



PROGRAMMA

A Newsletter for Graduates of the Program of Liberal Studies
The University of Notre Dame

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THE VIEW FROM 318

Summer greetings to all our alumni and alumnae. Various matters have delayed the production of our June issue until July, but this is a more leisurely time to produce the issue, without the conflict with the end of the fiscal year matters. On June 6, several of our graduates returned for Alumni/ae weekend, and Professors Fred Crosson and Walter Nicgorski led those interested in a stimulating seminar on the Declaration of Independence. This short text--some thought beforehand as too brief--never fails to provoke a lively conversation, and the richness and complexity of the document quickly emerges. In this constitutional year, it seems an appropriate time to turn to the foundation documents of our governmental system once again and reflect on the rich heritage they convey to us. Walter Nicgorski's opening address for the spring semester included below comments upon this heritage from his penetrating viewpoint as a student of classical political theory and the Founding Fathers. You should enjoy it as much as we did on hearing it.

This also seems an appropriate time to salute our graduates of the class of 1987 who have most recently been entered on the *Programma* mailing list. Each class has its own special character and dynamics, its own blend of personalities and intellects, and we miss each one in different ways. As usual there is the large number of Law School intents, several oriented to graduate school, many fine volunteers in the several volunteer agencies, and a group entering the world of business and commerce. It was also the last group to complete our old curriculum, and sadly enough, the last to have had Stephen Rogers as a teacher. I have included in this issue a short piece we found among Steve's literary remains which seems to characterize his spirit and openness like nothing I have yet read. I know all the graduates will recall his uniqueness when reading it for yourselves. We have in final stages of preparation the manuscript of Stephen Roger's collected essays and poems, and we hope to see publication of this in the next six months if all goes well.

Several items of news can be reported of general interest to our readership. On a regretful note, we have received word that R. Catesby Taliferro, one of the original founders of the Program, died recently at the age of 80 in Rocky Hill, New Jersey. Professor Taliferro was a distinguished historian of mathematics and astronomy, and taught for many years in the department of mathematics at Notre Dame after leaving the Program. He was the translator of the treatises by Apollonius and Ptolemy in the *Great Books of the Western World* series.

Michael Crowe recently returned after a year working in the libraries at Cambridge on John Herschel. While at Cambridge, Michael gave several visiting lectures at British universities, and even found time to make side trips to Italy, Russia and Scotland. He also conveys word of Fr. Gerard Carroll, who has been accepted into the European Province of the Jesuit order. He also informs me that his book *The Extraterrestrial Life Debate* is to be reissued in paperback (Cambridge University Press), which will make it more readily available to the general public. The serious and scholarly

contribution to this issue of *Programma* by Michael was submitted upon his return, and is intended to show his explorations in the great liberal arts of grammar and rhetoric in his year away. Professor Mark Jordan has published his major study on Thomas Aquinas (*Ordering Wisdom: The Hierarchy of Philosophical Discourses in Aquinas* [Notre Dame: 1987]), and was promoted to the rank of Associate Professor with tenure in the Program this past spring. Professor Susan Youens, our resident musicologist, won a prestigious National Endowment for the Humanities Fellowship for the year, and is off for a year of study in Vienna. Walter Nicgorski is currently conducting a summer NEH institute for Secondary Teachers on Cicero's Moral and Political Philosophy. Professor André Goddu will take a well-earned leave in the Fall, and Professors Power and Smith return to teaching after a semester of leave this past spring. Professor Rodney Kilcup, who has been a visiting member of the faculty for the past two years, has accepted the Deanship of the Whitney Young Honors College at Kentucky State University (Frankfort KY, 40601), our sister Great Books Program. We wish Rodney, his wife Jodi, and their two children the best for the future, and send Rodney off with a special note of appreciation for his contribution to the Intellectual History component of the Program over the past two years. Professors Goddu, Jordan and Emery will all be participating in the International Congress on Medieval Philosophy in Helsinki this coming August.

