



# PROGRAMMA

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A Newsletter for Graduates of the Program of Liberal Studies  
The University of Notre Dame  
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## A VIEW FROM 215

As I write this column, the finishing touches are being put on the expanded football stadium, which has gotten very close to the Decio Faculty Office Building. The good news is that next year many more alumni will be able to get tickets for home games. Please come by and see us if you are in town. I also hope that we will see many of our graduates at this year's alumni reunion. The Program has its own gathering on Saturday morning in the foyer of Decio. Last year we had a very strong turnout for our reception and the seminar on Virginia Woolf's *Room of One's Own*.

This has been an especially busy year for our faculty, as we conducted searches for positions in literature and musicology, which elicited almost 800 applications. I am pleased to inform you that Professor Julia Marvin and Professor Edmund Goehring will be joining us in the Fall. Professor Marvin will be receiving her Ph.D. in English from Princeton University this spring. She is a specialist in medieval literature who wrote her thesis on Arthurian legend. Professor Goehring graduated from Columbia University and has been teaching at the

University of Georgia. He is a specialist on Mozart.

The class of '96 took its place among the ranks of our distinguished alumni. J. Patrick Shirey was chosen by the seniors and faculty for the Willis Nutting Award, given to the student who has contributed the most to the education of his or her peers and professors in the program. The Bird Award went to Gregory Beatty for his Senior Essay, "Recent Developments in the Theory of Evolution: Stuart Kauffman's Ensemble Approach to Evolutionary Biology," written under the direction of Professor Phillip Sloan. The graduates of the class of '96 have, like their predecessors, gone into a variety of graduate programs, businesses, volunteer organizations, and professional activities. I am particularly pleased to note that over 40% of the class chose to do a year of volunteer service. Our students have a remarkable record of service both during their years at Notre Dame and following graduation.

Last December we welcomed back David Collins '56, who led a spirited faculty and student discussion of ethics and business. David was a Distinguished Visiting Professor

in the Business School during the fall semester, and he taught a course there on management and ethics using a Great Books approach. As you may recall, David was the manager responsible for removing Tylenol from the shelves when the poisoning occurred; the Tylenol case has become a classic in Business Ethics. David inaugurated what I hope will become an annual event in the program, a Distinguished Alumni Lecture Series.

Professor Fred Crosson, holder of the John J. Cavanaugh, Chair in the Humanities and a former Dean of the College of Arts and Letters, has told me that he plans to retire next year. Professor Crosson has been with the Program since we began, and he has been an exemplary proponent of Great Books

pedagogy. We will honor his remarkable achievements and thank him for his tireless dedication next spring. I will contact you next year about our plans.

As we bring the 1996/97 Academic Year to a close, I would like to thank all of you for encouragement. Thanks to you, our Program flourishes.

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Faculty Editor

Henry Weinfield

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## FROM THE EDITOR'S DESK

The issue of *Programma* that comes before you is an especially rich and ample one. In addition to Professor Power's "Opening Charge" on democratic education, a subject always dear to his heart, the issue includes not one but *two* Cronin Award-winning essays, "Fantasies of Feminine Sexuality" by Erin Hains (a fascinating meditation on a Balthus painting) and "Interpretation of the Logos: Plato's *Phaedrus* and the Gospel of Saint John" by Jeff Speaks (whose Cronin Award Essay on T. S. Eliot's *Four Quartets* was published in last year's *Programma*). Apparently, the Cronin Award judges were unable to make up their minds as to which was the best of the nominated essays—and we're delighted,

because it gives us the opportunity this year to showcase the diversity of student thinking and creativity in the Program.

As always, the issue includes Father Nicholas Ayo's All Souls Mass homily (this one includes a beautiful letter from a Trappist monk who was killed in Algeria); and in addition there is a poem by yours truly (which took me more than ten years to complete, and which I finally finished in the afternoon before the Cronin Award dinner—phew!) and an interesting book review on the problem of over-specialization in the university by Professor Frederick Crosson.

We're always happy to hear from you, so please keep those news notes coming!

## FACULTY NEWS

**Michael Crowe's** *Calendar of the Correspondence of Sir John Herschel* is now at the indexing stage. His associate editors are David R. Dyck and James J. Kevin. Important contributions to this ca. 750,000 word volume were made by former PLS students Gina M. Bacigalupi, Diana H. Barnes, Anne-Marie Clavelli, Ryan D. Dye, Rebecca L. Lubas, Susan P. Petti, and Jameson M. Wetmore. The volume will be published by Cambridge University Press, probably in 1998. Professor Crowe is also acting as co-chair for the Third Biennial History of Astronomy Workshop, which again this year will be held at Notre Dame: June 19-22, 1997.

**Steve Fallon** reports that he has been re-inspired by reading David Denby's *Great Books: My Adventures with Homer, Rousseau, Woolf, and Other Indestructible Writers of the Western World*, the *New Yorker* film critic's account of his return to Columbia a quarter-century after his graduation to retake the famous Columbia great books core (thanks to Bill Maloney, GP '70, who made a gift of the book to the PLS faculty). Having not made any major changes in his life, Steve continues to write about Milton and to coach youth soccer. He

presented papers on Milton and on Bacon (the latter inspired by a GB Seminar) at December's MLA convention in Washington, D.C. He encourages alums who know his wife, Nancy, to read her article on the death penalty in the spring *Notre Dame Magazine*.

**Katherine Tillman** says how delighted she is that the Notre Dame Series in the Great Books (originated by the Program's class of 1956) has allowed Newman's Oxford University Sermons on faith and reason to be put back into print, lengthily introduced, of course, by hers truly, and published this spring by Notre Dame Press. Her upcoming Newman lectures are at St. Mary's College, Moraga, CA (April 18) and St. Joseph's College in Indiana in August. In South Bend, she is leading six, monthly seminars for women in philanthropy, on Tocqueville's views of community service in relation to women writers' views of "giving." This summer she offers a week-long mini-course for Elder Hostel on Newman's views of lifelong liberal learning, and another in the Summer Session on Newman's little known work of historical imagination, *The Rise and Progress of Universities*.

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## OPENING CHARGE: 1996-97

### Democratic Education

by

F. Clark Power  
September 10, 1996

This November most of the students gathered here will be participating in their first Presidential election. Approximately a third of you will be voting for the first time. What will you and members of your generation add to the process of choosing a President this Fall? What kind of influence will you bring to bear on issues that get discussed and the level of discourse with which these issues are debated?

Last month I visited Independence Hall in Philadelphia where the Declaration of Independence was drafted. I saw a short film that showed our founders signing the Declaration, and remarked that in so doing they were signing their death warrant. I couldn't help but contrast their commitment with our own present-day attitude toward democracy. Are we Americans worthy of our democratic legacy? Are we fit for the responsibilities of self-governance?

This is indeed a propitious time for us to reflect on democracy and more specifically on how a democratic society should go about educating its citizens. It is also a propitious time at the beginning of a new school year for us to reflect on the Program of Liberal Studies and its contribution to preparing democratic citizens.

Thomas Jefferson once said, "Education is the anvil of democracy." Although most Americans would probably agree that education is crucial to sustain our society, few of us explore why education is necessary for democracy or more specifically what kind of education democracy requires.

Let me quote Socrates in the *Meno*: "I cannot presume to tell you how to educate for democracy, if I don't know what democracy itself is." We can, of course, establish in a preliminary way the meaning of democracy through its etymology. Democracy—from the Greek—means simply—rule by the people. As Aristotle pointed out in the *Politics*, and as President Chirac of France

recently told an audience in the Congo, "Democracy is plural." We can see the many manifestations of democracy throughout the world—from representative government in the United States to direct participatory democracy in Switzerland. According to a recent study, over the past decade the majority of the countries in the world (61%) are now democratic, compared to a minority (42%) only a decade ago. The major shift, of course, has occurred in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union where there are now 19 democracies in 27 nations.

The criteria used to classify countries as democratic are rather weak—free elections and majority rule. These criteria do not help us to evaluate democracies as more or less embodying an ideal of popular governance. Democracy, as many of us think of it, is not only a descriptive category but a moral one.

One key criterion for evaluating a particular democracy is the extent to which all people meaningfully participate in it. Most of us in this room have such a strong belief in human equality that we would vigorously oppose any attempt to establish a ruling class on the basis of gender, race, social class, or IQ score. Yet Aristotle and Nietzsche, for example, challenge our belief in equality, asserting a hierarchical view of human nature. Nietzsche characterized equality as a revolutionary and potentially destructive idea, and he attributed the origins of this idea (and laid the blame for its historical consequences) to the Judeo-Christian religious tradition. Recall, for example, the emphasis in the Hebrew Scriptures on seeking justice for the *anawim*—the poor, the widows, and the orphans—literally the "little breaths"—those who lack a voice in society. In the Christian Scriptures, we read that "in Christ, there is no slave nor free, there is neither male nor female" (Galatians 3: 24). This radical sense of equality before God is rooted in mysteries of the Creation and Incarnation. God creates

all persons in God's image and likeness. God's fullest self-expression is to become one of us. These core truths of our religious tradition lead us to acknowledge the God-like qualities of freedom and dignity in each and every person. Although Immanuel Kant provided the most articulate philosophical conceptualization of the moral autonomy of the human being, the idea that all human beings are free lawgivers, like their God, has long been a part of our religious tradition.

In the United States, we have had a sad history of slavery and of denying the vote to women; and we still struggle to find ways of giving under-represented minorities a significant voice in our government. Democracies will, I believe, always be beset with attempts to limit popular participation. Those who have wealth and power will always be tempted to exclude those who do not. Majorities will always be tempted to disenfranchise minorities. Clearly it is wrong to restrict participation in the democratic process for one's own advantage. On the other hand, doesn't the demanding nature of the democratic process suggest that those who participate in it should have some qualifications? In the United States today, the major qualification for voting, apart from citizenship, is age. At age 18, you can vote. But why must you be 18 and not 13, the age when Jewish adolescents have their Bar Mitzvah? Or why not allow 7 year-olds to vote since traditionally this has been regarded as the age of reason? What attributes does an 18 year-old possess that younger adolescents and children do not? A common response is that in our society, 18-year olds have generally finished their high school education and are ready to enter the world of work or higher education. Presumably these 18 year-olds are capable of independence. By independence, I mean that they have the physical and psychological resources to live apart from their parents. Presumably 18 year-olds are also able to make more reasonable decisions about their own welfare and that of others than 13 year-olds and 7 year-olds. Sixty years of research on the development of children's and adolescents' socio-moral reasoning confirms this. Yet this research suggests that most 18 year-olds (and most adults in general) do not have an adequate understanding of human rights or of constitutional democracy.

Even as we strive to make our democracies more inclusive, we must work

to insure that their citizens have the competencies necessary for self-governance. These competencies may appear to be minimal if we limit our view of democratic participation to the act of voting. The ancients had higher expectations for democratic participation. The restriction of citizenship to men holding property and thus having meaningful leisure time made sense in a society in which citizens were expected to participate several times a month in legislative and judicial assemblies. Legislative activity was not reserved for a few paid "politicians," but was the duty of all citizens. In his famous funeral oration, Pericles says, "We do not say that a man who takes no interest in politics is a man who minds his own business; we say that he has no business being here at all."

We do not have a direct participatory democracy at the federal and state levels of government. Yet this should not permit us to withdraw from the public sphere to attend almost exclusively to our private interests. As a matter of fact, we have opportunities to practice democracy daily in many of the organizations to which we belong. Home, school, work, and volunteer organizations provide meaningful ways of getting involved and making a difference at a local, national, and even international level.

What kind of competencies are necessary to participate in the legislative and judicial dimensions of a democracy? Those who participated in the juridical process that led to Socrates's execution, were good people who expended considerable time and energy. Their decision was tragically flawed, nevertheless, because fear and ambition obscured the pursuit of justice and truth. Democracy without conscientious deliberation is little more than mobocracy. This is one of the main reasons why throughout the Platonic dialogues Socrates warns of the dangers of rhetoric—the kind of speech-making that Thrasymachus advocates in the *Republic*. Rhetoric may sway the populace and cause a "bounce" in the polls but it cannot not lead to wiser and more just deliberation. Socrates thus practices and argues for the dialectical process of searching for the truth through open-ended discussion.

The drafters of the First Amendment to the Constitution apparently had this notion of dialectic in mind when they rejected the right of citizens "to instruct" their representatives on how to vote (Sunstein, 1996, p. 29).

