

PROGRAMMA

A Newsletter for Graduates of the Program of Liberal Studies
The University of Notre Dame
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A View from 215

Greetings once again to our many friends and supporters. Having recently returned from a semester on leave in London, I should first express my appreciation to Clark Power for his work as acting Chair, and to Mrs. Debra Kabzinski, our secretary, who performed many services for me and for the department in my absence "above and beyond call."

Teaching in London provided me with a new perspective on the London Program and also on the value of our form of education. It was an interesting and unusual context in which to conduct the new Seminar IV. The immediacy of the topical references in many of the books; the rich cultural context all around us; even the fact that we were doing the seminar in a complex urban city with many social problems accompanying its fine art, theater, music and architecture, made many of these books a new experience for me. I also could see some remarkable growth in the students themselves as they came to terms with the challenges of this new situation. The leave also provided me with the opportunity to bring to near completion my book dealing with the relations of German philosophy and early evolutionary theory in England.

One issue that emerged with some direct relevance to our Program was an understanding of the educational ideals which animated the formation of two institutions in London: one, University College, was founded in 1827 to be an institution which emphasized only practical arts and useful learning. Its inspirations were the philosophies of Francis Bacon and Jeremy Bentham. The latter still presides over University College—literally mummified—from his wooden cabinet in the foyer, surveying this domain of rational utility. The other, King's College, founded in opposition to University College by disciples of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, emphasized liberal education and the need for the study of literature, theology and classical languages. Its founders articulated the ideal of a complete education. This was to be a different kind of elite university from the Cambridge-Oxford model. It offered training in various specialized disciplines with the needs of a new technological and industrial society of concern. But it also was to be a university which sought to maintain an integrated notion of humanity in spite of such specialties.

The effect of the founding of King's College and the writings of its founders in the 1830s for John Henry Newman's reflections in his *Idea of the University* is not fully clear to me. But the associations between Newman and the Coleridge party is an issue which formed the topic of the doctoral dissertation of at least one of our graduates, Alan Crowley (Class of 1980). The founders of King's also spoke of liberal education as an Idea to be realized through study of the liberal arts. One work they cite is *Ueber die Idee der Universitäten* (1809) by a Dr. Heinrich Steffens, rector of the University of Berlin. Their ideal was to develop a fully cultivated humanity based upon

learning in the Classics.

In the context of the 1830s and 40s, these were matters of bitter struggle as the disciples of Bentham established departments of business, commerce, statistics, and other practical arts, carried out in an intentionally secular context. Kings sought to develop an educated leadership elite, where high culture and cultivated learning would characterize the graduate in whatever field they chose to enter. Today, little is in evidence of this great struggle in education. Both institutions form part of the University of London, and visitors to either facility would see little difference in the students or the curricular offerings. But the issue raised by this conflict is still with us as we pursue an integrated liberal education in a complex, results-oriented society.

Fortunately the great polarity between these two educational ideals evidenced in London in the 1830s need not, and does not in fact, manifest itself in the American context with the same bitterness and ideological partisanship. Perhaps at Notre Dame we are on the road to realizing the best blend of liberal learning and practical need. The historic struggle I have outlined in London between the defenders of elite learning and those advocating practical learning and democratic ideals also does not need to stand in such polarity. The contemporary debates in higher education in America over great books education, generated in part by Allan Bloom's *The Closing of the American Mind*, has also produced a response from none other than Mortimer Adler, the individual who played such an important role in the foundation of the Program at Notre Dame. Adler's alternative was made clear to us during his visit to the Program in 1988. He made a surprisingly pointed attack on Allan Bloom, and in response defended the importance of education in the classics not as a vehicle for elitist learning, but as a crucial means to develop a literate populace necessary for a fully functioning democracy.

Graduates often ask if we could give them a "Seminar VII-VIII" list for further reading. Some years ago such a list was published. But faculty and context change with time, and Brian Farmer ('89) solicited from the faculty its suggestions for a new list of this character. Except for the deletion of some titles which have now been incorporated into the regular seminar list, this list represents the choices of the recent faculty. We would be interested to hear from any of you on your reactions to some of these works.

As the Program continues to grow and change there are more new names to be added to the list of faculty. This past year completed the first year of teaching by our new musicologist, Dr. Linda Austern, who has continued the strong presence of fine art and music in the Program and brings us expertise in Elizabethan music. Professor Michael Waldstein, who has been teaching with us in a visiting capacity for the past two years, joins us this year as a regular faculty member in the Theology and Philosophy components. He brings to the Program expertise in biblical studies, having completed his second doctoral degree this past November from the Harvard Divinity School. He had earlier received a doctorate in philosophy from the University of Dallas. Professor Patrick Powers of Assumption College, whom many of you knew from the London Program, a specialist in political theory, taught ICH and seminar for us in the spring as a visiting faculty member. We will have with us again this year Professor Terry Brogan, a specialist in English Poetry and current editor-in-chief of the *Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry* who will be teaching in the Poetry and Seminar components. Professor Patrick Wilson completed a year as a visitor with us, teaching in the Seminar and Foundations of Thought tutorials. He will be joining the philosophy faculty of Hampden-Sydney College in Virginia. Professor André Goddu will be leaving us to take a position teaching history of science at Stonehill College in Massachusetts. I join the faculty in wishing him the best for the future in this new position.

This coming fall, Professor Glenn Olsen, a prominent medievalist from the department of history at the University of Utah, will conduct the first semester ICH tutorials. Professor Olsen is former director of the Honors Program at Seattle University, and two of his daughters have been students in the Program. We have also added to the faculty Dr. Cornelius O'Boyle from Cambridge University's Department of History and Philosophy of Science as a new faculty member in the science component. He is also a medievalist with broad training in both medieval and modern history. Professors Kent Emery, David Schindler, and Walter Nicgorski will be on

leave status this year. We welcome back Dr. Katherine Tillman from a sabbatical year working on her favorite person, John Henry Newman.

I am also pleased to welcome to the permanent tenured faculty Fr. Nicholas Ayo, C.S.C. and Stephen Fallon. Fr. Ayo has served this year in the new post of undergraduate advisor with tireless service. His book *The Creed as Symbol* was selected by the Clergy book service as one of its featured selections. Stephen Fallon, an outstanding Milton scholar, continues as a mainstay of the literature component. His book *Degrees of Substance: Milton and Seventeenth-Century Philosophy* is currently in press at Cornell University Press.

In the previous number, Professor Clark Power touched on some of the issues which we have faced as we have revised the seminar list. It has been important for us as a group of scholars, teachers, and fellow pupils of the great books to consider the issues raised by our critics. These are criticisms we hear from several directions, whether they be the voices of students who feel we are unengaged with the issues of relevance to the moment, or from high-level scholars speaking from various positions of Deconstructionism and those concerned to push the claims of the social construction of knowledge. Engaging in dialogue with our critics does not mean capitulation to them. Professor Schindler's essay in this issue displays additional attention to some of the deeper philosophical dimensions of this challenge to the notion of a canon, and some ways in which a response is possible.

I should not close without thanking all our supporters for their contributions to the Program in various forms. The principal on the Cronin and Nutting awards has been substantially increased through these contributions. The Otto Bird award for the finest senior essay could still use some assistance. The Stephen Rogers fund has been built up to the point that we expect to award this year a grant of \$1000 to a deserving student intent on studying in the Program who otherwise might not be able to attend the University. Contributions generally to the Program assist us in many other ways. Thank you for this generous support.

As a final note, I close by thanking Professor Michael Crowe for his tireless service as editor. His skill in editing has been at a professional level, and he has developed the alumni/ae networks into a major feature of each issue. He is the recipient of a major NSF grant for the next three years to work on the John Herschel correspondence. I welcome to the editor's desk Professor Stephen Fallon. I am sure his skills as a scholar and writer will maintain the quality of the publication.

Phillip R. Sloan
Chair, Program of Liberal Studies

From the Editor's Desk

As usual, the majority of my column consists of information supplied by the faculty on their activities over the past six months. Before proceeding to that section, however, I wish to extend all best wishes to Professor Steve Fallon as the new editor of *Programma* and to thank all the faculty and alums who have contributed so much to *Programma* during the four years I've have served as its editor. Special thanks to our Chair, Phil Sloan, who has been very generous in advising on every issue and to Debra Kabzinski, whose secretarial skills have been of the utmost value. And I wish to say a few words about the contents of this issue.

In addition to the very thoughtful essay contributed by Professor Schindler, the Cronin Award winning essays of Susan Clements and Peter Lyon, and the usual section of information on alumnae/i, this issue contains three valuable contributions from PLS graduates. As Professor Sloan has noted, Brian Farmer (PLS 1989) conducted the survey of faculty opinion on books that deserve consideration as additions to the Great Books list. Also John McGinnis (PLS 1976), who is now completing doctoral work in Finance at Pennsylvania State University, has provided a response to Professor Power's "View from 215," which appeared in the last issue as well as a

book review of a recent volume that should be of interest to readers. Many thanks to Brian and to John, whose contributions have given substance to my desire to make *Programma* more interactive with its readership. Both Professors Sloan and myself hope that these contributions will stimulate others to submit materials for inclusion in future issues so as to make them more lively and engaging. We anticipate a regular column for alumnae/i responses and contributions. It is asked that these be short, in good taste, and open to editorial revision.

Faculty News

Fred Crosson is the President of the American Catholic Philosophical Association this year (1990-91). The book he is most impressed with on re-reading is Ralph Ellison's *Invisible Man*, and is still trying to understand *Don Quixote*.

Michael Crowe has recently received in conjunction with Professor Barbara Turpin, now Director of Graduate Admissions at ND, a grant from the National Science Foundation to prepare an annotated calendar of the approximately 15,000 letters to and from Sir John Herschel, a leading nineteenth-century British scientist. One of the largest grants ever received for research in the A&L college, it will support their research over the next three years. In March, Dover brought out Professor Crowe's *Theories of the World from Antiquity to the Copernican Revolution* (\$5.95). This summer, besides beginning work on *A Calendar of the Correspondence of Sir John Herschel*, he is completing work on *A Guide to the Royal Society John Herschel Letters and Manuscripts*, which he is editing and which will be published by University Publications of America in conjunction with its issuing of a twenty-eight reel microfilm of the portion of the Herschel correspondence and manuscripts preserved at the Royal Society in London.

Steve Fallon is delighted to have the tenure hurdle behind him, but he wants to dispel rumors that he is selling off his books in order to buy golf clubs and water skis. He looks forward to many years teaching in the program and writing on Renaissance and seventeenth-century literature and philosophy. His article on Milton's writings on divorce has just appeared in *Politics, Poetics, and Hermeneutics in Milton's Prose* (Cambridge University Press, 1990).

Walter Nicgorski is currently occupied directing, for a second time, an NEH seminar for teachers on the moral and political theory of Cicero. He is editing and looking forward to the appearance, early in 1991 of a special issue of *The Review of Politics* on the thought of Leo Strauss. Professor Nicgorski was delighted and encouraged to meet PLS grad Kathy Kersten at a conference of the Madison Center on reviewing American education and then to have Sue Selner in his audience when he recently lectured in Dallas on Cicero's *De Re Publica*.

Clark Power is organizing an international conference on moral education that will be held at the University of Notre Dame from November 7 to November 10. Over 100 educational psychologists, sociologists, and philosophers from 30 different countries will be presenting.

David Schindler published an article, "Mort de la raison, résurrection du Verbe de Dieu," in the March-April issue of *Communio: Revue Catholique Internationale*; represented the North American *Communio* at its recent international meeting in Freiburg, Germany; and was appointed to the Board of Advisors at the newly established Center for Christianity and the Common Good at the University of Dallas. He has received research grants from the Earhart Foundation, the Wilbur Foundation, and the Institute for Scholarship in the Liberal Arts (ISLA) at Notre Dame, in connection with his sabbatical next year for work on his book on "Rationality and the Task of a Public Theology" (centered in the theology of Hans Urs von Balthasar).

Phillip Sloan has recently returned from a semester of partial leave in London, where he also taught the Seminar IV section in the London Program for the PLS students. He is currently completing his critical edition of Richard Owen's Hunterian Lectures, delivered in London in 1837, which are intended as a contribution to his work on early Darwinism. These will be published jointly by the British Museum of Natural History and probably by the University of Chicago press. During this period he was also affiliated with the Wellcome Institute for the History of Medicine in London, which had awarded him a travel grant. He delivered guest seminars in London, Cambridge, Leeds and Paris during this period. He will also be serving this year as a Visiting Lecturer for the History of Science Society.

Katherine Tillman at the time of publication is in England, where she lectured at a conference on Cardinal Newman in Oxford and is carrying out further research on him. In March,

she presented a paper on Newman at St. Thomas University in Houston, and in May, she led two seminars on Newman at Newman Centenary Celebration at the University of Pennsylvania. She recently published a review essay of Ian Ker's *John Henry Newman* in the *Review of Politics*.

