

PROGRAMMA

A Newsletter for Graduates of the Program of Liberal Studies
The University of Notre Dame

Volume XII, No. 1 January, 1988

The View from 318

Greetings once again to all our friends. This issue has several items of news for your interest, and the continued work of Professor Mike Crowe with the network of alums keeps us in constant contact with an ever-widening group of graduates of the Program. The Program continues to flourish, with size one of our major problems at the moment; we anticipate over sixty graduates this spring. Renewed interest in several quarters of the educational community in great books education is manifesting itself in a high level of student interest in the Program, and even our new classical language requirement (yes alums, all P.L.S. students must now take a year of university-level Greek or Latin) is not dampening enthusiasm. It is an exciting time to be directing the Program and teaching in it.

The many new names you now read on our roster of faculty do not imply that we have forgotten our tradition, however. Fred Crosson, Michael Crowe and Ed Cronin are still with us and maintain that needed link with our original founding past. But we are also a department with many younger scholars who have committed themselves to the unusual set of educational ideals which have made the Program a unique experience for students and teachers since 1950. A recent hospitalization of Otto Bird for a nasty fall on the ice (he is recovering well) gave me a new opportunity to talk with him again about his views of the Program, and I have spent considerable time with some marvelous unpublished essays he wrote in the early days of the Program when it was first seeking the attention and support of the Notre Dame faculty. I have some items of congratulation to mention with regard to our current faculty. Professor Stephen Fallon, teaching in the literature component for us, is one of the two Notre Dame faculty to win the most prestigious of faculty fellowships for next year, the National Endowment for the Humanities fellowship. He will spend the year deepening his studies on John Milton. Professor Susan Youens, our resident musicologist, is on a similar fellowship this year, shuttling between Vienna and Boston for her work on the poetry of Hugo Wolf and Schubert's renditions of it. Professor Kent Emery, Jr., teaching in the Intellectual History and Literature components, has just published his book, Renaissance Dialectic and Renaissance Piety: Benet of Canfield's Rule of Perfection (Binghamton: SUNY Press, 1987). And Professor Crowe's The Extraterrestrial Life Debate has now been published in paperback by Cambridge University Press.

With regrets we also convey to our older alumni the news of the passing of Catesby Taliferro and John Logan, who taught in the Program in its founding days. Michael Crowe has composed nice obituary notices for both. As the tradition passes to younger faculty, we hope to preserve, and even recover with greater fidelity, the original vision of Otto Bird for a unique program of studies blending the study of the great liberal arts in a Catholic intellectual unity of faith and reason.

In addition to the the traditional Opening Charge, given by yours truly this time, we have several

additional features for your interest. Fr. Nicholas Ayo's homily for the deceased graduates and alumni/ae at our traditional All Souls mass is included, and we have assembled a unique round table of the faculty centered on Allan Bloom's new book, The Closing of the American Mind, which has become a remarkable best seller in recent months. Allan Bloom, director of the John M. Olin Center for Inquiry into the Theory and Practice of Democracy and a member of the Committee on Social Thought of the University of Chicago, is the translator of the marvelous edition of Plato's Republic we current use in the Program (New York: Basic Books). We had the unique opportunity to hear some of the ideas developed in his book before publication during an extended visit to the Program in the fall of 1985. The discussions represented in this round-table recall some of the lively conversation we had with him in person at that time.

I wish to give a special thanks to those of you who have donated so generously to the Cronin, Bird, Nutting, and Rogers funds in recent months. The Rogers fund in particular we hope to build up to the point that we can make it possible for a financially worthy student to study in the Program and remain at Notre Dame. In these days of shrinking scholarship support and rising costs, I can cite several cases where it has become problematic whether good students can remain at Notre Dame. Eventually I would hope to support at least one student each year in a substantial way with this fund.

With all best wishes to you for a prosperous and blessed New Year.

Phillip Sloan

* * * * * * * *

From the Editor's Desk

Students from the early years of P.L.S. will be saddened to learn of the recent deaths of John Logan and R. Catesby Taliaferro, two of the outstanding teachers from the first decade of the program Having taken three or more courses with each and having remained to some extent in contact with both since they left Notre Dame, I have gathered some information on them, which I hope will be of interest to their former students and hopefully to later graduates of the program who may be interested in its early period. I am indebted to Harold Isbell, who taught in P.L.S. during 1963-4, for information on John Logan. Harry, who although now a banker in Salt Lake City continues his creative work as a poet and translator, remained close to John for nearly three decades. In 1971, he published an essay on John's poetry in Modern Poetry Studies and was among the friends who attended John's funeral.

John Logan 1923-1987

Born on January 23, 1923 in Red Oak, Iowa, John Logan took his B. A. in zoology and M. A. in English at the University of Iowa. After teaching in the great books program at St. John's College in Annapolis, he joined the P.L.S. faculty around 1951, teaching literature, biology, mathematics, and seminars here until 1963 when he departed for St. Mary's College in California. In 1966, after holding positions at a variety of universities, he became Professor of English at the State University of New York at Buffalo. He retired from SUNY Buffalo three years ago, moving to San Francisco, where he died on November 6, 1987. A Funeral Mass of the Resurrection was celebrated on November 9th at St. Mary Magdalen Church in Berkeley. Those attending his funeral included his former wife, Guen, and his nine children, his six sons serving as pallbearers. After his body was cremated, his ashes were scattered over Point Lobos near Monterey, which he had celebrated in some of his poetry.

John Logan's chief and ever increasing fame was as a lyric poet. The bibliography of his writings that appeared in Dissolve to Island: On the Poetry of John Logan, edited by Michael Waters (Houston, Texas: Ford-Brown, 1984) lists seven volumes of poems as well as dozens of short stories, reviews, essays, and two volumes of fiction. Many of his P.L.S. students from the 1950s and early 1960s will recall John reading us poetry from his first three volumes: Cycle for Mother

Cabrini (1955), Ghosts of the Heart (1957), and Spring of the Thief (1963). They may wish to browse among the sampling of his prose writings (with some poetry) from three decades, which recently appeared as John Logan, A Ballet for the Ear: Interviews, Essays, and Reviews, ed. by A. Poulin (Ann Arbor, Univ. of Michigan Press). He was founding editor of the poetry journal Choice and served as poetry editor for The Nation and Critic. His honors include a number of poetry prizes and fellowships from the National Endowment for the Arts as well as from the Rockefeller and Guggenheim Foundations.

Special as John Logan's gifts were as a poet, he was scarcely less skilled as a teacher. Probably some of his literature students at SUNY Buffalo would be surprised to see him, as we did, expounding the intricacies of renal physiology (in his biology course) from the writings of Claude Bernard or explicating along with Willis Nutting (Seminar V, 1957) the details of Cartesian epistemology. Many of us who took his novel course recall how deeply we were moved by the intensity and insights evident in his analyses of Crime and Punishment, Farewell to Arms, The Power and the Glory, and Ulysses. Although his influence was no doubt greatest on those P.L.S. students whose greatest interest was (or became) literature, he also inspired others who moved in different directions; for example, his interest in Freudian analysis probably influenced two members of the class of 58 who have become psychiatrists. John mentioned to me around 1970 during a return visit to Notre Dame that he had never been happier than while teaching in P.L.S.. I also recall one of us asking him in his novel course what we should do with these books after reading them: his response was immediate and straightforward: "Love them." And that, I suppose, is what we should do with John's lovely lyrics and with our moving memories of the excitement created by his courses.

R. Catesby Taliaferro 1907-1987

R. Catesby Taliaferro, who was born April 3, 1907 in New York City, died on July 12th, 1987 in Princeton, New Jersey. His B. A. and Ph. D. degrees, at least the latter of which was in philosophy, were both from the University of Virginia with intervening studies at the University of Paris. After teaching at the University of Chicago, Hamilton College, St. John's (Annapolis), and at Portsmouth Priory for a number of years, he came to Notre Dame in 1952, inspired by the prospect of a great books program at a Catholic University. He taught mathematics and seminars in P.L.S. for about four years. He then joined Notre Dame's Department of Mathematics, from which he retired in 1972, by which time he was suffering from Parkinson's disease. While on the mathematics faculty, he remained in contact with a number of P.L.S. students who as freshmen may have taken his honors number theory course or who while upper classmen struggled, as did Steve Rogers, Bob Bowman, Dick Leiten, Ernie Haverkern, others, and myself with his then ten credit Rational Mechanics. His funeral mass was at St. Paul's Church in Princeton with burial in Richmond, Virginia.

Catesby Taliaferro's most significant contribution to scholarship was his translation of Ptolemy's Almagest, the first and until recent years the only translation of that long and complex book, which served as the masterpiece of astronomy for over a millennium Only slightly less important is his translation of the first three books of the Conics of Apollonius of Perga, another classic of Greek mathematical thought. Originally prepared for the students of St. John's College, these translations became internationally available when published in The Great Books of the Western World. He also made a translation of St. Augustine's De Musica for the Fathers of the Church series. He had worked for a number of years on a translation of Johannes Kepler's Astronomia Nova and on preparing his lectures on mechanics for publication. We have learned that Professors Thomas Banchoff of Brown University and Daniel Burns of the University of Michigan are working toward the publication of the latter work.

Those of us who took courses with Catesby will long remember his deep commitment to Platonism as well as to mathematics and its pedagogical values. But perhaps most memorable is the intensity of the concern he showed for his students. A bachelor don, his life was above all his students, to whom he constantly offered counsel and whom he pressed to the limits of their abilities. Like John Logan, Catesby Taliaferro's interests changed somewhat and grew more specialized after

joining the P.L.S. faculty. Probably part of the excitement of their courses was that each was in fact a learner in his special area of instruction, neither possessing a Ph. D. in that discipline in which he attained distinction. Both in their later years retained a breadth of erudition that must have left many of their more specialized colleagues puzzled, if not in awe. At a gathering in 1972 for Catesby's retirement from the mathematics department, Tim O'Meara, then math department chair and now University Provost, cited a saying of Carl Friedrich Gauss, the greatest of mathematicians. Gauss aspired to having his writings be characterized as: "pauca sed matura," meaning "few but fully ripe." This in a sense captures the spirit of Catesby's inspired teaching and interactions with students.

In writing these reflections on John Logan and Catesby Taliaferro, I have been acutely aware not only of my personal debt to each but also of the fact than many of their former students, having been far closer to each of them than I was, would probably have written more appropriately of them. I have been consoled in regard to the last point by the idea, which Phil Sloan as P.L.S. Chair has fully endorsed, of establishing a permanent file in the P.L.S. office on each deceased teacher in our program. Such files, designed to preserve reminiscences that their former students will (we hope) take time to send, should someday prove invaluable to the person who will someday write a history of that extraordinary educational enterprise that Otto Bird began at Notre Dame in 1950 and that has been sustained and enriched by such fine teachers and scholars as John Logan and Catesby Taliaferro. Consequently, I ask any of you with special memories of John or Catesby or of Willis Nutting, Steve Rogers, Ivo Thomas, Bob Turley, or others to send me your thoughts and recollections for preservation in the file on them that we are establishing.

Michael J. Crowe

Programma (the Greek word means "public notice") is published toward the end of each academic semester by the Program of Liberal Studies for its graduates.

