I hope to spend some time in Ireland in the Fall, and the rest of the semester here at the University.

On this note, tonic or dominant as it may be, I end.

Plus ca change, plus la même chose.

John Lyon
Chairman

Editor's Notes:

In the Fall, 1978, I assumed editorship of this newsletter, and thereby inherited, among other things, your responses to the alumni survey distributed with the Spring, 1978, issue. The 58 responses, true to the General Program spirit, defy any attempts to translate them into statistics. Therefore the "results" provide little in the way of conclusive data, but do offer some interesting sidelights. With apologies to those respondents whose answers have been distorted in the interests of brevity, I would like to share with you the following information, with reference to the points on the printed form.

Point 1: Present field of work. (The categories listed are not identical to your written responses, but I grouped them as reasonably as possible.)

Sales and business--13; Law--12; Education--11; Student--10;

Government work--2; Priesthood--2; Publishing and journalism--2;
Scientific research--1; Architecture--1; Military--1; Laborer--
1; Medicine--1; Unemployed--1.

Point 2: Satisfaction with work. (Again, these categories did not appear on the survey, and are drawn as closely as possible from the variety of write-in answers.)

Very high--17; high--15; good--10; fair--7; poor--2.

Points 3 and 4, regarding political and religious outlook were too variable to compute. The ambiguous nature of the questions was surpassed only by the ambiguous nature of the responses!

Point 5: Political and religious outlooks may be ascribed primarily to:
(note: several gave multiple answers)

- a) family upbringing--35; b) General Program education--26;
- c) experiences after graduation--24; d) socio-economic status--4;
- e) other--13 (these were specified as follows: "all of the above," "Notre Dame as a whole," "personal inquiries," "travel," "Grace," "Vietnam;" and "high school.")

Point 6: If I had it to do over again, I would

- a) Major in General Program--50;
- b) Not major in General Program--4.

Point 7: During the average year since graduation, I have read

- a) 0-5 books per year--5;
- b) 5-15 books per year--20;
- c) 15-30 books per year--12;
- d) 30-60 books per year--11;
- e) more than 60 books per year--8. (Note--one respondent suggested that "more than 60" would indicate a GP seminar!)

(Regarding point 7, many noted that this number was in addition to reading done in connection with their work.)

Point 8: I am: a) married--32; b) separated or divorced--4; c) single--20.

Point 9: I would select the following field as needing greater emphasis in the General Program: (note--some respondents marked more than one.)

- a) history--18; b) literature--4; c) philosophy--2;
- d) science and mathematics--8; e) social sciences--14;
- f) theology--8; g) other--8 (specified as "oriental works"--2; art--2; language--1; "practical business knowledge"--1; "modern thought"--1; and "humor"--1).

Point 10: I would select the following as the skill or art or discipline which needs greater emphasis in General Program:

- a) art of discussion--3; b) art of thinking--24; c) art of writing--21; d) other--8 (specified as "art of studying"--3; "affective education"--1; "values"--1; "problem solving"--1; "research"--1; "the person"--1).

Point 11: My senior essay was for me:

- a) a very valuable experience--24; b) a valuable experience--19;
- c) a rather valueless experience--8; d) a waste of time--1;
- e) other--3 (specified as "of no particular significance"--2; "frustrating"--1).

The respondents represented the following graduating classes: Class of 1954--2; 1955--1; 1956--1; 1957--1; 1958--1; 1960--3; 1961--3; 1962--1; 1963--1; 1964--4; 1965--5; 1966--1; 1967--1; 1968--1; 1970--3; 1971--5; 1972--3; 1973--2; 1974--3; 1975--1; 1976--3; 1977--7; 1978--3; did not specify class--1.

The Spring issue, 1978, and the Winter issue, 1978, each carried invitations for alumni to contribute funds and/or information and greetings. Elsewhere in this issue, results of those invitations are made public. Again, we invite your contributions. We welcome your financial support, and also your moral support. Letters, essays, and other literary offerings are eagerly solicited. With all best wishes to our alumni, and especially to the Class of '79,

Linda Ferguson,
Editor, Programma.

Letters to the Editor

701 Kings Lane
Oxon Hill, Md. 20022
January 23, 1978

Dear Ms. Ferguson:

I have come across the December 1978 issue of Programma, and I thought I would take advantage of the invitation to comment and send along some observations on the subject of studying history. What follows is not entirely serious, nor is it wholly frivolous.