According to the political theorist Carl Sunstein (1996), Roger Sherman made the decisive argument against the amendment by pointing out that a right to instruct “would destroy the object of meeting” because “there would be no use in deliberation.” It is in the meeting—in the deliberative discussion among the representatives in Congress—that truth and justice are to be advanced.

In addition to needing dialectic to attain their ideal, democracies also seem to require a supportive culture, as de Tocqueville argued. This may be most apparent in Russia and in other former Soviet Republics where democratic institutions hang by the thinnest of threads. If economic conditions worsen, the majority may well vote to return to an autocratic form of government. In these countries, democracy has not had an opportunity to take root in the fabric of people’s lives. Many people are cynical about their governments, and often with good reason. The people lack faith that democracy will make their lives better in any meaningful way. In the United States, on the other hand, it is unthinkable that we would ever forsake our democratic heritage. Yet the signs of an eroding democratic culture are everywhere. As our economy has grown, as our social sphere has become more bureaucratic, and as our knowledge has become more specialized, we have given more and more power and authority over to the “experts” and retreated from public to private concerns. Obedience to authority and conformity may be far more characteristic of our social life than democracy. Low voter turnout is but a sign of a deeper malaise. Without a rebirth of citizen participation, we may well lose the culture that sustained our political institutions.

### Education

Having offered you a rough sketch of what democracy entails, I shall turn to the question of what kind of education a democracy ought to provide for its citizens. Thomas Jefferson believed that, at the very least, citizens needed to be literate. Basic literacy is necessary for voting and for acquiring information. E. D. Hirsch argues that cultural literacy is also important if citizens are to grasp the meaning of the information that they need to make informed decisions. Language, whether it is used to

preserve the status quo or to foment revolution, draws its power and persuasiveness from our cultural heritage, or more accurately our multi-cultural heritage. This means that educated people not only know how to read, but that they have acquired a core of knowledge.

In addition to literacy and cultural literacy, education should also provide citizens with such factual knowledge as the branches of government, when elections are held and for which offices, what jury duty means, etc. These are the topics of the common “civics education” course which, when I was in high school, was entitled “Problems of Democracy.”

Now I would like to suggest to you this evening that the education that I have described above is simply not sufficient if we are to strive for democracy in its fullest and most ideal sense. Democracy requires that we the people deliberate in common—that we engage in a serious and searching dialogue about justice and the common good. In Platonic terms, democracy requires that its citizens become philosopher kings. Plato, Aristotle, and many other great thinkers believed that it was impossible to educate the common person to be a philosopher king. They found the common person lacking in both the intelligence and the character for such a role. Hence the appeal of representative democracy. If common persons cannot become philosopher kings themselves, they can elect individuals who are. Jefferson believed that an educational system ought to be erected that would provide several years of basic education for all, but advanced education for the few, who would become the elected leaders. Although our elected leaders have generally been far better educated than the populace, an argument can be made, I think, that in their legislative deliberations they have all too often failed to rise above their constituents or the special-interest groups that backed their candidacies. To most Americans, politics connotes self-seeking manipulation and scheming, rather than a science of government based on public deliberation.

If we wish to educate citizens for democracy in the ideal sense, then we must find ways of teaching children how to deliberate together about complex issues. They must learn to grasp in a profound sense their common dignity as free and equal persons, and they must learn to respect and

listen to one another. Finally, they must come to value democracy as a way of life, as John Dewey put it, and not simply as a peripheral activity.

### The Program of Liberal Studies

I will now propose in a preliminary fashion that the Program of Liberal Studies offers just the kind of education that I believe is necessary for an ideal democracy. My apology for the Program draws heavily on one of the earliest presentations of the Program in our archives, entitled "The theory of the First Program, 1952." This presentation was written by Otto Bird, one of the founders of the Program, and the father and grandfather of two of our distinguished alumni. In 1952, the Program was only two years old and was known as the General Program of Liberal Education, or the "GP." In describing the Program, which he called an "experiment," Bird emphasized that the goal or end of education is the intellectual development of the student. Bird distinguished intellectual development—rather than the imparting of a subject matter—as the true aim of education. The kind of liberal arts education that Bird envisioned was an education in the exercise of rationality or of understanding—an education that nurtured the mind so that the student would have intellectual resources to engage any particular field of study. Bird strongly resisted the alternative position that the aim of education should be narrowly construed as the preparation of students for work roles in an industrialized society characterized by a progressive division of labor. Bird quotes Adam Smith's warning (1776/1776) about the devastating effects of highly specialized work roles:

In the progress of the division of labor, the employment of the far greater part of those who live by labor, comes to be confined to a few very simple operations . . . But the understandings of the greater part of men are necessarily formed by their ordinary employments. The man whose whole life is spent in performing a few simple operations . . . has no

occasion to exert his understanding or exercise his invention. . . . He naturally loses, therefore, the habit of such exertion, and generally becomes as stupid and as ignorant as it possible for a human creature to become. The torpor of his mind renders him not only incapable of relishing or bearing a part in any rational conversation, but of conceiving any generous, noble or tender sentiment. . . . Of the great and extensive interests of his country he is altogether incapable of judging. . . . His dexterity at his own particular trade seems, in this manner, to be acquired at the expense of his intellectual, social, and martial virtues (pp. 302-303).

Two hundred years later, the sociologist Melvin Kohn (1977) confirmed Smith's dire prediction. He and his colleagues found that the kind of work that one does has a significant effect on one's intellectual development and values. The more routinized and highly supervised the labor, the more likely workers' intellectual development will be stunted and their values will reflect a conformism and subservience to authority inimical to the democratic spirit. Although Smith and Kohn focussed principally on assembly-line work, the dangers of overspecialization and unthinking submission to authority (in its more subtle bureaucratized forms) are readily observed, even in the white-collar work world of our post-industrial society.

The university itself is perhaps more accurately described as a "multiversity" of distinctive disciplines and subdisciplines. I suspect that few of you students have any idea of just how specialized faculty scholarship has become. During the social time following my talk, I urge you to approach one of our faculty and ask him or her to tell you about the book or article that he or she is currently writing. Ask about the backgrounds of those who are likely to read that book or article. I wager that you will be surprised by how small and highly

specialized our scholarly circles have become.

Although we cannot avoid much of the specialization that we find in the workplace or in the research side of the university (which has borne remarkable progress) we can avoid a system of education that fails to engage the range of our intellectual and moral capacities as fully as possible. Bird sees education as the antidote to today's workplace. In his view, it is only through a general liberal arts education that we can develop the fullness of our humanity. Bird does not deal explicitly with the political implications of his view. Yet, clearly, democracy cannot thrive without citizens who have developed the capacity to address complex and difficult questions concerning the common good, questions that transcend narrow specialization.

Moreover, democracy cannot thrive without citizens who develop the capacity not only to obey but to make decisions as autonomous persons interacting with other autonomous persons. Passivity is one of democracy's greatest enemies. Education that turns students into quiet and dutiful note-takers that dare not question the authority of the teacher hardly suits a democracy that is built upon liberty and the free exchange of ideas. In fact, Otto Bird declared that education that puts the transmission of the subject ahead of the development of the student isn't really education at all. Bird noted that education must "dispose, encourage, provoke, irritate the student to learn" for himself and herself. Thus in Bird's view, the lecture method "must be abandoned" as the primary method of teaching and replaced by the method of Socratic discussion or dialectic.

The Great Books Seminar is, I believe, the most radical of all teaching methods, and the one best suited for preparing democratic citizens. The seminar is designed to nurture dialectic or what the political philosopher Jurgen Habermas (1984) calls the ideal speech situation. In the ideal speech situation, all participants:

- 1) have equal power;
- 2) attempt to reach mutual understanding;
- 3) do not act manipulatively; and
- 4) understand their obligation to offer reasons.

The outcome of the ideal speech situation is judgments based on "the unforced force of the better argument."

Let us consider the Great Books Seminar as an ideal speech situation. Unlike any other class, including the typical graduate seminar, the Great Books seminar attempts to equalize power between the professor and the students by saying to the students and the Professor alike: "Discussion will be limited to the contents of this book or to the books already read in common." The faculty leading your Great Books Seminars are rarely experts in the text being discussed or even in the general discipline to which the text belongs. I, for example, received my doctorate and do my research in developmental psychology, yet I lead discussions on the *Iliad*, the *Divine Comedy*, and *Madame Bovary*. There is nothing more unsettling for a faculty member than to have spent years, even decades, mastering a certain disciplinary specialty and to walk into a seminar class dealing with a text in which he or she is a mere novice—like his or her students. But this is a small price to pay in order to have an engaging seminar in which all share responsibility for making the discussion an illuminating and productive one.

How does a Great Books seminar attempt to bring about mutual understanding? First, note that a good seminar class is more than a series of commentaries on a text. It is an interaction in which listening is every bit as important as speaking. Through the seminar, we learn to respect and to be open to each other and to the author that we are reading. We learn that we must give reasons to support our positions and honestly weigh the reasons given by others. Sometimes it is exceedingly difficult to engage texts that come from very different cultures and points of view. Yet I know of no better method of multi-cultural education than a Great Books seminar on the *Iliad* or the *Teachings of the Compassionate Buddha*. The Seminar is not, of course a jury room or a congressional assembly. We do not make judgements about an individual's guilt or innocence or about welfare reform. We do, however, grapple with serious texts, not simply for the sake of interpreting them correctly but for the sake of understanding their claims on us and judging the integrity and truth of these claims.

I once overheard a PLS student reprimand a fellow student after a seminar class for approaching the discussion as a bystander. She advised, "If you want to be a part of this class, you have to live the



books." What she meant, I think, is that these Great Books make important claims on us as individuals and as a community. To participate in a seminar is to engage in more than an intellectual exercise. It is to encounter thoughtfully, openly, and seriously powerful ideas and sentiments that are meant to change our lives.

Tutorials also play an important role in preparing students for democratic citizenship. The tutorial classes acknowledge the liberal arts of analysis, critical reflection, dialogue and so forth, rather than general competencies that can be readily applied to any subject matter. As Aristotle shows and contemporary research confirms, there are different kinds of intellectual activity with corresponding kinds of intellectual virtues. Mathematical problem solving is very different from literary criticism, which in turn is different from philosophical analysis. Although it is impossible to master all of the intellectual domains, it is crucial that we develop sufficient competence in each so that we can respond intelligently to a wide variety of issues, from toxic waste to human rights abuses.

Finally, I would like to say a brief word about the PLS culture. It has been a standing joke that PLS students carry their class discussions over into the dining halls and student lounges. PLS is not just a major but a way of life. To be a PLS student entails a substantial commitment of time and energy both within class and outside of it—whether in informal discussions or in events such as this. PLS has succeeded in the past and succeeds today because students and faculty have high expectations for each other and share responsibility for helping each other to meet those expectations. This is the kind of culture in which democracy can thrive.

## Conclusion

In conclusion, I would urge us all to rededicate ourselves to the ideals that make the Program of Liberal Studies unique, not only as an undergraduate major but as an approach to democratic education. I would also urge us all to be mindful that to whom much is given, much is expected in return. We cannot be content to educate a democratic elite here in PLS, but must concern ourselves with the education of others, particularly those who because of poverty and race are alienated from the democratic process. Recall that American universities were established in the 17th and 18th centuries for the purpose of serving the churches and the nation. Universities in this century, however, lost sight of these public goals in pursuit of narrow research agendas and career preparation. In recent decades, as is apparent in the growth of Notre Dame's Center for Social Concerns and other such centers around the country, students are taking greater responsibility for their community. Last Spring, over 40% of our graduating seniors chose to participate in community service projects this year. Almost all members of that class were involved in some service activity while they were here. I hope that all of you continue this tradition. Community service is not simply an act of charity or noblesse oblige. Community service is a vital part of your education as democratic citizens. By serving others, you will learn from them and with them build bonds of community that will be mutually supportive.

So, as citizens of PLS and citizens of the United States, let us take up our responsibilities with all of the energy and seriousness of purpose that we can muster. And let us never rest content with the democracy that we now enjoy, but let us build a democracy that engages all persons in the fullness of their freedom and dignity as daughters and sons of God.