Faculty Address Update

Many of you would like to keep in touch with former faculty. The following address changes should be noted.

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Faculty Editor

Michael J. Crowe

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**CAN THE HUMANITIES SURVIVE
ON THE MODERN COLLEGE CAMPUS?
ON MEANING, DECONSTRUCTION, AND THE DEATH OF GOD**
By David L. Schindler

Opening Semester Address, Program of Liberal Studies
January, 1990

The juxtaposition of my title and subtitle is likely to be jarring. For what it suggests is that the survival of the humanities in the modern university is linked in some way with the survival of God in the modern university. And indeed this quaint, and to be sure controversial, claim is just what I propose to defend. Lynne Cheney of the NEH, in her report on "The State of the Humanities," is at pains to urge that the questions posed in the modern academic curriculum not lose their central focus on what concerns us most deeply as human beings. What I wish to consider in the present lecture is some of the conditions necessary for keeping alive those questions. More precisely, I propose to direct attention to issues concerning the foundations of meaning.

Unless our language in some significant sense means something, signifies something definite and intelligible, we can hardly move on to consider with seriousness what it is that is true or good with respect to what it means to be human. And yet it is just the presupposition of meaning, of the intelligibility of language as a sign, that can no longer be so readily granted. In what follows I will attempt to bring into relief what seems to me to have been involved in the demise—or deconstruction—of meaning, and in turn to be required in any effort at reconstruction.

I.

It may induce puzzlement—or it may not at all—that an essay which has begun by linking the survival of the humanities with the survival of God should turn first to the writings of Friedrich Nietzsche. But, as we shall see, Nietzsche gets us immediately to the point.

Nietzsche is withering in his attack on the conventions which have prevailed in liberal Enlightenment culture generally, and in the academy in particular. This attack in its various forms and expressions might be said to bear on what Nietzsche sees as the smallness of the modern soul: a narrowness of soul which for him is matched only by its superficiality. For Nietzsche, we live in a "fragile, broken time of transition" (*The Gay Science*, n. 338). "Nihilism stands at the door" (*The Will to Power*, p. 7). "The ice that still supports people today has become very thin; the wind that brings the thaw is blowing; we ourselves who are homeless constitute a force that breaks open ice and other all too thin 'realities'" (GS, n. 338). "After such vistas and with such a burning hunger in our conscience and knowledge [science] (in *Wissen und Gewissen*), how could we still be satisfied with *present-day man*? It may be too bad but it is inevitable that we find it difficult to remain serious when we look at his worthiest goals and hopes, and perhaps we do not even bother to look any more" (GS, n. 347).

Nietzsche goes on, indicating the presuppositions which impel him in his criticisms: "Another ideal runs ahead of us, a strange, tempting, dangerous ideal to which we should not wish to persuade anybody because we do not readily concede the *right to it* to anyone: the ideal of a spirit who plays naively—that is, not deliberately but from overflowing power and abundance—with all that was hitherto called holy, good, untouchable, divine; . . ." (GS, n. 347). And again: ". . . the world has become 'infinite' for us all over again, inasmuch as we cannot reject the possibility that *it may include infinite interpretations*. Once more we are seized by a great shudder; but who would feel inclined immediately to deify again after the old manner this monster of an unknown world?" (GS, n. 336).

Now Nietzsche is a much too complex figure to have his meaning easily captured by these brief quotations. But the suggestion here of the free and abundant play of the spirit, and of a world which has opened itself to an infinity of interpretations, reminds us of the contemporary movement among philosophers called *Deconstruction*. And thus we may turn to Jacques Derrida, one of these "deconstructionists" and a twentieth century successor to Nietzsche, to help us sharpen the implications of what Nietzsche is about.

Derrida, echoing Nietzsche, criticizes Western thought in terms of what he calls its “logocentrism.” Logocentrism “supports the determination of the being of the entity as presence.”¹ Or, to put it more sharply for our purposes, logocentrism presupposes that meaning is present to us, at least in principle, in the form of simple identity. (The meaning of *x* is present and in principle accessible to us as simply *x*.) Now, according to Derrida, however wrongheaded logocentrism has always been, at least in the pre-modern period there was recognition of the essential link between meaning so understood as a present and identifiable *logos*, and the Christian *Logos*. With the secularization of the post-Enlightenment West, this link has been severed, but logocentrism nonetheless persists.

But this, then, is just Derrida’s point: the semantic notion of what he calls the “transcendental signified”—that convergent object of reference to which all signs are somehow directed and which lies at the heart of logocentrism—is inextricably bound up with the sense of an eternal *logos* pervading the universe. To put it crudely, meaning and intelligibility presuppose God. But let us permit Derrida to express all of this in his own way: The relation between signifier (*signans*) and signified (*signatum*)—the very idea of the sign—belongs “in a profound and implicit way to the totality of the great epoch covered by the history of metaphysics, and in a more explicit and more systematically articulated way to the narrower epoch of Christian creationism and infinitism when these appropriate the resources of Greek conceptuality” (OG, p. 13).

Derrida proceeds:

as the face of pure intelligibility, [semiological or, more specifically, linguistic ‘science,'] refers to an absolute *logos* to which it is immediately united. This absolute *logos* was an infinite creative subjectivity in medieval theology: the intelligible face of the sign remains turned toward the word and the face of God.

Of course, it is not a question of ‘rejecting’ these notions; they are necessary and, at least at present, nothing is conceivable for us without them. It is a question at first of demonstrating the systematic and historical solidarity of the concepts and gestures of thought that one often believes can be innocently separated. The sign and divinity have the same place and time of birth. The age of the sign is essentially theological. Perhaps it will never *end*. Its historical *closure* is, however, outlined (p. 13f.).

Where I wish to direct attention, then, is to Derrida’s claim that “the sign and divinity have the same place and time and birth”; that “the age of the sign is essentially theological.” As Nietzsche relentlessly reminds us, God is dead. God has had nothing direct or internal to do with the meaning—the mind or order(ing)—of Western culture for quite some time now. And yet the sign lingers. To be sure, the nature of and foundations for the sign have shifted. No longer do we naively appeal to a Divine *Logos* which undergirds the intelligibility in and of things and their linguistic expression. Rather man gives things and language their intelligibility: *theos* has been replaced by *anthropos*, in a variety of ways. But it is just the deception implied here that Derrida wishes to unmask. There is a “systematic and historical solidarity” of the logic of things and the *Logos*. If God goes, so go the foundations of meaning. Nonetheless, and failing to pay heed, modern man wants it both ways: wants God removed from the “logic” of things, but wants then innocently to reconstruct that “logic,” now precisely on his or her own terms. Derrida’s point is merely that such an effort to reconstruct “logic” in this way is not at all innocent.

It is helpful to recall here Nietzsche’s madman, who says that he has “come too early.” “[The] tremendous event [of the death of God] is still on its way, still wandering; it has not yet reached the ears of men. Lightning and thunder require time; . . . deeds, though done, still require time to be seen and heard” (GS, n. 125). In a sense, Derrida represents the return of this madman, insisting that the requisite time has now passed: it is time now for the death of God to be seen and heard in its full implications. Intelligibility—identifiable meaning—does not, and cannot, outlive God. Rather, following the death of God, we stray “as through an infinite nothing” (GS, n. 125).

In short, Derrida, in taking aim at the logocentrism which persists, albeit in wounded form, despite the loss of its foundations, is merely carrying through Nietzsche’s dictum that it is sometimes necessary to give a robust shove to what has already begun to topple.

What follows from all of this, that is, if one accepts Derrida’s linking of sign and divinity, is

¹Of *Grammatology* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1976), 12.

evident: if one would rescue the sign, one must just so far restore divinity. This seems so banal as to be scarcely worthy even of being stated. Derrida acknowledges the truth of this only already to have rejected the legitimacy and possibility of the resurrection of God. Christians in their turn are inclined to acknowledge the truth of the link of sign and divinity, only to dismiss the seriousness of the issues raised by Derrida: Christians know that God exists, and hence know in advance that meaning cannot unravel into endless difference, as Derrida asserts. My proposal is that matters are not so simple as these facile alternatives would seem to suggest. My concern will be to focus principally on the second alternative: to suggest what is required for a Christianity which would meet the full thrust of the challenge occasioned by Derrida.

II.

There is a way of reinserting God as the foundation of meaning, but, as it were, after the manner of the foundation for a house: that is, as something which is necessary for support, but which nonetheless remains simply outside of or external to what it is that is supported. The God who is construed as the foundation of meaning in this sense has been a familiar sort in the modern period. I have in mind the patterns of liberal and mechanistic thought which have prevailed in, though of course do not exhaustively account for, modernity.

Liberalism displaces God by moving God to the margins or gaps of culture and consciousness: God is placed simply outside of the cosmos—of the discrete instances of being and meaning which make up our world; God affects the world, but only from outside and in terms of its movement rather than (also) from within and in terms of its internal structure or logic. Mechanism refers to the same sort of displacement of God, as it were, to the outskirts of the cosmos. But what the term “mechanism” does is now make explicit the nature of the intelligibility which has typically resulted from this displacement which has left God and God’s mind simply external to the cosmos. The intelligibility is that of the machine. The intelligibility is that of discrete entities which are simply identifiable in their externality to one another, and thus the understanding of which must be in terms of the controlling and manipulative effect of each on the others. The paradigms here of course are Descartes and Francis Bacon. Descartes insists that meaning is best gotten at through doubt and analysis: staying at a distance while breaking up meaning into its ever-smaller clearly and distinctly identifiable parts, which are subsequently forced into relation with each other. Bacon in his turn tells us that “knowledge is power.”

Of course Descartes and Bacon do not account exhaustively for all forms of liberalism and mechanism, even as liberalism and mechanism do not account exhaustively for all forms of thought in the modern period. I trust I need not belabor this obvious point here. At the same time, I take it that anyone who has occupied a chair in a modern classroom has experienced liberal and mechanistic patterns of thought in the sense indicated.

But I introduced this present line of thought in the context of suggesting that the proposal that God must be resurrected as the “foundation” for the logic of things risks being trivialized. The trivialization results from a failure to notice the ambiguity carried in the idea of “foundation.” “Foundation” can indicate what supports in a merely mechanical fashion. A God who is a foundation in this sense remains essentially indifferent to—because simply outside of—the meanings, the inner structure or logic, of the cosmos; or, if concerned with those meanings, then concerned to exercise what is now largely manipulative power and control over them.

Now of course most Christians would reject the cruder versions of the liberal and mechanistic God who serves as a foundation for the world and its meanings in this way—the crude version given expression, for example, in the Deism of the eighteenth century. But what is not so clearly recognized is how even a putative traditional Christianity in the modern period itself often shares the presuppositions of liberal and mechanical patterns of thought, that is, even as it would reject the cruder sense of those presuppositions. I refer to a Christian theology—and I understand Christian theology here to include streams of both Protestant and Catholic theology—which would emphasize the transcendence of God to the cosmos to the exclusion of God’s immanence within the cosmos; which would separate—that is, make merely extrinsic to each other—grace (the supernatural) and nature; which would emphasize God’s distance from the world to the neglect of God’s intimate involvement with the world. A Christianity which would thus stress the distance of God from the world of course typically does so with the intention of protecting God’s

transcendence, and this is in direct contrast with many liberals who, on the contrary, would want merely to keep God out of our worldly affairs, and thereby to safeguard the autonomy of worldly beings—and meanings. But, paradoxically, the end result is in one decisive respect the same: a world without God or in turn a world of meaning without God (what I, following many others, would call secularization). The end result is precisely a world whose God is merely external and whose rationality finds its model in the machine.

My suggestion, then, is that this understanding of God and rationality misses the radical thrust of Nietzsche's and Derrida's criticisms, and does so in a way which bears at once on God and on rationality.

First, then, with respect to God. What Nietzsche's criticisms should help make clear to us is that a God who no longer affects directly and from within the workings of the cosmos is a God who is dead. A God who is truly God must affect everything. A God who in some significant sense is not everywhere and does not affect everything, and every aspect of everything, is not infinite but finite. A God who remains outside of the cosmos is a God whose being leaves off where the being of the cosmos begins, whose being thereby reaches its boundary or limit—its *finis*—where the boundary or limit of the cosmos takes up. Such a God, once again then, is a finite God, and a finite God is dead: a God who is precisely not effective—and hence alive—*within* the cosmos.

This of course is evident in a fairly straightforward way in the cruder versions of liberalism and mechanism to which I have referred. But the more important point which I want to underscore here is that this is also true, albeit often unwittingly and in a more subtle way, in the modern Christianity which would emphasize the transcendence of God to the world after the manner of a cause which remains merely external to its effect.¹ Such a conception of transcendence entails, *is*, exactly the finitizing of God which occurs in liberalism, however much the language of infinity may continue to be used.