A final matter is an unusual financial appeal. Your contributions to the Program have been so generous that I am asking you for the time being to *cease* giving to the Program directly, and make your contributions to the specific Program awards instead. The Program currently makes three student awards. These awards are a small way of honoring our outstanding students, and they are currently in a state where the interest earned on the endowment barely keeps them above the actual cost of the award and the small stipend. The Edward Cronin award was instituted by alumni/ae to honor that student submitting the finest piece of writing in the Program in the ordinary course of normal classwork. It can be an essay, poem, journal entry, research paper, or a larger piece of creative writing, and is the one all-Program award. This year it was won by a junior, Ms. Shannon Winnubst, of Dallas, Texas with a fine essay submitted for Professor Susan Youens' Fine Arts II tutorial entitled "The Ordered Chaos of the Human Psyche," an analysis of the art of the abstract painter Jackson Pollock. This year we began the practice of awarding this at an annual High Table dinner for all the students in the Program. The Otto A. Bird award is the primary award given for the outstanding Senior Essay submitted in the Program. This year it was awarded to Mr. Thomas Stewart with an essay also done under Professor Youen's direction entitled "A Musical Revolution: A Change of Paradigm," applying Thomas Kuhn's notion of paradigm change to the development of atonal music. Our third award, the Willis D. Nutting award, is an unusual award established by the many graduates who experienced Willis' gentle Socratic teaching. It is awarded to the graduating senior who has been adjudged by fellow students and faculty as having contributed most to the education of their fellow students. This year it was awarded to senior Karen Mottola Blackburn, who also was designated the top Arts and Letters graduate of this year's graduating seniors. Each of these awards has carried with it a plaque and a stipend in the order of forty-dollars. Increased donations to these funds, designated such on the checks, would enable us to increase the award and also hedge against the inflation.

The Stephen Rogers scholarship fund is the most substantial award we are currently seeking to develop, and is particularly in need of a substantial endowment. It is a scholarship award to help a needy student intent on majoring in the Program. Currently we can give an award of approximately \$350 each year to a worthy student, helpful, but surely not sufficient to keep a truly needy student in school. We have had situations arise this year in which we were in serious danger of losing excellent Program students due to financial difficulties, and it would be a deep tribute to Stephen Roger's memory to be able to help such students in a more substantial ways. Checks for this fund should be so designated and sent directly to the Development Office, in care of Mrs. Carol Hennion. I should give a special word of thanks to all our graduates who have contributed regularly to the Program, often in substantial amounts. We have been able to do many things for the students and alumni/ae with these contributions. They show us that the kind of education we seek to provide is appreciated and respected. With all best wishes to our many friends. Our home football game open houses

were sufficiently successful last year that we will schedule two for this coming fall, one immediately after the Michigan State game on the 19th of September, and the other following the USC game on October 24 . In the event that either, or both, of these is scheduled as a night game, the open house will be cancelled. Please join us otherwise in the Agora, 317 O'Shaughnessy Hall for conversation and light refreshments.

--Phillip Sloan
Chair

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Faculty Editor

Walter Nicgorski

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**SEMESTER OPENING ADDRESS
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***LIBERTY'S VIRTUE
AND
VIRTUE'S LIBERTY***

My title this evening indicates clearly enough--alas redundantly--the two large ideas I wish to discuss. I seek simply to bring our minds to bear on the relationship of these two ideas; this relationship is no mere intersection; it is a complicated, multi-dimensional relationship. In contending, as I will, that liberty's virtue is virtue's liberty, I will be making what I presume to call a proper and integral defense of liberty. It is proper and integral in that it doesn't claim as much for liberty as do some; it is a defense in that it claims more for liberty than some are inclined to concede.

But here I pause to notice with you the occasion and timing of this talk. We are here this evening to mark the beginning of a new term in our common inquiry into the achievements of mind in our tradition. We begin this new term only a couple of weeks after entering the calendar year of 1987. And it is this year of '87 that marks the 200th anniversary of the drafting in Philadelphia of our United States Constitution. That Constitution stands as the longest-lived written constitution in effect in the world. Both its inherent merits and its perceived long success at providing a framework for orderly and free government have allowed it to be an example and prod in a development of which it is a part. That development being the triumph nearly everywhere in the world of constitutionalism, a belief in the use of constitutions, almost always written constitutions. The broader historical development in which the creation of the American Constitution falls is commonly and sensibly traced to efforts in the Middle Ages to limit kingly power and to moderate the struggle