Faculty Editor Michael J. Crowe

Copyright 1988 The University of Notre Dame

Special Feature

Faculty Reactions to Allan Bloom's The Closing of the American Mind

Editor's Note: As many P.L.S. graduates are aware, one of the most widely discussed books to appear in 1987 was Allan Bloom's The Closing of the American Mind: How Higher Education Has Failed Democracy and Impoverished the Souls of Today's Students (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987). After returning from England last July, I found it riding high on the nonfiction best-seller list and many persons, including P.L.S. graduates and faculty, discussing its claims. Recent graduates will recall that Professor Bloom, who is a professor in the Committee on Social Thought at the University of Chicago, had visited P.L.S. in November, 1985, giving both a seminar for faculty and a public lecture, the latter having been part of the department's lecture series on the Enlightenment. The intensity of interest in this book led me to think that readers of Programma would welcome learning faculty reactions to the book. Consequently, I invited my colleagues to write reactions or reviews of it. The interesting responses received are provided below.

Rev. Nicholas Ayo, C. S. C.

Allan Bloom's The Closing of the American Mind will help open one's mind. It is a fascinating book, wise and yet caustic, poignant and yet outrageous, both easy to cheer and to condemn. He speaks at length about what is wrong about the present-day world and its educational practice, and he knows what is right about the university of yesteryear, when philosophy as the pursuit of the true and the good was alive and students were not soul-dead. He says somewhat less about what is right with now and what was wrong with then. His book reminds me of Gary Wills' Bare Ruined Choirs, which lamented the new Church of Vatican II, paired by present untutored religious ineptitude and mindful of past and ancient sacred solemnities. One does grieve along with the author, and fears for a flat and fraudulent future. And yet, not all is wrong with the present-day church, and those of us who lived with the pre-Vatican II church know not all was right with the Tridentine past. I suspect the same thing must be said about the present-day university. It can be a dreadful place, as Bloom describes, and it can be a hopeful, exciting place where genuine education does happen, as many people can rejoice in from their own experience. Wisdom is present just when one had given up, and so often is grace.

Does any one era have more wisdom than another? Does any one time have more moral virtue than another? Those who lean toward nurture as determinative of human behavior, rather than nature (and grace), will point to the importance that formation plays. If university life fails to educate and, as Bloom argues, mostly indoctrinates for career and city, will one not reap the harvest of such a formation? Yes and no. Recall the education that Augustine describes in the Confessions, when rowdy students intimidated their teachers. Recall the church in the time of the corrupt papacy and the venal mendicant monks that wrought such harm throughout Europe. And yet reforms always took place, and transformation of mind and of heart always was available. Where sin abounds grace does abound even more. Where stupidity abounds, wisdom does eventually prevail.

Two conclusions about Bloom's jeremiad against the current state of the multiversity that is higher education in the West remain for me to propose. (1) It is true that the university needs reform and renewal, just as the church did and recognized, much to everyone's surprise, in the ecumenical council and reformation of this century. There may well be a shakeup of present educational models, with more of a return to the humanities and general liberal education. Some of that learning may take place on the fringe of the university as we now know it. Some of the inappropriate research that now preoccupies the university, especially in the physical sciences, may be sponsored in a different way than presently, yoked as it is to undergraduate education. I would agree with Bloom that the university ought not be left to follow the path of least resistance. A political will must be found to insist upon the university fulfilling its authentic role, which is the pursuit of the Truth.

(2) Never before has a large part of the human race established a city with godlessness as a basic

and militant premise. I myself believe that most people are believers, cryptic believers if you will, but believers as best they can in many instances. They are more idolaters than atheists. However, if it is true that a profound godlessness descends upon our history, then the kinds of questions that matter, about the existence of God and the immortality of the soul, will suffer much. Bloom sees that happening already in the dark philosophy of the European continent, with roots in the unbelieving enlightenment and especially in the loss of hope of 19th and 20th century continental thought. For this reason, I would think that church-related universities, such as Note Dame, play a crucial and urgent role in modeling how education might both humanize technological living and embrace the ancient metaphysical questions that culminate in an invitation to religious faith in the Lord of the past, the present, and the future. "In Him we live and move and have our being." Even were we in our present muddle to despair of reason, there remains hope in reason illuminated by relief.

Professor Frederick J. Crosson

A teacher necessarily begins from the opinions or pre-judices of his students, embodied in the customs of the society into which they have been acculturated, and which (they normally have been brought up to believe) reflect the best or at least best available way of life. The modern teacher then leads the student to become aware that every society or "culture", past or present, has its prejudices and customs and religious beliefs, that each culture and historical period rests upon values which are rejected by other cultures and periods. Our customs and values are simply ours: one set in a large number of diverse life-styles and religious traditions. Normally this awareness is a component of formal education only on the college level, but in our day it also pervades the media and categories of public discussion. Unless one clings to the customary ways just because they are our ways, this typically leads to the religious doubts of late adolescence, to a weakening of convictions about what is right and wrong, in short to a position of "relativism" about these fundamentally important issues.

What bothers Allan Bloom in his book is not the limp kind of morality (or immorality) which is the consequence of this position, but rather "the dogmatism with which we accept such relativism".(239) It is not just becoming aware of the variety of fundamentally different ways of life and the resultant doubts about whether our way is the good way, it is the dogmatic manner in which we assert the equality of all ways, the right of each person or each people to follow their own life-style, to commit themselves to the practices, the religious beliefs, the values they choose. For it was just that becoming aware of the variety of fundamentally different ways of life which led Socrates to a quite different conclusion: that the one thing needful was to find out what is by nature the good life. Only the fact that there are many different opinions about what is the right way of life grounds the dogmatic prejudice that all ways are equal. Only the dogmatic prejudice that all ways are equal — the pretension to know that they are equal — can block off the path of that inquiry. But that pretension to know what is right (and so to know that the opinion that they are not equal is wrong) self-destructs on examination.

What the American mind has been — or is being — closed to is the possibility that diversity of opinion does not entail either scepticism (the incapacity to know) or nihilism (there is nothing non-conventional, i.e. natural, to know). To say that we have come to think of society, culture, religion, morality as creations of the human spirit is only to hint at the centuries-long development of ideas which have led to this point.

Bloom's book is about the university and its students, but what is unusual about it is that his assessment of its malaise and his passionate indictment of its tepid nihilism rests on a comprehensive interpretation of the course of Western thought. In this respect, it stands apart from other critiques of our educational institutions, which are "close-up" and try to be practical in their suggestions. Bloom has no program or practical suggestions to make, other than that reading the great books is the basis of any genuine liberal education. (He qualifies this recommendation by acknowledging the possible weaknesses of great books programs.)(344) But then, Socrates' urging upon Athenians that they pay attention to the important questions of being human was not very practical either. It is, perhaps, ironically a kind of confirmation of Bloom's analysis that while Socrates was put to death for his indictment of Athenians, Bloom is rewarded (if wealth can be called a reward).

The comprehensive interpretation referred to agrees with Heidegger in this, that Nietzsche is the culmination of the project of modern philosophy and that we are still very much being drawn in his

wake. Indeed, the original structure of the book was just the reverse of its present order, and graduates of the Program might find it more intelligible to read Part Three on the university and its intellectual context first, then Part Two on American-style nihilism, and finally the first part on contemporary college students (the attention to which has verified the shrewdness of the Simon and Schuster editor who proposed the reversal). Otherwise the first part may sound like a sociological jeremiad about students, laced though it is with penetrating insights and thoughtful appraisals. One should keep in view the dualism (in its many forms) of contemporary American life which is the unifying theme of the work.

Reading the book, I kept thinking of the biblical remark about exchanging one's inheritance for a mess of pottage (as child I always wondered what pottage was), but that doesn't seem le mot juste since Bloom has no nostalgia for that old-time religion; some of the reviewers have misread him here. But he does have some sense of relation to the way in which traditional piety retained a certain reverence for the higher and for intellectual vision as the culmination of union with God. In contrast to that, he scorns the "sense of the sacred" which has become the focus of the "study" of religions: in this respect, he again reminds me of Socrates' pious criticism of the poets' theology. Since I agree with his assessment here, I shall end by quoting what he says about the term 'sacred':

> Of course, as we use it, it has no more in common with God than does value with the Ten Commandments, commitment with faith, charisma with Moses, or life-style with Jerusalem or Athens. (215)

Professor André Goddu

Rather than comment extensively on the irony of how, according to Allan Bloom, the openness of American society has led to the impoverishment of university-educated souls, I prefer to make only two critical observations and then suggest alternative studies that make a far more plausible case than Bloom does. To be sure, Bloom has identified some genuine problems; however, his analysis is based largely on the claims that the source of the problem is nihilism and that the roots of modern nihilism are to be found in Nietzsche and Heidegger. Mind you, Bloom is not talking about philosophical nihilism, but modern nihilism überhaupt. Personally, I would take it as a hopeful sign if any philosopher had the impact on American students that Bloom assigns to Nietzsche and Heidegger. Unfortunately for Bloom (aside from his questionable and very selective reading of Heidegger), it is assumptions of this kind, namely, that the ideas of philosophers have any influence at all on the intellectual climate of America that render his analysis implausible and, hence, irrelevant.

In The Last Intellectuals, Russell Jacoby undertakes an examination of American public culture, which tries to account for the absence of significant younger voices among American intellectuals. Contrary to Bloom, Jacoby's analysis is primarily social and economic. Jacoby's thesis is that the decline of vital urban centers in America and the professionalization of academia have created a vacuum, literally no place for educated laymen to grow in, much less contribute to, American intellectual life. Academics write for each other in obscure journals. The transmission of the results of their efforts to the general public, even to their students, is spotty at best if it occurs at all. In short, the arena of the potentially most critical inquiry in our society is cut off from the public sphere.

Related to the issues raised by Jacoby are two other recent studies that complement Jacoby's provocative analysis: The Culture of Capitalism by Alan Macfarlane and The Capitalist City, edited by Michael Smith and Joe R. Feagin. These two books provide a broader context in which to understand Jacoby's and, for that matter, even Bloom's complaints. In them also, however, we may find a somewhat more optimistic reading of the changes that have occurred and, implicitly, of the significance of these changes for a new style of public, intellectual culture.

Still, the fact is that the socio-economic structure of intellectual activity in the U.S. is significantly different from that of our predominantly European ancestors. Europe was and, for that matter, remains a decidedly urban culture, continuing the traditions of the city that by definition constitute the basis of Western Civilization. In other words, the change in urban structure means a break with tradition, the results of which are in doubt and therefore of genuine concern. This strictly literal end of civilization as we have known it is not the end of the world.

This transformation is a natural consequence of the individualism so highly valued in the U.S.;

only time will tell whether or not it will be as creative and lasting as that of other cultures. To conclude from its obvious difference with classical, urban tradition, as Bloom does, that it is inferior is a non sequitur, suggesting that the fundamental premise of Bloom's argument is a matter of taste (mind you, a taste I tend to share) as well as a reflection of the fact that Bloom underestimates the structural and material bases of culture. Bloom's efforts to dignify his prejudices as anything else are unpersuasive — "de gustibus non est disputandum." During the Middle Ages it was the monasteries, cathedral schools and then the universities that preserved that culture, and in the process they also transformed it. We are far from having seen the full impact of computers on American life and, who knows, perhaps therein lies the logical outcome of the individualism of American culture and of the American style of cultural transformation. As for myself, I always keep a small suitcase packed for a quick departure to a European city, among which I count Tokyo!