**ALL SOULS MASS HOMILY****November 7, 1996**

by

Fr. Nicholas Ayo, CSC

It is hard today not to be aware of divisions among us—first world, second world, third world, fourth world. Republican and Democrat, male and female, Catholics to the Right and Catholics to the Left, Straight and Gay, Rich and Poor, Black and White. Divisions, or at least differences, abound. In death, however, we are all equal. The grave markers may differ, but in eternal life we are all simply who we are before God in truth and in simplicity. Honorary titles as well as social and gender roles will fall away. We will differ only in this: some of us will have loved more and become more loving as persons than others. And salvation is just that—becoming a loving person capable of entering friendship with God, who is Love.

Salvation is the same for all human beings. It is becoming truly human and responding to God's invitation. The Holy Spirit, given to every human being ever born, invites us to learn to love as God loves. It is a generous and merciful love, easier to recognize than to define. It is found in many people in many places, and even in a thief at the eleventh hour on Calvary hill. It is found in all religions in their people who respond to the Holy Spirit, who is even now recreating the world.

If every serious and honest religion or philosophy were able to purify its tradition of distortion and inadequate understanding, there would remain a core of truth that all of us would accept as truth from the Holy Spirit. There is only one truth. I believe Catholicism is a world religion that contains

not the only signs of God in the world, but indeed the fullest revelation of God. That fullness is Jesus Christ, the Son of God become a human being, God's self-gift to humankind, a gift given once and for all. Whatever the truth without distortion in any religion, it can be embraced and honored by Catholics, who offer not to disregard the ways of others but to add to them by way of fulfillment. Because Jesus Christ is God's gift once and for all, that gift and revelation cannot be repeated or surpassed. It is once and for all. It is the total gift of God that all religions approach and in their best tradition have known in a real but incomplete way. We honor all human beings in their death. And we honor all religions in their best light. And we believe that Jesus Christ well understood is the fulfillment and nowise the rejection of any truth.

I should like to close with reading a letter by Christian de Cherge, a French Trappist monk in Algeria, who was killed by Islamic fundamentalists. I do not think the fundamentalists in this instance spoke in the most purified tradition of Islam, though they may have in conscience believed so. Indeed, the Christian crusaders of the Middle Ages did not represent Christianity in its purified form, though they too may have believed so. The author of this letter, however, does speak from the pure heart of Christianity and of humanity, which is that we should love one another as God has loved us in Jesus Christ.

## Testament of Christian de Cherge

### Opened on Pentecost Sunday 1996

When an A-DIEU is envisaged

If it should happen one day—and it could be today—that I become a victim of the terrorism which now seems ready to encompass all the foreigners living in Algeria, I would like my community, my Church, my family to remember that my life was GIVEN to God and to this country. To accept that the One Master of all life was not a stranger to this brutal departure. I would like them to pray for me; how worthy would I be found of such an offering? I would like them to be able to associate this death with so many other equally violent ones allowed to fall into the indifference of anonymity. My life has no more value than any other. Nor any less value. In any case, it has not the innocence of childhood. I have lived long enough to know that I share in the evil which seems, alas, to prevail in the world, and even in that which would strike me blindly. I should like, when the time comes, to have a space of lucidity which would enable me to bed forgiveness of God and of my brothers human beings, and at the same time to forgive with all my heart the one who would strike me down. I could not desire such a death. It seems to me important to state this. I don't see, in fact, how I could rejoice if the people I love were indiscriminately accused of my murder. It would be too high a price to pay for what will be called, perhaps, "the grace of martyrdom" to owe this to an Algerian, whoever he may be, especially if he says he is acting in fidelity to what he believes to be Islam. I know the contempt in which the Algerians taken as a whole can be engulfed. I know, too, the caricatures of Islam which encourage a certain idealism. It is too easy to give oneself a good conscience in identifying this religious way with the fundamentalist ideology of its extremists. For me, Algeria and Islam is something

different. It is a body and a soul. I have proclaimed it often enough, I think, in view of and in knowledge of what I have received from it, finding there so often that true strand of the Gospel learnt at my mother's knee, my very first Church, precisely in Algeria, and already respecting believing Muslims. My death, obviously, will appear to confirm those who hastily judged me naive or idealistic: "let him tell us now what he thinks of it!" But these must know that my most insistent curiosity will then be set free. This is what I shall be able to do, if God wills, immerse my gaze in that of the Father to contemplate with Him His children of Islam as He sees them, all shining with the glory of Christ, fruit of His Passion, filled with the Gift of the Spirit whose secret joy will always be to establish communion and to refashion the likeness, playing with the differences. This life lost, totally mine and totally theirs, I thank God who seems to have wished it entirely for the sake of that JOY in and in spite of everything. In this THANK YOU which is said for everything in my life, from now on, I certainly include you, friends of yesterday and today, and you, O my friends of this place, besides my mother and father, my sisters and brothers and their families, a hundredfold as was promised! And you too, my last minute friend, who would not have known what you were doing, Yes, for you too I say this THANK YOU and this A-DIEU to commend you to the God in whose face I see you. And may we find each other happy "good thieves" in Paradise, if it please God, the Father of us both. AMEN!

Algiers, 1 Dec 1993  
Tibhiring 1 Jan 1994

# THE CRONIN HIGH-TABLE POEM FOR 1996

## Beauty and the Beast

by

Henry Weinfield

“... desires what it has not, the Beautiful!”  
Shelley, “The Sensitive Plant”

“... the Orphic explanation of the earth,  
which is the sole task of the poet.”  
Mallarmé, letter to Verlaine (Nov. 16, 1885)

to Joyce

### I

He met her in the Library  
Where all things have their history  
But nothing living may endure—  
Among the dogs of literature.

In those lugubrious catacombs,  
Shadowed by dark, portentous tomes,  
She seemed a vision of delight  
When first she gleamed upon his sight—

Or some such words to that effect,  
Borrowed from some lost dialect  
Which happy poets used to know  
A hundred thousand years ago.

But how she happened to be hurled  
Down to that Stygian netherworld  
In which he spent his days in vain,  
The Beast could never ascertain;

Unless (to invert the fable) she,  
Playing Orpheus to his Eurydice,  
Had braved the gloomy depths of night  
To bring him back unto the light.

## II

Beauty loved reality  
In all its ambiguity:  
She saw things as they really were,  
Yet they were beautiful to her.

She lived so fully in the flow  
Of being that the here-and-now  
Was always dear to her and home  
Was everywhere that she did roam.

That latter-day propensity  
To anomie and ennui,  
That strange disease of alienation  
Had never marred her education.

Poetically she dwelt alone  
In self-sufficiency, as one  
Who hears within herself the song  
We strive to hear our whole lives long.

## III

The Beast detested the impure  
Chaotic world which we endure:  
He worshipped things celestial,  
And thought all others bestial.

He with his telescope trained high  
Upon impossibility  
Would ruminant on human folly,  
For he was prone to melancholy;

And oftentimes with clouded face  
Would stare abstracted into space,  
As if each solitary star  
Could tell us who and what we are.

## IV

This occupational condition,  
 Derived from frustrated ambition  
 And from the endemic narcissism  
 Of modern (or post-modern) ism,  
 Was a disorder that he shared  
 With many another would-be bard.

According to a certain gloom-  
 y thesis that Professor Bloom  
 Had recently set forth, the poet  
 Is driven, though he doesn't know it,

Not by eelymosynary  
 Motives—on the contrary—  
 But lust for power, or, if you'd rather,  
 Desire to do away with father,  
 Which makes him truculent and bitchy  
 (Thus Bloom—by way of Freud and Nietzsche).

Some diagnosed this diagnosis  
 As symptom of the same neurosis,  
 And some, more pessimistic, said  
 That all the poets now were dead.  
 Blizzards of prose and epidemics  
 Of deconstructionist polemics  
 Had turned them all to academics.

## V

Here a hiatus intervenes.  
 Beauty is lost—and by no means  
 Will she be called upon to give  
 Her presence to the narrative.

Why should she languish as a slave  
 In some benighted poet's cave,  
 Or for an egoistic male  
 In Hades as a shadow dwell?  
 Let him be chained to his old haunts;  
 Apparently, that's what he wants.  
 Let him be wretched and forlorn,  
 By his internal Furies torn:  
 We'll bring this fragment of his woes,  
 Though unconcluded, to a close.

With that, she rises up in flight,  
 Unmanifested, lost to sight,  
 Impalpable as wind . . .

## VI

Not quite.

## VII

Calling these verses back to mind,  
Years after they had been consigned  
To an old notebook on the shelf,  
Detritus of an abandoned self,  
Musing upon the waste of years,  
His eyes filled up with bitter tears.

Was it the first time he looked back  
In terror that he lost the track,  
Not even seeing she was gone?  
How could he wander for so long  
In error and have been so wrong?

But if the goal of his pursuit  
Had been for a lost Absolute,  
Maybe she'd never really been  
Gone, but had merely gone unseen.

Maybe through all his wasted youth  
Searching for Beauty, he'd found Truth;  
Maybe that mania to transcend  
Was ended and his tale could end.

## THE EDWARD J. CRONIN AWARD WINNING ESSAYS

### Fantasies of Feminine Sexuality

by

Erin Hains  
class of 1997

In Balthus' 1952 painting *The Room*, something has gone wrong. A fog of darkness envelops the bedroom and casts shadows throughout the lofty volume of the bare room. The central figure in the painting is a young girl thrown across the length of a lounge chair, lying exposed in a deep sleep. Has the adolescent girl been misused? The dreamlike state of the languid, almost lifeless, girl and the gnome-like figure yanking away the heavy curtains in the sinister room illuminate the elements of fantasy employed by Balthus. But exactly what type of fantasy is at work here? Is this a sexual, perhaps even nightmarish, fantasy of the adolescent girl or possibly an erotic, voyeuristic fantasy presented for the viewer's pleasure? The enigmatic room suggests notions of sexuality and death while portents embedded in the room call the young girl to awaken from this sexual fantasy, rise up in the chair, and look to the light. But are the fantasies of the real world that much better than those pervading the girl's own dream?

The naked girl sprawls soundly asleep on the long seat, absorbed in her own world of dreams. Her body is adorned only with socks and shoes, perhaps suggesting a fetish at play in the work. Has the young girl been abandoned by another person, perpetrator or lover, or did she bring this narcissistic seclusion on herself? Slumped in the plush green chair, the young girl's left leg bends at the knee as she props her foot on the end of the chair and extends her right leg down to the floor, spreading her legs and inviting both sexual interpretations and implications. The bulge of the chair's arm raises and arches the girl's back, slightly angling her naked body toward the viewer. Her breasts do not flaunt the fullness of an adult woman's breasts, but lie erect on her chest, nevertheless enticing. The adolescent's head is cushioned by the

arm of the chair and her dark hair tumbles to the floor as her face turns to the viewer. The closed eyelids and parted lips of the girl appear to be signs of ecstatic pleasure. The young girl's right arm hangs straight down to the floor as if all muscles have been severed in the arm and the lifeless extremity can do nothing but fall. This vulnerable position exposes the girl to all external forces, but whether those intruders be stares or penetration remains ambiguous. However, this does not seem to be the form of a girl who has recently been sexually violated. Her body language reveals a sexual being that is unguarded and alluring, not frigid and scared. There are no signs of a man having been in the room or any foreign aggressor having taken advantage of the adolescent girl. Within the confines of the young girl on the chair, the scene is generally peaceful.

The girl is a typical image of a collapsed female, but like many of the collapsing women images of that period, she is not weighed down by material objects and finery. The adolescent girl's flesh is what leads her into this fallen state denying her virginal purity and inducing a mystical transport (Dijkstra 77). This is not a case of naive, suppressed sexuality. The young girl seems acutely aware of her sexual potential as portrayed through her position on the chair and other indicators of her sensuality. The girl's left arm hugs her naked side and her curved, pinkish-red fingers rest on her abdomen. The lusty red color also outlines the girl's dangling right hand, but the shade is not as strong as the red that paints her left hand. Perhaps her right hand lies tired and spent, fallen at her side, while her left hand soothes her abdomen, the holder of her most precious reproductive organs. The young girl's eyelids are smoothed with a reddish eyeshadow and her lips and cheeks are also



dusted with this color. To complete this decoration of pinkish-red on the adolescent's sentient parts, the color also appears on her thighs and genitalia. With no sign of an outside sexual partner, yet all this sexual imagery with hints of bright color and the positioning of her hands, perhaps the adolescent girl was engaged in sexual self-gratification.