between regal and church power. Noting this development should not lead us to believe that the use of constitutions is peculiar to the modern post-Renaissance period. Suffice it to say that Aristotle's collection of 158 ancient constitutions and his plea in his *Politics* for the rule of law in all regimes is some indication that ancient practice and theory attended to this matter. Constitutionalism of the modern period does, however, appear distinctive in two respects. First in the degree of its triumph on the politics of the modern world. Secondly, in the dominant tendency of the constitutions of modern times to be seen by their makers and supporters as essential devices for securing liberty. Modern constitutionalism is seen then as primarily in the service of liberty. But allow me a further word on the former point, on the pervasive triumph of constitutionalism. This claim might be challenged by someone drawing attention to how constitutions sometimes--some might think quite often--function as facades for a political practice that is out of control or in some way tyrannous. In such situations, constitutional guarantees and aspirations seem to be exercises in hypocrisy. I am reminded of that story going about awhile ago about the American tourist encountering a Soviet citizen in Red Square and observing, in one of those conversations in fact so hard to have there, that the Soviet constitution is so similar to that of the United States, for the American tourist notices there in the Soviet constitution guarantees of the freedom of speech and of press. To which the Soviet citizen allegedly responds, that Soviets do indeed have freedom of speech and press, but Americans appear also to have freedom after speech and freedom after publication.

Whatever hypocrisy may be involved in the worldwide devotion to written constitutions, we best not forget that this devotion and common practice can be seen to mark a significant and positive collective moral development. After all, even the instances of hypocrisy which are not, needless to say, limited to the Iron Curtain or East Bloc nations, tell us something about what we allow to be claimed as good in public discourse. The point is aptly made in the sage observation that hypocrisy is the deference that vice pays to virtue.

If constitutionalism, belief in constitutions, is so widespread in the world that it is a badge of respectability that cuts across even divisions as those between East and West, democrat and tyrant--- and if constitutions in general and the United States Constitution in particular are seen primarily as means to secure liberty, you might ask why liberty needs defense. Why, in particular, would it need defense in this part of the world? Aren't we as some would say "freedom-crazy"? To this concern and question, I respond that liberty is in fact endangered by its apparent easy prevalence here in the United States--in other words by being taken for granted--, and by the poor defenses of it by certain of its advocates. And a particular word about us who turn so regularly to classical and Christian sources and traditions for our education and nourishment--we especially are apt to take liberty for granted, to hold it and the constitutions that secure it as pale accomplishments, and possibly even to hold it in some contempt because it allows such vice and stupidity in our nation and in the world. If to such a suggestion about our specific community, I hear a chorus of "Not I, Sir," let me simply say that on this matter I speak from the struggles of my own soul and have found them reflected now and again in the queries of thoughtful students in the Program. We are, after all, rightly attracted by the golden splendor of full virtue and wisdom; we might indeed welcome the unlimited power of the ring of Gyges--only we would use it not to rape and steal but justly and well; we *would* be philosopher queens and kings. We are quick with Antigone to transcend the ordinary law. Constitutions and liberty are at best hum-drum modest accomplishments.

These attitudes toward liberty are implicated with our difficulty in handling well two types of situations which confront us regularly in free and thus in quite diverse or pluralistic societies. I am referring to situations that appear to call for tolerance and compromise. Now, let me be clear on this, our difficulty in handling these is our difficulty precisely insofar as we are people who care deeply for human betterment and for those splendid highest goals. And of course, we tolerate and compromise all the time. Our difficulty is seen in that we more often back into, embarrassingly and begrudgingly, tolerance and compromise *than* see these solutions as having much of a moral ingredient and making a moral demand on us. Tolerance and compromise seem to require us to look the other way, to accept out of necessity and the survival of the group what goes against our vision of the good. Our looking the other way can become a genial mindlessness on these matters; Erasmus

does see compromise as one of the forms of folly and one that is especially necessary to the marriage bond. We would not hesitate, I believe, to say upon reflection that the relatively peaceful survival of certain necessary, organic communities, the family and political society, is a good, and insofar as tolerance and compromise are necessary to these communities, such actions can take on a positive moral dimension, but that is often as far as we seem to go. We are too rarely touched by the moral claim of the free agents we are called to live with and thus to tolerate and to compromise with. The we, I remind you, is especially those of us who take seriously and are nourished on the pre-modern sources of Christian and classical cultures and who are drawn to more complete and splendid visions of human fulfillment than human liberty immediately suggests. It is we then who are apt to have the most difficulty in accepting the Catholic Church's apparently new emphasis on human rights in the documents of Vatican II and in statements thereafter. Herein rights or liberties, including religious liberty, are grounded in the inherent dignity of the human person, and tolerance and compromise can be seen to follow more from that basis than from pragmatic, political necessity.