At the time I graduated from ND (in 1958 with Mike Crowe) I did not wish to spend any more time within the four walls of any educational institution. And I haven't. Most of the people I've worked with over the years have been laden with advanced degrees, usually legal, but frequently economic. I don't envy them.

At the time I left the GP, I was at least vaguely aware that I had finished a four-year liberal arts education without having had one formal history course. I thought it constituted a gap of some kind, but since I was not by any stretch of the imagination an assiduous student, I did not pursue the point. It does

seem to me, though, that we had an exit interview with Dr. Bird and that I did mention the fact.

It was so long ago that I don't remember how strongly I felt about not having had some history courses. I wasn't aware that there was a reason why such courses weren't offered in the General Program. At any rate, if it seemed important then, it seems less important now. There has never been a time in my career when my perceived lack of history studies adversely affected my work. There is no doubt in my mind, however, that having gone through the General Program was a big plus.

If I could sum it up briefly, the GP gave me the ability to think on my feet, and to think critically. It also helped me to make honest assessments, if I do say so myself, and that is a definitely mixed blessing since an honest assessment of our government and culture at this time can throw one into a catatonic depression.

As to the uses of history as taught in our nation's leading schools, I have noted that ambitious bureaucrats and hopeful presidential appointees will sometimes lace their speeches or conversation with references to historical periods or persons. It was Henry Kissinger, wasn't it, who was first compared to Metternich by political columnists? This sort of intellectual gamesmanship helps members of the Ivy League establishment to identify one another. After all, if you don't know who Metternich was and what his influence was, then you really can't identify with those who throw his name around. Moreover, you're not really educated. The exclusive few draw a curtain around themselves to the exclusion of everyone else. That's why, in administration after administration, the presidential appointees very often are graduates of either Harvard Law or Business School, or one of their close competitors. I saw a list of Rhodes Scholars the other day, and it was not surprising to see that about two-thirds of them came from Harvard, Yale, and one or two other schools. One name from Notre Dame suggests an error had been made by the selection committee, since I do not recall every having heard of an ND graduate being accorded that honor. Is it because there are no formal history courses in the GP? Must be.

What the GP might wish to adopt is a survey course in the uses of history for purposes of creating a common bond and as an intimidating exercise for the uninitiated. Mentioning Metternich in the right circles is the same as the secret handshake the Elks use. You might do your students a favor by warning them that they shouldn't panic when first confronted with historical name droppers. They should be advised to ask themselves the question, "Would I buy a used car from this person?"

There are, presumably, some constructive uses for history. One of my favorite books is The Roots of American Order by Russell Kirk. He treats the influence on our political system of the Jews before Christ, the Greeks, the Romans, and the Christians through the 12th century. But on page 208, the reader runs into what is, from my point of view, a stone wall:

In politics, as in metaphysics, and ethics, the Schoolmen of the thirteenth century sought for 'universals.'....

...Scholastic debates were not much heeded by the Americans who established a new nation in the eighteenth century: the Reformation would

form a towering barrier between the 'Papist' philosophers of medieval times and the settlers in British North America. At best, the concepts of Aquinas and other Schoolmen of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries would pass to some Americans only at second hand, through the books of Richard Hooker and some other Anglican divines of the Reformation. The Schoolmen of the Continent were sealed away from Englishmen and therefore Americans, once the medieval Church dissolved in the sixteenth century.

Well, now. I don't know what Mr. Kirk is talking about exactly, but it sounds as though the Catholic intellectual tradition is irrelevant to the American political experience. How much accuracy is there in what he is saying? I assume what he is saying is generally accepted by teachers in our colleges and universities, and this attitude could well account for much of the condescension toward Catholic education--and suspicion--that seems to exist. To dismiss Aquinas for Americans in one paragraph is no mean achievement, in any event. Maybe we should move to France. I'm sure much thought has been given to the subject of how Aquinas relates to the U.S.A., and until Mr. Kirk mentioned it, I didn't even think it was a problem. Whether it is or not, dealing with the attitude exemplified by Mr. Kirk is a problem if we want to be taken seriously in our native land.

Having worked in and around government for 20 years, I'd love to see some time devoted to Catholic political thought, particularly G.K. Chesterton. Not having read Chesterton in college is a gap that I do regret, and if his thought is worth keeping alive, then I can't think of a better place to do it than Notre Dame and the GP. Whether reading Chesterton would constitute "history" I'll leave up to you. My instincts tell me that there is a lot in the Catholic intellectual tradition that would be worthwhile from the political point of view, and I hate to see the field of political discussion preempted on the left by Teddy Kennedy and Jane Fonda and on the right by Arthur Burns. The country deserves better.