Professor Walter Nicgorski

Is there not a paradox in this stinging critique of our democratic tendencies being so well received and such a good seller? In terms of being noticed (and by and large favorably so) and in terms of sales, Bloom's book has had success unmatched by any serious book about the intellectual life and universities of this nation within my memory. Yet it is a book that makes the most of the weaknesses of recent America, her students and universities and even of the Enlightenment sources that shape her way of life. So sharp is the criticism that one worries that it has slipped at times into caricature or, at the least, overstatement Perhaps, there is no more of a paradox in Bloom's success than that in evidence in the 1960s and other times when America, especially her media, seemed to indulge her most severe critics. Then and now, one might speculate, it is our very lack of any sort of profound self-understanding that opens us to fascination with those who find us and our institutions dramatically deficient. One might then conclude that Bloom's success goes far to support the argument of his book. Seemingly self-assured, the American mind has closed around certain democratic generalities that produces a flabby tolerance of whatever is put forward and in fact glorifies for the moment (the New Left in the 60s, Bloom now) that which is done with commitment and, in this case, verbal dash.

I prefer to understand Bloom's success in a somewhat different way, believing that it stems in part from uneasy and questing souls beneath the apparently closed public mind. Not only among educators but also among those who attended universities in the last two generations, even among the holders of that degree Bloom finds symptomatic of our disease, the M.B.A., there is a strong undercurrent that senses that universities should be doing much better at nourishing the deepest and most enduring concerns of the human person and that in tending to such matters well, higher education best serves both human life and liberal democracy. Those puzzled and distressed about our democratic life and the university's role in it are, perhaps, not decisive in any way. But Bloom appears to have written for them, to have sought to articulate the uneasiness and explain the sensed shortcomings. I suspect this is the way Bloom understands his success and how he intended it to be. Bloom sought to reach those, not necessarily engaged in university life, but capable of seeing the problem and well-positioned enough to have some impact on our coping with it.

Bloom seems to understand his own classroom teaching and the mission of the university to have primarily this same audience. It will surprise no one, least of all Bloom, that his concern with this audience draws upon him the charge of "elitism." Bloom does claim that his student "sample" consists of those "students of comparatively high intelligence, materially and spiritually free to do pretty much what they want with the few years of college they are privileged to have—in short, the kind of young persons who populate the twenty or thirty best universities." Speaking of the same group, he adds that "they, above all, most need education, inasmuch as the greatest talents are most difficult to perfect...." It is probably Bloom's own understanding of the limitations of democracy that allows him to see this privileged student pool from the leading universities as those "of the greatest talents." Practicality must have allowed this collapse of two groups that do not clearly overlap. Behind it all, I suspect, is the fact that he has made his peace with "vulgar aristocracy" (as opposed to natural aristocracy) through his interpretation of the classical political philosophers.

Bloom writes that the ancient philosophers "were aristocratic in the vulgar sense, favoring the power of those possessing old wealth, because such men are more likely to grasp the nobility of philosophy as an end itself, if not to understand it. Most simply, they have the money for an education and time to take it seriously." Later Bloom adds, "In antiquity all philosophers had the same

practical politics, inasmuch as none believed it feasible or salutary to change relations between rich and poor in a fundamental or permanently progressive way." What Bloom's inferences about the practical politics of the ancients obscure is how the theoretical inquiry of the ancients carries us beyond the alternatives of a politics of the wealth and a politics of the poor. The two great political works of the period, Plato's Republic and Aristotle's Politics, seek to moderate those extremes, Aristotle explicitly seeking a dominant middle class as a way of opening to natural aristocracy. Might not our circumstances allow a practical politics more directly informed by the work of ancient theory than apparent ancient practice?

But even as this question is put to Bloom one must acknowledge that he serves us all well by challenging the uncritical democratic tendencies that are so dominant. Bloom writes, "Almost no one wants to face the possibility that "bourgeois vulgarity" might really be the nature of the people, always and everywhere. Flattery of the people and incapacity to resist public opinion are the democratic vices, particularly among writers, artists, journalists and anyone else who is dependent on an audience." The one simple rule for universities, he writes, is to provide students with experiences not available in democratic society. Bloom sees the differences between the many and the few, hence the question of the limitations of democracy, as one of the great questions to which thoughtful human beings should ever be returning.

Finally, let me confess that I have reason to distrust my judgement that Bloom overstates the deficiencies of the students and universities of the recent past and present. My experience in higher education has been almost entirely here at Notre Dame and in the Program of Liberal Studies. And I insist that this confession is no mere flattery of my readers! Bloom himself notes at one point that Catholic higher education has resisted some of the academic folly of the time. And when Bloom notes that "the contents of classic books have become particularly difficult to defend in modern times, and the professors who now teach them do not care to defend them, are not interested in their truth," I know that I am in some one of the Isles of the Blest, here in the PLS. In some ways then, we have reason to lead rather than follow the academic world that surrounds us.

Professor M. Katherine Tillman

My comments are not about Alan Bloom's bitter attack upon the 1960's, nor about his worry that women and minorities somehow emasculate or pollute higher education, nor about his omission of the best of American political thought in a book that claims to be about the "American Mind," nor about "the German connection" or his own "longing for Europe." I am interested in the third and final section of the work, where Bloom evaluates the American university in relation to the Socratic ideal of learning.

Bloom locates the current educational crisis in the fragmentation, democratization and relativizing of the disciplines. Knowledge is fractured into competing departments and divisions; education becomes training and specialization; liberal education, no longer possessed of a unified content, becomes "sampling" for the purpose of a vacuous "breadth." There is no vision in the land. In Bloom's words: "Liberal education flourished when it prepared the way for the discussion of a unified view of nature and man's place in it, when the best minds debated on the highest level. It decayed when what lay beyond it were only specialities, the premises of which do not lead to any such vision. The highest is the partial intellect; there is no synopsis." (346)

The "synoptic intellect," Bloom suggests, is attained by the study of the Great Books of the western tradition and by the pursuit of the perennial philosophic questions. With the "death" of tradition in our time, the books become but largely ignored collections of antiquarian information; the possibility and necessity of "world explanation" disappears; truth is outdated. Bloom goes further: he seems to suggest that the books themselves are the locus of truth and that without the furnishings of the books, there is no home of the mind.

Bloom writes: "Without the great revelations, epics and philosophies as part of our natural vision, there is nothing to see out there, and eventually little left inside." (60) I should like to propose that it is "our natural vision" that should be underscored here, and not only the books. Liberal learning should be an education of that "natural vision" until it becomes "synoptic intellect." It is Bloom's rather exclusive focus upon the books, upon the disciplines and subject matters, upon the content of the questions, that leads him, when he finds these lacking, to near despair regarding American higher

education. He never says what, precisely, he means by "natural vision," or just how the education of the intellect can become the capacity for wholeness. Does not "natural vision" mean that mind and its objects are so inseparably, originally correlated with one another that neither can really be spoken of in truth without the other? The history of thought from Parmenides to Heidegger bears witness to this wholeness of original human experience. Bloom's focus, however, seems one-sidedly concentrated on the "objects," the contents, the books, rather than as well on the developing habit of mind of the genuinely inquiring student who finds, founds, forms herself in dialectical conversation with what the books present, assisted in her labor of bringing thought to birth by the midwifery of the personally engaged teacher. Bloom himself seems not to have much to say to the poor, undecided undergraduate whom he depicts embarrassing the universities with the plea, "I am a whole human being. Help me to form myself in my wholeness and let me develop my real potential." (339) The question is urgently personal. Let our response then be the full response of Socrates: Come, let us inquire together. Perhaps we can help you remember, awaken, and develop all of the good, yes the Good, that is buried deep within yourself. Through the arts of discursive reasoning, grammar, dialectic, rhetoric, mathematics; through the reading of the best that has been handed down to us and the contemplation of that to which it points; through the personal influence and friendship of your teachers and fellow learners, you shall be confirmed in your noble passion to understand yourself better and to relate more fully, more humanly, to the world in which you live.

****

NEWTON AND THE CONSTITUTION: SOME REFLECTIONS ON AN ANNIVERSARY YEAR

OPENING CHARGE, PROGRAM OF LIBERAL STUDIES SEPTEMBER 3, 1987

Phillip R. Sloan

As tonight's opening charge, I am most generally concerned to display some important interrelations between aspects of our learning in the Program. We often ask ourselves, how does our learning in the Program connect together? We speak of a "circle" of knowledge in the brochure. But what does one tutorial in fact have to do with another? Why are the seminars and tutorials arranged in the way that they are?

To address this broad curricular issue in some specificity, however, I wish to begin with a timely discussion which occupied American attention over the summer months—the public congressional hearings over the affair known by the linguistic barbarism of "Irangate"

When all the theatrics and dramatic content of these hearings are put to one side, I think we perceive that these hearings involved an important encounter between different branches of government concerning the proper jurisdiction and perogatives of each. And from these discussions has emerged once again the reaffirmation of the unique principle of the separation and counter-limitations of governing powers central to our constitution.In my address this evening, I wish to focus on this unique constitutional concept in terms of two anniversary celebrations we celebrate this year—the two-hundredth anniversary of the United States Constitution, and the tricentennial of Isaac Newton's 1687 work, the Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy .

On first glance, we might ask what could possibly unite these two texts, other than the accident of their anniversary years. One is a foundational work, probably the singly most important work, of modern mathematical physics. The other is the document which institutionalized the outcome of the American Revolution, and established the basis for our modern federal system, with its three-part organization and bicameral legislature. The architect of the former was a reclusive Cambridge mathematician, working in private on a complex set of problems involved with the Copernican theory, terrestrial mechanics, and mathematics; the creation of the latter was by a diverse group of American patriots, who worked through the hot Philadelphia summer of 1787 to find an agreeable compromise between competing factions and differing ideals of government. The Founders of this nation were surely not the abstract speculators of the likes of Newton, but practical men, devoted to affairs of state and nation.

To see my reasons for seeking to associate these two works at all, let us return to the founding vision of the Program, that of Professor Otto Bird, our first director. Unlike other Great Books programs which structured their curricula in terms of the classical seven liberal arts—grammar, rhetoric, logic, astronomy, geometry, mathematics and music Professor Bird envisioned a program which dealt, via the great texts, with the dialogue between three great traditions . These were first the Classical literary-humanistic tradition, represented by the Roman and Renaissance humanists; second, the theological-scholastic, best exemplified by the great Scholastics; and third the scientific-positivistic. These were for him the great intellectual options. Their debate formed the great encounter of the modern age, each struggling for hegemony over the minds of humankind, and each demanded attention in the structure of the Program.[1] The great books were the means of exploring these encounters.