Cooke asserts that as girls were taught to abide by society's guidelines of chastity and tradition, masturbation was their only chance for sexual fulfillment. Cooke illustrates the female drawn to this activity as one "suffering from the psychophysiological based invalidism induced by her compliance with the conditions of the cult of the household nun" (Dijkstra 75). The sexual experimentation of an adolescent girl may take this route as society labels it "unwise" to attend to or acknowledge sexuality in any other fashion. Continuing to describe this practice of self-gratification, Dijkstra states that "such a singular condition of passivity and crime, such fascinating new evidence for woman's preoccupation with graceful self-abuse, could not but hypnotize the painters" (Dijkstra 75). The adolescent girl in the bedroom fascinates not only the painter, but the viewer as well.

Female indulgences in these sexual vices "inevitably led to exhaustion and hence to sleep" (Dijkstra 78). However, these pictures of the collapsing, sleeping female often appear as images of a woman on her deathbed as in *The Room*. Through this death imagery the adolescent girl is "a split representation, in which she appears as purity and lust, as victim and destroyer and in which the feminine serves as a cipher conjoining the threat of sexuality with that of death" (Bronfen 212). Although the sexual pleasure is the girl's own doing, Dijkstra points out that in a world and time in which middle-class men's changing perceptions of their economic domination was reaching a peak, a link was formed between "virtuous passivity, sacrificial ecstasy, and erotic death as indicative of feminine fulfillment" (Dijkstra 56). And who better to fill this role than the adolescent female? Men could gain voyeuristic pleasure by merely gazing on the painted image of a sleeping young girl,

sadistically fantasizing about her sleeping death while still safeguarding her moral conscience. This conservation of male personal power is heightened in Balthus' painting of the adolescent girl.

Thus the appeal of puberty was the prurient certainty of carnal knowledge, the shadow of evil which, for instance hovers threateningly behind the young girl in Edvard Munch's familiar painting called *Puberty*. Images such as these represent the marketing of an aggression that dare not speak its name. They represent rape, a promise of an unopposed carnal knowledge offered to the viewer—who became the sole proprietor of the innocence of the awakening woman—a fantasy of "love without fear."

Dijkstra 191

The sense of rape here employed is not limited to a man's forcing intercourse with an unwilling female. Various layers of violation are threaded throughout the painting.

Directly across from the chair a malevolent gnome-like figure assertively pulls away the curtain from a large window in the room. The sex of the dark figure is ambiguous with its bowl haircut and blunt body, yet the creature wears a skirt. Both masculine and feminine attributes grace the imp. It is the antithesis of the provocative adolescent girl. With its feet spread firmly apart, hands clenched in fists around the dark drapery, close-set squinty eyes, pointy little nose, and stern look, this sexless imp is not a nice storybook creature. The resoluteness in which it grabs the curtain from the window is contrasted with the young girl's spiritless posture. This nightmarish little person is determined to reveal the naked girl to the light penetrating through the window. But why does it want to expose her? Is it, like the girl, a narcissistic being and wants to expose the girl for its own twisted enjoyment? The creature is certainly not a divine image leading the misguided adolescent girl to the sacred light, yet it does call her to awaken from her dream world.

The chair the naked girl lies on is not designed for sleeping, but for sitting. The girl is being beckoned by the light to end this misuse and sit up appropriately. The red ruffled trim on the chair and the velvety green back give the bedroom chair the appearance of a throne. This piece of furniture is most likely used for some purpose other than what the naked adolescent has pursued. The sunlight breaking through the window and directed toward the chair falls on the girl's stomach, perhaps illuminating the specific point of concern. The room is "a private stage for the play of light, [focusing] into the receptacle of its incarnation" (Leymarie 17). The young girl must be raised from her spiritual, moral death. "The flesh of the woman is [the light's] triumph, and the ardent penumbra of the bare-walled, bare-floored room the glorious nakedness of the girlish body alight with sudden daylight brings about the miracle of the painting" (Leymarie 17). The miracle is one of resurrection, an awakening to an untainted life. When the girl opens her eyes she will see only the sunlight she faces; the darkness and few objects of the room will not be in her line of vision. A sheet of darkness in the background of the room squarely frames the adolescent girl's naked body, again emphasizing her stimulating sexual features. By opening the draperies and casting these shadows of light and darkness, the androgynous character fosters this rebirth.

A gray cat sits on a wooden table to the left of the window with its glowing red eyes glaring towards the warden of the light. Balthus' two paintings preceding *The Room* depict the adolescent girl reaching above her head to stroke and play with the cat. In this painting, the girl does not enjoy the cat's company, but instead is completely absorbed and has no need or desire for the animal. The cat still manages to take pleasure from the

girl, however, in a different manner than before. The posture of the cat's body reveals that it had most likely been voyeuristically enjoying the naked girl before the androgynous figure's presence. The lusty animal, streaked with red to match the naked girl, is in complete opposition to the brazen sexless imp.

Directly behind the slumbering girl in the chair, a pitcher and bowl sit on a block-like wooden table that echoes an altar. In Christian symbolist art, a basin and ewer signify the washing of the celebrant's hands at the Eucharist, an act of purification and innocence (Ferguson 167). The adolescent girl is being called to cleanse herself, but she first must wake up from her death-like sleep to be offered for the purification.

*The Room* is scattered with symbols of both death and redemption. The girl must awake from this sexual fantasy and enter into society's sexual confines. The doll-like girl is a victim, but has been used by no real force outside that room. She is her own seducer. In the bedroom, this erotic and self-satisfied creature confronts the mystery and perversity of sexuality.

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## THE EDWARD J. CRONIN AWARD WINNING ESSAYS

### Interpretations of the Logos: Plato's *Phaedrus* and the Gospel of John

by

Jeff Speaks  
class of 1997

Perhaps no portion of the New Testament is so rich in theological and ontological meaning as the first eighteen verses of the Gospel of John. Indeed, the first verse, proclaiming that "In the beginning was the word," is one of the most recognizable passages in all of scripture. One could write volumes exclusively on this clause, as a conscious reworking of the first lines of Genesis. Analysis of the prologue as a whole, though, reveals a complex and self-contained statement on the nature of the divine as Word. The Word (a translation of the Greek *logos*), which forms the axis around which the prologue spins, is a concept grounded in the Greek philosophical tradition. In particular, the nature of *logos* is addressed in the writings of Plato. Comparison of John's prologue with a Platonic text, in this case the *Phaedrus*, reveals both differences and similarities which will serve to illuminate, if only to a small extent, this enigmatic and thickly layered chapter in the most singular of the gospels.

Discussion of John's prologue must begin with the Gospel's opening sentence:

In the beginning was the Word, and  
the Word was with God, and the  
Word was God. (1:1)

The words printed above, like any translation, fail to capture the intricacies of the original Greek text. Although any attempt to fully recapture the original Greek meaning is also doomed to imperfection, it is a necessary precursor to close evaluation of any biblical text. The first line is a case study in the complexity of John's original Greek script. As previously mentioned, "Word" is the translation of the Greek *logos*. *Logos*, while it does mean "word," may also be rendered as "grounding" or "reason." Thus the explanation, or reason, was present "in

the beginning." The Greek word translated here as "beginning," though, is similarly multifaceted. *Arche*, in addition to "beginning," means also "origin" or "first cause," or in another sense, "power" or "sovereignty." The sentence, then, is much more complex than a simple assertion of the presence of the Word in some temporal beginning.

In fact, the relationship between *logos* and *arche* is central to the prologue. It is not the simple temporal relation implied by the English; such a relationship would be little more than a recapitulation of the Genesis account of creation. Instead, the opening line might be retranslated with equal veracity into something like "In the origin/first power was the Word/reason/explanation." This is not a temporal relationship, but an ontological one. It addresses not the passage of time, but rather the nature of the being of the divine. It tells us that the explanation or justification for all that is was present in the cause of the universe. The universe, then, is a self-explaining creation. The universe, in its origin, justifies itself. Cause and reason are unified. The *logos* is that reason which moves the *arche* to action.

The next two lines are equally significant. The statement that "the Word was with God," following on the heels of the establishment of the *logos* in the *arche*, sets up an implicit parallel relationship between *theos* ("God") and *arche*. The *logos* was in the *arche* and with *theos*. The final line of the first verse more directly correlates *logos* with *theos*, telling us that "the Word was God." The problem of interpretation, then, is the problem of unraveling the relationships established between these three central terms. Further analysis of the original Greek helps to demystify these relationships.

"The Word was with God, and the Word was God." On the face of it, these lines seem a pointless redundancy. It seems obvious,

after all, that for the Word to be God implies presence of the Word with God. To assert otherwise would be a logical impossibility. Indeed, the inevitability of the presence of the *logos* with God is part of the intention of the repetition. Nevertheless, it is not quite so simple as that. The Greek *pros*, translated as "with," connotes more than simple association. While one valid translation does render *pros* as "with," *pros* also means "with but standing against or apart from." Thus these two seemingly redundant lines are not, after all, redundant. In fact, they are far from it. With striking brevity and perhaps deceptive clarity, they state one of the central paradoxes addressed in John's gospel. The *logos* which, as we will come to see, becomes Christ as the enfleshment of God, is both one with God and somehow separate from God.

This simultaneous presence with and presence apart is so counterintuitive that it might best be expressed in analogical form. The relationship between *logos* and *theos* here might be compared to the relationship between thought and thinker. The thought originates in the mind of the thinker; as such, it is inseparable from the thinker. The thought, though, also must have an existence somehow independent of the thinker. Were such independence impossible, we would be unable to step back and look (with seeming objectivity) on our thoughts. To evaluate or analyze a thought requires that the thought be conceived as somehow separate from ourselves. Otherwise, we would be unable to distinguish the thought itself from our undistinguished essence as a human being. Thus might the Word be both grounded in and distinguishable from God.

Thus we have established, at least as far as we are able, the relations between *logos* and *arche*, and between *logos* and *theos*. The Word is ontologically connected with "beginning" or "origin" in that the *logos*, the justification for that of which the *arche* is the origin, is located within the *arche* itself. *Logos* and *theos* are both related and separable in the paradoxical fashion approximated above. The next point of analysis, then, is to evaluate the relationship between *arche* and *theos*. The second verse tells us that God, with the Word, was present in the origin, or beginning. Thus God is not, as we might be tempted to assert, interchangeable with the *arche*. In puzzling out this conundrum, it is helpful to seek

recourse in the earlier analogy of the thinker. If *logos* is the thought of the thinker *theos*, what is the *arche*? In this analogy, which seems an apt one given the philosophical backdrop against which this Gospel was written, the presence of both thinker, *theos*, and thought, *logos*, in the *arche* distinguishes the divine thought (with the understanding that "thought" is only a necessary anthropocentric guide in grasping what we can of the divine "mind") from human thought. Human thought, while in some sense free, is also to an extent predetermined by the particulars of the experience to which we are exposed and our unavoidably limited ability to know more about those particulars than we are given through the senses. Human thought operates within the necessarily limited parameters of human life. Divine thought, however, has no such limiting reagents. Its location in the origin of experience and existence guarantees that it cannot be limited by the form which that experience takes. Instead, the *logos*, as the manifestation (to use a necessarily imprecise word) of the *theos*, proceeds from the *arche*, that which is by definition prior to the limiting temporal and spatial organization of human experience.

This understanding of the free creation of the *logos* and by the *logos* sets the scene for the expression of the creative power of the Word, expressed in the assertion that "all things came to be through him [the Word], / and without him nothing came to be" (1:3). The *logos* (though not as separable from *theos*) is able to create freely precisely because of its origin in the *arche*. In this sense, John's prologue represents a reworking of the creation account of Genesis. This freedom is manifested in the free choice by which "the Word became flesh" (1:14). Even prior to the enfleshment of the incarnation, though, "He [the *logos*] was in the world" (1:10). The absolute freedom of *logos/theos* is precisely that which gives the presence of the Word in the world, indeed the Word's creation of the world, meaning. Similarly, the incarnation is a manifestation of the absolute freedom of the *logos*. In another sense, the *logos* gains its natural primacy from its existence in the *arche*. John the Baptist tells us as much by explaining that the *logos* made flesh "ranks ahead of me because he existed before me" (1:15).