What I am getting at here, then, can be indicated once again with reference to Nietzsche's madman, when he says that he has come too early. That is, the lightning and thunder of this tremendous event which has occurred in modernity have yet to be seen and heard. Liberal and mechanistic patterns of thought, even when they turn up in more subtle and seemingly more benign versions within Christianity, are but half-way stations on the way to the death of God. Or rather they are already forms of the death of God which simply have not yet had their requisite time to be seen and heard. They are but the West's timid and cowardly way of killing God, in contrast to the robust and resolute way of the East.

But the matter gets still more complicated. For even if Christians would now wish to restore God, that is, by way of restoring God's true infinity, what they must recognize is that meaning itself has in the meantime unraveled. The meaning which we had in the meantime detached from God and then in turn assumed we could give a simple identity, now on our own terms, has turned out, as it were, not to be all that it was cracked up to be. The meaning which we had, in our bourgeois comfort, given the simple identity proper to a machine turns out not to be present so simply and identifiably. On the contrary, we find that that meaning, when we press beyond the surface identity we moderns have given it, slips and slides and won't stay still. Having evacuated meaning of its relation to God, we modern liberals have thereby made the way ready for the Deconstructionists, who tell us what is now the truth: the depths of meaning are empty. Meaning, when we scratch below its surface, turns out now not to be turning into any center; on the contrary it appears to be turning outward, dispersing, *ad infinitum*.

This, then, is what I wish to suggest with respect to those Christians who would defend logocentrism, who would insist on both the sign and its theology: that such persons, insofar as they stand in the liberal tradition which has been so strong in modernity, risk reinstating a God whose relation to the world will remain merely external, and reinstating a meaning whose identity will remain simple. The risk, in other words, is that these persons will continue to give both the sign and its theology the form of a machine, however much that machine might now be refined and dressed up and polished.

But this, it seems to me, would be exactly to miss the radical issue forced into the open by

¹On the conception of God as "outside" the world as a falsification of the authentic Christian tradition, see Josef Pieper, *Living the Truth* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1989), ch. 2, n. 10; 47-49.

Deconstruction: the mechanistic God of the liberal tradition is a God who has already died and who, we must now recognize, has taken meaning—the mechanistic meaning of the same liberal tradition—with him to the grave. In a word: a mechanistic God is a dead God; a mechanistic meaning is a dead meaning. (cf. Nietzsche, *GS*, n. 373). To be sure, Derrida signals the death of God and meaning, not to resurrect them, but on the contrary to turn that death now into an achievement. The feeble—because merely implicit—nihilism of modernity must give way to the energetic nihilism of postmodernity.

III.

What, then, are we to do? How do we save meaning, logocentrism, in the face of the alternatives sketched here of a defense which is that of mechanism and a rejection which is that of nihilism?

The answer I wish to propose lies in what Derrida, as we have already seen, calls Christian creationism and infinitism. This proposal of course can only seem to be highly paradoxical, indeed question-begging. In an important sense, Christian creationism and infinitism is exactly what modern Christianity has understood itself to be defending in its defense of logocentrism, and what Derrida in turn has understood himself to be rejecting in his rejection of logocentrism. But this merely leads me now to make explicit my claim which has been left implicit thus far: both the conventional modern (liberal) Christian defense of logocentrism and the deconstructionist rejection of logocentrism have turned on giving the logos the face of a machine. Both center meaning in a logic which is that of simple identity, that of a presence which is simply identifiable. And thus follow the alternatives of either defending meaning as the simple identity proper to the machine, or rejecting meaning by emptying it into ongoing difference.

My suggestion is that there is a third alternative, and that this third alternative is in fact the one required by Christian creationism and infinitism, properly understood. In the present forum it will have to suffice to record the main principles of this third alternative.

These main principles are two: first, a God who is truly infinite affects all of our meanings all of the time; secondly, a God who is a creative Logos affects those meanings in terms of giving them a logos—a form or a logic. But the crucial question in the context of the foregoing is of course how this is so. And so we turn immediately to a third summary statement: God affects all of our meanings by giving them the form or logic of love. With this last statement, then, we come to the heart of what I wish to propose. What an authentic Christian creationism and infinitism requires is that the meaning whose identity has been assumed to be that proper to a machine be transformed into a meaning whose identity is rather that proper to love.

Put in its starkest terms, what all of this implies on the one hand is that meaning is never present as a simple identity, in contrast to the mechanistic presuppositions of the liberal tradition; what it implies on the other hand is that meaning, in no longer presenting itself as a simple identity, nonetheless is not thereby evacuated into simple and ongoing difference, in contrast to the nihilism of Deconstruction. On the contrary, a meaning which finds its logos or form in love will be one which maintains its identity, but nonetheless now does so only *from within relation*.

To make sense of what is being suggested, we may recall the retrieval in this century of what may be called, loosely, the classical-patristic theological tradition. Three achievements of that retrieval are particularly pertinent here. First of all, against the backdrop of a post-Tridentine dualism of nature and grace, and indeed of a theological rationalism which left God abstract and remote from the world, Henri de Lubac worked to restore God as the infinite reality who is the deepest center and principle of all created entities.¹ As St. Augustine put it, “You have made us for yourself, and our heart is restless until it rests in you” (*Confessions*, Book I, Ch. 1); or again: “You fill all things and you fill them all with your entire self” (*Confessions*, Book I, Ch. 3). What is implied here, then, is that relation to God on the part of finite beings is not adventitious: not something which is merely added on to their already constituted identity. On the contrary, relation

¹See, for example: *The Discovery of God* (New York: P.J. Kenedy, 1960); *The Mystery of the Supernatural* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1967); *The Religion of Teilhard de Chardin* (New York: Desclee, 1967). For a helpful overview of de Lubac’s work, see Francesco Bertoldi, “The Religious Sense in Henri de Lubac,” *Communio* (Spring, 1989), pp. 6-31.

to God is “constitutive” of finite beings.¹

But this requires deepening, and thus we turn to a second achievement of this theological retrieval. For the relation to God which is “constitutive” of each finite entity is established only in and through the Word incarnate in Jesus Christ (John 1:1-4). That is, relation to God comes only in a christological and hence trinitarian form. And that form is *communio*—or love. But of course the point is that the nature of *communio* is given precisely in the form of the Trinity and in turn in the form of Jesus Christ. God the Father has his identity, as it were, only in the simultaneous pouring out of himself into his Word, whom he then receives back in the unity of the Holy Spirit. Jesus Christ, as Word and as Son, likewise finds his identity only in giving it away, indeed to the point of death, an identity which is thereby not lost but returned to the Father, now as opened to, to be shared with, the entire cosmos. Finally, then, all things which come to be have their created identity only as themselves formed (already and not yet) in and through Jesus Christ and therefore in and through the *relation of communio* which Christ is.²

Where all of this points, then, is to recognition that the identity of all being, of each and every being and of every aspect of every being, is realized only in relation, that is, in the relation which in its primary sense is *communio*. Now it is clear from what has been said that the fullness of this *communio* is given only in the Trinity and in Jesus Christ. But the present point—and this is the third achievement of the theological retrieval to which I wish to draw attention—is that this trinitarian and in turn christological revelation of God provides the ground for an analogy of being—that is, from within the analogy of faith.³ In other words, a trinitarian-God-centered and in turn God-in-Christ-centered view of the cosmos requires understanding all created entities in terms of a logic of *communio*, of love: a logic, that is to say, according to which relation is the condition of their very being. To be sure, this logic is realized in its purest form only in spiritual beings (who, as spiritual, have the capacity for full mutuality). But what the Christian doctrine of creation nonetheless requires is that this relational identity which is proper to love be affirmed in principle, that is *analogously*,⁴ of every entity and every aspect of every entity in the cosmos.⁵

What has been indicated here as a matter of principle of course raises questions of the most far-reaching sort. What happens, for example, when we turn back to the academy, and consider the work of analysis of texts, gathering of evidence, and marshalling of argument which goes on

¹Cf., for example, Emile Mersch, *Morale et Corps Mystique*, 4th ed. (Paris, 1955), 26: “It is a total relation also, in this sense, that it affects not merely some modality of our being, but absolutely all that we are.”

P. 27: “It is a constituting relation and not an adventitious one.” “*Esse ad*, for us as for every finite being, is to be.”

P. 25: “This relation toward God, of our being and of every finite being, is religion.”

²The work of Hans Urs von Balthasar generally is central for what is suggested in this paragraph. Also see Joseph Ratzinger, *Introduction to Christianity* (New York: Seabury, 1969), esp. 105-204; and Norbert Hoffmann, “Atonement and the Ontological Coherence between the Trinity and the Cross,” in: *Towards a Civilization of Love*, ed. Mario Luigi Ciappi, et al. (San Francisco, 1985), 213-266.

³Cf. the formula of Chalcedon: the distinctness (of natures) in Jesus Christ is given only in the *relation* of unity (of person). See especially here, then, Balthasar’s argument that the analogy of faith includes within itself the analogy of being, and that the analogy of being becomes concrete only within the analogy of faith, in *Karl Barth: Darstellung und Deutung Seiner Theologie* (Cologne, 1971), 390, and, generally, 263-397. See also Balthasar’s *The Glory of the Lord*, vol. 1, (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1982), 679, where he suggests that, in the final analysis, the world is God’s “body,” that is, on the basis of the principle not of pantheism but of the hypostatic union; and Joseph Ratzinger, “Zum Personenverständnis in der Theologie,” *Dogma und Verkündigung* (Munich, 1973), pp. 217-19, where he argues that Christ ought not to be treated simply as an ontological exception (“einmalige ontologische Ausnahme”), but as an index for understanding the nature of man (that is, relation reveals the deepest meaning of person). On this latter point, see also Ratzinger’s *Introduction*, 132 and 135 f. Finally, see Pope John Paul II, *Dominum et Vivificantem*, no. 50, on the cosmic dimension of the Incarnation.

⁴According to the spirit of what was enunciated at the Fourth Lateran Council, in true analogy we must affirm the difference to be greater than the similarity — though of course without denying the simultaneous unity in difference which is required for preventing analogy from sliding off into equivocity.

⁵A certain level of interiority and relation as proper to every being — including all material being — in the cosmos is entailed in Ratzinger’s affirmation of the primacy of the *logos* (idea, freedom, love) in the Christian belief in creation. See *Introduction*, 104-115. On the interiority of all created entities, that is, as the ontological condition for their being understood truly as God’s *gift*, see Kenneth L. Schmitz, *The Gift: Creation* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1982).

there—indeed which is the very soul of the academy. The term “analysis” of course means, literally, “breaking up.” And thus the academy instructs us to study things—to give them meaning—by breaking them up: by reducing the whole or larger unities of things into manageable—i.e., more readily and precisely identifiable—parts. Of course, there are very different versions of this in the sciences and the humanities. What all of these have in common is nonetheless the impetus for breaking up and controlling. Now breaking up and controlling is the condition *sine qua non* for developing arguments, that is, as distinct from engaging in what is merely loose talk. If I do not belabor this point, it is only because I take it to be obvious. My purpose here is merely to bring into relief what by now should already have been noticed: namely, that breaking up entities and their meanings, seeking to give them identity, is in fact not the innocent matter it has so often in modernity been assumed to be—because it is possible to give identity not only after the manner of the machine, but also after the manner of love. Indeed, what should now be clear is that giving meaning the simple identity proper to a machine is but atheism unfolded into a “method”: it is the death of God made effective in our inquiry. My proposal, then, is simply that it is possible, instead, to give meaning the relational identity proper to love—and thereby to unfold trinitarian theism into a “method.”¹

Working through the detail of the differences between the two “methods” or “logics” indicated here is a large if necessary and important task, but one which is nonetheless beyond our purview. Our present purpose is merely to indicate the basic principle of these differences. But even within this limited context it needs to be emphasized that the distinction we have noted in principle between the two logics is *not* a distinction by way of exclusion. That is, the point of the distinction is not to eliminate the identity proper to the machine but to relationalize it. The burden of a logic of love, in other words, is not altogether to eliminate the distance and externality and forceful activity which are the way of the machine; but merely to insist that these features be seen as secondary, that they be situated in the context of interiority and relation which is always prior and more basic — that is, once again, assuming trinitarian theism rather than atheism as one’s basic horizon.

If I might summarize what is being proposed here, then, I would say that the logic of the machine has its paradigm in Descartes, and that the logic of love finds a model in a Marcel or a Pieper.²

V.

With this, then, I return to my original question whether in our present cultural circumstances meaning can find any “foundation.” For my own part, I must confess that I am grateful to Derrida’s Deconstruction because it forces into the open the seriousness of the crisis. The liberal or mechanistic pattern of thought which has prevailed in modernity has turned our attention away from the emptiness, the nothing, which lies just below the surface identity we have given things—precisely because it is characteristic of that pattern of thought to insist that we stay on the surface—the outside—of things. Deconstruction in an important way bids us now to move into the depths, and to embrace the nothing that we find there.