---

[1] O. Bird, Cultures in Conflict (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1974)

If we conceive of our question along these lines, we can see an issue here worth exploring. If we were to categorize the tradition represented by the Founding Fathers in their work, it would seem to be the tradition of the Classical Humanists. The main figures were most generally educated in this tradition, some deeply, and we find evidence in their writings, as we find in so many writings of the eighteenth century political thought, the great echoes of the Roman classical tradition as it had reached them through their study of the classics. The ideal of a law-governed republic, represented for many by the Roman Republic, could provide at least in part a model for the new association of states.Newton's work, on the other hand, stands as the great, in my view the supreme, work of the modern scientific tradition, and more than any other work defined the outline of modern science. Axiomatic in form, mathematically rigorous, reducing complex phenomena of nature to deductions of a few elementary principles and laws, Newton conveyed to posterity the image of what science could thereafter be. It promised at long last a rational control over the material world, an insight into its deepest working principles. Edmond Halley's "Ode to Newton", that effusive Latin oration appended to the first edition of the Principia, expresses much of what Newton's followers of the eighteenth century were to see in his work:

> Matters that vexed the minds of ancient seers,
> and for our learned doctors often led
> To loud and vain contention, now are seen
> In reason's light, the clouds of ignorance
> Dispelled at last by science. Those on whom
> Delusion cast its gloomy pall of doubt,
> Upborne now on the wings that genius lends,
> May penetrate the mansions of the gods
> And scale the heights of heaven. O mortal men,
> Arise! And casting off your earthly cares,
> Learn ye the potency of heaven-born mind,
> Its thought and life far from the herd withdrawn!
> *
> Then ye who now on heavenly nectar fare,
> Come celebrate with me in song the name
> Of Newton, to the Muses dear; for he
> Unlocked the hidden treasuries of Truth:
> So richly through his mind had Phoebus cast
> The radiance of his own divinity.
> Nearer the gods no mortal may approach.[2]

Can we find some deeper possibility of dialogue between these two great traditions and these two specific works which they have respectively produced? This is my task this evening.

II

To pursue my topic in more detail, I wish to develop in specific certain key principles formulated by Newton, and then display the relevance of these for the constitutionalism which was to culminate in the American Founding. This may help us see in new light the unusual character of the organization of the American system, and some of the reasons for its long-term success.

---

[2] E. Halley, "Ode to Newton," trans. by L.J. Richardson from the first edition latin text in: I. Newton, Newton's Principia, ed. F. Cajori (Berkeley: U. California Press, 1971), pp. xiv-xv.

Let us begin with a brief sketch of the key concepts developed in Newton's Principia for which the work is famous. Of foremost importance, Newton's work established the primacy for modern physics of the principle of inertia—the principle that bodies indifferently can either remain at rest, or in uniform motion in a straight line, with all deflections from these inertial states due to the perturbing action of external forces. This is the great first law of his physics, and no single principle defines the difference between the physics of ancient science and that of the moderns more sharply than this. It implied for Newtonian physics that uniform motion needed no more explanation than the state of rest.

Secondly, Newton introduced a novel analysis of the concept of force. Newton's force is not an inherent property of bodies, a vis insita as we might find an ancient writer speak of a power or potency. Rather it is a quantifiable and measurable relationship of the force exerted between bodies, and is defined by its effects, without attempting to specify more deeply its metaphysical character. Furthermore, Newton's force is not confined to the kind of thing that happens in contact action between billiard balls. Force can be exerted by bodies in motion, for example as momentum. But also and more mysteriously, it can be manifest as a measurable power acting between bodies in the principle of mutual attraction, a force precisely quantifiable in terms of the distance between the bodies and their respective quantities of matter.

As a third achievement, Newton formulated a mathematics which enabled him to deal with precision with circular motions and curvilinear areas—the calculus. With these mathematical techniques, he could finally give precise, or nearly precise, solutions to complex problems such as the motion of a planet around the sun, and define by this the magnitude of the forces acting on such circular-moving bodies.

A fourth achievement centers on the specific mathematical techniques employed in mathematically resolving and composing forces. Newtonian forces can be expressed mathematically, and represented graphically by a vector diagram. Because of this quantifiable treatment of forces, their relations and magnitudes can be analyzed in terms of geometry, trigonometry, and the calculus. Any two component forces acting on a body can be synthesized or expressed mathematically as a single resultant force of a definable quantity acting as if represented in a parallelogram of force. Similarly, any given force of definable magnitude can be analyzed as the product of at least two oblique component forces with the relations of these to the resultant expressed again by the parallelogram of forces. The diagram from first corollary to the third law of motion from the Principia illustrates my point.



This simple diagram, and others in this section of the Principia, have important implications for the theme I am developing. A stable and apparently static system of bodies can be analyzed as the resultant of a balance of counteracting forces with the net resultant of zero. By the same token, the combined action of component forces in a state of imbalance can be expressed as a single resultant force in a single direction.

Finally, Newton conveyed to his posterity of the eighteenth century not only a set of specific solutions to problems of mechanics and astronomy, but more importantly, a method of approaching highly complex problems, interweaving rational principles and laws with careful empirical observations of the phenomena. No one before Newton had quite achieved this mixture of reason and observation, and the success of this in solving some of the most perplexing physical problems suggested similar applications elsewhere. Might it not be possible to apply this methodology to very different questions and domains? The eloquent Perpetual Secretary of the French Académie des Sciences, Bernard de Fontenelle, could thus write at the end of the seventeenth century:

> The geometrical spirit is not so tied to geometry that it cannot be detached from it and transported to other branches of knowledge. A work of morals or politics or criticism perhaps even of eloquence, would be better. . . if it were done in the style of a geometer.[3]

Although there is something overstated in this, it suggests the possibility of the transportation of the methodology and categories of mathematical physics , with its uses of analysis and synthesis, geometrical reasoning, and deductive science, to areas as complex as that of politics.

The application of the new science to politics was nothing particularly new by the time of Newton's work. Thomas Hobbes marks our first important use of this in his great treatise of 1655, the Leviathan. The postulation of ideal conditions, mathematical properties of moving bodies, and mechanical metaphors Hobbes took especially from Galileo, and then applied these to the questions of political obligation, the theory of natural rights, and the foundation of political order. The state of nature, with each person pursuing naturally their own self-interest, is the Hobbesian analogue of the idealized conditions postulated by the new physics of Galileo.

Where then lies Newton's novelty in the political realm? I would suggest in the application of two novel dimensions of his work to the political order. A close reading of Newton's text reveals that his physics was not simply confined to the crudities of a mechanical system of bodies in motion. Newton's physics gives a much greater primacy to the concept of law than we see in prior works in natural philosophy. Law and force, rather than matter and mechanical collisions, are the dominant metaphors of his novel physics. The Principia opens with the three great laws of motion, also deemed, to emphasize their importance, axioms. These function as the great first principles from which the rest is to be deduced. This difference between a physics of bodies and a physics of laws defining the relations of bodies, is crucial for seeing my subsequent point. With this distinction in mind, let us turn more specifically to the lead this gives us to the American Constitution.

III

The American Constitution, finally completed and signed by the members of the constitutional convention at Philadelphia on September 17, of 1787, was not, as we all know, something which sprung like Athena from the brow of a Zeus, nor was it even the product of a single Solonic law-giver. It was the outcome of a complex decision making process needed to deal with the problems emerging in the loose conglomeration of separate states which existed following the American achievement of Independence in 1783. The Continental Congress which had assisted the states in necessary matters through the war of independence was, in many respects, a powerless body after the war. Many wished for it to remain so. But others envisioned a greater federation of the states, and this was the vision of figures like Alexander Hamilton, John Jay and most importantly James Madison, later to be the fourth president. Through their efforts, a grand convention of representatives of all the states was convened in Philadelphia in May of 1787 extending through the summer and early fall of that year.

---

[3] Fontenelle, "The Utility of Mathematics ", in H. Butterfield, The Origins of Modern Science (London, 1949) p. 185.

The question facing these new state governments was whether they should retain their autonomy, forming no more than a loose federation of otherwise independent states, functioning much like the Swiss Cantons and Dutch Republics, or if they should unite into one larger political body. The problem was that there were no really adequate models for such an enterprise, and doubts were in the minds of many whether it would be possible to construct a large republic with a strong central organization. Historical study could display to the Founders the constitutions and organizations of states in Antiquity and in Renaissance Italy. They also had the British model of constitutional monarchy, from whom they had recently broken. The model of the United Dutch Republics or the Swiss Cantons, which attracted many, seemed to the Federalists to promise in practice factionalism, lack of real unity, and potential anarchy.[4] In fact the Founding Fathers had to invent their own model.

I have suggested that Newton's science conveyed to many of the eighteenth century both a method and also terms of analysis which seemed to many possibly applicable to other topics. Let us pursue this more specifically.

As practical political men, the Founders were not likely to look in some specific way at Newton's work for inspiration. In fact I have found no direct references to Newton in the Federalist Papers, which capture much of the Federalist arguments in the post-convention debates. But a more immediate authority is of distinct interest, the French political philosopher Montesquieu, whose Spirit of the Laws of 1748 has been characterized by some commentators as the most complete and comprehensive treatise on politics to have appeared in the western tradition since Aristotle. This veritable ocean of a book combines extensive historical analysis of the various political systems over the world with penetrating discussion of their basic modes of organization and the principles upon which they operate.

If we examine the analytic index to the Jacob Cook edition of the Federalist papers, we find, for example, one reference to Plato, none to Aristotle, Cicero, Locke, Grotius, Spinoza, Hobbes, Rousseau, or Machiavelli, but eleven specifically to Montesquieu. In fact Montesquieu is the most frequently cited single individual author listed in the index. Furthermore, these are not incidental citations. He is, on occasion, quoted at length. Madison speaks of him in Federalist 47 as the "celebrated Montesquieu," and uses his authority as definitive on the question of the separation of powers.

Let us look briefly at this text by Montesquieu. When we compare the contents and organization of the Spirit of Laws to that of the previous modern treatises on politics--Machiavelli's De Principe , Hobbes' Leviathan; Spinoza's Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, and Locke's First and Second Treatises on Civil Government, it differs from these works structurally in two chief respects.

First, it proceeds deductively from an opening definition and discussion of "laws of nature". Hobbes' treatise had certainly proceeded deductively, but began not from the concept of general laws, but from individual psychological premises—how do we see ourselves as motivated, and what are the principles of motion on which we act? Montesquieu, however, begins with a discussion of the concept of law in general, and then explores more specific laws of nature, defined as rules of "fixed and invariable relation"governing man in the natural state.

As we follow this discussion, we see another interesting issue emerge. Such laws, since they are laws governing nature, precede the establishment of society:

> Antecedent to [positive laws] are those of nature, so called, because they derive their force entirely from our frame and existence. In order to have perfect knowledge of these laws, we must consider man before the establishment of society: the laws received in such a state would be those of nature.[5]

---

[4] See Federalist papers numbers 19 and 20, attributed to Madison, issued as The Federalist, ed. J.E. Cooke (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1961). All subsequent quotations from this edition.

[5] Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, trans. T. Nugent, (New York: Hafner, 1949), p. 3.

But we should note that unlike Locke and Hobbes, this discussion is not intended simply to ground a theory of natural rights. Montesquieu in fact says very little about the concept of natural rights and their inalienability. His focus instead is on the definition of the basic laws of political and social order which rationally define its action.