The defense of liberty that I propose, that proper and integral defense, rests, I believe on the same argument that brought the developments in Catholic teaching. The argument is not new; it is entirely rooted in--at times quite fully developed in--the pre-modern classical-Christian understanding of human nature and human virtue. So what I propose is in effect simply calling attention to something that is there, calling it to the fore and noting its implications for our esteem for constitutions that profess primarily to guarantee liberty and for our *mindful* approach to situations of tolerance and compromise.

The argument this evening is contained in the proposition, liberty's virtue is virtue's liberty. The argument will be made, in this context, largely by my explaining how I am using the terms in the proposition and then showing the difficulties in two other ways--possibly competing ways--of understanding the relationship of liberty and virtue.

First then, a word about liberty; this term is used in the same sense on both sides of the linking verb in the proposition. I take liberty to mean the actual power of self-direction, and hold this definition to apply both to individual liberty and to the liberty of groups as societies, peoples or nations. Though my concern in the proposition before us is with individual liberty, I wish to keep both applications of the concept of liberty before us, because, following Aristotle and many others, I find it important to notice that the liberty of the individual is tied up with the liberty of society, with what we ordinarily call political liberty. Thus individual liberty can only fully develop and flourish when the person participates in the decisions of the society. Individual liberty requires democracy, which is collective liberty, collective self-direction. The story, however, cannot stop there as we who read Alexis de Tocqueville and John Stuart Mill know. The shifting majorities which direct a democratic society can in Tocqueville's and Mill's correct view be more effectively and comprehensively tyrannous and neglectful of individual liberty than tyrants and oligarchs of old ever were. So the tension between society and individual liberty is not resolved in the choice of democratic institutions, but it requires continuing efforts by education and institutional adjustments to moderate democracy and save it from stifling individual liberty.

Let us turn from liberty, having understood it as self-direction and having gained some awareness of how that liberty is tied up with moderate democratic government. Let us turn to the other term in the proposition, namely *virtue*. Recall that the proposition before us claims that liberty's virtue is virtue's liberty. The general meaning of this term is the same on each side of the proposition--that is, virtue means specific excellence, but specific to what changes as we move from the front end to the back side of the proposition. The virtue in liberty's virtue refers to the specific excellence of liberty; the virtue in virtue's liberty is human excellence, the wholeness of human virtue.

The back end of the proposition, virtue's liberty, should be looked at with certain specific understandings of overall human virtue in mind. It would more than suffice to take as an example of what this overall virtue is, Plato's description of the fully just soul in the *Republic* or Aristotle's more detailed description of the moral and intellectual virtues in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Aristotle is the more explicit of the two in providing in the *Ethics* the teaching that bears directly on the matter at

issue here--namely, that liberty or self-direction is a necessary part of human virtue. What Plato and Aristotle teach we common-sensically testify to when we condemn rather than praise efforts to brainwash and to blindly habituate. The fullness of human virtue must involve choice, hence must involve liberty.

Thus the overall proposition before us constitutes a claim that liberty is fully itself in being a part or aspect of human virtue. In terms of our definitions, the claim is that self-direction's purpose, specific excellence, is to be the self-direction that is a necessary part of overall human excellence.

There are at least two other important ways of thinking about the relationship between liberty and virtue. The first takes liberty as human virtue; liberty is *the* human good. The second view takes virtue to be a necessary part of liberty--hence, you will notice that it is the opposite of the claim at the back end of our proposition that liberty is an essential part of virtue. This second way of thinking of liberty and virtue is, I believe, correct in a sense, but nonetheless often harmful in its practical effects.