All that I have urged here is that the proper response to this crisis of meaning, sharpened now by Deconstruction, is *not*, in accord with the spirit of modernity, to try to retreat back to the surfaces of meaning, to try to turn meaning once again back into itself, to close it up once again in

¹Indeed, the claim here is that it is equally “critical” (at the very least) to adopt trinitarian theism (a generous God) rather than atheism (a God who is inactive—dead—relative to the inner workings of the cosmos) as one’s “foundation” for meaning. In other words, the claim is that both “methods” — of the machine (simple identity) and of love (relational identity) — carry a presupposition in terms of *relation to what is ultimate*: some sense of that relation is of necessity *operative* in either method. It is perhaps the great merit of Deconstruction that it brings all of this to our attention, albeit in a negative way.

²An ontological “method” such as that indicated in the work of Gabriel Marcel and Josef Pieper (e.g., “The Philosophical Act,” in *Leisure the Basis of Culture* [New York: Mentor-Omega Books, 1963], 69-127) represents not merely one method among many others but in fact indicates a context (of dispositions and “procedures”) which is basic for *all* methods. That is, the plurality of methods proper to the various disciplines is to be understood after the manner of analogy rather than equivocity: differentiation of methods must occur within a basic and thus always prior context of interiority and relation.

terms of its own simple self-identity. On the contrary, what we must do is open meaning up. But in doing so, we must also now join issue with Derrida's Deconstruction. What we must attempt to show, in opening up meaning, is that it does not thereby unravel into the endless difference of infinite nothing, as he insists. Rather, meaning opens up into the relation called love, or again, opens up into an infinity which is full of intelligibility—indeed which is precisely that of the God who is full of the logos of love. This in any case is the claim entailed in Christian creationism and infinitism. Anyone who accepts Christian creationism and infinitism, therefore, seems to me committed to the task of exhibiting the truth of that claim, in all that it implies in form and in content for the work of today's academy.

The Cronin Award Essays

**FROM THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
IDEALS TEMPERED BY THE LESSONS OF TIME**

by Susan Clements
Class of 1990

(Submitted for Professor Nicgorski's Politics Tutorial)

The Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States are two very different documents. Spurred by a series of overtly "repeated injuries and usurpations," the Declaration laid the groundwork for a just dissolution of political bonds, describing only briefly and in the broadest of terms a just, or true form of government. The Constitution, on the other hand, skirted the issue of its own justification to concentrate for the most part on the complex inner workings of a newly proposed political system. As great as they are, these differences actually increase the importance of comparing the two documents: born of the ideals that justified its split from England, the United States in its working Constitution must either uphold the principles of the Declaration or admit to political hypocrisy.

With such consequences at stake, the analysis of the two works must proceed with deliberate caution, so that we do not confound contrasts in historic motivation with deliberate contradictions of political intent. Written from different perspectives—the one to dissolve, and the other to build, the bonds of government—the Declaration and the Constitution must be presented for comparison in their proper historical contexts. By entering into the spirit of the respective writers, we can make an accurate judgment of the faithfulness of one founding document to the other; extracting political goals from circumstantial worries, we can offer the founders a fair trial.

The Constitution of the United States was written eleven years after the signing of the Declaration of Independence. In the period that lay between, the new confederation of states first tried its wings as a power independent of Europe, manifesting under the Articles of Confederation a long history of staunchly held political beliefs. Under trial during these years were the means of arriving at the security of life, liberty and property for which Lockean societies unite; the Articles offered one solution to a general problem posed by the Declaration. We must not, then, criticize the Constitution on the sole ground of its deviation from the Articles of Confederation. If the Constitution added to the power of the national government or drew the states into homogeneous union, our present comparison allows criticism only if such actions conflict with principles inherent in the spirit of the Declaration.

Committing itself to no specific form of government, the Declaration of Independence described instead the ultimate ends of a good political system concerning the lives of its people. It would secure the rights of "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness"; it would derive its "just powers from the consent of the governed." Though eminent politicians of the time doubted the mechanism created by the Constitution to guarantee these rights, there can be little doubt that in words, at least, the Constitution envisaged the same ultimate political ends as the Declaration. Beginning with the words "We the People of the United States," the Constitution rests its authority at least rhetorically on the consent of the people, and Article Seven asserts that its rule will be established by the ratification of two thirds of the states—and only "between the States so ratifying the same." The security of "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness" appears in extended form in the preamble of the Constitution, which describes the ends for which government is established, "in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity." Here, of course, there is something new, for the authors of the Declaration wrote nothing about the formation of "a more perfect Union" into their goals. While this phrase represents a major step in political attitudes concerning the benefits of a large and powerful sphere of government, there is nothing in it which conflicts per se with the words of the

Declaration of Independence. Though the earlier thinkers had viewed their specific creation as a powerful alliance of separate "united States," the Declaration is broad enough in its ideals to allow this aspect—indeed, many aspects—of a given government to change. The only political system explicitly forbidden by the Declaration is that of despotism; to any other form of government the new nation had a right to turn, as long as it stood upon the "consent of the governed."

Justifying their disavowal of English citizenship on the failure of that system to promote and support their well-being, the founding fathers opened the way for the Constitutional Convention of 1787 to reject the Articles of Confederation, which had failed to bring security to the states. "Whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness." Central to the ideology of the Declaration, this clause permits any popularly approved change in government (excluding the establishment of despotism) as long as there is enough danger to the society to justify it.

Turning, then, to the condition of the United States under the Articles, we find that the situation did merit concerned attention. Both supporters and opponents of the new constitution agreed that something had to be done, for the weakness of the national government was threatening to pull the individual states into chaos. The national Congress, in fact, had little power to speak of; determined after the war to retain rights dearly bought from the English monarch, the states had formed what amounted to little more than an alliance. This federation of small republics was to work together in matters of common need, while each state retained its "sovereignty, freedom and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right" not specifically granted to Congress. Without the power to tax, to regulate trade or to execute laws, with no national system of courts, and completely dependent on the unanimous assent of the states to its every proposal, the national government could do little more than beg the states to comply with its wishes. Meeting irregularly, and enfeebled by rampant absenteeism, the Congress was often ignored by the sovereign states, which refused to send it money or agree to a badly needed tariff policy. Nor were all Americans satisfied with the status quo: caught in the grip of economic depression, and lacking federal protection from Indians and other frontier dangers, settlers in Kentucky and Tennessee began seriously to consider offers of citizenship from Spain.

As the national economy stumbled and European nations began to anticipate the downfall of the impudent country, men who later found themselves on opposite sides of the constitutional debate agreed that the urgency of the situation merited at the very least a revision of the Articles. Thus, George Bryan, an Antifederalist from Pennsylvania, remembered that "previous to the Appointment of the Convention, there seemed to be in Pennsylvania a general Wish for a more efficient Confederation. . . . Whilst Congress could only recommend Measures and the States individually could refuse to execute them it was obvious that we were in Danger of falling to pieces." George Washington, too, recognized this danger, expressing his concern in a letter to Alexander Hamilton in 1783. The government, he said,

must be improved by other means than State politics, and unreasonable jealousies and prejudices; or. . . we shall be instruments in the hands of our Enemies, and those European powers who may be jealous of our greatness in Union. . . . No man in the United States is, or can be more deeply impressed with the necessity of a reform in our present Confederation than myself.

Almost everyone, then, seemed to agree that a change was necessary—based on imminent danger to the people, and a growing discontentment with the present form of government, the decision to alter the Articles actually proved that the spirit of the Declaration of Independence was still alive. To stand up to this document, however, the new government would have to provide a better means to "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness"; we have already seen that in words, at least, the Constitution upheld these ends. The problem, however, arose not with self-avowed goals, but with allegations of secret motives and undetected flaws: certain thinkers of the time saw a great potential for evil in the way the Constitution proposed to mend the ills of the country. What they saw, in fact, was a potential for despotism or aristocracy—two evils that would seriously undermine the nation's foundation in liberty.

Looking to the new constitution, critics such as George Mason, Edmund Randolph, and John

Lansing saw in it an excessive grant of national power—power that threatened what they considered the essential independence of the states. In one of many debates leading up to the Declaration of Independence, Roger Sherman of Connecticut had declared that “there is no other legislative over the Colonies but their respective assemblies”; now, it seemed, the Constitution was divesting the states of their rights, and positing them in an ominously powerful national government. “All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives,” the new constitution declared, raising the fear of a government with power beyond the people’s control. By diffusing authority across the states, the Articles had aimed to prevent the very concentration of power that now seemed to reside in the proposed Union. With control of the armed forces and the supreme judicial, legislative and executive branches under its auspices, a powerful national government offered potential weapons against the people to future leaders. “Who knows but in some future corrupt times there may be a Congress which will form a design upon the liberties of the People and will it be difficult to execute such a design *when they have the absolute command of the navy, the army, and the purse?*”

Expressed by the representatives of West Springfield, Massachusetts in deliberation over the Articles of Confederation, this fear returned to the nation in 1787. Harkening back to the Revolution and the power from which the people had declared themselves free, opponents of the Constitution were alarmed by the unlimited power of taxation that it granted to the national government. Through taxes, the government claimed its share of the people’s property, and thus exerted its force on one of their most sacred Lockean rights. By vesting the legislature with the whole of this power, the Constitution greatly reduced the sovereignty of the states, and placed a dangerous power in what were considered dangerous hands. “The assumption of this power . . . does . . . entirely change the confederation of the states into one consolidated government,” George Mason warned the Virginia convention.

There were problems, too, with the several branches of the proposed government. Though happy with the idea of a House of Representatives, the Antifederalists objected that with their large districts and two-year terms, the representatives would end up losing touch with the people. Even more alarming were the Senators envisioned to be, with their six-year terms and elections through state legislatures. Nor could critics find anything reassuring in the figure of the President: reminding them, perhaps, of recent kings, the single executive was decried for his veto power, his re-eligibility, his access to the army, his right to appoint his own federal officers. In short, the proposed national government appeared to Constitutional opponents as one great mass of raw power: the judiciary would answer to the President’s requests, and “many Antifederalists contemplated the possibility of a union of interest between the Senate and the President, concluding that if it should occur the result would be despotism.”

If justified, of course, these fears posed a serious threat to the ideals set forth in the Declaration of Independence. Like concerns with the Constitution, the Declaration had grown out of a perceived threat of despotism, for it was motivated by a very recent and ongoing history of transgressions against American rights. In a way, then, the Antifederalists were transmitters of a major part of revolutionary America’s mood: its pervasive distrust of power. In pamphlets and newspapers everywhere—in the Declaration itself—this fear had found expression. Decrying the national government’s control “of the navy, the army, and the purse,” critics of the Constitution echoed the Declaration’s list of grievances against monarchy, as well as the warnings they had read in booklets published in support of the independence movement. “The people can never be too jealous of their liberties,” wrote James Burgh in the *Political Disquisitions* published in America in 1775. “Power is of an elastic nature, ever extending itself and encroaching on the liberties of the subjects.” Likewise, the widely distributed *Cato’s Letters* of Thomas Gordon and John Trenchard warned that “all history affords but few Instances of Men trusted with great Power without abusing it, when with Security they could.” To the critics of the Constitution, claims Jackson Turner Main, the proposed government seemed bound in this way to negate the Declaration’s ideals; concentrating power in the hands of a few, the Constitution would lead inevitably to aristocracy or despotism. Thus we have the testimony of the diary of John Quincy Adams, who lamented that the Constitution was “calculated to increase the influence, the power, and the wealth of those who have any already.”

Transferred, however, from Revolutionary America to completely different historical

circumstances, these fears were largely unjustified. If the Constitution vested the national government with an abundance of power, it did so with the greatest of caution, checking the power of each department in such a way that the whole national machine could not easily move against the wishes of the people. Month after month, delegates to the Constitutional Convention wrestled with the issues at stake, and there were so many opposing interests present that a system of checks and balances worked its way naturally out of mutual suspicion and compromise. Thus, voices of both large and small states eventually fused into the national Congress, which guaranteed extra weight to greater populations in the House of Representatives, while equalizing all states in the more serious Senate.

James Madison's journal of the Constitutional Convention also reveals that most delegates were aware of the dangers of unchecked power, and therefore stood guard against dangerous omissions and secret ploys to lead the country to despotism. On September 6, even as the Convention neared its conclusion, Alexander Hamilton recalled with distaste the presidential term as described in an earlier draft of the Constitution. "In this, the President was a monster, elected for seven years, and ineligible afterwards; having great powers in appointments to office; and continually tempted, by this constitutional disqualification, to abuse them in order to subvert the government." Nor were the framers of the Constitution blind to the dangers of wealth, or the evils of aristocracy. Though Charles Pinckney and a contingent of other delegates pushed hard for the requirement that potential legislators own a certain amount of property, Benjamin Franklin strongly objected to this proposal. On August 10, Madison takes certain delight in recounting, "Dr. Franklin expressed his dislike to everything that tended to debase the spirit of the common people. If honesty was often the companion of wealth, and if poverty was exposed to peculiar temptation, it was not less true that the possession of property increased the desire of more property. Some of the greatest rogues he was ever acquainted with were the richest rogues"—after which "the motion of Mr. Pinckney was rejected by so general a *no*, that the states were not called."