Secondly, Montesquieu's work seeks to display the interaction of these general laws with empirically-derived "principles" of action, discerned by a combined historical and conceptual analysis of the various forms of governments and constitutions of the past and present . To determine these Montesquieu looks specifically at despotisms, monarchies, aristocracies, and various historical forms of democracy. The determination of these empirical principles and the general laws is to give Montesquieu the framework by which he can then set up a normative political philosophy, defining the ideal functioning of a given form of government.

This begins to look to the attentive eye very Newtonian in its method, and not accidentally so. Montesquieu's biography reveals some interesting information on this. Originally trained as a lawyer, Montesquieu had studied extensively the classical legal theorists. He also had practical experience with legal and political matters through his presidency of the provincial Parlement of Bordeaux. But Montesquieu also showed a strong interest in this formative period of his life in the new science, and was an active member of the Bordeaux Academy of Sciences, and carried out written and experimental work in physics, biology, and geology. Subsequently, he had travelled to England and there became a close friend of Pierre Coste, the French translator of Newton's second great work, the Opticks, and it was while staying in England in 1730 that he was elected a member of Britain's prestigious scientific society, the Royal Society of London, still dominated by the towering presence of its president from 1703-1727, Sir Isaac Newton. Montesquieu's career after his return to France in 1731 turned away from these early scientific interests and contacts, and he directed his attention thereafter to political matters. But there are reasons to think that the similarities of Montesquieu's and Newton's methods on some key points are not accidental.

Newton began the Principia with his great laws of motion, or Axioms. In the fashion of Euclid, these were the assumed self-evident beginning points from which he could then proceed. The task of Newtonian physics is to determine how the laws of nature apply to physical systems, and not simply to analyze impacts and collisions of matter itself. First deriving the consequences of these principles theoretically, these laws then are brought up against the empirical laws and principles derived by induction from phenomena. For example, the empirical laws of Boyle, Kepler and Galileo are explained by Newton in Book III as consequences of these more general laws. The specific manifestation of the phenomenal world is thereby the product of the combined effect of the general law and the specific set of initial conditions holding in a given case. The concrete task of the Newtonian physicist is to see how the general laws can explain the exact empirical situations encountered in nature.

This is a novel framework in which to interpret the problems of physics, and I would suggest that we see this same critical difference in approach as we compare Montesquieu's approach to a science of politics with that of his great predecessors. Montesquieu's analysis begins from very general laws of nature which, like Newton's laws, govern all political systems generally, in this case because they govern human beings in the hypothetical state of nature. Montesquieu has also delimited the fundamental laws of political order, and from these derived four subsidiary laws . Those who have read Hobbes, for example, will see the difference in rhetorical strategy this imposes: the first law is that all human beings desire peace and are basically peaceful in the natural state—none of Hobbes' "nasty, mean, brutish and short" existence here. The second is the human need for food. The third concerns the natural inclination all human beings to associate with members of the opposite sex, and the fourth is the natural law to live in organized society.

As we look at this list, it is very different than other lists emerging from the "state of nature" discussions with which we may be familiar, most particularly those of Hobbes and Locke. In many places it does not sound that distant from Aristotle's principles in the Politics. But the language and approach is not that of Aristotle. The best state is not one leading to a teleologically ordered end, but is the product of the specific interactions of laws, principles, and the given empirical conditions on the earth. The form of political order depends as much on climate, geography and language as on abstract principle. For Montesquieu, democracy as a form of government is therefore only possible under certain climatic and historical conditions.

Montesquieu moves from a discussion of the general laws of nature to the concrete examination of various constitutions and forms of government. The intent of this is, as he puts it,

> [to determine] the relations which laws bear to the nature and principle of each government; and as this principle has a strong influence on laws, I shall make it my study to understand it thoroughly; and if I can but once establish it, the laws will soon appear to flow thence as from their source.[6]

There are two things to notice in this passage. Montesquieu separates the notion of a law from the concept of a "principle". The latter is a dynamic power or source of activity which is determined inductively from an examination of the various historical constitutions, "the human passions which set [a government] in motion."

The principles are also specific to each main governmental type. In the second book he outlines four main forms, each with a specific principle: monarchy, aristocracy, democracy, and despotism.The ideal manifestation of a given form of government will result when the specific principle interacts smoothly with the general natural laws, and this interaction depends on geography, past history, climate and language. Montesquieu's concept of a "principle" is important to underline in the framework we have developed. The difference between his natural "law" governing all given forms of government, and its specific dynamic principle is illustrated as follows. A democracy is governed by a basic natural law, that of the possession of power by the people. But the principle which enables it to act dynamically, its motivating force, is the virtue of the individual citizen. In a monarchy, by contrast, the motivating power or principle is honor and hierarchy.

This perhaps begins to appear perhaps abstract and complicated, and to follow it in more detail here would be. But his point is, I feel, clear. By analyzing out these ideal aspects of forms of government, and defining their motivating powers, Montesquieu provides exactly the kind of idealized framework we find in Newton's physics, now applied to the political order. We see the interaction of general law and empirical reality; dynamic forces are identified; and a rational system of politics is at least outlined which looks very different in emphasis than the natural rights philosophies of Hobbes and Locke.

By setting up these idealizations, deviations from these norms can be defined and isolated by analysis. It is not necessary that any given form of government exactly conform to these ideals. Where they fail to conform, this lack of conformity can now be delimited. Thus in book five, Montesquieu argues that the positive laws enacted in a given government must be in conformity with its principle. For example, in a democracy, which must rest on a concept of citizen virtue, the laws must not take such a form that they create great distinctions of wealth, emphasize self-aggrandizement, or otherwise encourage inequality. Such laws would not, however, be inconsistent in a monarchy. Education in a democratic republic is necessary in a way that is not required by other forms, because education is the primary place outside the family that citizen virtue is to be acquired and inculcated.

---

6 Ibid, p. 7.

It is within the context of this larger framework that Montesquieu sets out in Book Eleven his most important contribution to political theory, the doctrine of the balance and separation of powers. In examining this notion, there are some important matters to attend to. Initially, we see that he applies it only to his ideal of one of the main forms of government, that of the democracy. Central to a monarchy, for example, is the consolidation, not the separation of powers. Secondly, this concept follows as a consequence of his understanding of the proper interplay of the laws of nature governing all societies, and the specific principle of the democratic form of government, namely citizen virtue.

The reasoning behind Montesquieu's discussion of the concept of citizen virtue for a democracy is important to follow. It is is put forth in a section devoted generally to the discussion of political liberty. In one form of government only—democracy—is political liberty necessary. But in a democracy, it is essential to the proper interaction of the laws and principles, and a necessary condition for realizing the principle of citizen virtue itself. Much more clearly, I feel, that we sometimes find in our own self-understanding of this issue, Montesquieu does not see political liberty as equivalent to unlimited freedom to act. It is a "right to do what the laws permit".[7] The principle of the separation, and also the balance of powers is posed as necessary for there to be proper space for the principle of citizen virtue to act properly. He acknowledges that most empirical examples of democracy do not show this separation of powers. But the issue is the best rational design of a political order following this form, not simply empirical description of what has been the case.

The principle of the separation of powers is based on Montesquieu's distrust of power, and particularly in this case, on the way power has been abused in historical democracies. Citizen virtue may the the proper motivation, but it is not itself sufficient to prevent abuse. Formal structuring is also needed:

> To prevent this abuse[of power], it is necessary from the very nature of things that power should be a check to power. A government may be so constituted, as no man shall be compelled to do things to which the law does not oblige him, nor forced to abstain from things which the law permits.[8]

Montesquieu describes in this discussion the need for the three-part separation of powers into the legislative, judiciary and executive, and the intent of his ensuing discussion is to emphasize the need for each to check the other, because each has the tendency to usurp the functions of the other. This separation extends not simply to the different tasks in initiating, enacting, and enforcing the laws, but also to the conduct of the various branches toward each other. The executive branch is to restrict the encroachment of the elected legislative body; and the legislative is to be restricted in the degree to which it can have power over the executive. It can impeach, but not try the executive, for example. The legislative body cannot be at the same time judge and accuser, the great defect Montesquieu sees in the ancient republics.

The Newtonian framework I am suggesting for this emerges as Montesquieu continues his discussion. We have spoken earlier of Newton's concept of the balance, resolution and synthesis of forces. Similarly for Montesquieu, the properly balanced democratic state will be effectively a state of repose, or when it does act in a given direction, it can only be as a resultant of the cooperation of these powers:

> These three powers should naturally form a state of repose or inaction. But as there is a necessity for movement in the course of human affairs, they are forced to move, but still in concert.[9]

---

[7] Ibid., p. 151.
[8] Ibid., p. 150.
[9] Ibid., p. 150.

If we understand this properly, the concept outlined by Montesquieu does not commit a democracy to inaction. But it does mean that effective action can only take place by cooperation between the three powers.

IV

Of all the important individuals who assembled at the Constitution Hall in that hot and muggy Philadelphia summer in 1787, James Madison was probably the most influential on the form the constitutional document was eventually to take, and also the individual best read and studied in the tradition I am developing. It is also in his writings we see most clearly articulated the concept and justification for the division of powers in the new constitution.

The so-called Federalist Papers edition we read in the Program are a series of articles published in New York newspapers in the months following the close of the Constitutional Convention which were intended to convince the New York legislature in particular, and the other states more generally, of the need for ratifying the new constitution. Variously authored by Madison, Hamilton and John Jay, they are an important window into the reasoning behind the new constitution by some of its most philosophically acute formulators.

It is in Federalist 47, authored by Madison, and dated January 30, 1788, in which he most directly takes up the issue of the separation and balance of powers we have described, and here Montesquieu's discussion from the eleventh chapter of the Spirit of Laws is commented upon directly, cited as authority for the concept, and quoted. Furthermore, it is not only Montesquieu's name that is cited, but also his methodological approach is in evidence. Montesquieu had examined as empirical support the various known historical examples of Republics to see to what degree they moved toward this principle. Madison now does the same in his examination of the various state organizations in the American colonies. His point is to show that almost all have violated the precept of the separation of powers, and this is a sign of their deficiency:

> It is but too obvious that in some instances, the fundamental principle under consideration has been violated by too great a mixture, and even an actual consolidation of the different powers; and that in no instance has a competent provision been made for maintaining in practice the separation delineated on paper.[10]

In Federalist 48, dated February 1, 1788, Madison continues this discussion by arguing for the need to have these separations explicitly spelled out in the new constitution, rather than left to tacit agreements as some would prefer it. Montesquieu, as we have seen, made this structurally necessary for the realization of political liberty in a democratic republic. And with Montesquieu, rather than seeing these formal constitutional separations as inhibiting liberty, Madison views them as necessary for its true maximization. Counterbalance is needed for the executive branch precisely because this is an area where personal ambition can be most easily expressed. By the same token, the legislative body must also be restricted by the other powers because of its inherent tendency to have almost unlimited actual power. It is also seen as the branch which can most easily encroach upon the other branches in subtle ways. It holds the purse-strings of the society, and can easily manifest its will in a system of hidden monetary rewards and punishments.[11] The legality of the laws passed by the legislative body therefore cannot reside only in its own hands.