I'm enclosing a check for Programma. Best wishes to all the faculty.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ John Rippey
John Rippey

P.S. I am now legislative director of the Association of Bank Holding Companies; in other words, a registered lobbyist. From 1970-75 I handled congressional liaison matters for the Federal Reserve Board. I've also lobbied for credit unions and had been a newspaper reporter.

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19 Prospect St.
Cuba, New York 14727
January 26, 1979

Dear Professor Ferguson:

I was pleased to receive my first copy of PROGRAMMA the other day. It arrived at a propitious time for me as I have recently returned to my hometown after an absence of some 20 years. Renewing a deeply felt connection with

Notre Dame and the General Program is synchronous with that event and so I'm feeling doubly fortunate.

I was especially interested in the comments concerning the value of history as a discipline. We readers can be grateful to William Frerking for providing to those of us who did not attend the faculty seminars a demonstration of both genealogical and pragmatic history in his presentation. He summarized for us the past events of those discussions as well as drew some pragmatic lessons, viz., that 'historicism' is, ultimately, a self-defeating skepticism. Nevertheless, as Frerking also points out, there is value in viewing experience through the model of 'literary forms' even though aestheticism cannot remain an absolute explanation of human affairs, either.

I have some uneasiness, however, with the language of the 'transcendental' point of view. For, "objective reconstruction of the past," "value in itself," albeit, "within as it were 'the human sphere'" (p. 10), begins to suggest, to me at least, the 'thing-in-itself' to which the human mind would somehow link up. If a danger of 'historicism' may be expressed by saying that it embeds man in his culture leading to skepticism, a danger of 'transcendentalism' may be expressed by saying that it cuts him off from his culture, leading to dogmatism.

The problem, it seems, is one of those generated by our difficulty in being unable to think in any other way than we do typically think, viz., dualistically. We end up with subjective vs. objective, self vs. world, past vs. future, historicism vs. transcendental (ideal) meaning, skepticism vs. dogmatism, rather than being able to sustain a vision of these opposing pairs as reciprocally generating polarities, which, again, seemingly always present themselves as absolute and mutually exclusive choices.

Frerking's concluding paragraph implicitly participates in this reciprocating, 'polar' vision, however, in acknowledging a transformation of the original question: "What is the nature and value of the discipline of history?" into "What way of doing history is valid and of value?" The transformation of the question (historicism being transcended in the process) transforms the questioner from being an external observer of a "subject matter" having a "nature" into a participant of a "way." The question, originally addressed outside of oneself, comes back to question the questioner himself. It seems to me that this process of recoil is the "way" of any liberal art, including history.

The issue of validity posed by Professor Frerking also provoked me to wonder whether he wasn't implicitly employing a criterion of truth in the sense of natural scientific truth? Validation in history, or validation of history as a discipline, would become like that found in the empirical natural sciences. My own opinion would be that propositions pertaining to history are more appropriately validated in an argumentative fashion such as that used in legal interpretations employing a logic of probability rather than a logic of empirical verification. Probably this is what is meant by a history whose goal is the closer and closer movement to the truth. (P. 12)

The relevance of all of this for a Great Books based education is that the texts we read are valuable and valid because they enable that disciplined, closer and closer movement to the truth to occur better than any other written documents so far discovered. They do this by acting as mediators between writer and

reader They provoke a merging, a creative union of our world and the past, and out of this union our future is being born.

In closing, I am hopeful that we can continue to recommence connections.

Peace,

/s/ Tom Doyle
Tom Doyle
GP, 1966

Contemplations of Education and Knowledge

The essay, "Philosophy and the Purpose of Education," was written by a student in Professor Michael Crowe's Great Books Seminar III in the fall semester, 1976. The author, Ms. Mary Sawall (Class of 1978, Phi Beta Kappa) has recently completed her first year in the graduate program in social anthropology at Yale University. She is currently involved in preliminary research and field work to support her special interest in urbanism and urban migration in South Asia.

The poem, "Luminous Shadows," was composed by Philip Lieber, a student in Professor Linda Ferguson's Great Books Seminar III in the fall semester, 1978. The poem was submitted as part of a longer document, "In Defense," in which the author stressed the importance of admitting the possibility of multiple ways to knowledge. Mr. Lieber, from Synder, New York, has completed his Junior year in the General Program this spring semester.