To the accusation that the Constitution united states foreseen as sovereign entities by the signers of the Declaration, one must cede: but only with the note that this expectation was rooted less in inter-state attitudes than in a long history of political thought and in painfully recent displays of despotism over a large sphere of power. Colonial sectionalism itself was not strong enough to counter the feelings of unity that lay at the heart of the entire movement for independence. On May 27, 1774, as the *Papers of Thomas Jefferson* recall, Virginia's House of Burgesses issued a written proposal for an intercolonial convention to discuss American rights; like many others of its kind, this document reveals the growing sisterhood of the states. "We are further clearly of the opinion, that an attack made on one of our sister colonies, to compel submission to arbitrary taxes, is an attack made on all British America, and threatens to ruin the rights of all, unless the united wisdom of the whole be applied." Though the signers envisioned a union of sovereign states, they were fully aware of the benefits of strong central government—indeed, the first Continental Congress had assumed in 1774 a certain degree of national authority. "In adopting the Association," claim John Blum, Arthur Schlesinger et al., "Congress assumed an authority over the economic life of every American. To make that authority felt, it authorized the election of local committees . . . throughout the colonies . . . [to] search out violators of the agreement, and publish their names." Representing the colonists' wishes to England and making its presence known throughout America, the records of the first Congress indicates that the founding fathers were not as opposed to central power as later critics of the Constitution often claimed. If the Declaration expresses its era's belief in individually sovereign "united States," we have seen that it makes only one real demand: that a given government provide safeguards against despotism and rest on the consent of its people.

In spite of all this, opponents of the Constitution still criticized its supporters for ignoring the urgent lessons of history. "When once Bodies of Men, in authority, get Possession of, or become invested with, Property or Prerogative," warned Hugh Hughes of New York, "whether it be by Intrigue, Mistake, or Chance, they scarcely ever relinquish their Claim, even if founded on Iniquity itself." It was, however, precisely to history that the framers of the Constitution turned: to the history of their own fledgling government. Having watched the sovereign states bicker amongst themselves and refuse to submit taxes for the good of the whole, the framers must have found themselves in 1787 looking at human nature in a more revealing light. "I find also the pride of independence taking deep and dangerous hold on the hearts of individual states," wrote Thomas

Jefferson to Edmund Randolph in 1783. "What will be the case? . . . The states will go to war with each other in defiance of Congress; one will call in France to her assistance, another Great Britain, and so we shall have all the wars of Europe brought to our own doors." Jefferson's fears were not as exaggerated as they might seem, for only one year later disgruntled settlers in Tennessee, prompted by Spain, considered secession from the Union. In some cases, as in Rhode Island, states even defrauded their own people, making it illegal for creditors to refuse their worthless paper money as payment for debts.

In the end, then, it was not enough to disperse authority across the individual states, for small units appeared as likely to abuse their own power as a centralized government would be to take advantage of its. No longer able to believe that individual states would by nature bend their wills to the good of the whole, the writers of the Constitution sought to build a system that would compel discussion and compromise. In this way, the national government would check the power of the states; the states through Congress would keep constant guard on the executive; the executive would originate no laws; but could veto them if displeased. Standing guard over it all, the judges of the Supreme Court could maintain their distance from the executive and legislative branches by the guarantee of tenure during good behavior.

The de-idealization that led to this intricate system of checks and balances extended also to the common people; they, too, would be checked, by the Electoral College and the appointment of senators by state legislators. Such institutions, wrote Madison under the guise of Publius, "may sometimes be necessary, as a defence to the people against their own temporary errors and delusions." While the Constitution stood ultimately on the "consent of the governed," it recognized the peril of granting them, like any other member of the government, an overload of power.

If, then, the national leanings of the Constitution conflict with the individualistic strains of the Declaration, it is because the Declaration emerged from a history of over-concentration of power, while the Constitution was prompted by a dearth of effectual strength. In 1787, however, the nation's thinkers had *both* lessons of history to stand on, and could work them into an intricate system of checks and balances. "The great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department, the necessary constitutional means, and personal motives, to resist encroachments of the others," wrote James Madison in Federalist Number 51. Like the human beings of which they are composed, individual states and governmental departments are creatures of self-interest: but if correctly harnessed, this same selfishness can drive the nation to happiness and prosperity. "The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place," Madison continues, and then pauses to reflect on the need to pattern government after human weakness. "It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to controul the abuses of government. But what is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on human nature?"

By anticipating evil on all sides of human government—in small as well as in large domains, in individuals as well as in legislative bodies—the Constitution set in motion a government designed to realize the ideals of the Declaration of Independence. If the Declaration decried the evils of monarchy, the Constitution recognized the potential harm of any unchecked or unbalanced system of government, and sought to alleviate the evil effects of all selfish hunger for power. The difference in the documents lies, then, not in their essential spirit, but in this: by 1787, the framers of the Constitution had learned enough about human nature to know that only in a heavy framework of unified and balanced strength could our unalienable rights be secured.

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Cronin Award Co-Winner

SHAPLEY -V- CURTIS, 1920
PLS Supreme Court, District II
Volume II, Chapter VII
by Peter J. Lyon
 Class of 1990

("Great Debate" paper submitted for Professor Crowe's Natural Science II Tutorial)

Around the year 1900, the field of astronomy began to tremble, and would later violently shake and change dramatically in appearance, due to the undercurrents of a swiftly emerging debate. And in 1920 this debate found its most mature expression in the contrasting opinions of Harlow Shapely and Heber D. Curtis. Like all great scientific debates—Ptolemy-v-Copernicus, and Darwinism included—the debate pitting Shapley against Curtis involved the accumulation and arrangement of a great deal of evidence in an attempt to achieve the most accurate, most plausible, and most widely-accepted theory within the scientific community.

In brief, the 1920 astronomical debate between Shapely and Curtis centered on three crucial and interrelated topics: the nature of nebula, the question of island universes, and the size of the Milky Way galaxy. By 1920, two opposing camps had, in effect, emerged, for one was either a Shapleyite and believed that the Milky Way was the only island universe, or one was a Curtisite and believed that the Milky Way was but one of an immeasurable number of universes. Perhaps Dr. Michael Crowe best summarizes the prevailing astronomical opinion around 1900 by telling us that most scientists believed that

the Milky Way is essentially the entire visible universe; it is about 7,000 to possibly 30,000 light years in diameter with the sun located near its center. Nebulae are basically of three types: (1) gaseous nebulae, which almost invariably are found in the plane of the Milky Way; (2) globular clusters, which lie off but near the plane, generally in the direction of Sagittarius; and (3) spiral nebulae, sometimes called the "white nebulae," which also avoid the plane of the Milky Way, generally clustering toward its poles.¹

Despite the intimidating amount of opinion supporting the Milky Way as the only universe in existence, which seemed to confirm Shapley's suspicions, Agnes Clerke and other scientists had to allow for the possibility that the Milky Way and its contents could be a "large part of a larger design exceeding the compass of finite minds to grasp in its entirety" (From: Clerke, Agnes. *The System of the Stars*, 2nd ed., 1905, 359). And it is this very possibility that Heber D. Curtis seized upon and argued for the existence of island universes other than our own. As a result, the stage was set, and, like a quickly shoaling wave, the debate ensued and the once tranquil "shores" of astronomy rumbled with change. The following is a simulation of that debate and its outcome as tried in a court of law.

On the twenty-sixth day of April in the year nineteen hundred and twenty, Chief Justice I.C. Truth delivered the opinion of the PLS Supreme Court, District II, in the case of *Harlow Shapley, et al. -v- Heber D. Curtis, et al.*, and so brought to resolution perhaps the second greatest case ever witnessed before this court—the first, of course, being the infamous *Ptolemy -v- Copernicus* case, which was laid to rest just two years earlier. Subsequent to days of intense debate with his fellow justices, and an equally intense scrutinization of Dr. Michael Crowe's unquestionably authoritative text on stellar astronomy, Justice Truth rendered, quite fittingly, the truth:

If the defendant Mr. Curtis had come before this court claiming an allegiance to the island

¹Crowe, Michael J., *Stellar Astronomy from Herschel to Hubble*. Poverty Publishing Co., 1989, Chapter V, p. 2. Note: All subsequent parenthetical page references are to the above edition.

universe theory at the turn of the century (1900), the case would have been injusticable—not amenable to legal recourse. As of 1900, the evidence contradicting the island universe theory seemed insurmountable, for even the great William Herschel had “freely [to] confess that by continuing [his] sweeps of the heavens [his] opinion of the arrangement of the stars and their magnitudes, and of some other particulars, [had] undergone a gradual change,” (II, 42) and so he essentially recanted his views on island universes in favor of the view that nebulae are but “shining [fluids], of a nature totally unknown to us” (II, 40). And as shining fluids nebulae cannot be island universes. Importantly, John Herschel’s findings that the majority of observed nebulae lie not in the plane of the Milky Way, but rather at its poles, was perhaps the most convincing counter-evidence posed to the island universe theory adherents. In short, if nebulae are island universes, they should be randomly distributed throughout space, and not oriented relative to the plane of the Milky Way. For why should all other universes be situated in relation to ours? To assume such relation is to assign both undue and unfounded significance to our universe.

Although William Herschel’s concept that nebulae are but “shining fluids” was seemingly disproved by Lord Rosse and William Bond’s resolutions of the Orion Nebula, respected authors such as Herbert Spencer still held that “the nebulae are not further off from us than parts of our own sidereal system, of which they must be considered members . . .” (III, 18). In brief, the nebulae, resolvable or not, are not island universes, but rather distinct intragalactic phenomena. In fact, Wilhelm Struve claimed that even the “alleged miracles of resolution, for example of the Orion and Andromeda nebulae, [were] nothing but illusions” (III, 19), and so dispelled any claims that nebulae are resolvable as island universes.

The evidence unfavorable to the island universe theory continued its rapid accumulation. With the advent in 1859 of Bunsen and Kirchhoff’s spectrum analysis of stellar phenomena came a new era in astronomy, for the once strictly observational astronomer soon became an astrophysicist and astrochemist. Because each chemical element and compound has its representative spectral color, the astronomer could now access the chemical composition of his observed phenomena, and he realized that glowing solids and liquids yield a continuous spectrum, whereas glowing gases exhibit a bright-line spectrum, and that continuous spectra passing through a gas reveal dark-line spectra. Most importantly, these advances in spectroscopy led Sir William Huggins in his 1897 paper to claim to have solved the “riddle of the nebulae” (IV, 5). In short, Huggin’s spectral observations of the planetary nebula in Draco revealed nothing but a “single bright line” (IV, 5), and so he seemingly affirmed with certainty what William Herschel had claimed years earlier, namely, that nebulae are not “[aggregations] of stars, but [rather simply] . . . [luminous gases]” (IV, 6). Huggins further held that, of the “sixty of the brighter nebulae and clusters, . . . about one-third, including the planetary nebulae and that of Orion, . . . give the bright-line spectrum” (IV, 6-7). Obviously, nebulae exhibiting the bright-line spectrum of gases cannot be island universes.

From astronomers to evolutionists, the opinion was seemingly univocal by 1900: the Milky Way alone was considered to be essentially the entire visible universe. Astronomers Richard A. Proctor in 1874 and Simon Newcomb in 1882 reaffirmed John Herschel’s argument that the non-random clustering of nebulae in orientation to the poles of the Milky Way disproved the island universe theory. In 1899, Herbert Spencer requalified his opinion regarding the remote possibility of island universes by holding that they were “impossible,” and Max Wolf further amplified Spencer’s claim by maintaining that “Distant, isolated Milky Ways have never [emphasis mine] been sighted by man” (V, 2). Even the evolutionist Alfred Russell Wallace in 1903 ventured to claim that our sun lies “in the centre of the whole material universe” (V, 3), and so “our position in the material universe is special and probably unique . . .” (V, 3). In short, ours is the only “island universe.” Perhaps Agnes M. Clerke best summarized the majority opinion in 1900 by holding that, in light of the evidence and astronomical advances, “we [scientists] find the unity of the stellar and nebular systems to be fully ascertained” (V, 17). It is, therefore, a gross understatement to say that the island universe theory was in difficulty as of 1900.

The rapidly accumulating pile of evidence opposing the island universe theory had reached its lofty peak by 1920. As of 1920, there were five major challenges to the island universe theory that had to be refuted for that theory to stand. The first has been mentioned previously and was revisited in 1912 by A.C.D. Crommelin: the “fact that the spirals appear off the plane of the Milky Way and toward the Galactic poles indicates that they must be part of the structure of the Milky

Way" (VI, 3).