---

[10] Publius, (Madison), Federalist #47 in Cooke (ed.), p. 331.

[11] Ibid., p. 334.

In many respects we are celebrating this year Madison's defense of this principle of the need for a rational separation of powers. Time and again it has weathered difficulties in the State which in its absence might have proved fatal to the republic. The ratification of the Constitution made this the first state to organize itself on these precepts. Our constitution formally separates and defines the powers and jurisdictions of the three branches in Articles Two, Three and Four.

Nine states of the thirteen were needed to ratify the new constitution for it to take effect, and New Hampshire in the summer of 1788 finally achieved this needed number. The American Constitution, with its plan for a sovereign union of states with a strong federal system, represented the first instance of a democratic government formally designed on the principle of the balance and and separation of powers. It was to be an equilibrating system, which formally prevented any one branch of government from becoming too powerful. Yet by acting in concert between the branches it need not result in mutual paralysis. Strong and vigorous action could be undertaken, but only by a cooperation of these powers.

It was also a model which, by affirming the principle of federalism, tempered the strong natural rights philosophy of Locke. Law, rather than inherent right, is its principle of structure. But it is also designed such that law cannot be wielded unchecked or imposed arbitrarily to endanger true political liberty. As the longest-lived democracy, this rational design suggests the potential and power of insights of the new science for the attainment of stable political order.

V

But least I end this on too easy a note, this interaction of scientific metaphor and modern democratic constitutionalism took in American only one of its possible forms. Two years from now we will see the bicentennial anniversary of another great democratic revolution, the French. Here the consequences were much more ambiguous, the manifestation much more terrible, as it worked itself out over almost forty-years of European turmoil.

I only wish to highlight one point in extending my theme in this direction tonight. If it was to Montesquieu and his principles of equilibration and balance that the American Founders were to look, it was in another direction that the French revolutionaries were to seek their inspiration, that enigmatic Swiss Jean-Jacques Rousseau.

Like Montesquieu, Rousseau was interested in science as well as in politics, but it was not Newton's science that attracted his attention, but the sciences of biology. Instead of terms like 'balance,' 'equilbration' and 'law' governing his political metaphors, we find instead the dominating concepts of organism, subordination of parts, and a curious combination of Newtonian force metaphors with biological analogues. In his great treatise, which was to be so influential on the French Revolutionaries, The Social Contract, Rousseau set out principles which imply a very different kind of democratic order that we see in our own. And his metaphors illustrate the ways in which Newton's science could be pursued in a different direction.For Rousseau the Social Contract by which government is first established implies the resolution of all the individual force of each individual citizen into,

> a sum of forces that can prevail over the resistance; set them to work by a single motivation; and make them act in concert. This sum of forces can arise only from the cooperation of many.[12]

As he continues this discussion, The basis of the contract is "the total alienation of each associate, with all his rightrs, to the whole community."13 Its result is a perfect union of the individual with the resultant whole, which manifests its will in Newtonian terms, into an undivided General will:

---

[12] Rousseau, On The Social Contract, trans. R. & J. Masters (New York: St. Martin's, 1978), p. 53.
13 Ibid.

> Each of us puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the general will; and in a body we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole.
>
> Instantly, in place of the private person of each contracting party, this act of association produces a moral and collective body.[14]

Sovereignity, for Rousseau, is not in this case to be divided and balanced, but resides in this resultant force. Against it there is no proper resistance:

> Therefore, in order for the social compact not to be an ineffectual formula, it tacitly includes the following engagement, which alone can give force to the others: that whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be constrained to do so by the entire body; which means only that he will be forced to be free.[15]

It is not difficult to imagine that such principles, and these metaphors, in the hands of lesser lights, and under practical needs of the state, could become a basis of a different conception of the state--directed to higher and nobler aims perhaps than the compromise of the American system--read the stirring speeches of Robespierre as he pursued his ideal of a republic of virtue--but also one without the healthy distrust of power central to Montesquieu, and ultimately Madison and Jefferson. But to pursue this in detail is another story.

VI

To conclude my talk I wish to summarize some key points. First, I have sought to illustrate the possibility of important dialogue between what may seem like widely separated subjects and issues in the Program, and even between tutorials. Both Newton's Principia and the American Constitution marked out new beginnings and charted out new questions which show surprising interactions on some levels when we seek to relate them.

Secondly, I have wished to highlight the way in which metaphors and analogies from one great tradition can be utilized by another, often with important practical consequences. If I am correct in seeing Montesquieu as carrying out a Newtonian analysis of politics, this also implies an emphasis on certain features of Newton's science over others he could have emphasized.

Finally, I would suggest that we can see the importance of the specific form of our constitution for the long-term stability of our republic, and also to highlight once again the continued need to respect the importance of these principles. The separation of powers and the idea of external controls of one branch by the others can seem highly inefficient at times. Indeed, this was a major objection of some of the anti-Federalists in the debate over the Constitution. But this principle was designed to insure the equilibrium of an otherwise very fragile system of government, western democracy.

Montesquieu's model also placed, as we have seen, a deep importance on the need for a concept of citizen virtue if this was to work effectively. Unlike the great moral vision of the state we find expressed by Rousseau, Robespierre, Hegel, Marx, or Mussolini, in which the state would fashion man, by force if necessary, into the virtuous citizen, the American constitution must leave much to the interplay of private choice and individual responsibility if there is to be proper realization of the principle of action.

As we begin our year of studies I would urge you, in the context of these two centennial celebrations, to reflect on the significance of this larger point.

****

---

[14] Ibid., p. 53

[15] Ibid., p. 55.

Identity and Decision
Creation as the Great Mystery

Nicholas Ayo, C.S.C

Editor's Note: This is the homily given by Fr. Ayo at the Annual Memorial Mass for deceased alumnae, alumni, and faculty that was held on November 4, 1987.

My theme is creation, creation as Jews and Christians understand it, creation from nothing. Each one of us is something new in the world, someone new in the world. There has never been anyone just like us, and there never again will be. Creation is a mystery of selection, of existence, of vocation, of personal identity, of being not part of God but yet not outside of God. Not everyone believes in such a creation; not everyone who believes in it appreciates what a startling and crucial mystery of creation from nothing turns out to be. How wonderful to live from the mystery of creation that dwells in our very being.

Not everyone cherishes creation. The religions of the East and Platonism in the West believe a much more understandable doctrine. Nothing altogether new comes to birth. Just as there is conservation of matter, so there is conservation of soul. Both matter and soul have existed from all eternity. There is no beginning, no beginning of time, no creation from nothing. All things, physical and spiritual, have always been in some form. They undergo change. Matter is constantly recycled and transformed into equivalent forms of energy. Soul is a saga of cyclical and recurrent rebirth. There are a thousand visions and revisions. Happily there is hope of bringing the soul into spiritual union with the one and absolute supreme good. Only then is there some kind of salvation, some kind of surcease from the eternal wheel of time and its endless turning.

Many observers of the human predicament, from the Greek and Roman stoics to the Hindu and Buddhist traditions identify the source of human suffering in the desires of the human being that stem from the body. They know of an original sin. Thus, our plans, our loves, our fears, our joys in this life risk unhappiness. The way to avoid grief, disappointment, and heartache is not to care for these matters of bodily existence. If one can outsmart this pain or become numb to it, and at the same time cultivate the contemplative life, then one hopes to achieve a salvation, a certain unity with the absolute, a nirvana state of peace beyond change and becoming.

Christianity stands more with this peculiar and just-mine body. By the example of the cross of Christ it encourages the Christian to embrace the hopes and loves of this life and strive for what would overcome injustice and unloving. Even though loving hurts, and sooner or later must fail because death touches adversely all our accomplishments, nonetheless the loving is worth it. One will die knowing the cross, but the love attempted will live on knowing the resurrection. The cross is central to Christianity, because the decision to love no matter what the cost to the body is central.

The Sacred Heart of Jesus is a symbol of how love in the body should be welcomed and yet will be achieved despite suffering. The Sacred Heart is crucified love, the only fully human love, because the only love that takes the body and this life, with all its obstacles and vulnerability, seriously and

urges the human being to give not counting the cost. The Christian does not seek to avoid the pain of caring in the body, but to embrace it and to work through it and go beyond it to the eternal life promised to those who die with hope in Christ. Christians seek not to be rid of the body that is such a drag, but to be purified in the body. Christians seek not so much union with God in the merging of our soul with the great Spirit of the world, but rather the very specific and personal resurrection of the body, which is to be with the body of the Lord in the intimacy of the divine life—Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Christianity preaches caritas and love in the body, rather than just vision and union with God outside the body. The vision and the union with God will fulfill humanity, and the body will be transfigured. However, the resurrected body will not be left behind, and its cravings in this life, which have been suffered through, will finally be fulfilled. In the gospel appearances of the resurrected Jesus, his bodily wounds shone with splendor.

Jews and Christians believe in creation from nothing. Because we are new born, we will not be reborn. Our earthly life has a beginning, just like the universe, and it will have an ending. In Dante's Purgatorio, whenever a soul has worked through its purification and become ready for the vision of the face of God, the whole seven-storied mountain quakes with recognition of the importance of this individual and his or her fulfillment. What must happen in Dante's purgatory is this. The individual must remain himself or herself, and yet the sinfulness must be overcome and even forgotten. What makes the individual unique and gives identity, the life and deeds of the body in this world, that identity must be recalled without losing a drop of this earthly life as a grace from God. In Dante's purgatory, the soul becomes lighter and more mobile the higher it climbs, and climbing can only go on in the light of the sun of heaven. We are not destined to make ourselves into the kind of persons that God intended us to be, and then see ourselves begin at the bottom all over again, in constant jeopardy that none of our achievements and none of our identity is any more lasting than the physical composition of our bodies. Our life perdures, and our own identity, the fruit of our own choices, has been guaranteed. We are not like those early polaroid snapshots that would fade if not fixed with a permanent chemical. Just when one had the picture right, it faded, and one must compose the scene yet again. It will not be thus for those who die in the Lord, the Lord of life, who once and for all took unto God the body of this life and the wonder and reality of this created world, and pledged that the particular and the bodily would always have a place at the right hand of the Father.

Creation celebrates our newness, our identity, our decisions, our vocation, our freedom to be who we will be, our being taken seriously in time and beyond time, even for all eternity when time will no longer be the measure of motion. Because we really exist apart from God and yet not away from God, created and yet always and everywhere sustained by God, we have the capacity to be called, and to respond, to be chosen and to say yes or no. To be created is to begin to decide, to have an ending because we had a beginning. It is a great mercy to decide. This is who I am and who I wish to be. To be created is to begin to decide, because in our ending we will have decided. Creation is real, and therefore individual life here and now in the body, once and for all, is precious. The names we read out in our prayers for the dead live on in all their unique bodily identity. Creation is real and therefore this life is earnest, and we are always to be remembered and treasured.

****

Alumnae/i News

Editor's Note: **Help Needed!** We are still seeking class correspondents for most years. We would greatly appreciate volunteers and will send persons volunteering our most up-to-date mailing list, possibly even mailing labels.