Philosophy and the Purpose of Education

Philosophies of education concern men in every age. Methods of teaching, the disciplines studied, and the goals of education all reflect fundamental values and beliefs of the educator and the society as a whole. Ultimately the success or failure achieved in educating the young will determine the future direction a society takes. In a matter of such significance, debate becomes inevitable. Michel de Montaigne (1533-1592), in "The Education of Children," says

...the greatest and most important difficulty in human knowledge seems to lie in the branch of knowledge which deals with the upbringing and education of children. (Montaigne's Essays and Selected Writings, ed. and trans. by Donald M. Frame, St. Martin's Press, p. 27)

Montaigne challenges the tradition that imposes a rigid system of elementary education on young children. Education, he believes, ought to teach a child how to live well. Mathematics, grammar, and other traditional subjects, according to Montaigne, are of little use in this. Learning to philosophize should be the primary concern of education. This goal requires a new method

of teaching. Rather than recommend improvements for the traditional education, Montaigne offers an alternative. From his idea of what philosophy is he derives a philosophy of education. The education that Plato proposes for the future philosopher king in The Republic similarly rests on his beliefs about philosophy. The educated man as Montaigne conceives him is in some ways like the philosopher king whose judgments are guided by reasoned truths rather than opinion. But the philosophical understanding which comprises the end of education for both Plato and Montaigne cannot be considered similar in any way. Their conceptions of the nature of philosophical knowledge differ. Because of this difference, they disagree about the capacity of a child to learn philosophy and about the way that philosophy ought to be taught.

Montaigne and Plato agree that to philosophize is to understand and to know. But is the knowledge practical, theoretical, or both? Is it objective or subjective? Undeniably there are issues that reasonable men will disagree on. Disagreement for Montaigne is predictable but largely insignificant because he restricts philosophy to a practical study of learning to live the good life. Clear reasoning may lead different men to different conclusions since no one can have perfect rationality. The criterion for knowledge which philosophy depends on, reason, is imperfect and so knowledge is never certain. If a decision seems true and defensible it is good, or as good as any other decision. The alternative, to withhold judgment, Montaigne also believes is valid for the philosopher who sees no clear answers. Philosophy will show the way to live and die well but truth itself is uncertain and subject to personal judgment. In this way the ultimate truths theoretical philosophy pursues are unattainable. A philosopher who claims to understand with certainty is nothing but a sophist. The practical nature of philosophy is the whole of philosophy. Knowledge and wisdom for their own sake have no value.

The Platonic philosopher loves truth and knowledge. He sees reality in the abstract form of the good, an ideal that can be known only after a foundation--a way of thinking--develops. To understand the form of the good is both the task of philosophy and the necessary means for perfecting the practical life. Plato says,

...you have often heard that the greatest task is to learn the perfect model of the good, the use of which makes all just things and other such become useful and helpful...it is no advantage to possess anything without the good. (The Republic, Book VI, 505b)

Knowledge of the good is necessary because that is what truly is. The form becomes the standard of reality and all else merely partakes of it through imitation. Education must lead the child to knowledge of the theoretical first principles before he can apply these to his life in the certain knowledge that his actions are in accord with the good.

The different philosophies of education Plato and Montaigne develop emerge from this distinction in their conceptions of philosophy. Both of them realize that a young child must learn moral virtue. His education will influence his character and life. Above all, education will involve experiencing and questioning life. The similarities, however, end here. Moral virtue is the end of philosophy for Montaigne and only the first step toward seeing the one Good for Plato.

To learn philosophy, as Montaigne conceives of it, a child must be encouraged to question authoritative ideas and then assimilate into his own thinking those with which he agrees. No values or standards may be imposed on him except that he learn to defend his positions. The tutor accomplishes this by questioning the understanding of the child and by exposing him to a variety of ideas. No idea or belief is strange to his pupil. But Montaigne does not believe that it is necessary for the tutor to lead the child to any particular conclusions or in any direction. As a whole, the education is carried on with "severe gentleness: because virtue, the goal of philosophy, is simple and pleasant to attain. With no way to know what is really true philosophy is significant in that it liberates the child from becoming a slave to unreasoned opinion. As he grows in experience he develops a philosophy of life. Montaigne describes philosophy as very natural to anyone:

...the value and height of true virtue lies in the ease, utility, and pleasure of its practice, which is so far from being difficult that children can master it as well as men...She is the nursing mother of human pleasures. By making them just, she makes them sure and pure. (Essays, p 59).