The second challenge to be refuted was the appearance in 1885 of a bright nova, S Andromeda, which was located in the central region of the Andromeda Nebula. Because S Andromeda reached a brightness of the 7th magnitude, which is nearly visible to the naked eye, astronomers concluded that "either Andromeda is quite near and not composed of stars or that this star surpassed all known stars in magnitude" (VI, 1). In short, if Andromeda is an island universe, its small observational size necessitates that it be located at a great distance from the Milky Way for it to be somewhat proportionate in size to the Milky Way. Yet, the very size of the nova S Andromeda observed in Andromeda indicates that either Andromeda is not an island universe, or that S Andromeda is inordinately large, and so appears extremely bright when viewed.

A third challenge came from Karl Bohlin in 1907, for he measured a trigonometric parallax for the Andromeda Nebula, and so calculated its distance to be 19 light-years. If Andromeda is an island universe comparable in size to ours, then surely its distance must greatly exceed 19 light-years, perhaps by a factor of 25,000 or more.

Adriaan van Maanen posed a fourth challenge to the island universe theory in 1916 by his measurements of the rotational behavior of nebulae. The findings of van Maanen indicated that, if the period of 85,000 years for the rotation of M101 he measured was correct, then a point on the edge of M101 would have to be moving at 1.72 times the speed of light. Yet, such speeds contradict Einstein's assertion that the speed of light represents the outer limit to the speed attainable by any body.

The final and perhaps most controversial challenge to the island universe theory came from the complex findings of Henrietta Leavitt in 1912, and the subsequent treatment in 1913 of her findings by Ejnar Hertzsprung and Henry Norris Russell. In short, Leavitt realized that the relationship between the brightness (B) and the absolute magnitude or luminosity (L) of a star ($B=kL/D^2$, where D =distance, and k =constant) could be useful in finding the distance of a star. By studying variable stars of the Cepheid type in the smaller Magellanic Cloud—for she knew the stars in that cloud were all at nearly the same distance, and so provided an equidistant frame of reference—Leavitt found that the luminosity of such Cepheids was proportional to the log of their periods ($L \sim \log t$). Moreover, Leavitt discovered that period length of variability is directly proportional to brightness among such Cepheids, and so, given two Cepheid variables, one in the plane of reference of the Magellanic Clouds, and the other elsewhere, Leavitt could compare their observed periods, compute their relative luminosities, and thereby derive their relative distances. Importantly, however, Leavitt could find only the relative distances of such stars, for all Cepheids are beyond direct parallactic distance measurement.

In an attempt to establish absolute distances on Leavitt's scale, Hertzsprung employed statistical techniques based on observations of the proper and radial motions of 13 Cepheids. By rough correlations, Hertzsprung placed the smaller Magellanic Cloud at an "absolute" distance of 30,000 light-years. Knowing the distances of a substantial number of stars from their trigonometric parallax measurements, and knowing their brightness from observation, Russell could then apply Leavitt's brightness-luminosity equation ($B=kL/D^2$) to calculate their luminosities. Russell then constructed a spectrum-luminosity graph, which plotted the luminosities of stars at known distances (i.e., measured directly via parallax) against their six spectral types. Russell found that, when plotted, the resulting pattern was always that of a backward seven. Russell's plot thus seemed to provide a means for measuring the distance of stars lying beyond the limits of parallax to measure, for the distances of stars of different spectral classes could now be inferred from luminosity without the necessity of parallactic measurement. Most importantly, Harlow Shapley emphasizes greatly the Russell technique in his stellar distance determinations, and such determinations undoubtedly provide the foundation of his argument against Curtis.

Realizing that the above-mentioned five challenges have to be refuted if the island universe theory is to succeed, Heber Curtis carefully constructs his response to Shapley, in which he advocates a small Milky Way (30,000 light-years in diameter), and a large, perhaps even infinite universe with many nebulae as island universes. Knowing that Shapley admits that the island universe theory "probably stands or falls with the hypothesis of a small galactic system" (VII, 15), for a small Milky Way, as will become evident, allows for nebulae as island universes, Curtis organizes his entire argument around such size or distance determinations. Curtis commences his argument by remarking on the limitations of galactic measurement methods. The most reliable

method of distance determination is that of direct trigonometric parallax, which is quite accurate for distances up to 200 light-years. Yet, photometric parallax measurements are susceptible to considerable error margins, and because they depend on trigonometric methods for an absolute scale, spectroscopic measurements are as limited as their trigonometric counterparts.

Realizing these limitations, Curtis begins by mentioning briefly galactic dimensions and discussing the type of galactic genera and distribution of celestial genera. Although there is general accord on the exact dimensions of the Milky Way, it is important to note that Shapley held the diameter of the Milky Way to be 20,000 light-years in 1915, whereas in 1920 he, for no apparent reason, increased that diameter to nearly 300,000 light-years. As Curtis soon shows, Shapley had to increase his diameter in order to save the phenomena he seemingly observed. Illustrating the simplicity of his theory, Curtis then argues that, despite immense galactic dimensions, there are but five main classes of galactic phenomena: stars, globular star clusters, diffuse nebulae, planetary nebulae, and spirals. Importantly, Curtis holds that with "one, and only one, exception, all known genera of celestial objects show such a distribution with respect to the plane of our Milky Way, that . . . all classes . . . are integral members of our galaxy" (VII, 19). Curtis argues that the spirals alone "are a class apart, and not intragalactic objects" (VII, 19), and such spirals are "individual galaxies . . . comparable with our own galaxy in dimensions and in number of component units" (VII, 19). Because of their likeness to our galaxy in size and composition, however, Curtis must prove first that Shapley's dimensions for our galaxy are inordinately large, and then prove that the spirals are at immense distances.

To demonstrate the inaccuracy of Shapley's distance measurements, Curtis constructs an argument based on the "average star." Because both Shapley and Curtis admit that "uniformity of conditions and of stellar phenomena naturally prevails throughout the galactic system" (VII, 7), Curtis argues that "the more distant stars of our galaxy are in [no] way essentially different from stars of known distance nearer to us" (VII, 20), and so "we may safely make . . . correlations between the nearer and the more distant stars" (VII, 20) based on the average star. Moreover, because Shapley's studies show that the average star lies between spectral types F and K, Curtis goes on to describe the characteristics of F-K type stars of known distance, so as to elucidate the characteristics of the average star. Curtis concludes that the average luminosity of such F-K type stars is no brighter than +6, and is probably even closer to +7 or +8. Curtis makes a critical point here, on which the entire argument seems to turn. For, "due to the omission from our parallax programs of the intrinsically fainter stars" (VII, 20), studies such as Shapley's would set the average luminosity for F-K type stars at around +4.5, which by Curtis's figures is inordinately bright. In short, Russell's luminosity-spectral class diagram—which Shapley greatly relies on for distance measurements—is based on the 300 brightest stars of known parallax, rather than on the characteristics of the average star, the majority of which lie within the F-K types and exhibit an average luminosity of +6 or more.

Most importantly, the 300 brightest stars constituting the foundation of Russell's plot are predominantly giant stars, which are far from being average stars. In comparing the Milky Way stars with the "average" stars, Curtis finds that the luminosities for the F-K type stars of apparent magnitudes from 16 to 20 are of the same luminosities as "known nearer stars of these types, if assumed to be at the average distance of 10,000 light-years" (VII, 20). Shapley's value for the dimension of the Milky Way, which is 10 times Curtis's, necessitates an inordinate amount of giant stars. Curtis thus demonstrates that "All existing evidence indicates that the proportion of giant stars in a given region of space is very small" (VII, 21), and so giant stars are not to be included with average stars. In short, because he agrees that stellar phenomena are relatively uniform throughout space, Shapley's distance determinations for the size of the Milky Way must reflect such uniformity. Yet, Curtis effectively demonstrates that Shapley's distance determinations necessitate an unfounded preponderance of giant stars, greatly to the neglect of the average star that is uniform throughout space. Therefore, Curtis is wholly justified in claiming that "galactic dimensions deduced from correlations between large numbers of what we may term average stars must take precedence over values found from small numbers of exceptional objects . . ." (VII, 21).

Curtis then addresses Shapley's attempt to assign distances in terms of Cepheid variables. Simplifying Curtis's argument, we realize that Shapley's attempts to assign distances via Cepheid variables is subject to great error margins. Although Shapley assumes that "there is a close

coordination between absolute magnitude and length of period for the Cepheid variables of our galaxy" (VII, 22), and that "if of identical periods, Cepheids anywhere in the universe have identical absolute magnitudes" (VII, 22), Curtis alerts us to the fact that the "errors in our star positions, . . . meridian observations, . . . the constant of precession, [and] . . . the systematic corrections applied to different catalogues, all have comparatively little effect [on] . . . proper motions as large as ten seconds of arc per century" (VII, 23). Yet, proper motions of one second of arc per century, which Shapley employs in his distance determinations, are "still highly uncertain quantities . . ." (VII, 23). In brief, Shapley's Cepheid distance method relies on proper motions so uncertain that even experts such as Auwers and Boss are nearly diametrically opposed as to how to classify them.

Most importantly, if the "curve of correlation deduced by Shapley for galactic Cepheids is correct in both its absolute and relative scale . . . the curve of correlation . . . should fit fairly well with other available proper motion and parallax data" (VII, 23). Unfortunately, a plotting of such other data reveals no correlation whatsoever between Cepheid period and luminosity. Even more unfortunate is the possibility that Shapley selected only the data that agreed with his supposedly deduced correlation in order to save the desired phenomena. Thus, it "would seem that the available observational data lend little support to the fact of a period-luminosity relation among galactic Cepheids" (VII, 25).

In discussing the average giant star, Curtis further demonstrates the inaccuracy of Shapley's distance determinations. In keeping with his conservative, yet rational bent, Curtis holds that "it would seem preferable to begin the line of reasoning with the attributes of known stars in our neighborhood, and to proceed from them to the clusters" (VII, 25) in unknown regions. Even when using "ultra conservative" (VII, 25) estimates for the mean absolute magnitude of a galactic giant star, Curtis must conclude that "Shapley's distances [are] four times too large" (VII, 25). Moreover, knowing that "Shapley's mean visual magnitude for the twenty-five brightest stars in the twenty-eight globular clusters is about 14.5" (VII, 26), Curtis calculates an average distance for these clusters of 10,500 light years, and such a figure "may be regarded as satisfactorily close to those postulated for a galaxy of the smaller dimensions held in [Curtis's] paper . . ." (VII, 26). As Curtis demonstrates, even Shapley's values agree with a smaller Milky Way galaxy!

Turning away from the inaccuracy of Shapley's distance determinations, Curtis then addresses directly the spirals as external galaxies. Because, as Shapley insists, celestial objects of the same genera are approximately equal in size, then if the "Nebula of Andromeda is but 20,000 light-years distant [as Shapley also insists], the minute spirals would need to be at distances . . . of 10,000,000 light-years, or far outside the greater dimensions postulated for the galaxy" (VII, 28). Yet, such distances contradict Shapley's insistence on equality of size. If, however, we hold that Andromeda is 500,000 light-years distant, it "would be 17,000 light-years in diameter, or of the same order of size as our galaxy" (VII, 28), and so would adhere nicely to the equality of size stipulations. Moreover, the spectra emitted by the spirals supports the island universe theory in that this spectra "resembles closely the integrated spectrum of our Milky Way" (VII, 28). Even Huggins found that only "about one-third [of the brighter nebulae and clusters] give the bright-line spectrum" (IV, 6-7), and so made considerable room for nebulae to exhibit stellar continuous spectra.

To refute the challenge regarding the clustering of spirals around the polar regions of the Milky Way, Curtis has recourse to a vast array of significant data. Because it is "most improbable that our galaxy should . . . be placed about half way between two great groups of island universes" (VII, 29), Curtis holds that obscuring matter is the primary reason we witness the polar clustering of spirals. First evidence of obscuring matter was proffered in 1847 by George Wilhelm Struve's "showing that stars grow dimmer more rapidly than is reconcilable with the assumption that they are homogeneously distributed in the plane of the Milky Way" (III, 7). In brief, there must exist some obscuring matter in space that serves to diminish or impede stellar light at greater distances. Furthermore, in 1914 Jacobus Kapteyn, by noting that fainter stars at greater distances exhibit a reddening, concluded that obscuring matter existed in space that blocked the blue light from such stars. Still further, Curtis himself in 1917 found "dark lanes on the edges of spirals seen edge on" (VI, 5), and so determined such lanes to be obscuring matter. Finally, E.E. Barnard's decade-long work on "dark markings" in the heavens allowed him to conclude that such markings were due to "dark matter in interstellar space" (VI, 5). In short, the preponderance of

evidence in favor of obscuring matter helps explain why spirals are clustered at the poles of the Milky Way, for, if obscuring matter exists in the plane of the Milky Way, then surely we would not see spirals in its plane, and so the peculiar distribution we do notice is due to the fact that obscuring matter does not block those areas of distribution.