Regarding the first view, liberty as human virtue: recalling our understanding of liberty as self-direction, whether applicable to a person or a society, we can see at once the difficulty that this position has regularly floundered on. It takes the power to choose as end in itself and refuses to say anything about the objects of choice. It professes to be indifferent to them, presumably because we cannot know the good and bad among the objects of choice to the degree that we can know the very power to choose--liberty--to be good. Here is the nub of the difficulty. How can liberty itself be defended as virtue, how can it be taken as a good in a world in which nothing much can be said with assurance about human nature and hence about human virtue. This opinion that liberty is virtue seems to mask an unreflective preference, a belief that liberty as virtue allows us to keep our options open. The opinion can obscure the fact that liberty itself is a choice and must be defended. This opinion thus constitutes an inadequate defense of liberty. On the other hand, classic writers on liberty like John Stuart Mill and before him John Locke give us much more to think about because they make an actual defense of liberty. They defend it in terms of other goods, for Mill, its instrumentality in discovering truth, for Locke, its instrumentality in providing for personal security.

Although the view that liberty is virtue seems to be but a popular, unreflective preference, that second opinion that virtue is an essential part of liberty seems to have a long history of support among philosophers and thoughtful analysts of political life. One can see the basis for this opinion in the psychology in Plato's *Republic*, for there, only the well-ordered or virtuous soul is genuinely free, and one might even say that there, only the virtue of the philosopher can claim sufficient experience and knowledge to have the fullness of liberty. Plato directs our attention inward in the effort to find the conditions of freedom. For him, human beings who are internally enslaved and thus not really self-directing, might well have the external forms of democratic freedom. The argument that moral order or virtue is a condition of freedom and hence of its survival has, however, also and often been applied to societies and nations and especially to the American nation. In the United States, the argument is not only heard from recurrent prophets of doom from the time of the Revolution to the present; it is also found in such sensitive analysts as Tocqueville who stresses the essential role of morality in American liberty. In this century John Courtney Murray found this argument to be a central and persistent American conviction. Murray wrote, "Part of the inner architecture of the American ideal of freedom has been the profound conviction that only a virtuous people can be free."

That American conviction seems as sound as the similar Platonic analysis that long preceded it. Yet the persuasiveness of that view that virtue is an essential ingredient of liberty seems to leave a portion of my argument this evening in contradiction. For, you may recall, the back end of our major proposition this evening was the phrase "virtue's liberty," and I approvingly understood that to be a claim that liberty is an essential part of virtue. Now we seem to be left saying that each is an essential part or condition of the other. Let us put this difficulty on hold only momentarily to allow me to refer to the harmful practical effects that I suggested often flow from the correct claim that virtue is an essential part or necessary condition of liberty. Those harmful effects are in the form of efforts of compulsion and control in order to create or develop virtue in the interest of allowing liberty at some future point. Efforts like this are suggested, of course, by the

view that virtue is a part or condition of liberty; such efforts are likely to be neglectful of the other truth that liberty is part of virtue. Such harmful practical effects and the seeming contradiction in our argument can be overcome by introducing the idea of development as in moral development and with respect to individual development as well as that of peoples or nations. In speaking of "introducing the idea of development," I mean introducing it to this discourse, for it is not new; it is there in outline in the great classic thinkers and has been unfolded itself in various ways and in much detail in recent times. An idea of development allows us to admit the place of liberty in the process of attaining virtue and yet accept the reality of a fuller liberty reflected in the thought and actions of the person possessed of virtue. The liberty that people and peoples need for their development cannot however be a counterfeit or pseudo-liberty; it must be real enough to allow failure and hence to allow vice and stupidity in our environs. The moral claim of this liberty of potential failure is rooted in, we might say, the right of people to their virtue, to their ultimate liberty.

In the practical order, securing liberty by such efforts as establishing and protecting constitutions, stable laws, conventions of genuine tolerance and positive attitudes toward compromise is always difficult. This is so not simply because there are powerful interests to overcome and check but also because we may rarely see the fruits and blessings of liberty and so often see her vicious offspring. From a developmental perspective that appreciates the integral role of liberty in virtue and in the process to it, there is the possibility to see in liberty's failures, virtue struggling to be born.