In several ways, the means of education that Montaigne advocates seem incongruous with the results he expects them to achieve. The role of the tutor is, in one sense, to allow his pupil to experience life freely using his own reason to come to a philosophy of life. "He [the child] is pledged to no cause except by the fact that he approves of it." (Essays, p. 43). With this statement Montaigne must assume either that the child will have the capacity to choose well or that the tutor will, by his example, impose certain values on his student. If the child is not able to choose well naturally then there must be some standard given him because Montaigne stresses that the end of education is moral virtue. The question is whether a child is capable of making moral decisions with no experience or norm to follow. Since Montaigne further emphasizes the inability of reason to reach knowledge, it seems that the tutor will have to impose a set of values on the child at times. Yet this is inconsistent with allowing him free choice. In opposition to his assertion that philosophy is easy to learn, Montaigne, in his "Apology for Raymond Sebond," says

...Our mind is an erratic, dangerous, and heedless tool; it is hard to impose order and moderation upon it.... People are right to give the tightest possible barriers to the human mind...Wherefore it will become you better to confine yourself to the accustomed routine, whatever it is, than to fly headlong into this unbridled license. (Essays, p. 233)

In his essay, "Of Experience," Montaigne also says that, despite the absurdity of some laws, they should be obeyed because they are laws. But why, if not by compulsion, would a child who is told to follow his reason arrive at this conclusion? Moreover, to allow a naive child to believe as he chooses is illogical if reason, acquired through experience, is weak even in the adult. To Montaigne, I think, these contradictions are resolvable. The tutor could lead his student to see that, while reason and understanding are the greatest tools he has, they are imperfect and cannot reveal anything with absolute certainty. Challenging the child constantly and pointing out the difficulties in any argument could accomplish this aim without forcing the child to accept a particular doctrine.

Prejudice and dogmatism are as unreasonable as unthinking acceptance of common opinion. The teacher would also have to show his pupil that the social order should generally be maintained and so there is a kind of logic in following illogical or absurd laws.

Plato avoids contradictions of this sort because he believes that certain knowledge is possible to achieve and that there is a necessary path that leads to it. Philosophical education consists of learning the difference between opinion and truth. The future guardian of the Republic undergoes a structured education that will lead him from the cave of mistaken perceptions to the light of the true good. It is not possible "...to slip into the naturalness and ease of her gait" (*Essays*, p. 59), as Montaigne supposes. Though Plato realizes that the child must be allowed to experience many things, these are introduced progressively as the child becomes more mature. Those children with philosophical minds, capable of eventually seeing the one ideal which all other things imitate, may grow to become the best of men or the worst of men. Their education will make the difference. Bombarding a child with too much at an early age may corrupt him. While Montaigne holds that "It is not a soul that is being trained, not a body, but a man; these parts must not be separated" (*Essays*, p. 63), Plato asserts that it is a child, not a man, being trained. Children do not have the moral and intellectual strength of men. To acquire strength involves hard work so that the child may liberate himself from the slavery of the sensible world.

Education in The Republic begins with physical training and music as preparation for the difficult tasks ahead. A minimal presentation of philosophy, suited to the age of the child, begins to instill values and an idea that there is good and bad. But at this level the child can only rely on sense perception. Further study will lead him to see the reality in which the senses merely partake. Mathematics and astronomy help accomplish this. Then the child begins to reflect systematically on the abstract. By ordering his thoughts he will think more clearly. After a number of years the final study, dialectic, leads the young man to the reality of the forms. Preparation for dialectic reasoning must begin with the common opinions of early childhood. After the child can reject opinion as false, yet look for the reality in which all opinion partakes, he is capable of knowing the truth. With pure reason the philosopher arrives at the first principles. Not until the student masters dialectical reasoning are his ideas freed from common opinion and truly his own. Philosophy, to Plato, is not so removed from the world that it is beyond the practicable, but the abstract precedes the practical. To accept the ideas of the forms requires maturity. The forms are real but to understand them the student must challenge every belief he holds. Maturity guards against the possibility that the student will despair of ever knowing the truth. Moral virtues that the philosopher learned as a child can now become real virtues grounded in knowledge. The Platonic student achieves the end Montaigne seeks but with a certainty Montaigne denies.