Class of 1955

Donald Yeckel sends his address as 1616 Nautilus St., La Jolla, Ca 92037. He is Vice President of Merrill Lynch in La Jolla.

Class of 1958
(Class Correspondent: Michael Crowe, PLS, U. of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN 46556)

Bob Bowman has now become Director of a psychiatric unit in Fayette County, Pennsylvania. He and his wife are very pleased that their oldest child, Mary Alice (P.L.S. class of 1985), will receiver her law degree in June from Dickinson University.

Bob Byrnes is a Captain with Delta Airlines, flying out of Fort Lauderdale. He is also in his second year as a doctoral student in Clinical Psychology at Nova University in Fort Lauderdale. He plans to retire from flying in 1989 and either to practice or teach pyschotherapy. His address is 2060 Deer Creek Country Club Blvd., Deefield, Beach, Florida 33442.

Frank Crumley continues to practice child-adolescent psychiatry in Dallas. His oldest son has now entered college. Frank writes that he enjoys writing papers in the field of psychiatry as a break from his practice.

Bill Sigler has now retired from the Foreign Service and his position as Director of Personnel of the Agency for International Development. He is now working in Washington for the Salesian Society of St. John Bosco as their Director of Overseas Development. His current address is 4312 Lorene Lane, Annandale, VA 22003.

Bob Spahn: Congratulations to Bob and his wife Nancy on their 26th wedding anniversary. They have four sons, the oldest being in business with Bob, the second in law school, the third an undergrad at Marquette, and the youngest a senior in high school. Bob has also completed his 26th year with Northwestern Mutual Life.

Class of 1960

Anthony J. Intintoli, Jr. (formerly Anthony J. Indence, Jr.) gives his address as 912 Georgia St., Vallejo, Ca 94590. He is running for mayor of Vallejo, CA in the November 3, 1987 election.

Class of 1966

Paul R. Ahr , President, The Altenahr Group, Ltd., gives his address as 225 S. Meramec Ave, Suite 1032, Clayton, MO 63105.

Class of 1968

James Ewing writes that his new address is 6715 Breckenridge Road, Lisle, IL 60532. He is the Principal of Spring Avenue School in LaGrange, Illinois.

Class of 1970

Kenneth Geuntert lists his current address as 2151 Tulip Rd., San Jose, CA 95128. He is the Editorial Director for Resource Publications, Inc. and the Editor of Festivals Magazine.

Class of 1977

Anne Dilenschneider-Codol gives her new address as 945 Moss Avenue, Chico, CA 95926. She is

the Associate Pastor of Trinity United Methodist Church in Chico.
Bill Holtsneider writes that he is a Senior Technical Writer. His address is 1150 Pedro St., San Jose, CA 95126.

Class of 1980

Lynn Joyce Hunter writes that she had a new son, Gregory John, on February 10, 1987. After the birth of her son, Lynn resigned her position as Manager, Program for Disabled Persons, to work half-time as Communications Coordinator, Catholic Charities, Archdiocese, St. Paul, Minnesota.. Her address is 1750 Dayton Avenue, St. Paul, MN 44104.
David Neild is Manager Corporate Development, MacMillan, Inc., 866 Third Avenue, NY, NY 10022. David is married and their first child, Genevieve Elizabeth, was born Nov. 3, 1987. His home address is 100 Theodore Fremel Ave., Apt. #A2F, Rye, NY 10580.

Class of 1982

Kevin Yoder reports that his new address is 23 East Tenth St., Apt. 505, New York, NY 10003. Kevis in an Attorney with Coudert Brothers.

Class of 1983

Tim Bozik writes that his knew address is 253 W. 73rd St., 9M, New York, NY 10023. He was recently married to Elizabeth Clark. Tim is an Editor for Prentice Hall Publishers.

Class of 1984

Jerry Mulligan and Caroline Masciale were joined in marriage on October 10, 1987 at Holy Trinity Church in Poughkeepsie, New York. Best wishes to the new couple!

Class of 1985
(Class Correspondent: Laurie Spurgin, c/o Church of St. Bonaventure, 901 East 90th St., Bloomington, MN 55420)

Editor's Note: On December 19th, 1987, Laurie Denn married Phillip Anthony Spurgin at Saint Bonaventure Church in Bloomington, Minnesota. Best wishes to the happy couple! We assume that this is why we have not received a report from her comparable to what she has supplied in the past, but she should understand that this excuse cannot be used repeatedly! The information given below has been supplied by the PLS office.
Thomas Berry continues a graduate student at the University of Pittsburgh. His new address is 5445 Claybourne St., Pittsburgh, PA 15232.
Maureen Loiello informs us she received her Master's Degree in Developmental Psychology in July 1987 from Notre Dame. She will be moving to Washington, DC in the fall of 1987. She may be contacted at her parents address: 2292 Whippoorwill Road, Charlottesville, VA 22901
Mark Melchior is at Yale pursuing his masters degree in religion with emphasis on church history and the Christian East. He can be contacted at Yale Divinity School, 409 Prospect St., Box #190A, New Haven, CT. 06510.
Mike Richerson: Congratulations to Mike on his winning a Rotary Scholarship to study philosophy of education at the University of Durham next year.
Mary Beth Wackowski gives her address as 30913 Mosby St., Alexandria, VA 22305. She is a Sales Representative, Society for International Development, and is involved in Parish Youth Ministry activities, Big Sister of Washington, Washington, DC.

Class of 1986
(Special thanks for the following to theClass Correspondent: Margaret Neis, 500 W. Fullerton, #517, Chicago, IL 60614)

Editor's Note: Just as we were going to press, we received word that your class correspondent has

just become engaged to her classmate Joe Kulis! We wish them every happiness and believe this information will clear up the mystery created by portions of the information supplied below on both Margaret and Joe.

Maureen Babis: No word from Maureen Babis. (See, guys, some things do change). No new address.

Char Beyer: According to Megan Koreman, Char is in her second year of JVC at the same pre-school job in Syracuse, NY. No new address for Char.

Mike Bolger: Mike has been busy re-reading (or is it just reading) Leviathan. He is in his second year of law school at DePaul. He is also working at a law firm a couple of days a week. Mike's address: 400 East Randolph, Apt. 3002, Chicago, IL 60601 (313) 856-1765.

Charles Boudreaux. No word from Charles Boudreaux.

Pete Bowen: Pete wrote to me from Kingsville, Texas. Kingsville is about 40 miles south of Corpus Christi, and there are no trees there. (It is considered "The Garden Spot of Texas," believe it or not.) Pete has been selected to fly jets in the Marine Corps. He will be "going to the boat" (translation: landing the jet on an aircraft carrier for the first five times) in February and March. Pete says, "Every flight is like a final exam with someone sitting behind you yelling (while) trying to avoid flying into the ground at 400 kts." Pete also mentioned his wedding plans!! Yes, there was a lucky few of us that met Angie at the Michigan State game. Pete and Angie will be married on June 4, 1988 in Dotham, Alabama. He wants people who will be in the area at that time to contact him. (It is a little difficult to track you all down!) Pete's address in Kingsville: 2901 So. Brahma, K-8, Kingsville, TX 78363.

Gerry Bradley: Gerry spent the summer in Washington, D.C. He is still in L.A. I don't have an updated address for Gerry.

Jan Buchanan: Jan Buchanan was married to Greg Becher on Oct. 10, 1987, Congratulations, Jan! I do not have an updated address for Jan at this time.

Erin Buckley: Erin is very glad she is near the half-way point of law school. Both Erin and J..J. Hearn (remember him?) are on the Law Review at George Washington. Erin is one of our California earthquake survivors. Her address: 8900 Iron Gale Ct., Potomac, MD 20854.

Tim Buckley: Unfortunately, I did not hear from Tim. I say unfortunately because everyone asked about you, Tim. WHERE ARE YOU?

Gary Chura: I had a couple of military sources on this one, but unfortunately no current address. Gary is the commander of a platoon of five tanks as a leading part of the Rapid Deployment Force. His group specializes in desert warfare. They are based at 29 Palms, California (a nice way of saying the Mojave Desert). It has been said that Gary is happy with this position (the location is debatable).

Jesus Campos: I assume Jesus is in his second year of Harvard law. No address.

Colm Connolly: No word from Colm.

Tom Considine: "Will someone tell me why we read this book?" I did hear from Tom, at last word he was selling swampland, I mean insurance, in Florida. No address.

John Dettling: According to Erin Buckley, John is at George Washington University's school of International Studies. He spent last year in London. No recent address for John.

Deirdre Erbacher: The information on Dierdre is from Katie Fogle. Dierdre lives in NYC with Carolyn Hagan. Dierdre has just returned from a vacation in Malaya. Dierdre also has a boyfriend with a British accent. Sorry, no current address.

Patrick Ettinger: Rumored (my source asked to be confidential) to be in Washington, DC. Supposedly he's working for some Government/Special Interest Board/Agency/Something along those lines. Pat, if we don't hear from you, you might be in Law School for the next Programma. Sorry, no current address.

Beth Fenner: This is my chance to reprimand Ms. Fenner, who by this time probably is a yuppie, but who also encouraged me to do this fiasco. Luckily, I did see Beth at the Michigan State game. Beth's address: 50 Green St., #202, Brookline, MA 02146.

Anne Marie Finch: Anne Marie spent the summer in Europe travelling and taking law classes in London. Anne Marie mentions that she saw Megan K. in a train station in Germany (see also Korman, Megan). She did mention that Megan was having a hard time keeping up with two classes and blames it on the California lifestyle. She also thanks Dr. R. Kilcup of Women in Love (how could you forget that movie) for Megan's switch to history. She would like to know where Charles Boudreaux is--he'll be in law school soon enough if I don't hear from him.

Anyhow, Anne Marie is living in Pasquerilla East as Assistant Rectress. She is interviewing everywhere, and she is doing research for a demi-god of a professor.

Katie Fogle: Katie is in Bloomington, IN working on her masters degree in the History and Philosophy of Science (and you call me the Nat. Sci. Queen). Katie also stares blankly into the ever-cloudy future. Katie lives at : 907 South Washington, Bloomington, IN 47401.

Marie Frank: Marie is on a Rotary scholarship in Scotland. She's having "the best time." (Marie, don't I remember you saying that while you were writing your essay?) Anyhow, our shy Marie has joined seven clubs including archery, riding, golf, and Scottish Ballroom dancing (oops, I forgot mountaineering). Obviously, Marie will not be seeing too much actual classroom activity. She says the people of St. Andrews are wonderful when she can understand them. She mentioned that mail would indeed be welcomed because the sun doesn't shine (now what kind of argument is that?) Marie's address: Room #63 University Hall, Kennedy Gardens, University of St. Andrews, St. Andrews, Fife/KY 16 9 DL SCOTLAND.

Timothy Gallagher: Tim is now a "folk hero" for the first year students at Georgetown Law School, according to himself. Congratulations, Tim. Sorry, no address.