A final characterization of the *logos* is relevant to our discussion here. Returning to

the initial verse paragraph of the prologue, we find the evangelist describing the nature of the creation of the *logos*:

What came to be through him was life, and this life was the light of the human race, the light shines in the darkness, and the darkness has not overcome it. (1:3-5)

In seeking to understand this final crucial passage from the prologue, it is fitting to enlist the aid of Augustine's commentary on Genesis in the last several books of his *Confessions*. Though commenting on a different creation account, his insight into the nature and importance of light in creation are worthy of extrapolation into interpretation of John's gospel. The *logos*, then, founds and sustains human life. In what sense, though, is this life understood to be light? Evaluation of this question calls first for evaluation of the term against which light is set, namely darkness. Augustine, addressing God, points out that "before you gave form and outline to that formless matter, there was not anything, neither color nor shape nor body nor spirit" (236). Augustine regards the formless matter of the earth to be, simply, matter before light. Light, and its revelatory power, is that which "shines in the darkness" and in so doing allows for the revelation of form. Life is this light, for the creation of life is precisely that which allows for revelation. Thus the *logos*, in creating life (and therefore light, as the evangelist tells us), creates the opportunity for both the existence of form and the perception of form.

Let us, then, recapitulate the above interpretations of the role of the *logos* in John's prologue. The *logos* pre-existed creation; in fact, it was in the *arche*, the origin or first principle from which creation arose. In addition, the *logos* is both perpetually conjoined to and distinguishable from God, or *theos*. The Word, then, is that which, existing in the most originary principle of the universe, proceeds from the "divine mind" and becomes flesh in the incarnation. The *logos*, however, "was in the world" (1:10) before the incarnation. The incarnation marked not the entrance of the Word into the world, but the enfleshment of the Word and its corporeal entrance to the world. Because "all things came to be" (1:3) through the *logos*, the Word is also the source of life, and thus of light, the existence of which transforms the earth from formless matter into that in which forms both exist and are

perceptible. In all these interpretations, however, it is necessary to remember the multiple meanings inherent in the evangelist's use of the term; *logos* simultaneously signifies Word, grounding, reason, explanation.

The notion of the *logos*, as many commentators on the Johannine gospel have noted, is deeply rooted in the Greek philosophical tradition. Prior to this philosophical tradition, however, as Karl Barth tells us in his *Witness to the Word*, the *logos* is also significant in "the mysteries and in popular religions of Hellenism" (24). Addressing non-Greek mythology, Barth notes the importance of the *logos* for "the Egyptian Thoth" (24). This mythology, however, is in some sense antecedent to Greek philosophic thought. As tangible truth of this, Plato in his *Phaedrus* addresses directly a variant of the Egyptian myth mentioned by Barth. Near the end of the dialogue, in the context of a discussion about writing, Plato relates the "Myth of Theuth" in which Thamus, the King of Egypt, discusses with Theuth, one of his subjects, the nature of the written and spoken word. While Theuth, Plato's god of writing, is to all appearances an invented character, Jacques Derrida's examination of the *Phaedrus* shows the intimate relationship between Theuth and Thoth, the Egyptian son of the sun-god, to which Barth alludes in his exposition of the mythological history of the term *logos* (85-86).

Thus we see the *logos*, so central to John's prologue, addressed by Plato. And this attempt to deal with the concept of *logos* should not be regarded as an accidental one. By conjuring up the Egyptian Thoth, Plato consciously brings the *logos* to the forefront of the dialogue. Plato's story depicts Theuth, "the father of writing" (275a), discussing the advantages and disadvantages inherent in various arts. When they come to discuss the nature of writing, Theuth extols its virtues, calling it "a potion for memory and for wisdom" (274e). Thamus, however, the chief Egyptian god (identified with Ammon-Ra or the Greek Zeus), disparages writing as a substitution for the spoken word. He tells Theuth that:

It [writing] will introduce forgetfulness into the soul of those who learn it ... they will put their trust in writing, which is external and depends on signs that belong to

others, instead of trying to remember from the inside. You have not discovered a potion for remembering, but for reminding; you provide your students with the appearance of wisdom, not with its reality. (275a)

As the dialogue continues, Socrates explores alternatives preferable to the sort of writing advocated by Theuth. His conclusion is that this better type of discourse "is written down, with knowledge, in the soul of the listener; it can defend itself, and knows for whom it should speak and for whom it should remain silent" (276a). This spoken discourse is the type that Plato supports in opposition to the sort of written discourse represented by Theuth.

Major distinctions are evident which separate the two types of discourse. First, writing is external while Socratic discourse is internal; this internal nature guarantees that the communicated thought will be accompanied by knowledge. The spoken word, unlike the written word, is held accountable for itself, for "it can defend itself" (276a). The written word, on the other hand, "can neither defend itself nor come to its own support" (275e). The spoken word, the type which proceeds from wisdom, is not only accountable for itself but is also reliable. Socratic discourse will never comport itself inappropriately; the knowledge from which it springs guarantees that "it knows for whom it should speak and for whom it should remain silent" (276a). The unsupported written word, on the other hand, is mischievous and unpredictable. Its behavior is not governed by any constraining knowledge; thus it "rolls about everywhere, reaching indiscriminately those with understanding no less than those who have no business with it" (275e). The spoken word must be supported by knowledge, for the speaker is always present and is held accountable for her words. The written word, though, can exist independent of knowledge. Although "it always needs its father's support" (275e), its father need not accompany it in the same way that the speaker must accompany the spoken word. In the distinction made between these two types of discourse, we find Plato's implicit treatise on the nature of the *logos*.

The emphatic difference between the Socratic discourse and that of Theuth is that

the spoken word is accompanied by its source, whereas the written word need not be. In one sense, this results from the physical reality of speaking in ephemeral sound waves and writing on transportable paper. But if one is to regard discourse more abstractly, perhaps, the question as to the source, or origin, of the discourse (whose presence, as we have seen, is of the utmost importance) becomes far more difficult to answer within the context of the *Phaedrus*. If, however, one returns to the allegory of the cave in the seventh book of the *Republic*, the source of discourse becomes more intelligible. The sun, as the source of the shadows which constitute the reality of non-philosophers, is the source of discourse. The sun, in that case, is the form of goodness, or simply the Good. The source, or "father," which must accompany discourse is the Good. True discourse, or *logos*, then, is that which translates the Good into discourse. The Good, as the blinding sun of the *Republic*, is too fearsome for direct encounter. *Logos* makes the sun intelligible in the realm of the human.

So far Plato's *logos* is known as that sort of discourse which proceeds from the Good. Indeed, *logos* as separate from its father, the Good, is exactly that type of discourse to which Socrates objects. Connection to the Good is that which disciplines the *logos* and makes possible its self-defense. On a basic level, this alignment of *logos* with the Good is reminiscent of John's connection between *logos* and *theos*. Whether this connection is a valid one, though, and where (if at all) other such connections exist, is answerable only with further investigation. It is an appropriate beginning, however, to discuss the connection between Plato's Good and John's God. Recalling the above exegesis of the first several lines of the prologue, the *logos* for John was both intimately related (indeed, originally related) to God and somehow distinguishable from God. The same, it seems, is true of the relationship established by Plato between the Good and the *logos*. The *logos*, or "discourse," Socrates asserts in the *Phaedrus*, cannot properly exist without a source; namely, the Good. They are, then, related on a basic level. In addition, the blinding light of the Good is unknowable without the intercession of the *logos*. Speech (or "discourse" or "the word") would not exist were it not for the fact that it makes

comprehensible that which is otherwise unintelligible, at least in concrete terms. Similarly, John's *logos* is necessary for any knowledge of the *theos*. Thus the evangelist asserts in the prologue that "no one has ever seen God. The only Son, who is at the Father's side, has revealed him" (1:13). Only through the Word, that which proceeds from God, can God be known. Furthermore, John's God possesses the same blinding light of the Good in Plato's allegory of the cave.

Before we can trace the implications of the similarity between the Platonic and Johannine conceptions of the *logos*, however, that similarity must be further established. After all, the complexity of the *logos* in John's prologue exceeded its relationship to God. In addition, the *logos* was rooted in the *arche*, or beginning/origin. It remains to be seen whether this relationship holds true for Plato's *logos*. Upon further investigation, however, it seems that for Plato the Good is similarly grounded in the *arche*. To recall again the allegory of the cave, the stunning light of the Good is that which founds the particulars of ordinary human experience. The non-philosophers within the cave perceive "the shadows cast by the fire on the side of the cave" (515a), and mistakenly (according to Plato) consider the shadows to be that which is real. The shadows, however, are not any more "real" than the shadows common to daily experience. They are real in the sense that they exist as shadows; further knowledge of them requires that they be seen as manifestations of objects blocking a source of light. If the Good were to be removed from the allegory of the cave, the shadows would cease to exist. That is, the particulars of sensed worldly existence would cease to exist. The Good, Socrates contends, "is in fact the cause of all that is right and fair in everything" (517c). Creation, in this sense, is impossible without the Good. Thus, since sensed creation cannot exist without the Good, the Good (tentatively analogous here to John's *theos*) must exist in the origin of

that creation, the *arche*. But does the *logos* similarly exist in the *arche*? It seems that it must; for existence of the Good requires *logos*. The Good could perhaps exist without *logos* prior to creation. If it is to be experienced, however, creation requires *logos*. Thus for Plato the *logos* was also "in the beginning." To say that for Plato the *logos* is life-creative in the Johannine sense is difficult, unless life is read as "light." There is, after all, a parallelism between the two in the prologue established by the assertion that "life was the light of the human race" (1:4). The *logos* clearly can be characterized as "the light of the human race" for Plato. Though one might suggest that it is rather the Good that is the light, the realization that the light of the Good is inaccessible without *logos* makes the Word indispensable to light in the aforementioned Augustinian sense of that which illuminates and reveals the formless mass.

The *logos*, then, forms at least a partial bridge between John's Gospel and the *Phaedrus*. In both works, the *logos* precedes creation, is intimately related yet distinguishable from a source, and is itself a source of light for humanity. Certainly, there are areas where the similarity is less obvious. Casting aside those areas for the purposes of this inquiry, however, one wonders only how to view the similarities in relation to the two texts. Are we now to read Plato as an unconscious harbinger of Christianity? Or is Christianity simply "Platonism for 'the people'" in the pejorative sense intended by Nietzsche? We need not, I would argue, seek recourse in either extreme. Rather, the two are mutually justifying. Platonism has become one of the cornerstones, perhaps the cornerstone, upon which Western intellectual history has been built. Acceptance of some of the tenets of such a successful system implies no shame for Christianity. Indeed, if reconciliation of faith and reason is to be sought, certain similarities between Christian belief and the principles of non-Christian philosophical systems are to be expected and, perhaps, cherished.

## DAVID DAMROSCH:

*We Scholars: Changing the Culture of the University.*

(Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press,  
1995. pp. 225. \$15.95, paper.)

by

Frederick J. Crosson

The discovery of the top quark was announced in two papers in *Physical Review Letters* in 1995, by 831 authors. To be sure, this is a somewhat unusual authorship, but it represents the antipodes of the situation that Damrosch laments as the reigning paradigm-situation in the humanities and some of the social sciences: a state of affairs in which fields and disciplines are increasingly subdivided into sub-specializations, in which scholars increasingly work apart, in which the curriculum both reflects and fosters such separation. Of course the natural sciences are similarly sub-divided into specializations, but research is normally by groups.

Robert Hutchins once jocosely remarked that a university was a group of departments connected by steam tunnels. But even the departments are now less unified, less of a community than they were in the recent past. There are deep structural tensions in the universities (or "pluriversities" as Clark Kerr termed them) and in the colleges, which increasingly model themselves on the research universities. The author's purpose is to examine the ways in which academic work is presently structured, to look at its sociological, historical and psychological aspects and to sketch some fundamental reforms in both undergraduate general education and, especially, in the way in which graduate training and scholarship are organized.

These divisions in the academy accompany the constant partitioning of disciplines and fields of specialization, and they also reflect the divisions in society: for example, identity politics is not only a social parallel to academic specializations, but group identities in political society have given rise to new scholarly specialties and even departments. No one can master the methods

and literature of more than a handful of sub-fields of the discipline one is identified as belonging to, and so we talk to each other about our work less and less.

One exemplar-model of the present situation is the image of the humanities professor sitting alone in his or her office researching (reading, thinking) or typing on the computer. Why is that the standard model? Why does the structure of academic culture make it so hard to work collaboratively? Why has undergraduate education become a kind of assembly-line, with infusions of credit-hours from various departments (degree and distribution requirements), but with the individual departments or professors having little sense of being consciously involved in a common enterprise? Why does graduate education, especially in the humanities and social sciences, reflect this model, so that each student after fulfilling course requirements goes off, so to speak, to work alone in the library or carrel or dorm room, with periodic checks by the "advisor" or director?