The conflict between Montaigne and Plato about what philosophy is and therefore what education should be, is irreconcilable. While Montaigne praises the pedagogical approach of Plato he cannot conform to it because of his position that the student has a right to choose what he wants to believe. Plato holds that, for the philosopher, there is only one reality. Clearly any judgment of these two approaches to education requires an understanding of what knowledge is for both Plato and Montaigne. The distinction, I think is of fundamental significance in formulating any philosophy of education.

--Mary Sawall

LUMINOUS SHADOWS

Sitting in a brown study complacent
A student picks up his Plato complete,
Not trusting his reason, despite Descartes,
He mounts a wingless bird soaring sunward.

Seeing all in a carnival mirror,
He leaves his threshold, and follows a raven.
The bird, shining black, spectrums of white light
Glean his eyes, cocks his head in wonderment.

The Platonist unfolds forgotten wings,
And nods, loosing his formal perspective.
Flying in contrails of color complete
He soars to the known but as yet unseen.

Icarus fell when he saw too clearly
What he searched for, in that honeyed sun glow.
Blinded by what emitted a queer blaze,
He forsook vision, to plummet headlong.

Escaping the cave, sun scorched eyes intense,
The student becomes teacher to himself,
Senses turned inward, revel in nature's truth,
Commanding thought of the cyclical path.

Returning to the beginning of flight
Icarus now flies from the valley
And soars, in a gyre about the heart
Of all that hovers in thought temporal.

--Phil Lieber

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List of Alumni Contributors to Programma, June, 1978-May, 1979.

Rev. David W. Barry
Otto (Barry) Bird
William A. Bish
Tom Booker
Bill (Carl) Bosch
James S. Byrne
Dave Carlyle
Paul N. Clemens
Charles Condon
Thomas B. Doyle
David Dreyer
Mark Dulworth
Peter Frank

Mark W. Gaffney
Biff Godfrey
Rev. John J. Griffin
Bill Hackman
Martin Hagan
Peter Hennigan
Michael J. Hoffman
Anne Dilenschneider Holtsnider
William C. Holtsnider
Pat Houren
Anthony J. Intintoli, Jr. (formerly, Indence)
Katherine Kersten
Hugh Knoell, Jr.

Mark Kulyk
Lee Lagessie
Joseph C. McCarthy
James J. McConn, Jr.
Marilee Smith Mahler
Scott A. Medlock
Michael L. Metzger
William H. Miller
Bob Mugerauer
Jerry Murphy
Pat Murphy
R. Ann Norton
Dennis O'Connor
Brain Pardini

Tony Phillips
John Rippey
Janet M. Robert
James A. Ryan
Jan Joseph Santich
Michael S. Sherrod
William A. Sigler
Richard Spangler
Kevin Spillane
Anne Marie Tentler
George F. Voris
Donald G. Yeckel
Joseph Zarantonello

Lines of Communication

This issue, like previous ones, invites alumni response. In the past year, the following persons indicated they would like old friends and teachers to know where they are and what they are doing these days.

Class of 1954

Rev. John J. Griffin, Professor of pastoral psychology, Boston.
Peter Frank, English teacher, Philadelphia Community College.

Class of 1955

Donald G. Yeckel, Stockbroker, La Jolla, California.

Class of 1956

Pat Houren, Chairman, Insmark Co., Dallas, Texas.

Class of 1957

Paul N. Clemens, Chairman, Dept. of Social Studies, Archmere Academy, Claymont, Delaware.

Class of 1958

William A. Sigler, Deputy Director, Office of Project Development, Bureau for Latin America, Agency for International Development, Washington, D. C.

Class of 1960

Jerry Murphy, Consultant (on political and institutional questions relating to nuclear waste management), Boston.

Anthony J. Intintoli, Jr. (formerly, Indence), teacher and local politician, Vallejo, CA.
James S. Byrne, Journalist, Washington, D. C.

Class of 1961

Tom Musial, Dean of Arts, St. Mary's University, Halifax, Nova Scotia.
John P. Keegan, Lawyer, New York City.

George F. Voris, Commercial real estate sales, North Arlington, Virginia.

Class of 1962

William A. Bish, Attorney, Bryan, Ohio.

Class of 1963

Bruce A. Bigwood, Contract/Lease administrator, Menlo Park, California.

Class of 1964

Jan Joseph Santich, miner, Rock Spring, Wyoming.