Bill Goebel: Bill wrote to me from a ranch in New Mexico. First, Bill wants everyone to know that he did finish his senior essay! He really enjoys "cowboying," and he pointed out to me that philosopher/cowboys were in high demand for good money (he did mention company pick-ups). As it is, he is employed by a 75-year old retired lawyer named "Dub" who rises at 4:30 a.m. and rides all day! (I'm exhausted just thinking about it!) Bill is also working in a bar in Cimarron, N.M. If anyone is interested in some skiing, take note--Bill is 45 minutes away from all the hot spots, and the power is already piling up. Bill also wanted to know if Colm Connolly received "payment" from Tom Walker on a golf course wager for one miraculous putt. Colm??? Also, Bill wanted to let Dr. Crowe know that there was absolutely no light pollution in N.M., so he should hold his Nat. Sci. classes out there. Anyhow if you're in the rawhide mood, Bill's address: HCR 61 Box 10, Springer, New Mexico 87747.

Dan Groody: Dan's address: Holy Cross Novitiate, Marigreen Pines, Cascade, CO 80809

Carolyn Hagan: My scoop on Carolyn is from Katie Fogle. Carolyn shares an apartment in NYC with Deirdre. She is working as an editorial assistant for Glamour magazine. Sorry, no address.

John Joe Hearn: As far as I know he is attending George Washington Law School in Washington, DC.

Kate Hebert: Kate is in Spain studying at the University of Barcelona. She will be in Barcelona until Christmas (possibly later). She says the people in Spain are short. Her address: American Express Viajes, S.A., Paseo de Gracia, 101/08008 Barcelona.

Ann Marie Janairo: Ann Marie is still alive and well in Japan. She is still in Tokyo teaching conversation to Japanese college students, housewives, and businessmen. She says her teaching job is rather like being an entertainer (Is this what Dr. Jordan meant when he used to dance on tables?) She also says she's learned things from her students that they don't know they taught her. She fears they believe that when you speak English all manners and considerations can go by the wayside. She plans to be in Japan for another year, and then she hopes to go to grad school for music. She has been able to find some voice teachers in Japan who speak some English. Ann's feeling a little homesick, so send your greetings to Japan! Ann's address: #101 Marie Claire Rokunozaka/2-26-18 Nakai/Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 161/ JAPAN.

Mike Kennedy: Seen twice in Sough Bend by Bill Goebel after graduation. At that time he was taking classes and working in a medical research lab. (Where are you, Mike??) His address: 49 St. Rose, Boston, Mass. 02130.

Liz Kenney: Liz is on a Rotary Scholarship at the University of Heidelberg studying Comparative Literature. Liz would also like to mention that she is an "earthquake survivor," since she was in California at the time of the most recent big quakes. Liz would appreciate letters from people who are studying comparative literature of similar fields, because she is looking for direction to her studies. She sends Umatmungen and Kusse (hugs and kises). Her address is Neuenheimer Feld 687, 6900 Heidelberg, W. Germany.

Matt Kineen: According to Sean Reardon (and a few other sources), Matt is in Germany or Austria learning German. No current address.

Megan Korman: Megan spent the summer in Europe. She had a scholarship to study German at the Univ. of Regensburg for six weeks. She spent the rest of the summer traveling around Ireland, France, Czechoslovakia, and Spain. She also ran into Ann Marie Finch (complete coincidence)

at 6:30 a.m. in the Munich train station. Megan is now back in the country. She has switched from the comparative literature program to history. She is studying "Modern History" i.e. since 1789. She plans on staying at Berkeley a few more years (at least). Megan's address is: 2555 Virginia #209, Berkeley , CA 94709.

Charles Kromkowski: Charles is in graduate school at the University of Chicago. He studies political theory or some such thing. His address (for the 1987-88 school year): 5711 Kimbark Avenue, #2, Chicago, IL 60637. (312) 752-2092.

Mike Kueber: I did not hear from Mike.

Joe Kulis: Joe lives in Oak Park, and still works for the printing company. He is applying for the MBA program at the University of Chicago. I also heard rumors that he's dating some beautiful PLSer who graduated in '86. Any ideas? Joe's address: 855 Lake Street, #311/Oak Park, IL 60301. Joe's answering machine number (312) 524-0325.

Larry Lamanna: Larry is MIA. [Added at PLS office: Larry is living in South Bend and working for the People of Praise.]

Michael Leary: Mike is having "a very exciting time in the infantry." He is a platoon commander and will remain so for a few more months. He is stationed at Camp Pendleton, but his unit has done a good deal of traveling for specialized training. On tap: the Mojave Desert, the Sierra Mountains, Japan, Korea, and Okinawa. Mike wants everyone to know that he has a great place in San Clemente which is near the ocean, and he would love to have guests. (Mike will be there until May). San Clemente address: 245 Avenue Madrid, Apt. #6, San Clemente, CA (714) 498-1792. Mailing address while overseas until May: FCO 2/7, FPO San Francisco, CA 96602.

Maura Lee: As far as I know, Maura is still in Yap. (Peace Corps).

Felicia Leon: Felicia has returned from London, and now resides in West Virginia. She lives in a trailer, and asks for everyone to please say a prayer if you hear of any tornado or other natural disasters in the W.V. area. She is going to interview for the Peace Studies Program at ND (the masters program). Currently, Felicia works full-time at a day care center and loves it. She is also taking two night classes to prepare herself for grad work in International Relations. In addition, she works on the weekends as a photographer for WVU events! (Too bad you can't keep a little busier, Felicia!) Felicia would really like to hear from people. Her address: 989 Maple Drive., Box 10, Morgantown, WV 26505-2831.

Gerry McCafferty: Gerry wrote to me to make sure that no more rumors exist that she was still in law school. Gerry is living in Colorado and working in a shelter for the homeless. She is trying to decide if she will return to law school, and she also mentions that she is considering the pursuit of the philosophical life! Gerry would love to hear from some other PLS'ers--Her address in Colorado is: 1241 Steel St., Denver, CO 80206 (303) 355-7984.

Beth McCahill: No official or unofficial word on Beth McCahill.

Colleen McCloskey: Because I didn't hear from Colleen, it would seem safe to say that she is still in law school at Loyola in Chicago.

Maureen Madion: (info. courtesy Ms. Finch). Maureen transferred to ND Law School from Cooley in Michigan. Apparently Maureen makes frequent trips to New York. She can be written to at ND Law School (you guys know that address).

John Mangin & Kevin Quinn: I received a joint letter from John and Kevin written on Buffalo Law Review stationary. They haven't opened their own bar (yet), but they indeed threaten to when they have passed the bar. They partake of the typical law student's life, "School, work, drink*, drink, drink again, then eat if there's money left." (*Modest libations only.) They did mention some serious lottery investments too. You can write to Kevin and John at the Law Review: State University of New York/Faculty of Law and Jurisprudence/John Lord O'Brien Hall/Amherst Campus/Buffalo, NY 14260.

Dena Marino: No word from Dena.

Nancy Miceli: No word from Nancy.

John Mooney: The last time I talked to John, he was attending school to get certified to teach high school. John's address: 419 Ojibua Trail, Mount Prospect, IL 60056.

Gerry Murphy: I assume Gerry is still in law school at Buffalo.

Margaret Neis: Margaret spends most of her time organizing PLS newsletters--just kidding. I still work at the Newberry Library in Chicago. (I've been here for a year now). I am currently applying to grad. schools for philosophy (I think). I am dating some guy from PLS 1986--He's

ok I guess. Let me know if you're ever in town. My address: 500 W. Fullerton, #517, Chicago, IL 60614 (312)477-9171.

Bob Newhouse: Bob was one of our delinquents last year, so I was glad to hear from him. After graduation Bob spent three months in Europe, and returned to Houston. He worked in a Texas Commerce Bank as an "Account Representative" in the Securities Trading Department (does anyone else have a hard time picturing this?) Anyhow, it doesn't matter if you can picture it; Bob doesn't give himself ulcers anymore. He is currently at the University of Texas at Austin studying Art History as a Post-Baccalaureate student. He hopes to go on to grad school in the fall, but is undecided as to where that will be. His address: 2612 Guadalupe #513, Austin, TX 78705 (512) 477-8534.

Rachel Nigro: (also courtesy Ms. Finch) Rachel is still singing, and has started as a first year law student at Notre Dame (where?). Rachel spends a lot of time scoping in the Law School library and being in love.

Fausto Nolasco: Thanks to Cecilia Smith, we have some information on Fausto. He has entered the seminary in Connecticut. Fausto's address: Legionaries of Christ, 475 Oak Ave., Cheshire, CT 06410.

Sean Reardon: Sean is one of our "Early Bird" prizewinners. Sean is at the Red Cloud Indian School, but is now teaching photography and physics instead of English. He "loves" it, and is very comfortable with his volunteering position as well. In the next couple of years he plans to go to grad school--he is considering a program called "History of Consciousness" at UC Santa Cruz. Sean's address is Red Cloud Indian School, Pine Ridge, SD 57770. (605) 867-5782.

Meegan Reilly: As far as I know, Meegan is in her second year of law school at Georgetown Law. No address.

Steve Ross: I saw Steve the weekend of the Michigan State game. He is back from France. He was looking for a job in Louisiana. Steve's address: 21 Sedgefield Drive, Harahan LA 70123.

Liz Siegel: Liz is taking a little time off from philosophy grad school. She is still living in Texas at last word. Liz's address: 517 East 40th St., Austin, TX 78751.

Cecilia Smith: Cecilia is the other "Early Bird." She is currently in her second year at the Columbus School of Law (Catholic Univ.) in Washington, DC. Cecilia also worked as a clerk in a law firm until the end of October, so she could prepare for finals. She claims that nothing is going on in her life because she is desperately looking for a summer internship. Cecilia's address: 125 Michigan Ave., NE, Kerby 407C, Box 809, Washington, D.C. 20017. (202) 265-6431.

John Tallarida: John "pencils" people in for lunch. John is still working for Chubb Group Insurance in Chicago. John's address: 2912 N. Halstead, #2, Chicago, IL 1 60657. (312) 477-6091.

Class of 1987

Thomas Hardiman, who is now enrolled at Georgetown Law School, has won first place in an essay contest sponsored by the World Federalist Association in honor of the Bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution. This award includes a $1,000 prize and a one-semester internship with the World Federalist Association in Washington. His essay was a shortened version of his PLS senior essay: "The Constitutional Convention of 1787 and World Government: Lessons to Be Learned." Congratulations, Tom!

Daniel W. Smith recently accepted an offer from Basil Blackwell-a publisher of scholarly books based in Oxford England, and will be learning about the publishing business there.

****

Many Thanks
to
Contributors

Persons who have made contributions received at the P.L.S. office since the last issue for support of Programma and of the Progrm of Liberal Studies

Tim Bozik
James Ewing
Dick Gorman
Robert McClelland*
David Neild
Mary Schmidtlein**
A. J. Schwartz
William Sigler

Contributors to the Bird Award Fund

Donald Yeckel

Contributors to the Cronin Award Fund

Paul R. Ahr
John Duffy
William M. Kane
Donald Yeckel

Contributors to the Nutting Award Fund

Jeremiah Murphy*
Donald Yeckel

Contributors to the Rogers Award Fund

Felicia Leon
Mark Melchoir
Michael Rauenhorst
Mary Beth Wackowski

*Plus matching fund from the contributor's company.
**Gave to University, earmarked for PLS.