We who understand the liberty necessary to development to be a great good but not the final orienting good for human beings, will find many occasions in which the cause of personal and societal liberty can be advanced by alliance with the unreflective champions of liberty as virtue. And here one sees the practical good effects of the widespread often uncritical modern preference for liberty. The spread of the rule of law and constitutions and greater general expectations for tolerance and compromise owe their development in part at least to this modern preference for liberty. We who look beyond liberty to a fuller notion of human virtue must be wary not to underestimate this achievement of liberty, and we must be alert for the securing of liberty so it can then be utilized to higher purposes. We learn this lesson when we see how Socrates looks on Athens so known for her liberties; we know Socrates is her greatest critic, but we had best also notice how he defends her constitution with his life, specifically reflecting in the *Crito* on his own long life of freedom, freedom to teach and criticize, and freedom in his trial to make the best plea he could. I find a comparable teaching in the respect for liberty of Sir Thomas More as manifested in his respect for English law, that being the English constitution. A fictional vignette of More's position is captured by Bolt in *A Man For All Seasons*. More's son-in-law, Roper, is portrayed trying to get More to act against the schemings of Richard Rich. More, even yet with the powers of chancellor, refuses to touch Rich in his liberty and says he should stay free, "if he was the Devil himself, until he broke the law."

Roper observes: "So now you'd give the Devil benefit of the law!"

"Yes," says More. "What would you do? Cut a great road through the law to get after the Devil?"

Roper assents, "I'd cut down every law in England to do that!"

And More muses upon that--"Oh? And when the last law was down, and the Devil turned round on you--where would you hide, Roper, the laws all being flat? This country's planted thick with laws from coast to coast--man's laws, not God's--and if you cut them down--and you're just the man to do it--d'you really think you could stand upright in the winds that would blow then? Yes, I'd give the Devil benefit of law, for my own safety's sake."

In closing, a plea for understanding with respect to the limits of the argument this evening. I

have sought only this: to praise liberty in a certain way that I have called proper and integral and to cite some implications of a proper esteem for liberty. The emphasis on liberty's role in the development of virtue has left much unsaid about what also must be done in the pursuit of virtue. In addition, please do not hear certain of these remarks to support a servile deference to all law and constitutions or a flabby tolerance of and ready compromising with whatever comes down the road. The courage of the uncompromising has much to be said for it. But when and where and concerning what? That involves us in specific practical judgements, and my intention has been to be much more practical than to deal with such judgements; the intention has been to prepare the way for the innumerable such judgements life will bring, by making a contribution to our thinking about the relations of liberty and virtue.

And with these disclaimers, I truly do close, and I toast the new term of '87 and wish us all much enjoyment in the course of the arduous effort in the coming months.

--WALTER NICGORSKI

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SUGGESTIONS FOR VISITING CAMBRIDGE, ENGLAND

One of the main attractions for Americans visiting England is that it's a foreign country for which one does not need to learn a new language. However, it will be wise to mind the following directions.

After landing at Heathrow near London, you may want to go up to a kiosk or baparie and if it's breakfast time, get some semolina with black treacle and sultanas or a banger and mash, or if later, a bap and mince, some shepherd's pie or a ploughperson's lunch, and perhaps a side order of aubergine, courgettes, or broad beans with a bitter or lager to drink and afterwards an iced lolly, some sorbet, and perhaps a coffee white. Take off your anorak or windcheater and helicopter hat, enjoy your meal (if some of your bap and mince is left over, save it by means of some sellotape and a serviette--but don't ask the waitress for a napkin). Then after dossing around a bit, leave the airport, unfurling your broly if the conditions require it. You may wish to stop at a public convenience before entering the queue for a bus to Cambridge. The trip along the motorway will include many flyovers, and you'll surely see lots of lay-bys, centre reservations, and round-a-bouts as well as numerous lorries and saloon cars, the latter all equipped with bonnets, boots, windscreens, and silencers. You'll notice that nearly all the cars have a serious design flaw: the steering wheel is on the right side. Another universal problem is that the clocks are all incorrect, being off by six hours. Arriving at Cambridge, you'll be tempted to ask some bloke for directions to the University of Cambridge. Don't be put off if he thinks you've gone over the top in asking that question and patiently explains that there is almost no such entity, but that you're standing next to a college. After going to a taxi rank, you may be tempted to tell the driver that you want to go our flat on Madingley. This will produce an explanation that Madingley without qualification means very little. Is your destination at/on Madingley Avenue, Causeway, Close, Lane, Mews, Passage, Road, Street, Terrace, Way, or what? It's not that the British are short on street names; indeed, were you to ask the driver to take you down the two main streets of Cambridge, you would see within less than two miles and with only one major turn: Hill St--Regent St--St Andrew's St--Sidney St--Bridge St--Magdalene St--Castle Street--Huntingdon Road and running parallel to it St. John's St--Trinity St--King's Parade--and Trumpington St., and all this will cost only a couple quid. One of the best kept secrets is where

each of these streets ends and the next begins. By the way, it is permissible to eat apples in cars in England, but litter laws forbid you from sticking your butt out the window.