Damrosch likens the partitioning of fields to the way in which one language of learning—Latin—was replaced centuries ago by the vernaculars. For a long time after that transition began, academics kept up with cognate research in at least a small group of other languages, but unless works are translated, it is more and more rare for the literature in even one or two other languages to be known. Damrosch thinks that the patterned isolation of disciplines, and of fields within them, began about a century ago, and has been accelerating as time went on. One of the catalysts in the disintegration of undergraduate general education—though the partitioning of disciplines proceeded independently—was sheer numbers. From



1960 to 1980, college enrollments went from three to twelve million, paralleling an analogous spurt a century before. One of the consequences then, as well as now, was the "industrialization" of enrollment, the amassing of bureaucracies, the certification for graduation by transcripts instead of persons interviewed.

His proposals do not quixotically aim at vanquishing specialization, but at fostering new modes of interaction among academics, and allowing (at least) two kinds of scholars and research to flourish. To that end he suggests a number of things that might be tried in a re-structuring of graduate education, with the aim of fostering collaborative learning at the graduate level. To mention only one: how about allowing at least some dissertations to consist of a series of concordant articles, written with a number of different sponsors?

The argument of the book is effective in drawing the reader's attention to what goes on around us and in stimulating thoughts about what might be done to change it. It is gracefully written, informative and concerned in the best sense. But it is also arguing a thesis, and some things could be said to mitigate the darkness of the picture that is painted of "we scholars."

Nevertheless, there is a genuine problem to be concerned about. That the proper historical perspective to understand it is only a century seems dubious: at the bottom of the fragmentation Damrosch deplures is a doubt about whether all truth is related, whether what is known in one discipline can in principle illuminate or be related to another. *Universitas* came from *universus*, the oneness of knowings reflecting the unity of the whole—and that was rooted in the notion of creation by one God. That was still the ground of Newman's confidence in the interrelatedness of all knowledge, in the *Idea of a University*. In the 40's and 50's of this century, there was a flood of research and writing by Catholic scholars on the "integration" of the curriculum, an effort to counteract or think against the trends Damrosch is mapping. (If you type 'integration' into your on-line catalogue you can find some of these books, but since the 60's, 'integration' has come to refer to the

racial integration of our social institutions, so most of the recent literature refers to that meaning.) Damrosch has only one passing, and inaccurate, reference to Newman's work, which might have helped him. (He says that the relation of the Church to the university was a "leitmotif" of the *Idea*, but in fact Newman insisted that he was not talking about a Catholic university but rather about the nature of a university as such.)

Moreover long before the medieval university espoused such a vision, the Greeks had discovered a world of "nature" and law, and of a common human nature, that subtended the project of analyzing, for example, *the* nature of the human political community. It is an ironic reflection of our present situation that Damrosch can refer scornfully to Plato's conviction of a common human nature as "a religious vision of a mystical unity above history" (p. 119).

And there are reasons other than the author's historical and sociological ones for the "individualism" in the academic enterprise of the humanities. In the first sentence of this review, I could have put the word "authors" in quotes, since in the natural sciences, authorship refers more to the work done than to its written report (as is evident to any reader!). In the humanities, thinking one's thoughts out into words in a way that both articulates what one has come to see and brings that into view for others, that makes it persuasive and evident for someone else, is not at all like writing a summary of an experiment. There are, as Damrosch says, some fine examples of collaborative work in the humanities (and a fortiori in the social sciences), but they will remain the exception. Which does *not* mean that more interactive scholarly work is not desirable, and that even computers—for some the very model of a one-on-one relation—through things like listserves and discussion groups of those sharing common interests might not in time make a major contribution.

Despite some shortcomings, this work is nonetheless strongly recommended to academics—teachers and scholars—who, more than most engaged in work that can make a difference for our common future, need to re-think what they are doing.

## 1996 PLS SENIOR ESSAY TITLES

Name	Title	Director
<b>Jason Baasten</b>	The Effects of the Development of Adolescent Autonomy in Family Relationships	Clark Power
<b>Susan Barnidge</b>	Saint Teresa of Avila's <i>Interior Castle</i> : A Biography of God	Gretchen Reydams-Schils
<b>Bridget Barry</b>	Challenging Gender Conventions: An Examination of Individuals and Relationships in <i>Othello</i> and <i>Paradise Lost</i>	Marc Conner
<b>Gregory Beatty</b>	Recent Developments in the Theory of Evolution: Stuart Kauffman's Ensemble Approach to Evolutionary Biology	Phillip Sloan
<b>James Carolan</b>	Andreas Vesalius and the Anatomy of His Natural Theology	Cornelius O'Boyle
<b>Kelly Cox</b>	One in Christ Jesus: An Examination of the Process and Product of the United States Catholic Bishops' Pastoral Letter on Women	Michael Waldstein
<b>Catherine Crisham</b>	Further Up and Further In: Exploring the Multitudes of Levels and Meanings in C.S. Lewis's <i>The Chronicles of Narnia</i>	Marc Conner
<b>Todd Crosby</b>	Unaccommodated Man in <i>King Lear</i>	Walter Nicgorski
<b>Brian Crossen</b>	The Role of Coaching in the Character Development of Preadolescent and Early Adolescent Athletics	Clark Power
<b>Jennifer de los Reyes</b>	Business and Marriage: The Romance of Jane Austen's <i>Pride and Prejudice</i>	Michael Crowe
<b>Jorge Diaz</b>	Plato's "Thises," Aristotles's "Suches," and the Third Man	Gretchen Reydams-Schils
<b>Jeffrey Dix</b>	Reason and Rationality in Religion	Frederick Crosson
<b>Heidi Doerhoff</b>	Johann Wolfgang von Goethe: Metamorphosis and the Poet	Phillip Sloan
<b>Timothy Dunn</b>	The Legitimacy of Biblical Prophecy: A Discussion Among Aquinas, Spinoza, and Maimonides	Kent Emery

<b>Erik Goldschmidt</b>	The Healing of the Body of Christ: A Journey with Thomas Merton into the True Self	Nicholas Ayo, CSC
<b>James Haigh</b>	In the Image of God: Catholicism, Liberalism, and the Culture of Love	Michael Waldstein
<b>Steven Juras</b>	“The Essential Poem at the Centre of Things”: The Concept of Personality in the Poetry of Wallace Stevens	Henry Weinfield
<b>Carolyn Keiper</b>	Deviancy, The Self, and Moral Development	Clark Power
<b>Laura Kern</b>	The Reconciliation of Mind and Nature in Wordsworth’s Poetry of Vision	Henry Weinfield
<b>Matthew Madden</b>	The Race in Intelligence: A Synthesis and Analysis of The Bell Curve	Clark Power
<b>Joseph Maes</b>	The Development of the Cardinal Virtues in Dante’s <i>Purgatory</i>	Kent Emery
<b>Sean McMurrough</b>	The Debate over Insanity’s Prognosis: Freud’s Psycho-Analysis vs. Kraepelin’s Psychopharmacology	Phillip Sloan
<b>Meghan Moran</b>	The Influence of Renaissance Art on Science: The Rejection of Authority—The Power of the Image—A New Dimension	Michael Crowe
<b>Stasia Mosesso</b>	Caravaggio’s Judith: Femme Fatale Par Excellence	Linda Austern
<b>Katherine O’Prey</b>	Feminist Images of Women in <i>Sense and Sensibility</i> : New Parameters of Feminism in the 1990s	Linda Austern
<b>Vishal Pahwa</b>	Truth: An Analysis of Prince Andrew’s and Pierre’s Mystical Experiences in <i>War and Peace</i>	Frederick Crosson
<b>Beth Perretta</b>	Leo Tolstoy’s <i>War and Peace</i> : The Marriage of Inner Consciousness and Reason	Katherine Tillman
<b>Cort Peters</b>	“When I Read the Book”: Walt Whitman’s Use of the Bible in <i>Song of Myself</i>	Marc Conner
<b>William Raney</b>	The Real and the Transcendent in the Life, Work, and Critics of Franz Kafka	Cornelius O’Boyle
<b>Suzanne Riemann</b>	A Personal Passing: The History and Devotional Use of the Rosary	Nicholas Ayo, CSC
<b>James Sankovitz</b>	Natural Law Theory and the Founding of the American Constitution	Frederick Crosson

<b>Erin Scanlon</b>	Human Availability and Divine Restoration: A Sketch of Gabriel Marcel's Philosophy and a Reflection on the Theological Virtue of Hope	Michael Waldstein
<b>Matthew Schlatter</b>	From Cartesian Dualism to Eliminative Materialism: The Progression of Consciousness from the Transhuman Realm	Linda Austern
<b>Nicole Schuster</b>	Ecce Cetus	Walter Nicgorski
<b>Jonathan Shirey</b>	Anthropology in the Thirteenth Century: Thomas Aquinas and the Separated Soul	Kent Emery
<b>David Sullivan</b>	Social Justice, Agrarian Policy and the Church in 20th Century Mexico	Walter Nicgorski
<b>Michael Sundy</b>	Dante's Innovative Treatment of Love in the <i>Vita Nuova</i>	Henry Weinfield
<b>Anne Tran</b>	Footbinding: Beauty Practice or Political Tool	Nicholas Ayo, CSC
<b>Nicole Voelz</b>	From Glory to Glory: John Henry Newman's Ideal of Christian Holiness	Katherine Tillman
<b>Jameson Wetmore</b>	Amish Technology: Regulating Machines and Techniques to Forward Social Goals	Michael Crowe

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## ALUMNAE/I NEWS

*Editor's note:* Please write your class correspondent.  
We continue to need class correspondents for some years.

**Class of 1954**

(Class Correspondent: Jim Skeese, 4928-B  
Friar Road, Stow, OH 44224-2033)

**Brian Jennings** sent a brief note. He's doing well in Manhasset, NY. He either puts out fires or he delivers water. He prefers to correspond by E-mail, so I'll have to get up to speed.

**David Burrell, C.S.C.** is doing well. Dave spent one year as rector at Tantur. You can write Dave at Box 402, Notre Dame, IN 46556.

**Class of 1955**

(Class Correspondent: George L. Vosmik,  
P. O. Box 5000, Cleveland, OH 44104)

**Class of 1956**

Added by the PLS Office:

**Martin Coady** retired from civil service in 1989 and began a second career as an English professor at one of the universities in Taipei, Taiwan. Always active, Martin became a founding member of the Taiwan Notre Dame Alumni Club. His address is: Apt. 512, 220 Kuang Ming Rd., Peitou, Taipei, Taiwan.

**Class of 1958**

(Class Correspondent: Michael J. Crowe,  
PLS, U. of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN  
46556)

**Class of 1959**

Added by the PLS Office:

**William Gannon** has retired and is currently attending seminars at Southern Oregon State College.

**Class of 1960**

(Class Correspondent: Anthony Intinoli, Jr.,  
912 Georgia St., Vallejo, CA 94590)

**Class of 1961**

Added by the PLS Office:

**Peter McGovern** was a visiting scholar at the University of Notre Dame in Australia recently and is now teaching at John Marshall Law School in Chicago. His address is: 440 N. Wabash Ave., Apt. 4706, Chicago, IL 60611 Phone: (312) 595-1273.

**Class of 1962**

(Class Correspondent: John Hutton, Box  
1307, Tybee Island, GA 31328)

**Class of 1963**

Added by the PLS Office:

**Michael O'Shaughnessy** is a publisher for Red Crane Books in New Mexico. He also serves on the boards of Accion Duterational and Chamber Music America. His address is: 924 Canyon Rd., #5, Santa Fe, NM 87501.

**Class of 1965**

(Class Correspondent: Lee Foster, P.O. Box  
5715, Berkeley, CA 94705)

**Class of 1966**

(Class Correspondent: Paul R. Ahr, 225 S.  
Meramec, Suite 1032, St. Louis, MO  
63105)

**Class of 1967**

(Class Correspondent: Robert W.  
McClelland, 5008 West Connie Drive,  
Muncie, IN 47304)

Added by the PLS Office:

**Robert Mugerauer** has been promoted to the Meadows Foundation Centennial Professorship of Architecture at the University of Texas. His latest book is *Interpreting Environments* (Univ. of Texas Press).