Not only does the existence of obscuring matter explain the peculiar clustering of spirals, but it also helps explain Karl Bohlin's problematic parallax measurement for Andromeda, which placed that spiral at the distance of 19 light-years. Although Curtis admits that trigonometric parallax is accurate up to distances of 200 light-years, it is entirely possible that obscuring matter in space distorted Bohlin's angle of parallax enough for him to adopt his 19 light-year distance measurement for Andromeda. For obscuring matter could have made Bohlin perceive a greater angle of parallax than actually exists. Moreover, Curtis has already shown that the principle of approximate equality of actual size for celestial objects of the same genera necessitates an Andromeda at great distance.

Curtis's discussion on the space velocities of the spirals seems also to support their existence as island universes. For Jacobus Kapteyn in 1904 gave thorough evidence to the fact that even the nearest stars in our galaxy "show a definite tendency to move in two opposite directions or 'streams'" (VI, 2), and such star streams along the plane of the Milky Way are strong evidence for its rotation. Like other spirals, then, the Milky Way too exhibits rotational motion. Furthermore, Vesto Slipher's 1915 findings of high radial velocities for 15 spirals confirms Curtis's notion that the "velocity factor [of spirals allows them to] stand apart from all galactic objects" (VII, 29), and so avoid being grouped as intragalactic phenomena. Finally, high spiral velocities would somewhat confirm Adriaan van Maanen's findings for the high speed of M101. Although van Maanen calculates a speed beyond that of light for M101, slight adjustments for error in his rotational period for M101 bring it within an acceptable velocity range for spirals.

Perhaps Curtis's findings on intraspiral novae give the greatest support to the island universe theory, for Curtis holds that "such novae form a strong argument for the island universe theory and furnish . . . a method for determining the approximate distance of the spirals" (VII, 30). Assuming, as Shapley does, that intraspiral novae are similar to galactic novae, Curtis finds that "the dispersion of the novae in the spirals, and probably also in our galaxy, may reach at least ten absolute magnitudes" (VII, 30). By then assuming that Andromeda is at a distance of 500,000 light-years, Curtis finds that "the agreement in absolute magnitude is quite good for the galactic and the spiral novae" (VII, 30). In short, by applying island universe distances to spiral novae, Curtis finds that galactic and spiral novae behave very similarly, as is expected by Shapley's "uniformity of conditions" (VII, 7) stipulation. Curtis thus concludes that spiral novae are approximately 100 times more distant than Milky Way novae, and so has a means for measuring the distance of spirals.

In addressing the inordinate brightness of the S Andromeda nova, Curtis has recourse to two possible explanations: first, Knut Lundmark's 1920 analysis of 22 Andromeda novae concluded that S Andromeda "belongs to a special class of novae different from all novae previously observed in Andromeda" (VI, 5), which, in turn, would explain its exceptional brightness; second, perhaps the S Andromeda nova is not an Andromeda nova at all, but rather a closer intragalactic nova superimposed on the Andromeda Nebula, and such superimposition simply makes it appear as part of Andromeda.

From Curtis's responses to the challenges levied on the island universe theory we realize the accuracy and the thoroughness of his defense. Perhaps the greatest strength of Curtis's argument lies not in its ability to refute handily its critics, but rather in its methodological simplicity and fruitfulness. Curtis readily admits that, with "all its elements of simplicity and continuity, our universe is too haphazard in its details to warrant deductions from small numbers of exceptional objects" (VII, 30), and so Curtis relies on "reasonable [averages]" (VII, 27), rather than unfounded details. Unlike Shapley, Curtis has no need to "fit the spirals in any coherent scheme of stellar evolution" (VII, 31) using complex and error-prone measurements and calculations; nor does Curtis find it necessary "to attempt to coordinate the tremendous space velocities of the spirals with those of the average star" (VII, 31), for Curtis's spirals are not galactic objects. Whereas Shapley must use highly technical data and theorize anew to account for phenomena not agreeing with his theory, much like Ptolemy had constantly to add epicycles and equants to save the phenomena he could not easily explain, Curtis's theory points to an aesthetically pleasing and

heuristically fruitful consistency. And notable scientists, such as Eddington, realize the heuristic potential to which Curtis's theory gives evidence, for the island universe theory "is much to be preferred as a working hypothesis; and its consequences are so helpful as to suggest a distinct probability of its truth" (VI, 4). Even A.C.D. Crommelin, a former island universe critic, acknowledges the aesthetically-pleasing perspective of Curtis's theory, and so holds that "the hypothesis of external galaxies is certainly a sublime and magnificent one . . ." (VI, 3). And Curtis himself lauds the "unity and internal agreement in the features of the island universe theory which appeals very strongly to [him]" (VII, 31).

Just as we cannot ignore the impact of Copernicus's revolution, we cannot ignore the implications of Curtis's island universe argument. And just as Copernicus had to infinitize the universe to account for his inability to find stellar parallax, so too must Curtis extend the heavens to great distances to allow for island universes. Think of the fruit we now enjoy because of Copernicus's courage, and look forward to a greater harvest at the hands of Curtis. Avoid with all your might the absolutist claims of Auguste Comte (III, 1) and J.P. Nichol (III, 13), and look deeply into the heavens that Vesto Slipher and many others find to be expanding at tremendous rates. For is it not equally self-centered to assume that the nebulae are all oriented to our universe as it is to assume that ours is the only one?

And so Chief Justice I. C. Truth had delivered the truth, and court was promptly adjourned.

Alumnae/i Corner

Suggestions for Seminar "VII-VIII"

The following is a list of "Great Books" compiled by Brian Farmer in a 1988–89 survey of faculty of the Program of Liberal Studies. Brian asked faculty to recommend books for the "use of graduates of the Program and those parties interested in continuing their search for Truth."

Note: The entries have been arranged in rough chronological groups.

Aristophanes: *Lysistrata*
 Aristotle: *De Anima*
 Aristotle: *Metaphysics*
 Euripides: *Bacchae*
 Xenophon: *Memorabilia*
 Plato: *Timaeus*
 Ovid: *Metamorphoses*

Cicero: *De Finibus, De Officiis, De Re Publica, De Natura Deorum*
 Plutarch: *Parallel Lives*
 Seneca: *Epistulae Morales*
 St. Paul: *Epistle to the Romans*
 Marcus Aurelius: *Meditations*
 Boethius: *The Consolation of Philosophy*
 Galen: *On the Natural Faculties*
 Augustine: *On the Teacher*

Koran
Beowulf
The Song of Roland
Gwain and the Green Knight
 Christian de Pisan: *The Book of the City of Ladies*

William Shakespeare: *Hamlet, King Lear, Winter's Tale*
 Francis Bacon: *New Atlantis*
 Galileo: *Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems*
 William Harvey: *On the Motion of the Heart and Blood*
 Christiaan Huygens: *Treatise on Light*
 Blaise Pascal: "Conversation with Monsieur de Saci"
 Rabelais: *Gargantua and Pantegruel*
 Baruch Spinoza: *Ethics*

George Berkeley: *Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous*
 Boswell: *Life of Johnson*
 Jean de Caussade: *Abandonment to Divine Providence*
 David Hume: *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion and Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*
 Immanuel Kant: *Critique of Judgement, Part II and Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals*
 Leibniz: *Monadology*
 John Milton: *Areopagitica* and *Paradise Lost*
 Isaac Newton: *Opticks*
 Voltaire: *Candide*

Henry Adams: *Mont St. Michel and Chartres* and *The Education of Henry Adams*
 Honoré de Balzac: *Père Goriot*
 Sadi Carnot: *Reflections on the Motive of Power of Fire*
 Joseph Conrad: *Heart of Darkness*
 Charles Darwin: *Autobiography*

Feodor Dostoyevski: *Crime and Punishment* and *Short Stories*, esp. "Notes from the Underground" and "Dream of a Ridiculous Man"
 George Eliot: *Middlemarch*
 Thomas Hardy: *Jude the Obscure* and *Tess of the d'Urbervilles*
 Nathaniel Hawthorne: *Scarlet Letter*
 Hermann von Helmholtz: *Popular Scientific Lectures*
 Soren Kiekegaard: *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*
 Friedrich Nietzsche: *Ecce Homo*
 Therese Raquin: *Emile Zola*
 Leo Tolstoy: *Anna Karenina*
 William Whewell: *Thoughts on the Study of Mathematics as a Part of Liberal Education* (To appear in the *Great Ideas Today* ca. 1990)
 Walt Whitman: *Leaves of Grass*

Joan Andrews: *You Reject Them, You Reject Me*
 Maurice Blondel: *Letter on Apologetics*
 Whittaker Chambers: *Witness*
 Kate Chapin: *The Awakening*
 Teilhard de Chardin: *The Divine Milieu*
 G. K. Chesterton: *The Everlasting Man*
 R. G. Collingwood: *The Idea of History*
 Christopher Dawson: *The Making of Europe*
 Mircea Eliade: *The Myth of the Eternal Return*
 T.S. Eliot: *Four Quartets*
 William Faulkner: *The Sound and the Fury*
 Etienne Gilson: *The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy*
 Graham Greene: *The Power and the Glory*
 Vassily Grossman: *Life and Fate*
 Dietrich Van Hildebrand: *Liturgy of the Hours* and *Transformation in Christ*
 James Joyce: *Ulysses*
 Claude Levi-Strauss: *The Savage Mind*
 Henri de Lubac: *Catholicism*
 Bernard Lonergan: *Insight*
 Thomas Mann: *Dr. Faustus*
 Gabriel Marcel: *Creative Fidelity*
 Thomas Merton: *The Seven Storey Mountain*
 Burnt Njal: *Icelandic Saga*
 Flannery O'Connor: *The Habit of Being* (Letters) and *Wiseblood*
 Rudolf Otto: *The Idea of the Holy*
 John Paul, II: *Love and Responsibility*
 Josef Pieper: *Leisure the Basis of Culture*
 Jean-Paul Sartre: *The Flies*
 Erwin Schrödinger: *What Is Life?*
 Wallace Stevens: *The Palm at the End of the Mind*
 Igor Stravinsky: *The Poetics of Music*
 D'Arcy W. Thompson: *On Growth and Form*
 Sigrid Undset: *Kristen Lavransdatter*
 Simone Weil: *Gravity and Grace*

Letter to the Editor

I always look forward to receiving the *Programma* and my expectations are usually surpassed by the articles and information on the PLS. The recent issue, however, I find most disheartening. The news that books are now being included among the Great Books for "representational" reasons is a supreme disappointment. I had expected more than a trendy acceptance of affirmative action from those who make the decision on what are Great Books.

How is such a decision criterion acceptable? Why are political forces allowed to invade the PLS? Isn't it academia that is to give direction to politics through its adherence to principles, rather than taking orders based on prevailing prejudices?

The notion that we must include among Great Books at least some books that are written by women and minorities is bogus. Worse than bogus, it should be insulting to women and minorities. Are women somehow unable to appreciate *Moby Dick*, because it is written by a man and concerns only the lives and adventures of men? I remember covering this work in a seminar moderated by Professor Tillman and still clear in my mind is her exposition on the camaraderie of the sailors. Today, it is called 'male bonding', but Professor Tillman observed then (1974) that there seemed to be more evidence of bonding among women than men. In any case, her insight helped me better appreciate the book and its relevance to society. In another seminar, my insight helped some students to appreciate *Emma* by Jane Austen. My point is that gender is irrelevant to the appreciation of Great Books. So, also, is race. To include books on the list for "representational" reasons is to suggest that minorities and women need a boost in order to appreciate and understand the Great Books. This is demeaning.

Obviously, I am not swayed by Professor Power's defense of inclusion of books on a representational basis. A few of his remarks are close to being disparaging of both the Great Books and women. For instance, Professor Power writes that he "... would not be too hasty in dismissing charges. . ." that the Great Books canon oppresses minorities and women. He goes on to call the adoption of the canon "inevitable" as if it is a necessary evil. How can one who truly values the wisdom of the Great Books so feebly describe its canon and acquiesce to such racist and sexist criticism? We use capital letters for 'Great Books' because they are so singularly important and vital. The canon of Great Books may be inevitable, but it is also one that is to be revered, not rebuked and belittled.

Professor Power further states "... women were denied the education and the opportunity to participate in the mainstream of our culture. . . ." The truth is that, in America, women have been indispensable in the acculturation of its citizens and women have played large roles in the determination of that culture. It is true that women have not enjoyed equivalent academic and professional opportunities as men until recently, but that is largely the result of family roles that evolved as effective ways to promote the species and the culture which defines it. Despite modern feminist critiques (which generally takes no account of nature and only selective account of history), it is neither lamentable nor "shameful" as (Professor Power states) that women have played the roles they have.

When engaging the Great Books at the University, it will not do for us to allow political ideology to shape our perspectives. We go to the Great Books simply because they go beyond current and local matters. They are the library for the wisdom of the ages. I maintain that accepting a book as a Great Book for any other reason than the book's merit is a disservice to the students of the PLS and to the Idea of Great Books.

I hope future decisions on the Great Books canon are made without sexist and racist preferences. Such preferences serve no purpose in the pursuit of wisdom.