Seeing how modern England is, you may expect the Brits to have everything from A to Zed; however, you'll find no dime stores but a number of Woolworths, no vacuum cleaners but plenty of Hoovers, no real estate salesmen or lawyers but abundant estate agents as well as barristers and solicitors, no monkey wrenches but a good supply of spanners, no drug stores but a lots of chemists, no gas water heaters but a quantity of geysers, no tires on cars but all have four (or three) tyres, no subways to travel on (some to travel through, however) but an excellent underground or tube. And you'll find many curious things: there is no fall, but autumn is lovely; their months are never longer than 12 days, but their years have 31 months; at least, I saw a letter dated 31/12/86. And they have all the floors of buildings misnumbered. Not least distressing is the fact that the Brits believe that a Martini consists of a glass of Vermouth. Moreover, as this note suggests, the natives speak a strange and decadent dialect of American that some Americans call English-English. Once you've come to twig it, you'll feel half American and haaalf English. Enjoy your 'oliday!

Michael J. Crowe, Esq.

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STEPHEN ROGERS

SOME THOUGHTS BY WHICH TO REMEMBER HIM

The following document was found among the remains of Stephen Roger's work by Ms. Kimberley Pelis ('85), who was his research assistant during his final year, and who has been of valuable assistance in working with his literary remains. It is used with the permission of Mrs. Stephen Rogers, and it previously appeared in the Arts and Letters Student Publication *Humanitas* Vol. 1 (Spring, 1986). It was occasioned by Professor Roger's attendance at a Christmas Concert at a South Bend High School. The text is slightly edited, principally for grammatical purposes. Perhaps better than any other document we have found it seems to capture his spirit and greatness as an individual and teacher.

Tonight at a concert by the Clay High School orchestra and choir, I thought I understood something important, as I sat between two choirs singing antiphonally. Voices were reaching out to one another charmingly. Whole collections of voices, beautiful, young. Tears came to my eyes, and I realized that yes, this was what I have been trying to do all my life as I remember it--trying to reach out and create something the way music does, or for that matter, the way all art does, but especially music. But what was it? This is what I find hard to say. At first I thought it was to express sorrow: my sorrow certainly, but everyone else's too. That's not it, though. I was trying to create seeing. All my life that I remember, I have been trying to create seeing. I do it when I teach. I do it through my family. I do it in conversations of all sorts, the ones that obviously matter, but also the ones that seem trivial--with the ladies at the Huddle, with the taxi driver, with the janitors in O'Shaughnessy, with the bus drivers (long ago), with people of all kinds. It is as though not seeing is a vacuum, and the fashioning of human bonds fills it up. It is as though that were light for me--and beauty. This is still not exactly what I mean. I think of the basic problem: it is the problem of connectedness--of being connected with the

unknown, so that it can become known. This is not my problem only. Everyone has it in some measure. But there is beauty in connectedness with the unknown. "Beauty is a sequence of hypotheses, which ugliness cuts short in barring the route that opened on the unknown." Establish connections and you have beauty; you have a sequence of hypotheses. Cut short that sequence before it concludes (many of our sequences fail), and you make a blank. You reduce yourself toward a point in the void again. I must insist that connectedness seems to me to be the basis, it is the necessary condition, of humaneness. And humaneness is a name for the quality which I would substitute for the light, the sight, the seeing I do not have. Others make the same sort of substitution, somehow, for whatever it is they do not have. . . .

Stephen Rogers
(1933-1985)

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ALUMNI/AE NEWS

Class of 1957

Donald V. Bulleit, a lawyer, sends his address as P.O. Box 210, St. Petersburg, FL 3373.

Class of 1970

Donald J. Buckley writes that he is an attorney specializing in Maritime Law. His address is 360 Guerrero St., Apt. 417, San Francisco, CA 94103.

Stephen J. Massey, an attorney with New York's Cravath, Swaine & Moore, writes that he was married on October 18, 1986 to Debra Livingston. He states there were several former PLS students there. His new address is 225 Rector Place, Apt. 9-J, New York, NY 10280.

Thomas J. Duffy is returning to the States after three years in Korea, the last year serving at the Korea Contracting Agency and he will continue doing contracting with the Army. His address in the States is 208 Drummonds Way, Hampton, VA 23669.

Class of 1974

Mark Maurer is President of the National Federation of the Blind. His address is 353 Yale Avenue, Baltimore, Maryland 21229.

Class of 1975

David M. Miller writes that he is Regional Marketing Manager for Jones Intercable, Inc. His Special Activities are hunting, fishing, karate, tennis, Big Brothers, Junior Achievement, Special Olympics, United Way, and youth soccer. His address is 3001 Belke Avenue, Stevens Point, WI 54481.

Class of 1976

Patrick Murphy writes that his third son arrived in 1986. He gives the following lineup: Michael Murphy, ND 2004; Sean Murphy, ND 2006; Darren Murphy, ND 2008

Class of 1977

Scott Medlock, 16515 Frederick Road, Mount Airy, MD 21771, graduated with a Master's in Divinity in May of 1986 from the Duke University Divinity School, and is currently employed as a United Methodist Minister in Maryland.

Anne Dilenshneider-Codol writes that she has a new son. Anne is a seminarian at this time and is completing her Master's of Divinity at the Graduate Theological Union at Berkeley. Also, she is a candidate for ordination in the United Methodist Church.

Class of 1978

Mark Kulyk, 7234 Springside Drive, Fairview, PA 16415, writes that he is currently Vice President of Marketing for Rogers Brothers Corporation. He edits the sales newsletter, and sends his greetings to all fellow "philosopher kings."

Class of 1980

Carol desLauriers Cieri is the Assistant Managing Editor, International Weekly edition of *The Christian Science Monitor*. Carol finished a law degree but found her way into journalism. Her address is Box 933, Astor Station, Boston MA 02123.

Bill Rooney has been taking a year's leave of absence from his law firm to write a thesis on methods of constitutional interpretation at Magdalen College in Oxford. In July he rejoins Willkie Farr & Gallagher, 153 East 53rd Street, New York 10022.

Class of 1981

Nora Lyon can be reached at 52393 Kenilworth Road, South Bend, IN 46637. She writes that she has returned as a Jr.-Sr. High School teacher at Trinity School in South Bend after a year of missionary work and teaching in Grenada, West Indies.

Class of 1983

John Haley will complete his MBA at the University of Virginia in June and then will work in Philadelphia. "Please send us your Pennsylvania address, John."

Class of 1984

Bob O'Donnell writes that his new address is 9950 Jordan Ave., #24, Chatsworth, CA 91311. Bob is working as Associate Editor (US) for *Music Technology Magazine* at 7361 Topanga Canyon Blvd., Canoga Pk., CA 91303.

Charles Sheridan has completed his many-faceted *Wanderjären*, with a year of intensive study of French at the Alliance Française in Paris, and has been accepted for entry this fall into the graduate program in telecommunications at the University of Colorado at Boulder.

Class of 1985

Tom Wood, P. O. Box 278, Denmark, Wisconsin, 54208, writes that he entered the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee School of Social Welfare in January. Good Luck, Tom!

Mike Richerson, 31 Park Drive #9, Boston, MA 02215, is with Prudential Insurance, and is also working at disseminating the Great Books movement to secondary schools. He notes that he even reads philosophy for *fun* these days.

Amy Brecount and Peter White were married by Fr. Nicholas Ayo in June of this year. Amy is finishing a Master's degree in English Literature at the the University of Virginia and Peter is in his first year of law school at the University of Virginia. Their address is 10 University Circle #9, Charlottesville, VA 22903.

Laurie Denn is updating the 1985 class notes. Anyone who has news that they want to include in the next newsletter, please write Laurie at 901 East 90th Street, Bloomington, MN 55420.

Kathleen Lach completed a Master's degree in Early and Middle Childhood Education at Ohio State university in June. She also spends some of her time singing and dancing in community productions. Her school address is 2427 Tremont Road, Columbus, OH 43221.

John Dettling writes from London that he has been working for the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, and plans to study international affairs. He also has been living next door to Colm Connolly, who is currently enrolled in the London School of Economics. Colm writes that he is enjoying his studies, but is often frustrated by his teachers and fellow students.

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