**Thomas Neuburger** informs, "I am still writing and still grateful for my education at the Program." Tom is a freelance writer in Los Gatos, California. His address is: 120 Lester Lane, Los Gatos, CA 95032.

### Class of 1970

(Class Correspondent: William F. Maloney, M.D., P.O. Box 8835, Rancho Santa Fe, CA 92067-8835)

Greetings from San Diego. . . Well actually as I'm writing this I am 37,000 feet somewhere over the Malaysian peninsula; a remarkably dynamic part of the world right now. My work in ophthalmic surgery is increasingly international. The new technologies that we use in eye surgery carry the need for new skills. Teaching those skills is ever increasingly part of my work. As a result, I have been traveling more and more, particularly in Asia, where the pace of progress is remarkable.

I recently heard from the best man at my wedding, **Dennis Kohler**, in Teaneck, New Jersey. His law practice is as busy as ever after a recent relocation to a new office setting. His daughter, Candace, recently graduated from Columbia University and is now in graduate school.

**Rich Meehan** is practicing law together with his two sons in Connecticut. I remember when the first of those sons was born in South Bend to young Rich and his wife Kathy during our senior year. It looks as though we may be witnessing the beginning of a Meehan Legal Dynasty!

Here in the Maloney family it looks as though the Notre Dame tradition will continue. My younger daughter Alexandra is a senior in high school and, if accepted, plans to enroll as a Notre Dame freshman in September. Danielle is a sophomore at Richmond College in London. After an extraordinarily rich and rewarding two years of international study, she plans to transfer to Notre Dame next year as a Program of Liberal Studies major. (Needless to say I am thrilled about the prospect of another Philosopher/King in the family.)

Incidentally, if any of your children has expressed interest in studying internationally, I can enthusiastically recommend Richmond College in London. Visiting Danielle, I have attended several of her classes. The Shakespeare class I attended was taught by one of Europe's leading Shakespeare scholars. He told me that he had arranged the curriculum such that the students would attend a performance by the Royal

Shakespeare Company of each play they were to study that semester. As a result, Danielle is addicted to Shakespeare now!

As part of another course entitled "A History of the Soviet Union," Danielle spent four weeks in Moscow during the democratic elections held last June. Her group of 25 students witnessed firsthand the struggle between democracy and communism that was unfolding immediately prior to Yeltsin's ultimate victory. Somewhat ominously, Danielle left there feeling that the legacy of Stalin lies just beneath the surface and true democracy as we know it will be a long time coming in Russia.

Interestingly, that seems to be the opinion of Professor Gary Hamburg in his course entitled "The Rise and Fall of Soviet Communism: A History of 20th Century Russia." Dr. Hamburg, from the Notre Dame History Department, is the first professor to participate in an excellent series of courses on a broad variety of topics offered by The Teaching Company (800-832-2412). Professor Hamburg's was among the best of the many courses I have taken from The Teaching Company. If you are inclined, call them for a catalog. Courses of note I have taken recently are:

1. Power Over People: Classical and Modern Political Theory  
Professor Dennis Dalton, Columbia University
2. No Excuses: Existentialism and The Meaning of Life  
Professor Robert Solomon, University of Texas
3. The Search for a Meaningful Past: Philosophies, Theories, and Interpretations of Human History  
Professor Darren Staloff, City College of New York

When you have a moment, drop me a line using any of the following alternatives. In the meantime, CARPE DIEM!

Bill Maloney  
74044.2361 @compuserve.com  
619/941-9643 fax  
619/941-1400 phone  
2023 West Vista Way, Suite A  
Vista, CA 92083

Addendum: I just finished a wonderful book that I am certain all of you will thoroughly enjoy entitled, *Great Books: My Adventures Homer, Rousseau, Woolf and Other Indestructible Writers of the Western World* by David Denby, published by Simon & Schuster. In *Great Books*, Denby lives the common adult fantasy of returning to school with some worldly knowledge and experience of life. A gifted storyteller, he leads us on a glorious tour, by turns eloquent, witty, and moving—through the canonical western classics comprising “Great Books” course he first took at Columbia in 1961 and to which he now returns at the age of 48. He recounts his failures and triumphs as a reader and student (taking an exam leads to a hilarious breakdown—I simply could not stop laughing aloud as I read this passage!). This book is a jewel: a brilliant reprise for those of us who have read, discussed, and absorbed these works. It brought me right back to the Great Books Seminar in O’Shaughnessy Hall thirty years ago.

#### Class of 1971

(Class Correspondent: Raymond J. Condon, 2700 Addison Ave., Austin, TX 78757)

#### Class of 1972

(Class Correspondent: Otto Barry Bird, 15013 Bauer Drive, Rockville, MD 20853)

#### Class of 1973

(Class Correspondents: John Astuno, 1775 Sherman St. #1875, Denver, CO 80203-4316 and John Burkley, 2008 Lane Road, Columbus, OH 43220-3010)

#### Class of 1974

(Class Correspondent: Jan Waltman Hessling, 5231 D Penrith Drive, Durham, NC 27713)

Added by the PLS Office:

**John James Boyd, Jr.** has been promoted to partner of a law firm in Maryland. His address is: P.O. Box 478, Shady Side, MD 20764.

**Ann Marie Tentler McGee**, a homemaker and mother, started a Junior Great Books program at her local Highland Park, Illinois grade school. Her address is:

1641 Thornwood Ln., Highland Park, IL 60035.

#### Class of 1977

(Class Correspondent: Richard Magjuka, Department of Management, Room 630C, School of Business, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47501)

Added by the PLS Office:

**David Carlyle** just completed his term as president of the Iowa Academy of Family Physicians. One of his main efforts during the year-long commitment was encouraging legislation to start a pilot program for insuring kids without health insurance. The family made it to the Olympics in Atlanta, flying in the day after the bombing. It was chaos, but the highlight was seeing Michael Johnson run a preliminary race. They considered it a marvelous, once-in-a-lifetime experience. Dave also had the opportunity to spend a week on an island in the Bahamas, volunteering his skills and vacationing with his wife, Cathy, and daughters, Laura and Jamie. Their address is: 2309 Buchanan Dr., Ames, IA 50010.

#### Class of 1978

Added by the PLS Office:

I have been reading *Programma* semi-religiously over the years, but I do not believe I have provided any recent updates on my status to the PLS office. If I have, then some of this will be redundant. I’ve been married to my wife Kim for ten years and we have two children, Kelsi, who just turned 8, and Patrick, who is 5 AND A HALF (that half is very important). I lived in Greensboro, NC for 14 years where I worked as a financial manager for AT&T/Lucent Technologies until July 1996. Although my position was secure, I had always wanted to be a college professor. When Lucent offered a voluntary separation package, I jumped at the opportunity. So, in August 1996, at age forty, I quit my job, packed up my family and moved to New Orleans to get a Ph.D. in Organizational Behavior, concentrating in Diversity Management, at Tulane University. Although I received an MBA at Butler University in 1980, a BS in accounting at Guilford College in 1989 and a CPA in 1994, I never excelled academically (witness my 2.65 at ND); so I was a bit nervous about

going back to school full time. Fortunately, my first semester at Tulane went well (3.667 gpa), which allows me to keep my tuition waiver. I worked twice as hard as I did at Lucent and got none of the pay—whatta deal! I plan to complete my degree by the summer of 2000. Kim, who still works for Lucent, refuses to support me after that.

That pretty much covers my current adventure. New Orleans is a lot of fun, but it has more than its fair share of problems. We'll be heading back to North Carolina when I'm finished. Tell Professors Tillman, Nicgorski, Crowe, Cronin and Sloan I said hello. My new address and other info. follows:

Brian J. O'Leary  
2711 Calhoun St.  
New Orleans, LA 70118-6307

Home Phone: (504) 862-6965  
School Phone: (504) 865-5466  
Fax: (504) 865-7207

E-mail: boleary@office.sob.tulane.edu or  
boleary@worldnet.att.com

Our door is always open to GP/PLS students, alum and faculty (actually, it's double locked, with a security system, but we'll open it if they knock). I'm looking forward to the next *Programma*. I hope to get back to ND for a football game in the fall.

Take care.

### Class of 1979

(Class Correspondent: Thomas A.  
Livingston, 517 Fordham Avenue,  
Pittsburgh, PA 15226)

In the fall of '96, the **Britton** family—Mindy, **Bill**, Matthew, and Shelby—moved from Chicago to Denver where Bill now practices law in a firm called Campbell Bohn and Leffert.

Some of us convened in Manhattan one frigid Saturday in January to celebrate **Mark Gallogly's** birthday. He and Lise Strickler are the proud parents of three girls: Katharine, Grace, and the youngest, Helen Frances, a.k.a. "Nell" who was born on March 27, 1996. Fr. Jim McDonald was on hand to baptize her.

News is scarce this time, but rather than ending by simply asking classmates to call or write, indulge me while I wonder about something that began, lo these many moons ago. One day in class we were reading a

Greek tragedy—we don't remember which—and John McKie astounded us by calling its heroine a "paradigm of moral turpitude." Is there a single word that stands for what happens when the sound and the sense of a phrase intensify each other? What's become of John?

One of the reasons we remember what he said is that, at about the same time, we were also reading Thomas S. Kuhn's *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. When Professor Kuhn passed away last summer, he was honored, as he was in life, for the meaning he ascribed to "paradigm," and for the insights that attended his meaning, i.e., insights into the process and practice of science.

The meaning that Professor Kuhn intended is distinct from McKie's. John used "paradigm" to mean what our tradition accepted before Professor Kuhn came along: he meant something like the embodiment of a particular quality. And although the critics in Professor Kuhn's wake have documented the variety of ways in which he used "paradigm," he used it primarily to stand for a theory that accounts for a set of phenomena. The theory prevails among a community of scientists, but it may fall out of favor and be replaced if an anomaly generates a new theory that better accounts for the same set of phenomena. In one example, the apparent epicyclic motion of certain heavenly bodies—when viewed from a geocentric paradigm—is the anomaly the generated Copernicus's heliocentric paradigm.

The publicity that followed Professor Kuhn has lately caused people to skew his intended meaning, and apply "paradigm" to disciplines that do not aspire to be science, and do not otherwise seek truth. In a tone of voice that suggests an erudition that they have not earned, those people more and more use "paradigm" to mean only a style that will readily fall out of favor when the popular taste changes.

The change in how people use "paradigm" is a case-in-point for a larger issue; to-wit, when is a change in a tradition a development, and when is it a corruption? As Cardinal Newman struggled, in a less than systematic way, with this issue in his *Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine*, his unspoken assumption is that a corruption is unacceptable because it signals a communal loss of something that is true or good or beautiful.



With this assumption in mind, consider another case-in-point. The word this time is "sublime." Like "paradigm," it's a word that, in and around 1979, few of us would have used in a sentence. But another time in class, **Professor Frerking**—now Abbot Thomas—used it to invoke the effect achieved by a passage from Homer. By how he said it, we sensed that he meant something grand and tempered, refined but not effete—something akin to the meaning that Edmund Burke and Immanuel Kant, in their clumsy and formulaic ways, ascribed to "sublime." But rather than being limited to the sense that Professor Frerking intended, "sublime" also stands, in our tradition, for what aesthetics regard as easy, common, and merely pleasant effects. The coincidence of these meanings demanded that we think hard before concluding that Professor Frerking's use of the word did not reveal an undue sensitivity. Our hard thought taught us instead that his use of the word conjured a providence of experience that we would detect only in our most privileged moments.

Although our tradition continues to accept both meanings, prevalence of the common meaning now threatens to supersede the more valuable one. The threat is confirmed in a recent study of Mark Rothko's paintings, Anna C. Chaves', *Mark Rothko, Subjects in Abstraction*, Yale University Press, 1989. In its opening pages, its author admits the difficulty of finding words that adequately stand for what the paintings are. And as she considers the prospect of using "sublime" in the body of her text, she decides against it. Not because the word would never have been an aid in appreciating the paintings, but because the prevalence of the diluted meaning would cause today's reader to understand, if he or she were to read "sublime," a quality inferior to what the likes of Burke, Kant, and "Frerk" had in mind. *Id.*, pp 17-18.

Allowing that an important part of what we can experience defies articulation, does a corruption to the meaning of a word like "sublime" nevertheless deprive us of an access to certain experiences? In other words, may the condition to which a word, however imperfectly, once referred pass away when the word no longer refers to that condition?

Let me know what you think.

Thomas A. Livingston

Added by the PLS Office:

**Dennis G. Fazio** is a middle school language arts teacher in Albuquerque, New Mexico. His address is: 1013 Richmond Dr. NE, Albuquerque, NM 87106 Phone: (505) 260-1690.

#### Class of 1980

(Class Correspondent: **Mary Schmidlein** Rhodes, #9 Southcote Road, St. Louis, MO 63144)

#### Class of 1981

(Class Correspondent: **Tom Gotuaco**, 4475 Callan Boulevard, Daly City, CA 94015)

**Janice Peterson** finished her residency in family practice medicine in 1992 and is currently living and working at a small rural hospital in the mountains of Ethiopia as head of the children's ward. Janice sends her "sincere greetings" to former classmates and professors. Her address is: Gambo Hospital, Shashemene 121, Shashemene, Ethiopia.

#### Class of 1982

Added by the PLS Office:

**John Roda** just moved back to Lancaster, Pennsylvania, his hometown, after an 11-year hiatus. He is presently the in-house counsel for AMP Incorporated. John writes, "Business travel to over 30 countries only confirms what the Great Books taught us about human nature, its universality and man's difficulty/challenge to manage it." His address is: 3032 Gloucester St., Lancaster, PA 17601.

#### Class of 1983

(Class Correspondent: **Patty Fox**, 902 Giles St., Ithaca, NY 14854)

Added by the PLS Office:

**Libby Drumm** and her husband John had a baby girl, Isabel Marie Muench, last May. Libby is currently teaching at Reed College in Oregon and reports finding "interesting hard-working students" and fabulous colleagues there. Her address is: Reed College, 3203 SE Woodstock, Portland, OR 97202.

**Friedrich J. von Rueden** is a manager in the consulting division of Deloitte and Touche LLP. His address is: 4815 Quaker Ln. North, Plymouth, MN 55442-2517.

**Class of 1984**

(Class Correspondent: Margaret Smith, 2440 E. Tudor Rd. #941, Anchorage, AK 99507)  
Added by the PLS Office:

**John Gallagher** is the owner/director of Gallagher Fitness Resources in Oregon. John has been coaching and advising adults in running, walking, and fitness activities in the Salem, Oregon area for the last four years. His address is: 799 Waldo Ave. SE, Salem, OR 97302.

**Class of 1985**

(Class Correspondent: Laurie Denn, 5306 Malibu Drive, Edina, MN 55436)  
Added by the PLS Office:

**Michael J. Witous** is a financial consultant for Merrill Lynch in South Bend.

**Class of 1986**

(Class Correspondent: Margaret (Neis) Kulis, 1203 Harvard Terrace, Evanston, IL 60202-3213)  
Added by the PLS Office:

**Elizabeth Siegel** recently served as director of the Northwest Center Maternity Home Project in Washington DC. She has also been teaching part-time in a Lay Formation program called "The Documents of Vatican II," and began working full-time in Adult Religious Formation last fall. Her address is: 1215 Kearney St. NE, Wash. DC 20017.

**Class of 1987**

(Class Correspondent: Terese Heidenwolf, 41 Valley Park South, Bethlehem, PA 18018)

**Paul Giorgianni** graduated from the Ohio State University of College of Law in 1995 and is in the middle of a two-year judicial clerkship in the service of Judge Cynthia Lazarus of the Ohio Court of Appeals. He plans to practice law in Columbus when his clerkship ends. His address is: 4307 Cameo Dr., Dublin, OH 43016-3559.

**Tom Hardiman** has been made a partner at the law firm of Titus and McConomy in Pittsburgh, PA, where he specializes in litigation. He also holds an adjunct faculty position at LaRoche College, a small Catholic college in Pittsburgh. He has been married for 4 years and has a daughter, Kate Josephine, who is 2 years old. Tom writes that he welcomes

correspondence from classmates and professors, particularly those "political junkies who might be able to cure my compulsive application of Lockean principles to the political issues of the day." His e-mail address is: thardima@counsel.com.

**Norb Knapke** and his wife Molly McGinnis have a 20-month-old son named Samuel. Norb is a litigator at Jenner & Block in Chicago, where he does "a little bit of everything": white and blue collar criminal, fraud litigation, internal investigations, securities litigation, and general commercial litigation. He started at Jenner in 1993 after law school at Duke and a clerkship with Judge Noonan on the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals in San Francisco.

Norb writes, "While at Duke, I fell under the spell of Stanley Fish, who really isn't very politically correct. There's no reason to fear him: he's nothing more than Aquinas without the Holy Spirit." His address is: 1111 W. Lill #3W, Chicago, IL 60614 Phone: 773-296-2879 (h), 312-923-2657 (w) e-mail: nbkii@aol.com.

**Nick More** writes, "I've done three things in ten years. I married Michelle Birke (in Italy, 1994), I earned another degree (a Ph.D. in philosophy at the University of Texas at Austin), and gotten a job (Chairman of the Philosophy Department at Westminster College)." His address is: 440 E. Elbert Ave., Centerville, UT 84014-2537 e-mail: n-more@wclslc.edu.

**Class of 1988**

(Class Correspondent: Michele Martin, 4901 McWillie, Apt. 932, Jackson, MS 39206)

**Class of 1989**

(Class Correspondent: Coni Rich, 9400 Atlantic Ave., Apt. 206, Margate, NJ 08402)

Added by the PLS Office:

**Milda Palubinskas** is an assistant professor of Italian at the University of Delaware. Milda received her Ph.D. in Italian from Columbia University last May. She sends a "BIG thank you to Fr. Ayo, whom I have discovered as a profound influence on my thinking and teaching. Thank you to Prof. Sloan who advised me well when I was in error. PLS was a very sound basic education and a wonderful opportunity to work with some fine and

generous minds. In my teaching and in my writing I have often heard, with pleasure, echoes of my professors and my colleagues." Her address is: P.O. Box 1503, Annandale, VA 22003-9503  
e-mail: mjp@athens.fllt.udel.edu.

### Class of 1990

(Class Correspondent: Barbara Martin, 2709 Mildred Apt. 3A, Chicago, IL 60614)  
Added by the PLS Office:

**Margaret Bilson** was married on September 14 of last year and is currently the account manager for a marketing services company. Her address is: 18373 W. 13 Mile Rd., #34, Southfield, MI 48076  
Phone: 810-614-8403 (w).

**Missy Holland** is in her second semester at Harvard Divinity school, going for her M.Div. Her address is: 5 Morgan St., #2, Somerville, MA 02143  
Phone: 617-776-4751.

**Robert J. MacDonald** is an attorney in Michigan, "clerking in circuit court and waxing eloquent on behalf of working people in Flint, MI." His address is: #B312, 5635 Parview Dr., Clarkston, MI 48346.

### Class of 1991

(Class correspondent: Ann Mariani, 4210 Hickory Hill Blvd., Titusville, FL 32780)

### Class of 1992

### Class of 1993

(Class correspondent: Anthony Valle, 147-55 6 Ave., Whitestone, NY 11357)  
Added by the PLS Office:

**Chrissy Hall** earned a master's degree in journalism from the University of Arizona this May and hopes to "land a job in the field of journalism or communications." Her address is: 3500 W. Orange Grove #3108, Tucson, AZ 85741  
Phone: 520-531-8362.

### Class of 1994

Added by the PLS Office:

**Anne O. Heaton** is a music student, studying voice and composition at City College of New York. Anne got married to Richard H. Schaupp in Chicago this past December. Her address is: 311 E. 91st St., Apt. 5, New York, NY 10128.

**Wendy Holthaus** is a high school English teacher and volleyball/track coach in Forestville, Maryland. Outside of the classroom, Wendy was able to make two presentations: one at the National Urban Middle School Educators Conference where she presented on "Active Learning Strategies," and one before a Senate committee in Washington DC on the "Philosophical Issues of Paid-Volunteerism." Her address is: 4320 South 35th St., Arlington, VA 22206.

**Rebecca L. Lubas** completed her master's degree in Library and Information Science at LSU and is currently working for Ball State University Libraries. Her address is: 1510 W. Bethel, Apt. 11, Muncie, IL 47304.

**Stephen Smith** will begin graduate study in literature at the University of Dallas this fall. He writes that "Texas seems an interesting frontier, though I've yet to purchase the requisite gun rack or tobacco."

**Rich Traynor** is in his second year at the University of Virginia Law School and reports that the Program of Liberal Studies prepared him well for Law.

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## SUMMER ALUMNI/AE SEMINARS 1997

Once again we are offering a slate of one, three and six-week alumni/ae seminars. Listed below are the dates and brief descriptions of the courses. The seminars have been notable successes. Professors and students have enjoyed the opportunity to dwell on great books and great ideas at an unhurried pace in beautiful surroundings.

### **PLS 281. Great Books Seminar I: Homer to Early Plato**

3 credits, Bartky (6-0-3)

10:20-12:20 p.m. MWF, 6/17-7/29

Seminar I is the first in the program's Great Books Seminar sequence. It encompasses many of the most important classics of Greek civilization from Homer to early Plato. In addition to Homer's two epic poems, the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, it includes tragedies by Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides, historical works by Herodotus and Thucydides, and philosophical works by Plato and Aristotle. Seminar I is designed to introduce the student to the Great Books Seminar methodology. A discussion format is employed, which is intended to develop the art of discussion and communication of complex ideas.

### **PLS 282. Great Books Seminar II: Plato to Bonaventure**

3 credits, Meissner (6-0-3)

12:30-2:30 p.m. MWF, 6/17-7/31

This seminar begins with a close reading of Plato's *Republic* followed by Plato's *Phaedrus* and Aristotle's *On the Soul*. Among the Roman classics studied are Virgil's *Aeneid*, Lucretius's *The Way Things Are*, and works by Cicero and Epictetus. The seminar concludes with a number of central works by early Christian thinkers: St. Augustine's *Confessions* and *City of God*, St. Anselm's *Prosologion*, and St. Bonaventure's *The Journey of the Mind to God*.

### **PLS 501. John Henry Newman's The Rise and Progress of Universities**

1 credit, Tillman (10-0-1)

1:00-3:15 a.m. MTWTF, 6/30-7/4

While he was rector of the Catholic University of Ireland in the 1850's, Newman wrote 20 lead articles for the *Catholic University Gazette*, which he gathered together for later publication in his *Historical Sketches*, vol. 3. Actually more typical of Newman's writing than his classic *Idea of a University*, these essays imaginatively trace, in a conversational tone, the historical development of his idea of a Catholic university, from its formative period in Athens, then Rome, through the Middle Ages, to Paris, Oxford and Dublin. This course will focus upon a representative selection of these essays. M. Katherine Tillman is a Newman scholar, and a member of the program's faculty.

### **PLS 502. Milton and Wordsworth: The English Epic**

3 credits, Fallon, Weinfield (10-0-3)

10:20-12:35 MTWTF, 6/23-7/11

An intensive study will be undertaken of John Milton's *Paradise Lost* and William Wordsworth's *The Prelude*. *Paradise Lost*, generally considered the greatest long poem in the English language, had an enormous influence on the Romantics, an influence that is nowhere more intimate and far-reaching than on Wordsworth's *The Prelude*, generally considered the greatest long poem in English of the 19th century. Thus, this course not only introduces the student to two major authors and to two seminal poems, but also explores the nature of literary influence. Stephen Fallon is a Milton scholar and a member of the program's faculty. Henry Weinfield is a poet, translator and literary scholar and a member of the program's faculty.

**PLS 504. Basic Issues in Political Philosophy: The Classical-Modern Encounter**

3 credits, Nicgorski (8-0-3)

10:20-11:55 a.m. MTWTF, 7/7-8/1

This course will explore the turn from the classical tradition in political philosophy to modern and postmodern thought. Readings are drawn from the writings of Cicero, Locke, Maritain, Leo Strauss and Eric Vogelin. Walter Nicgorski, a political theorist, is a member of the program's faculty.

**PLS 507. Joyce, *Dubliners***

1 credit, Cronin (10-0-1)

9:00-11:15 a.m. MTWTF, 7/15-7/19

As we read and discuss James Joyce's *Dubliners*, we will look for the unifying themes in this famous collection of short stories. An added attraction will be a showing of the movie (directed by the famous John Huston). Edward Cronin, a Joyce scholar, is also founding member of the program.

## MANY THANKS TO CONTRIBUTORS

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