John McGinnis

Comment from Professor Clark Power:

Would Mr. McGinnis accuse me of representationalism if I advocated including a book by an Eastern Church Father or a book by a Renaissance humanist if they were missing from the PLS canon? I would hope that students of the great books be sensitive to the exclusion of Afro-Americans and women from participation in the mainstream of Western culture, a fact that any who reads *A Room of One's Own* and *Invisible Man* would have to conclude is "shameful" and in need of rectification.

**A Review of *New Ideas from Dead Economists* by Todd G. Buchholz
(New American Library, 321 pp., \$19.95)**

When you think of it, the progress of computers and computer technology is amazing. Faster, more powerful and more efficient machines are being developed all the time and sophisticated and useful software has continually improved service to a growing number of users. No one can doubt the astounding progress, but who, in fact, is directing it? The beauty is that no one agent or group responsible for this progress—it is the sum of desires and decisions made by all. It is Adam Smith's invisible hand doing its most visible work.

Tod Buchholz's *New Ideas from Dead Economists*, as its title suggests, rediscovers the power and pervasiveness of Smith's *The Wealth of Nations*. He uses this Great Book, not just as a focus, but as the touchstone to an analysis of economics. Buchholz has written a simple, humorous, and engaging text that traces the path of economic thought from Smith to Keynes and Hayek. (Included in the discourse are contributions from Friedman, Galbraith, and others who cannot yet claim title billing.) PLS compatriots will find much of the analysis related to the work of familiar names like Malthus, Marx, Hobbes, Hume, Mill, and others as well as Smith. All of their important contributions to the philosophy of economics are interestingly presented.

This is perhaps what I like best about the book. The coverage of economics in the PLS is no doubt respectable, but could be enhanced. *New Ideas* reveals the dynamics and complexities of economic issues that are often just touched upon. It will acquaint the reader with a wide range of ideas including free enterprise, utilitarianism, and communism. From a political perspective, the coverage by Buchholz is evenhanded (though Marx was wrong and you, me, and everybody else knows it). Buchholz, a former economics lecturer at Harvard and currently an economic adviser to the President, possesses a superior intellect that manifests itself only after you realize how simply he has presented some very subtle economic points.

I highly recommend *New Ideas* because it is an excellent depiction and summary of the clash of ideas concerning economic principles. (And besides, it's funny.) An educated person should be more than superficially acquainted with economics. Economics is, after all, the science of choice and choice is the very richness of life (fatalism notwithstanding). *New Ideas* is a general viewpoint, yet easily develops deeper principles which illuminate both history and the present. It will increase one's appreciation of the economic problems and their solutions while at the same time broaden one's knowledge of the Great Books. Its chief virtue is the best we can ask of any secondary source: it gives focus to primary sources.

John McGinnis

Alumnae/i News

Editor's note: Please write your class correspondent. We continue to need class correspondents for some years.

Class of 1955

(Class Correspondent: George L. Vosmik, P. O. Box 5000, Cleveland, OH 44104)

Class of 1958

(Class Correspondent: Michael J. Crowe, PLS, U. of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN 46556)

Class of 1960

(Class Correspondent: Anthony Intinoli, Jr. 555 Santa Clara Street,
P. O. Box 3068, Vallejo, CA 94590)

Class of 1965

(Class Correspondent: Lee Foster, P.O. Box 5715, Berkeley, CA 94705)

Class of 1966

(Class Correspondent: Paul R. Ahr, 225 S. Meramec, Suite 1032, St. Louis, MO 63105)

Class of 1967

(Class Correspondent: Robert W. McClelland, P. O. Box 1407, Muncie, IN 47307-0407)

Class of 1971

(Class Correspondent: Raymond J. Condon, 2700 Addison Ave., Austin, TX 78757)

Class of 1972

(Class Correspondent: Otto Barry Bird, 15013 Bauer Drive, Rockville, MD 20853)

Added by PLS Office:

Dan Moore is a motion picture costume designer and he has a new address, 3119 Berkeley, CA 90026, phone: (213) 666-3510.

Class of 1973

(Class Correspondents: John Astuno, 1775 Sherman St. #1325, Denver, CO 80203-4316
and John Burkley, 1643 Barrington Road, Columbus, OH 43221)

Added by PLS Office:

Laurence Pino is an attorney for Pino and Dicks, Attorneys at Law. He has made numerous television and radio appearances, many seminars and published on a wide variety of topics from the U.S. Constitution to business and real estate investment laws. His address is 24 S. Orange Avenue, P.O. Box 1511, Orlando, FL 32802.

Class of 1974

(Class Correspondent: Jan Waltman Hessling, 5231 D Penrith Dr., Durham, NC 27713)

Class of 1979

(Class Correspondent: Thomas A. Livingston, 517 Fordham Avenue, Pittsburgh, PA 15226)

Last time I wrote (July of '89), I promised to devote this entire space to a fictional account of "The Life and Times of Russell Reed King" *unless*¹—between then and now—I managed to accumulate a fair amount of news about our classmates. It turns out that I *do* have news², but not quite enough to suit me. So, at the end of this space, I've included just the first few lines of the novel. But first, a big dose of the Truth:

In Our Nation's Capital on June 10, '89, Anne Wagner married Allynn Howe. They share a home in Annandale, VA, and Anne—who attended law school at George Washington U.—is an attorney with the American Federation of Government Employees.

The weekend of Anne's wedding was also a Reunion Weekend in South Bend. One highlight was Dr. Cronin's talk—in the CCE—about the condition of Our Lady. Another was breakfast with Drs. Tillman, Sloan and Nicgorski. Reed King, Tony Pace and Walt Rogers were among the luminaries who attended (Walt stayed awake the entire meal). Reed is a graduate of the Cornell Law School; for the past year or so, he has lived in Cleveland where he works for a nationwide real estate concern called Developers Diversified. Tony and his wife Heather live in Cranford, NJ, and Tony is a senior vice-president with the advertising firm of Young & Rubicam. Walt and his wife Michelle Weldon had been living in Dallas, but about a year ago, they moved to Northern Indiana, and Walt is pursuing a law degree at Notre Dame. Michelle and Walt's son Weldon is reported to be in training for the 2001 Bengal Bouts.

Since the Reunion, there have been at least two noteworthy weddings. First, in Chicago on

¹Dr. Cronin used to insist that one should not underscore a word for emphasis; instead, if the sentence is properly written, the emphasis will suggest itself.

²Some of it concerns All-Stars from the Class of '78.

March 10, '90, Melinda Shelby married Bill Brittan.¹ They Honeymooned in Hawaii, and on their way home, they stopped in Denver long enough to check in at the Final Four.² Among the distinguished guests at Mindy and Bill's wedding were Chris and Joe Scally (Class of '78). Joe—who had been practicing law in Chicago these past few years—now studies in DePaul's graduate program in Child Psychology.

On April 27, '90—down in Charlotte, NC—Olivia Chaplin married Bill Baker. At the wedding and reception, Bill and his groomsmen (including Mark Gallogly and myself) looked rather convincing in white ties and tails.³ From the altar, Fr. Kevin Caspersen's homily cast a special light on things. And when thunderstorms downed the power lines at the reception, hundreds of candles cast a special light of their own.

Fr. Kevin kindly provided the following report:

The Scranton Preparatory School hosted a benefit concert for the Mark E. Clarke Endowment on April 7, 1990 with pianist Daniel Epstein performing. The honorary host of the evening's festivities was the Honorable Robert Casey, Governor of Pennsylvania. Governor Casey, whose son Mark had taught at "the Prep", offered a touching tribute to our classmate who manifestly continues to effect the lives of people in his community. Mark's dedication to the Christian education of youth continues in this scholarship.

I have news of children: first, here in Pittsburgh, back on July 1, '89, Jim and Gina McLean welcomed their third son Owen into the world.⁴ And out in Phoenix, Patricia O'Donnell Gales (Class of '78) and her husband Paul are enjoying the sun/Suns with their five kids: Nicole, Christopher, Kara, Patrick and Paul, Jr. a/k/a "Rockin". In March of '90, when Fr. Jim McDonald was up for a few months from Chile, he and I visited the Galeses. They treated us royally—except when it came to teasing me for doggin' it on our hike to Fatman's Pass and back. And then they were merciless.

And now, some Notes toward "The Life and Times of Russell Reed King."⁵

Reed King did not discover his true name until he was six years old. Those first six years were as peculiar as any young man in the United States will ever know. For his own good, Reed's parents had resolved to expose him—from an early age—to the pleasures and perils and lessons of nature. But either God, or nature, or a set of human agents could not bear to see this ill-conceived experiment run its course. Mr. and Mrs. King had sense enough to choose a temperate climate, and on Reed's first birthday—with the courage of their convictions, and a full measure of sorrow—they left him to the wilds of Tennessee, with only a resourceful collie and his guide. . . .

Keep those cards and letters coming.

Class of 1980

¹In Chicago that weekend, I stayed with my brother Terry (Class of '78) and his wife Debbie Cafaro. They are the proud parents of a man-child named Kevin—born of May 4, '89. Kevin's grandparents, aunts and uncles have all made it our business to spoil him rotten.

²Maybe next year Coach K. Speaking of b-ball, may I propose a change in the Fine Arts component of the Program? In coming years, require all PLS students to watch at least one Michael Jordan game per semester.

³We wore no gloves. The bridesmaids' gowns were a blue brocade.

⁴In the fall of '90, Jim's sister Kathy will be sophomore in the PLS.

⁵One sort of history which is unrepresented in the Great Books Seminars is biography. There is the *Autobiography of Benvenuto Cellini*, and now—I understand—there's the *Autobiography of Malcolm X*. [Added by PLS Office—Malcolm X's *Autobiography* is not on the list]. But is there something distinctive about straight biography that renders it unfit for greatness? Recall that, among the Great Books, there are novels which take the life of a single character other than the narrator as their focus. See, e.g., *Don Quixote*, *Madame Bovary* and *Anna Karenina*. Does this fact refute any suggestion that biography is either conceptually or structurally inferior? Anyway, rather than risk missing the boat to Greatness, I've opted to declare at the outset that these Notes are fiction.

By proceeding this way, I'd hate to foreclose the possibility that Reed will someday reduce the truth about himself to writing, have it published, and have PLS professors "in the year 2525" assign it to our descendants.

(Class Correspondent: Mary Schmidlein, 9077 Swan Circle, St. Louis, MO 63144)

Class of 1983

(Class Correspondent: Patty Fox, 103 Knickerbocker Rd., Pittsford, NY 14535)

Class of 1984

(Class Correspondent: Margaret Smith, 2440 E. Tudor Rd. #941, Anchorage, AK 99507)
David DeJute is a law clerk to Hon. William J. Rae, USDC Judge. His new address is 6134A Glen Tower, Hollywood, CA 90068 and phone: (213) 957-0337.

Class of 1985

(Class Correspondent: Laurie Denn Spurgin, 55 W. 96th, Apt 2L, Bloomington, MN 55420)
Jim Silver married Ms. Julie Girant, a medical student in Lake Tahoe in June '90. They are living in a Virginia suburb of Washington, DC. Jim continues to work as a lawyer for the Washington Office of Baker & Botts and can be reached at the firm's offices: 555 13th st. N.W., Suite 500 E., Washington, DC 20004.

Added by the PLS Office:

Susan St. Ville's new address is 1231 Woodfield, South Bend, IN 46615. She is completing her degree in theology from the University of Chicago. Her husband has joined the Notre Dame theology department faculty.

Class of 1986

(Class Correspondent: Margaret Neis, 936 Pleasant, Apt. P2, Oak Park, IL 60302)

Class of 1987

(Class Correspondent: Terese Heidenwolf, 843 Mandy Lane, Camp Hill, PA 17011)

Class of 1988

(Class Correspondent: Michele Martin, Theology Department, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN 46556)

Added by PLS Office:

Elizabeth Cornwell has just purchased her first home and finally admitted her eyesight is very poor. She now has glasses. Her new address is 112 N. Sheridan Ave., Indianapolis, IN 46219.

Class of 1989

(Class Correspondent: Coni Rich, 2680 Trader Court, South Bend, IN 46628)
Mark Lickona has received a full scholarship in Applied Philosophy at Bowling Green State University for the fall.

Class of 1990

Added by PLS Office:

Margaret Bilson is relaxing this summer before entering graduate school in Classics as UC Santa Barbara for the fall. Her summer address is 30110 Green Acres, Farmington Hills, MI 48334.

Amber George has been lying on the beaches of Hawaii (isn't she lucky). Amber's summer address is 44102 North 27th St. W., Lancaster, CA 93536.

Andrew Gordon is back in Jamaica, planning to enter politics. His address is P.O. Box 02-8528, Miami, FL 33102.

Barb Martin has a summer job with a daycare center. Her summer address is 105 Thompson Dr., Wheaton, IL 60187.

Colleen McShane has a job at a bookstore (she loves to read good books) and a second job lifeguarding (she also likes getting sun burned). She would appreciate hearing from you; her address is 1006 Rose Ave., Coraopolis, PA 15108.

Many Thanks to Contributors

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
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