Brian Dibble, Head of Dept. of English, Western Australian Institute of Technology, Perth, Western Australia.

Roger T. Sobkowiak, Employee relations, General Electric, Schenectady, N.Y.

Charles G. Braff (class of '64 and '69), Sales engineer, Breard-Gardner, Inc;
presently a candidate for Permanent Diaconate, Baton Rouge, La.

Class of 1965

John Whelan, Philosophy teacher, Williamsport, PA.

Hugh Knoell, Jr., Architect, Phoenix, Arizona.

Michael J. Hoffman, Manager, Asst. Secretary, Standard Life of Indiana,
Indianapolis, Indiana

Tom Kerns, Professor of Philosophy, North Seattle Community College, Seattle, WA.

Rev. David W. Barry, Priest, East Syracuse, New York.

Class of 1966

Bill Hackman, Attorney, Bloomington, Illinois.

Class of 1967

Bob Mugerauer, "teacher and thinker" (Associate Prof. of Philosophy and
Interdisciplinary Studies), Grand Rapids, Michigan.

Class of 1968

Robert Kohorst, "lawyer and farmer," Harlan, Iowa.

Class of 1969

Ray Patnaude, Director of Personnel, trucking company, South Bend, In.

Class of 1970

Dennis Koller, lawyer, Hackensack, N.J.

William H. Miller, Asst. Headmaster, Stuart Hall School, San Francisco.

James J. McConn, Jr., Trial Lawyer (business litigation), Houston, TX.

Class of 1971

Joe McCarthy, Orthopedic surgeon, Boston, Mass.

Michael Pownall, "student, secretary, amateur gardener," Chicago.

Herbert S. Melton III, Sales Manager, Louisville, Ky.

Biff Godfrey, Attorney for Zale Corporation, Dallas.

Tom Booker, Attorney, Austin, Texas.

Class of 1972

Dennis O'Connor, Management analyst, Office of the Secretary of Defense,
Washington, D. C.

Brian Pardini, Field trip coordinator, San Diego Zoo, San Diego, Calif.

Otto (Barry) Bird, Attorney, Department of Commerce, Washington, D. C.

Class of 1973

Mark Moes, Meat cutter and student, Dubuque, Iowa.

Katherine Kersten, Madison, Wis; now preparing to enter law school.

Martin Hagan, attorney, Pittsburgh, Pa.

Mark W. Gaffney, attorney, antitrust division, U.S. Dept. of Justice, New York City

Class of 1974

Michael S. Sherrod, magazine publisher, Odessa, Tx.

Anne Marie Tentler, English teacher, Chicago, (south side)

Kevin Spillane, Graduate student in history, Univ. of Virginia.

Bill (Carl) Bosch, teacher of English and reading, Seymour, Conn.

Edward M. Denning, East Providence, R.I.

Class of 1976

Margaret (Humphreys) Vampola, Graduate student, Harvard in History of
Science, Cambridge, Mass.

Pat Murphy, law student, Univ. of Wyoming, Laramie, Wyoming.

Michael L. Metzger, law student, Jackson, Michigan.

Class of 1977

Scott A. Medlock, Account executive, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fesmer & Smith,
Orlando, Florida.

William C. Holtsnider, Sales Representative, Overland, Mo.

Anne Dilenschneider Holtsnider, Distributor for Department Store, Overland, Mo.

Dave Carlyle, Medical student, Iowa City, Iowa.

David Dreyer, Law Student, Notre Dame, Indiana

Mark Dulworth, Aviation Officer Candidate, Pensacola, Florida.

Janet M. Robert, Law Student, St. Louis, Mo.

R. Ann Norton, Claims adjuster, Atlanta, Georgia.

Class of 1978

Marilee (Smith) Mahler, "housewife and student," Hopkins, Minnesota.

Tony Phillips, M.B.A. Student, University of New Hampshire, Durham, N.H.

Patrick Mannion, student, Syracuse, N. Y.

- - - - -

I would like my old friends and teachers to know where I am and what I am doing these days.

Name _____

Class _____

Present Occupation _____

City _____

I would like to contribute the enclosed amount _____* to help with the publication of PROGRAMMA.

Comments: _____

*Please make checks payable to "Programma, John Lyon" or "Programma, Linda Ferguson."

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My suggestions for change of name for the General Program of Liberal Studies are (Please tell us why):

My intentions concerning the Alumni Seminar to be held January 12, 1980, in Chicago, are:

