

PROGRAMMA

A Newsletter for Graduates of the Program of Liberal Studies
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CONTENTS

A VIEW FROM 215	Phillip R. Sloan	2
ALL SOUL'S MASS HOMILY	Fr. Jeffrey Schneibel, C.S.C.	6
OPENING CHARGE 2003	Walter Nicgorski	8
FACULTY NEWS		15
THE EDWARD J. CRONIN AWARD-WINNING ESSAY	André Vincent	17
2003 PLS SENIOR ESSAY TITLES		24
ALUMNI NEWS		27
CONTRIBUTIONS		32

A VIEW FROM 215

Phillip R. Sloan

This will be the second time I have written a parting reflection from the Chair's desk in 215. This old wooden desk, used by all PLS chairs since the founding of the Program in 1950, is still functional and it maintains a rich sense of continuity with a tradition that has seen us grow from those first beginnings as the General Program of Liberal Education in 1950, to the mature stature of the Program as a "crown jewel in the Arts and Letters College," as one of the reviewers who recently evaluated the Program said of us. I accepted the Chair position for a two-year period, and I will be passing the baton in July to Professor Henry Weinfield, a member of the literature component of the Program since 1991. We were all given a special treat of his poetry with an original poem in honor of Fr. Nicholas Ayo, "August, the Lake at Notre Dame," first given as the poetic oration at the annual Edward J. Cronin Award dinner in April, and again at the formal retirement Communion breakfast honoring Fr. Ayo's retirement on May 2. The poem captured some of the spiritual sense of place and the rhythms of life around Notre Dame, illustrated by Fr. Nicholas in his recent *Signs of Grace* (Roman & Littlefield, 2001) and *Times of Grace* (Roman & Littlefield 2004). Henry expressed well the deep appreciation and respect we all felt at this commemoration of Fr. Ayo's twenty-three years of teaching with us in the Program. We also had talks from two generations of the Program faculty, Michael Crowe, now emeritus, who has been with us since 1963, and Gretchen Reydams-Schils, with the Program since 1994. These will all be printed in the next issue of *Programma*. With the retirement of Michael Crowe in 2002, Nicholas Ayo, and before too long yours truly, it means a second generation of Program faculty is passing the tradition on to a younger generation. I can assure you that the Program is in very good hands.

The Program is a unique item in the landscape of liberal education. Because of our unusual history, described in the Chair's history of the Program (see www.nd.edu/~pls), we have evolved into the only example of the original great books programs to survive in the context of a disciplinary, research-and-teaching university. As we all learned from the self-study that we prepared this year for our second ten-year external review, the Program has gone through many changes in its fifty-four years of existence, but compared with all other departments at Notre Dame, we have maintained the closest tie to the founding vision of our department. Of course, we have a very different look. More than half our students are now female. PLS now has a stronger disciplinary and research orientation, in keeping with the developments of the University around us, with our faculty winning prestigious research awards and publishing in outstanding academic presses. But we remain united by a sense of our common commitment to general liberal education and to the challenges of the great books seminar and the seminar form of teaching that affects us as teachers as well as the students in ways that are difficult to quantify. Perhaps most important is that we must remain fellow learners from books about which we cannot claim disciplinary expertise.

As alums, you have certainly received news in the last *Notre Dame Magazine* of the end of the Arts and Letters Core Course, a year-long seminar that originated with the Collegiate Seminar, which was founded by the General Program faculty in 1955. This was originally a junior-year required seminar, but then moved to the sophomore year. Originally organized on a common "great books" syllabus, it was given a thematic re-definition in 1979. Many of the reasons for its final demise are described in *NDM*. This now means that we are the only program at Notre

Dame devoted to the reading of a common syllabus of classic texts. Rather than simply regret the passing of the Core, we can also take this as a new challenge to be the voice of integrated learning in the College, a counterweight to the ideals of hyperspecialization. We will be able to contribute our own seminars as a departmental contribution to the new College Seminar that has replaced the Core.

One of my current hats is that of President of the Association for Core Texts and Courses (ACTC, <http://www.coretexts.org/>), an organization that has grown in ten years from an initial group of twenty-one institutions to an international association of nearly two hundred programs. This organization networks together a broadly diverse association of programs and individuals who are committed to the pursuit of education through the reading and discussion of classic texts. Some of these programs are one-year required courses, such as Notre Dame's Core Course; others are full college curricula, such as the course of studies at St. John's College. A few are departments like the Program. Others, such as the Columbia College Core Program at Columbia University, begun in 1919, are complete core curricula that cover writing, literature, science and the other basic requirements of general education. Columbia College is in significant ways the historical source of us all. Columbia will celebrate the seventy-fifth anniversary of its Core Programs in September of 2004, and both Henry Weinfield and I will attend the conference it plans as delegates from the Program. The growth of ACTC in the past decade highlights the deepening sense felt in many circles of higher education of the importance of renewing our civic and cultural dialogue by the reading and discussion of the great works, not out of nostalgia for the past, but because understanding "the best that has been thought and said," to borrow Matthew Arnold's famous phrase, seems important for us as we enter the complex world of the twenty-first century.

One illustration of this has been the growth of

international interest in core curricula. Currently there are efforts to establish a Spanish-language core program in central Mexico. Our own alumna, Patricia Martinez de Pereira ('79) worked for several years in the development of a core curriculum for the secondary schools in Colombia. She is now President of the Universidad Tecnológica de Bolivar in Cartagena de Indias, Bogota, Colombia and is seeking to develop at a higher level the interaction of the Liberal Arts and Sciences at a university dedicated to training engineers and scientists. ACTC now numbers several Canadian institutions in its membership, and there are initiatives for developing core curricula in places as far away as India, Africa and Tajikistan. Notre Dame has already established projects for greater intellectual and educational links with Africa through the Notre Dame Africa Solidarity with Initiative that was launched this year with the assistance of Program professor Fabian Udoh. This began with a conference in September on the Notre Dame campus attended by the President of Nigeria, and was followed by a return visit with a conference of several faculty and students who went to Nigeria in January. These contacts have had a strong theological and social service connection, but they also provide opportunities for helping us think cross-culturally about the meaning of intellectual traditions. Program alum Fr. David Burrell, C.S.C. ('54), of the Notre Dame Philosophy and Theology departments, has also been interested in helping Notre Dame develop a foreign study connection with India, particularly through the Holy Cross community in Pune, and we now have working with us as part of the Program faculty Fr. Jeffrey Schneibel, C.S.C. (PLS '80), whose All Souls homily follows below. Fr. Jeffrey is an expert on Indian history and thought, and he will bring these insights into our teaching of the non-western texts in Seminar V this fall. Such resources on the faculty may assist us in expanding our Program educational mission beyond traditional borders.

As the idea of great books education moves into

other cultures and national settings, it need not be a fixed Western content that is being exported—more important is the method of teaching. In Tajikistan, for example, where such forms of core education are now being tried, the collapse of the Soviet Union also meant the collapse of a unifying curriculum that had been taught in a stylized fashion through lecture with a strongly Marxist content. Now there exists an educational vacuum throughout much of central Asia that threatens to fracture into Islamic fundamentalism and tribal and clan factionalism, with consequences of which we are all now very aware. Educators there are trying to fill this vacuum with a curriculum designed around the reading and discussion of texts from the West, from Persian and Islamic sources, and from the great traditions of the far East. Most unusual for their educational system has been the idea of a discussion of these texts in small seminars rather than through formal lectures. I can express my hope and optimism that we in the Program will be able to play a role in these important international and even geo-political developments.

Thinking about great books education from an international perspective offers us an opportunity to expand our curriculum and our educational pedagogy in ways that can develop the meaning of a classic great books education. I remain unapologetic about our deep concern with education in the classic liberal arts, including the reading and discussion of great texts of the Western tradition in a common curriculum, and in a curriculum that takes seriously the claims of both Athens and Jerusalem. This involves us in a conversation of great complexity and nuance. Factoring in a new set of complexities presented by the consideration of the conversations within other world civilizations presents a new order of challenge.

We have already explored the expansion of practice beyond the walls of the University in the Great Masterworks seminars established by professors Stephen Fallon and Clark Power at the South Bend Center for the Homeless, with the assistance of alum Lou Nanni ('84). This

local community outreach has also been developed by our Program students through the Junior Great Books seminars, also established by Professors Power and Fallon, which have been conducted in local junior high schools. We have been greatly assisted in this latter program by the assistance of Ms. Meredith Bowers, the local coordinator.

The graduating seniors given special honors this spring included Ms. Katie Ellgass of South Bend, entering medical school at Indiana University next fall, who was a rare dual winner of both the Willis D. Nutting award as the student from both faculty and students have learned the most, and also the winner of the Otto A. Bird award for the finest senior essay for her essay "A Crisis in Modern Medicine: The Ailing Doctor-Patient Relationship." Senior David P. Retchless from Boerne, Texas was the winner of the Edward J. Cronin Award for the finest piece of writing submitted in the course of ordinary coursework. Next year David will do a year of service work teaching English in Japan. Through the assistance of alums and the Clements family, we have been able to award this spring the first endowed Susan Clements award for excellence to senior Jacqueline Hagen of Germantown, Tennessee. Jacqueline will teach English in the Peace Corps for the next few years. Pictures of awards can be found on our web page at www.nd.edu/~pls.

On some faculty news items of importance, we are pleased to welcome to the Program new faculty members. Kevin Mongrain, a systematic theologian who has been teaching at St. Mary's University in San Antonio, joins the Program Theology component. Kevin has particular expertise in the thought of Hans Urs von Balthasar. He will be a replacement for Fr. Ayo. Dr. Ruthann Johansen, the former Associate Director of the Arts and Letters Core Course, and an expert on the work of Flannery O'Connor and Simone Weil, will join the faculty and assist us in the teaching of our Seminars and our University Seminars. We are also pleased to welcome to the Program as a pre-doctoral Senior Erskine

Peters Fellow Ms. Jessica Wormley, a Ph.D. candidate at Fordham University, currently completing her doctorate on the thought of Karl Rahner. She will be team-teaching in our Great Books Seminars.

With regret we mourn the passing of emeritus Professor Richard Thompson, one of the founding members of the Program, who taught many years in the early days of the Program before moving to the Dean's office.

I also wish to thank you personally for your continued generosity to the life of the Program through generous gifts to the Stork, Cronin, Bird, Nutting, Rogers, Clements and Kelly Funds. With the assistance of Fr. Ayo's family, we have also established this year a scholarship award in the name of Fr. Nicholas. These funds make possible events and awards that otherwise would not be possible, and we have also been able to help students in need with some substantial scholarship aid. A list of the contributors to these funds appears below.

As I complete my term as Chair and also my thirtieth year of teaching in the Program, I wish to thank all of the alums I have had as students over the years for all I have learned from you. I also thank the unique faculty that makes up the Program, scholars who have chosen to dedicate so much of their professional lives to education in the liberal arts. Their support over the past two years has been deeply appreciated. A special thanks must also go to our departmental Administrative Assistant, Ms. Debbie Kabzinski, who has served the Program with such tireless assistance and kindness since joining us in 1989. Every occupant of this position knows that the Chair's office would be much more burdensome without her constant assistance and attention to the needs not only of the faculty, but also to our generations of students. As this edition is going to press, I am pleased to announce that Debbie has received notification of her receipt of an "Award of Merit" from the University, to be presented in August. Congratulations Debbie!

ALL SOULS MASS

HOMILY

Program of Liberal Studies
Annual Memorial Mass
Dillon Hall Chapel

November 5, 2003

Rev. Jeffrey Schneibel, C.S.C.
PLS Class of 1980

Romans 13.8-10; Luke 14.25-33

When we consider the Feast of All-Souls and try to place the long customary practice of praying for the dead during the month of November, we need to take account of both the liturgical and the secular calendars. As the days grow short and autumn passes into winter, we celebrate a series of Harvest feasts, feasts of in-gatherings that are both Thanksgiving and memorial. For if we take Easter—the passion, death, and resurrection—as the founding event of the Christian church, and if we understand Pentecost as the birthday and feast of first fruits with the gift of the Holy Spirit in the young church, then All-Saints and All-Souls are feasts of ripening, harvesting and maturity.

As the natural world changes with the seasons of growth and harvest, we enter a period of in-gathering, reflection, and rest. This is the time for memorials, for the palace of memory, for the meditation on death and mortality.

But let me be clear and offer an immediate caution: this is no maudlin exercise of melancholy or self-pity. We do not think that death is some form of defeat. The natural cycle of winter sleep is only seeming death, and so it is accurate too to take rest and ripening as symbols for gestation and fresh growth. And it is this connection, between rest, memorial and fruitfulness, that is the theme I would like to develop today—

memorial and teaching community. In other words, at this memorial Mass I want to guide you through a special graveyard, inviting you to stop with me for a few moments at two or three of those ancient weathered tombstones otherwise known as The Great Books.

Which brings me to one of my favorite autumn figures, Michel de Montaigne (1533-1592), that marvelous French humanist, who one day, burdened by the recent death of his well-loved father, returned home pretending the excuse of the family estate but actually to quietly escape the fray of business and gently retire. Himself wearied from years of active life as a man of law, friend of kings, and tactful mediator of various and cruel rivalries at court, Montaigne knew that he no longer had the resources to continue in the royal and national politics, and so heeding Jesus' advice he canceled his different campaigns and projects, put down his own ambitions and sought the quiet of rural life. He renounced the world, though it may not in fact have seemed a very painful sacrifice; but Montaigne fled society and a promising career to begin tending grape-vines, riding and hunting in his timber lands, and locking himself in the library tower of his country-seat to consider the fact of his own mortality and prepare for his last days. He was thirty-eight.

Some autumns arrive early.

But Montaigne tells us he never regretted his withdrawal, that there was no new loneliness in the country-side, and that despite the expectations of his court-friends that he would wither and fail breathing the fresh air of a rustic province, he himself reports that it was only in his library that he began to mature and ripen and discover an appreciation for life.

Though he guarded his retreat, he was no recluse, no hermit or monk. He shared his thoughts, his friendship, his love—circulating his essays, soliciting comments and begging praise—and was gradually drawn out of himself again. Ten years into his retirement the councilors of Bordeaux, gaining the permission of two kings, elected Montaigne their mayor, and kept him longer from his private retreat by honoring him again with a second term of service to the citizens of Bordeaux. Of course his voluntary retirement stretched out over twenty-one years, so perhaps he did not resent the flattering burden of public honors.

His real work, however, was not in politics. In the tower library at Montaigne (yes, he received the name from the house), surrounded by books in Greek, Latin, French, and by literary maxims engraved in the beams, the whole man Montaigne committed his whole energy to the work of memory and, drawing on the content of his personal life and a lifetime of broad reading, he produced an incomparable harvest in the three books and six hundred-plus pages of his meandering and deceptively learned seductions: meaning the *Essays*, naturally. Montaigne was apologetic about the work, believing that his sketch of himself could not have much to commend it to others, but he wrote well enough to

suffer Shakespeare's admiring plagiarism.

Now let me draw the moral and return to the theme of our celebration. Montaigne's self-portrait in the *Essays* is a still living monument to his life. His life, though, was so completely entwined and supported by the love and friendship of his father, that the *Essays* is also a monument and memorial to Michel's father, Pierre Eyquem de Montaigne. When Michel wrote, testing and savoring his memories, communing with himself he found himself in fresh and living contact with a community of absent and separated and past, and even dead friends. The essays are written exercises in absence and longing, repaying the debt of love; and they are testimonials too—links and bridges and ever stronger present acts of love.

Remember Plato who lived with Socrates for forty years, making mementos—those productive forty years coming after the events reported in the *Apology*.

We are here today to pray a memorial for the members of the Program family who have died. Teachers, students, alumni—we remember people who have committed acts of love and wanton friendship through the PLS. Our memory and prayers are memorial. Our community—us present—this itself is memorial. Our continuing pursuit of scholarship and insight through the Great Books is memorial.

Being here and part of this University, being formed and shaped by this PLS community, we become, consciously or not, the memory and harvest of those who have been here before us—making this meeting today, our autumn Thanksgiving celebration, into a festival of promise and ever fruitful life.

OPENING CHARGE 2003

THIS TIME OF OPPORTUNITY

August 27, 2003

Walter Nicgorski

Professor Sloan, colleagues of the faculty, students and friends of the Program of Liberal Studies, I know no honest way to charge us all, students and faculty alike, other than by talking about what it is that draws us together and what we do together. I will try to do this with a sensitivity to certain contemporary concerns and partly in relationship to perspectives brought forward in faculty addresses at monthly meetings such as this in the last academic year.

In these last two days we have begun the 54th academic year in the Program, and the 161st academic year in this remarkable university. The Program so distinctive among the tracks in American, if not world, university education has, we notice, been a part of Notre Dame for one-third of the university's existence.

Even as this week marks the beginning of my 40th academic year in this place, it is the first for some of our faculty and the very beginning of a journey in the Program for a number of students among us. Others are returning to renew their journey, some after conventional summer breaks, perhaps notable in some cases by self-discovery through exhilarating successes at jobs and internships. Others return after travel and foreign study, and at least a few no doubt return after deeply soul-touching experiences of love, suffering, death, family division, and, one hopes, instances of forgiveness and reconciliation. Significant developments in our lives might occur as well in the quiet streets of Centerville, Ohio, or Fort Collins, Colorado, as well as while moving along the dusty paths with tourists and

looking up in awe at the Parthenon in Athens. Among our faculty, there are not only those just beginning, marked by their concerns in adjusting to this community and in coming to know the dynamic of the classrooms of PLS, but there are also the faculty retired and approaching retirement marked by their concerns with just what they might most usefully and happily do, and how welcome will their contributions be. There are also faculty approaching contract renewal and tenure decisions that are so potentially determinative for the material shape their lives will take. And for all faculty at whatever career-stage, this has been a time for the special annual effort to refocus their minds and energies on their teaching, on what I would call their mid-wifery in the Program; they must then draw back at least some from their important and on-going dedication to sharing the fruit of their research and thought with scholarly audiences and other audiences beyond those of the Program. Faculty also, perhaps with more frequency than students, come to their efforts touched anew by such experiences of love, suffering and death; and their lives are varied by different degrees and mixes of love and concern for children, spouses, close friends and parents at advanced age.

Might we say about this time of opportunity that it is a different time for each of us? Imagine being able to look around the seminar table and actually see that everyone's internal clock is set to a different hour. What I mean, of course, is more than the difference in some students beginning the Program and others continuing into their second or third year; it is more than the differ-

ence between the faculty just beginning here and those experiencing or anticipating retirement. Rather, we all realize there can be notable differences in understanding and perspective among students at the same biological age and entering the Program together in this year, and similarly for faculty. Here it seems that significant diversity or pluralism comes into view. Behind the similarity of age and formal stage of education or employment are nearly always differences in the range of experiences and differences in the ability, disposition, and opportunity to integrate, to assimilate, those experiences to understandings of the nature of things, of who we truly are, and of where we are. When I say “where we are,” I trust you will not see this as a slip into prioritizing geographical location and in turn suggesting that geographical journey, from place to place, is what is primarily important. Rather, I have privileged the temporal metaphor in these remarks, for it better captures the notion of the inner journey that is above all testified to by the travels of Odysseus, Aeneas, Bonaventure, Dante, Augustine and Ralph Ellison. When we say to someone confronted with an ordinary practical problem like travel plans or organizing a set of rooms with dorm partners, “where are you at” in this matter, we are asking what sense they make of the task and what direction they have reached in resolving the problem. Might we not also ask, though it is not conventionally polite to do so directly, “where are you at in making sense of the human condition?” Now then imagine the differences in our PLS community as a whole or, let us say, even in a seminar of all entering students. Where are you at? Where has your journey taken you? What is your time? The inner clocks vary all around the table, and I repeat they vary not primarily because differences of biological age, gender or pigment of skin, but rather because of the varied experiences and the various abilities, dispositions and opportunities to integrate those experiences into an understanding of what is, who we are, and where we are.

How then does the Program of Liberal Studies fit

into the thoughts about diversity and human development sketched here? One way to look at what happens in the Program is to see it as providing a notably intensive opportunity to extend our experience, and that is done primarily, though not exclusively, through reading. A fair amount of the extension of our experience through reading is rather raw and unmediated; I mean by this our encounter with the seminar books, an encounter that can be tough and unsettling and one in which the faculty role is traditionally consigned to being a questioning guide, at best in the background. Yet some of the extension of our experience, and I mean our experience for faculty and students alike, takes advantage of faculty leadership and expertise; I speak of our tutorials or courses for students, and what happens for faculty in our seminars together and in our common work on the curriculum. For faculty, one of the wonderful benefits of working in the Program—you grow more appreciative of it as the years pass—is the opportunity it offers to continue to extend your experience and understanding and to resist the narrowing tendency of your specific discipline. These guided extensions of our experience mean we are led to notice aspects of problems and issues, and facets of the natural world and artifacts that might not come to our untutored attention. We may even find that not all significant human experience is simply grist for the mill of philosophical analysis; we may, I mean, encounter the beautiful in human art and be led to notice aspects of it without reducing it to something wholly explicable. This discovery for ourselves of the aesthetic sense and at least some of its objects may be a philosophical act in another sense of philosophy, but it is surely an important extension of our experience to come to know that this too is human and elevating.

The Program is most known, and sometimes even derided, for another way that it extends our experience. It seems heavily concerned with old works of the human mind. Most of us who have, as students or faculty, studied in the Program know that it is not old matters as old which

concern us (old *qua* old as another generation of philosophers would have phrased it), but it is classic instances of human achievement on which we focus, and by “classic” we do not limit the field to ancient Greek and Roman achievements. Rather, we mean to draw attention to manifest peaks in human creations, in human writing and thinking, to what often are expressions of paradigmatic or foundational positions on basic human questions. Of course, “old” to some of our influential contemporaries means anything prior to their generation or, at the outside, the preceding century. Nonetheless, that many of these achievements happen to be old may simply reflect that it takes some time for us to recognize classic stature. That many of these are old by our usual standards may also reflect that what is foundational or paradigmatic for the human consciousness may be expected to surface early in recorded human history and with a special sharpness and clarity in what seems to have been simpler times.

However that may be, consider how we are compelled by taking seriously these past achievements to call into question prevalent views and opinions of our own day. We have some capacity not to be mere captives of the present wherever we may finally come down on important questions. Our experience is extended out of our own time: we read intelligent critics of democracy; we ponder how the movements of the heavenly bodies can lead people to quite different conclusions to those ascendant today. We have then in our experience a significant diversity manifestly missing from the lives of many of our contemporaries. But this is not all—the very Western tradition we step back into is hardly homogenous and harmonious. I do not here enter at all into the very modest forays the Program takes into the Eastern classics. Within this Western tradition we encounter Plato’s critique and rejection of Homer as the educator of Greece, Aristotle finding Plato’s political direction unnatural and counterproductive, Machiavelli and Hobbes rejecting both Plato’s and Aristotle’s ways and wanting to build a good

and stable society from entirely different foundations, Bacon and Descartes wanting a new more certain way of knowing. Kant, shaken by Hume’s skepticism, becomes neither a follower of it nor of the tradition before it, but sets forth a radically new way of understanding how we know and what certainty we can have. Need more be said? We are called on to experience all of these encounters and oppositions and many more as we journey through the Program.

There is one sense in which I need to say more if we are to note fully the character of the experience we have through the great authors. We do not, after all, encounter them as we meet certain places or even incidents in life. To wrestle with Kierkegaard, to think through St. Augustine’s two classics on our list, is not the same order of experience as a visit to Trafalgar Square, even a reflected-upon visit. The critical difference is that a great author has already processed and integrated experiences in the ordinary sense into some perspective, some statement, some philosophy of meaning respecting the whole and our part in it. Part of our potential experience in the Program is to try to appreciate, as well as we can, the sense and the emphases in each great author’s response to human life and to our specific experiences of it. Now we can see that what each new student brings to the Program had also to be some earlier digest and integration of life’s experiences up to that point.

Consider now how complex and varied is the situation in the Program. Earlier we imagined a seminar table with each participant’s inner clock set to a different hour. Imagine further a table for our entire PLS community with places for our great authors. There are the students and faculty with all their differences and now the great authors whose considered efforts in quite different historical periods have, it seems, brought them to different interpretations or at least different emphases in interpreting human experience. Why do we not have cacophony and confusion? Or is it just beneath the surface? Perhaps, Chairman Sloan should hang out a

banner, “Welcome to the Program of Liberal Studies, a madhouse of conflicting views!”

What is it then that, at its best, makes the Program other than such a madhouse? What makes the opportunity the Program offers work so often so very well? It is first important to understand clearly what that opportunity is, for it is decidedly something more than simply the Program’s capacity to extend and enrich experience in a multitude of ways. Above all, the opportunity the Program provides is the space, the stimulus and encouragement, and the guidance for making sense of our experiences. We talk together about them, and this process of assessing and understanding our experiences and integrating them into our larger understanding of what is and who we are begins at once in our journey. I mean it begins when, for instance, we wonder aloud with others in our first days in the Program whether Achilles appears to us an admirable man. It begins at once because the Program encourages an active appropriation of what we encounter. We are not in this community expected first to experience a certain quantity of perspectives, of views, of books—marked by a certain percentage of diversity—before the process of assessment and integration can begin. We do not say you first must have been to London and Johannesburg before we may talk of the nature of man. The active intellect properly encouraged resists any invitation simply to see sites and wonders and then at some later point to begin the process of making sense and of integrating experience. Some people do seem to live that way or, I had best say, attempt to live that way; they enumerate the places they saw in a summer vacation as if they had simply passed by them; they may report with impressive recall and a shrug of perplexity the views they heard in fast-moving talk shows or in a range of journals of opinion. Much of our ordinary discourse seems at times like a casual channel-flipping through the surface impressions of our personal and communal experiences. Experiences reflected upon and processed into our understanding allow us, I must add, a richer grasp of what is there in

subsequent experiences. When my senior colleague, Professor Crosson, observed, in his Sheedy Award address that a liberal education allows us to see more in all that happens in life, that it therefore makes life more interesting, I found this very much on the mark.¹ Never, it seems, can a liberally educated person see events or history as one cynic described the latter, as one damn thing after another.

The space and stimulus the Program provides for assessing and integrating our experiences seems to have been mandated by at least two of our great authors who confronted the phenomenon of bright and apparently educated people delighting simply in a range of interesting experiences. Plato in Book V of *The Republic* has Socrates lead Glaucon through an exchange in which there is first appreciation that the potentially wise person is one who loves to taste learning of every sort, pursues it all with gusto, and is a lover of sights and sounds—we might say a lover of experiences. Plato’s Socrates then finds this inadequate and potentially distracting in pursuit of wisdom, in the pursuit of understanding the essential nature of things. John Henry Cardinal Newman near the end of the “Preface” to his classic *The Idea of the University* laments that the educated person of his time, “as the world now conceives him, is one who is full of ‘views’ on all subjects of philosophy, on all matters of the day. It is almost a disgrace not to have a view at a moment’s notice on any question from Personal Advent to the cholera or mesmerism.”²

¹Professor Crosson’s words on this occasion were, “To be better informed, but also to reflect on and to understand that information, is to expand not only our memory banks, but the scope, the articulation, of the everyday world we live in, to enrich the meaningfulness of our daily experience. Learning can help us to see more, to see otherwise, to discern what we never noticed. *The more you know the more you can actually see and hear and feel.*” “Sheedy Award Address,” *Programma* (March, 1998), 13.

²John Henry Cardinal Newman, *The Idea of A University*, (Garden City, New York: Image Books, 1959), 16.

Let us say one must have an opinion on the California recall, on the current status of the war in Iraq and, of course, on parietals at Notre Dame. Years later, Alfred North Whitehead, the American 20th century philosopher, would put what distressed Newman more succinctly and less charitably. Whitehead observed, “A merely well-informed man is the most useless bore on God’s earth.”³ Newman argues that no truly educated person can rest in the delight of simply posing views, possessing multiple perspectives and savoring a range and variety experiences. Rather, she must move toward understanding of what is and how things fit together. To develop a habit of moving toward understanding and knowledge of the whole is what Newman above all calls for as the fruit of university education, a philosophical habit of mind. Both Plato and Newman remind us that however natural, it may seem, for the strong inquisitive mind to pursue many experiences, to delight in the paradoxes of contending opinions or views, to know the depth of differences that constitute significant pluralism in our societies and churches, this is no resting place; this is not the knowledge that truly satisfies the human intellect. Our diversity, our pluralism—both the superficial differences at our external surfaces and the more significant differences that we above all find in the great books—is a condition of our human existence; it is not simply a necessary condition but often a welcome and stimulating one, one that can help us to move out from the limited horizons of our own experience, one that can help us toward our goal.

It looks like I have dodged the possibility that this Program is in fact a madhouse of conflicting views and the experiences beneath them. I turned to describe the opportunity the Program presents for mutual assistance in working through our experiences and integrating them in our understanding. I did this, and with the support of Plato and Newman, seemingly assum-

³A.N.Whitehead, *The Aims of Education & Other Essays* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1929), 1.

ing that it works, that it is possible, amidst all our differences and those in the authors we read. Not so much in spite of such differences, but partly because of them, it is possible to work ever more to a true understanding of who we are and the nature of the whole in which we find ourselves. I have meant then to complement both what Professor Sloan argued in the course of his “Charge” address of last year when he said, “... multiculturalism, true multiculturalism, need not imply cultural relativism,”⁴ and the thesis of Professor Reydams-Schils lecture in this forum titled “Why Pluralism Is Not Relativism.”⁵

Despite our differences around the PLS communal table, as we read and talk together we are able to recognize common questions of significance and more or less adequate responses to these questions. We welcome into our discourse questions like, is it really so? Is it sufficiently true for you to base your life on it? We talk and act from the earliest experiences in the Program as though truth is a common bond across all of our differences. Yet still we hear almost every year from a student and now and then from a faculty member uneasy with this drift of things, “Well, that may be true, but you surely don’t mean to claim truth with a capital ‘T.’” I have never quite known for sure what this Truth with a capital “T” is, unless perhaps it is a big truth you might get to on the basis of many small “t” truths. Seriously, however, I do understand the fear and uneasiness that is probably often behind this comment; it stems from a concern with a possible closure and thus an asserted completeness in philosophical thinking, a fear of settling into being forced into a total system of philosophy that then spawns lack of openness if not arrogance. There are protections in our tradition against such a corruption of philosophy, of such an over-extension of human claims to truth.

⁴“Looking Ahead: Assuming Leadership of the Great Books Movement,” *Programma* (May, 2003), 16.

⁵Lecture delivered at the University of Notre Dame, October 9, 2002.

Recall that Socrates says he does not know even as he acts in certain ways like he does; it is likely that Plato explains this in describing the elusive idea of the Good, elusive but clearly critical for truly knowing everything else. Thomas Aquinas reminds us seekers of who we are, that one does not truly know a part until one understands the whole in which it is a part. And what are our prospects for knowing the whole when we are properly cautioned in our Judaeo-Christian tradition that it is not for us humans to know in this world the mind of God?

Yet these persuasive limits on what we can know can hardly reduce philosophy to nothing but process or method, or even love of and striving for wisdom. Such reductions seem to render incoherent what we do in our conversations in seminar and the very life of philosophical inquiry. Philosophy must have some fruit to be worthy of our pursuit. Our self-understanding must be that we are approximating the truth; we must have at least intimations of it; we must see, if through a glass darkly, something of what we are seeking. Only then is the activity worthy of our love and our constant practice.

Let me return to the Program and the opportunity it offers. I very much like the seal of the Program [printed after this address]. If I were more technologically inclined and thus more prepared in this way, I would have appeared this evening with the seal thrown up behind me by an overhead projector. It was designed by a student in the early 1980s and was the winning selection in a competition of students, faculty and alumni. The student, Richard Houghton, had a Jeffersonian range of interests and went off, after completing the Program, to study architecture at Mr. Jefferson's University of Virginia. The seal captures that the center of our activity is focused on these great books and that then through the practice of the seven liberal arts (seven sides of a septi-lateral figure which each move out toward the outer circle), let us say through the arts of reason and expression, our analyses and conversations, we work toward the outer circle of a


unified and complete knowledge. It is only in this artifact and representation of the circle that we can see this whole as we surmise the mind of God must behold it. In our efforts from inside we must look in one direction or the other, and we necessarily are limited to approximating but one very little part at a time.

Let us then take up the opportunity the Program offers. It extends our experience in a number of significant ways, and it provides a context for reflecting with others on that experience and integrating it into what we hold to be true and important. The opportunity must of course be grasped and the effort made, not just as we begin but through the heavy reading and constant writing of mid- and late-term. Not every single day or possibly even every week will find us readily seeing the relationship of what we are asked to do to the great promise the Program holds out. Constant effort in holding ourselves to a high standard of class preparation, of being effective in listening and in discourse with others and of learning to write ever more effectively about matters of high importance will bring us to points where we recognize clearly our intellectual and personal development. I was encouraged a few years ago when Professor Power reported that a certain senior class had developed such high expectations of one another that the greatest disincentive to coming to seminar ill-prepared was a sense of shame at having let your fellow students down. I recall too a strong student named Erik who came to the Program already with a young family and having given up or put on hold a very successful fishing business in Alaska. He came for the kind of education in the Program I have described. He was lingering at the table one day after seminar, and when I looked quizzically at him, he said that before he left the room after each seminar he wanted to assess the size and nature of the next seminar reading and make sure the time was provided to get it done properly. "You know, Professor Nicgorski, he said, with a family I have to plan carefully to get the reading done in the way it should be done." Lest this sound a bit like

exhortations to drudgery, let us remind ourselves of the great enjoyment and good friendships that form in the Program as we do significant work together. May we be up to the call to this path of studies; nearly all are who follow it come to be better and happier human beings for having made the effort.

This time of opportunity now before us is attuned to each of our times, and it is thus somewhat distinctive for each, students and faculty alike, for each of us has the inner clock at our own special hour. It is where we are at in the development of our understanding and our growth in wisdom. If each of us puts our very best effort into what we do together, not only are we as individuals on our own trajectories likely to flourish more, but the Program also, as a

community, will more likely and decidedly grasp the opportunity of this time. That opportunity was featured in Professor Sloan's address of last year; it is the opportunity for leadership in providing an example and stimulus for the reform of undergraduate education in the modern university. As a vital part of liberal education at this remarkable and much watched university, it is a special responsibility for us to be able to articulate as well as to exemplify what we think our best practices are. That is what I have attempted in a partial way tonight. Let me call a halt to this season of beginnings and to reflections on what we are about. Let's go do it. In the words of an ancient injunction to scholars and students, "Taste the salt of wisdom, drink the wine of happiness."



FACULTY NEWS

Steven Affeldt spent six delightful weeks of the past summer at St. Johns College in Santa Fe, New Mexico where he served as a core faculty member for a National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Institute entitled "Ralph Waldo Emerson at 200: Literature, Philosophy, Politics." He returned to South Bend just in time for the challenges and pleasures of teaching Philosophical Inquiry (for the first time) and Seminar V. And he has spent the Spring semester as a visiting faculty member in the Department of Philosophy, Graduate Faculty, at the New School for Social Research in New York City where he has taught Emerson and the later Wittgenstein. While he has thoroughly enjoyed New York and the New School, he has missed Notre Dame and PLS and looks forward to returning at the beginning of the summer.

Nicholas Ayo's twenty-three years of service in PLS were honored with a Mass and Communion Breakfast on May 2nd. The mass was held in Keenan-Stanford Chapel, and the brunch in North Dining Hall. Michael Crowe and Gretchen Reydams-Schils gave the main after-breakfast reflections. Phillip Sloan was the master of ceremonies. Father Ayo came away with a full heart and he was very grateful for such kind recognition and also thankful for several thoughtful gifts—exquisite pens and a scrapbook of letters from faculty, students, and graduates. The family of Fr. Nicholas also set up a Nicholas Ayo, C.S.C. scholarship award that will be given annually to a PLS student.

Father Ayo has recently published a sequel to his book on the campus, entitled *Signs of Grace*. The new book, now in the bookstore at Notre Dame, is entitled *Times of Grace*. Events of the academic year are detailed within a spiritual perspective.

Michael Crowe, who became emeritus in 2002, has been enjoying his retirement. In the fall of 2003 he taught a graduate course in the history of modern astronomy and this spring he and his wife traveled for a period in Austria, Germany, and Switzerland. He continues to work on two books. His *Mechanics from Aristotle to Einstein* will be published next year by Green Lion Press. He is also finishing *The Extraterrestrial Life Debate from Antiquity to 1915: A Source Book*.

The big news in the life of **Walter Nicgorski** is that at the end of the summer he steps down from the editorship of *The Review of Politics* where he has been chief editor for the last decade and involved in other editorial capacities for twenty years. Though always involved in PLS (two to three courses a year plus senior essay direction) during that time, he looks forward to even more of a commitment to the Program and to completing certain key writing projects. He will present from his work on Cicero at the early September American Political Science Association meeting in Chicago. He has just returned from lectures both on Cicero and on the American constitutional tradition to various university audiences in Guadalajara, Mexico.

Among the happy events of the past year was his speaking at Universal Notre Dame nights at Naperville/Lisle and Spokane. At the first of these he faced some tough questioning from **John Breen** ('85) which was followed by a delightful visit with him and his family in their Naperville home. In the audience in Spokane was **Melissa Flores** a current PLS student who has extended her summer service project with L'Arche throughout this year. Professor Nicgorski was introduced in Spokane by **Doug Siddoway** ('74). Not only was it a gracious introduction, but it was also informed by an appreciative and rich understanding of what characterizes an education in PLS.

Clark Power was given the Rodney F. Ganey, Ph. D. Faculty Community-Based Research Award on Monday, May 3.

In the Fall of 2003, **Gretchen Reydams-Schils'** new book was accepted for publication with the University of Chicago Press. The title of this project is: *The Roman Stoics: Self, Responsibility, and Affection*.

The Notre Dame Workshop on Ancient Philosophy, which she established, and in which colleagues from seven different academic units participate, continues to grow, and this year for the first time received grant money, from the Delmas Foundation.

In May and June she was in Paris, as a visiting scholar with the École Pratique des Hautes Études, giving a series of four weekly lectures on Calcidius, who in the fourth century A.D. translated part of Plato's Timaeus in Latin and wrote an extensive commentary as well.

Of all the ongoing contacts with students, she enjoys most the weekly letters she receives this summer from a student in India.

Phillip Sloan served for the second year as President of the Association for Core Texts and Courses. He is also the new Chair for Section L. (History and Philosophy of Science) of the American Association for the Advancement of Science. He published this past year the opening chapter to the new *Cambridge Companion to Darwin*, edited by S. Radick and M. J. S. Hodge (Cambridge University Press, 2003). He has also been working on the three-year Ford Foundation project on Religious Visions and Bioethics with Rice University and Baylor University Medical School. With a co-leader from St. John's Col-

lege, he has been leading a three-year NEH seminar "Bridging the Gap Between the Sciences and Humanities" that met for its second seminar this summer at Notre Dame. He also continues as faculty advisor for the Forum for Bioethics student club.

Tom Stapleford won the 2004 Joseph Dorfman Dissertation Award from the History of Economics Society. The award will be officially announced and presented at the HES meeting in late June in Toronto.

Professor Katherine Tillman is proud to announce the inaugural issue of the *Newman Studies Journal* (Spring, 2004) of which she is co-editor. (See <http://www.pdcnet.org/nsj.html> and <http://www.pdcnet.org/nsjtoc.html>.) In August, she will give one of the plenary session addresses at the Fourth International Newman Conference at Oxford, England. Alums will recognize in the title of her address the value to her of their own class discussions: "Can Truth be Taught? Newman and the Issues of Plato's Meno." She sends warm greetings to one and all!

Henry Weinfield writes: "As I will be assuming the duties of the chair in the middle of July, I want to take this opportunity to thank my predecessor, Phil Sloan, for his tireless efforts on behalf of the department and, in particular, for all of the help he has given me with the transition. I also want to thank Debbie Kabzinski, our secretary, for her resourcefulness and good humor. (Everyone knows that it's really Debbie who runs the department.) I look forward to alumni reunion weekend and to our summer alumni seminar (in which I will be leading a week-long seminar on Dante's *Commedia*). Please keep in touch."

THE 2003 EDWARD J. CRONIN AWARD WINNER

The Elimination of Deliberation in Kant's *Critique of Pure Practical Reason*

André Vincent
Class of 2004/05

Our modern, liberal-democratic belief in human rights and the possibility for social transformation can trace its roots back to the Age of Enlightenment. In the era that yielded the scientific discoveries of Galileo and Newton, an intellectual climate emerged that emphasized the importance of method in scientific investigation and the primacy of reason over claims to authority or tradition. Figures such as Bacon, Descartes, and Hume worked to free Western philosophy from Aristotelian science and metaphysics once and for all. Indeed, their revolutionary efforts in all areas of thought laid the foundations for the technologically oriented society we live in today. In the area of moral philosophy, however, the outstanding figure is arguably Immanuel Kant.

Drawing from the spirit of Enlightenment, Kant imbued his ethical philosophy with scientific rigor. In doing so, he made final the split between theology and philosophy initiated by Bacon and Descartes, choosing in favor of a metaphysically or theologically oriented approach that emphasized the autonomy of pure and unaided reason. After centuries of religious strife, Kant saw the light of human reason as a weapon against religious fanaticism and superstition. He condemned speculative metaphysics and made reason, rather than the supersensuous spirit, the seat of the moral consciousness. This move had several consequences, and one of the most profound, I believe, is that it raised the epistemological claims of ethics. The role of intuition, choice and deliberation in moral decision-making was diminished. Ethical questions began to be conceived primarily as ab-

stract, rational problems, akin to problems in mathematics, rather than issues of vital personal urgency. For these reasons I feel that an inquiry into Kant's system, with reference to Aristotle's distinction between scientific knowledge and practical wisdom, as well as his discussion about choice and deliberation, can shed some light on why moral decision-making benefits from a personal approach and how ethical uncertainty can contribute to the development of a moral consciousness.

Kant's systematic approach to moral philosophy reflects the strong influence of science and mathematics on his thinking. Toward the middle of the *Critique of Practical Reason*, in a chapter entitled "On the Topic of the Pure Practical Faculty of Judgment," Kant, proposes that, "we...use nature, the sensible world, as the type of an intelligible nature..." (73). He bases this assertion on an earlier definition he gives us: "Nature, in the widest sense of the word, is the existence of things under laws" (44). Clearly, the concept of nature that Kant wants us to have focuses on its orderliness and uniformity; nature, as an intelligible concept, provides us with a "schema" analogous to the moral law, which also takes the form of universal and objective laws. A schema is, in essence, the "form" of nature, a conceptual framework which we can construct a priori that does not depend on experience. Kant, like Plato, is highly suspicious of sense perception and so he limits the type of nature to its "pure intelligible form." Kant's use of nature as a schema for the moral law reminds me of Plato's fondness for geometrical figures as a visual

analogue for the Forms. Granted that Kant explains morality as an exercise of our reason, and that the categorical imperative is in no way a Form, the idea that the form of the natural law can serve as a schema for the moral law implies an idea similar to Plato's ascent through mathematical abstraction to higher truths.

The understanding of nature as divisible into sensuous and intelligible realms takes place on a cosmic scale for Kant. On the level of external nature, he divides the world into two dimensions: the world we understand through reason (*natura archetypa*), and the world we encounter empirically (*natura ectypa*). This separation of the idea of nature from its physical embodiment carries over to human beings as well. For Kant, the awareness of the moral law makes human beings conscious of an intelligible order separate from the natural order. As he says, "The supersensuous nature of the same beings, on the other hand, is their existence according to laws which are independent of all empirical conditions and which therefore belong to the autonomy of pure reason" (44). This concept of nature is analogous in turn to the dual existence of humans as noumena (beings of pure consciousness) and as phenomena (beings subject to the laws of nature). This makes the seat of human consciousness and being (in the existential sense) a realm completely separate not only from the sensuous world, but from the larger psychological and social context of the human being.

Kant's proposal that the lawfulness of nature serve as a schema for the moral law falls apart because it fails to recognize the incommensurability of the idea of the lawfulness of nature and its physical embodiment in the larger context of the world. For example, although scientists can use mathematical formulas to describe and predict natural phenomena, these formulas cannot account for the many forces at work at any given moment. These formulas serve as paradigms, constructs that help us to make reliable predictions. These predictions, however, are true only for the most part and hold only

generally. For example, when Galileo was working out his law of universal acceleration, he had to ignore such factors as friction and air resistance. The same applies to Newton and his development of universal gravitation: his laws can describe phenomena in general, but he has to assume ideal conditions. Today, we can test Newton's hypotheses by creating a vacuum. Human beings, I fear, never operate in a vacuum, even as self-reflective beings. The concept of "pure reason" strikes me as the equivalent of reason operating in a vacuum where human desires, cultural context, and individual psychology have no influence. What Kant failed to appreciate is how much the affective part of human nature, the source of our capacity for compassion and empathy, contributes to the development of our moral nature. Morality should encourage a personal, affective investment in the well being of other human beings; otherwise we must seek motivations for acting that do not call to life the full range of human integrity.

At this point I think that Aristotle might help us to understand what kinds of epistemological claims Kant proposes for his ethics. In Book I of the *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle says, "We must be content, then, speaking of such subjects and with such premises to indicate the truth roughly and in outline, and in speaking about things which are only for the most part true and with premises of the same kind to reach conclusions that are no better" (936). Aristotle's rather verbose disclaimer promises a procedure less precise, but perhaps no less rigorous, than Kant's. In the field of moral philosophy or ethics, the mode of inquiry can tell us a lot about the epistemological status of the conclusions one reaches. Kant's description in the conclusion of the *Critique* is telling:

We have at hand examples of the morally judging reason. We may analyze them into their elementary concepts, adopting, in default of mathematics, a process similar to that of chemistry, i.e.,

we may, in repeated experiments on common sense, separate the empirical from the rational, exhibit each of them in a pure state, and show what each by itself can accomplish. (170)

Here, Kant provides a different methodology and objective for ethics and this, as it must, implies new criteria for deciding what is or what is not moral. The analogy to mathematics and chemistry again reveals Kant's predilection for the 'scientific' values of neutrality and objectivity. In the process, he redefines the parameters of what Aristotle calls scientific knowledge (the knowledge of things that are eternal and unchanging), in relation to practical wisdom (which involves the knowledge of particulars and pertains to the individual). Although Kant stresses our human inability to fulfill the moral law and assigns such fundamental ideas as immortality and God the lower epistemological status of postulates, Kant's ethical system hinges on the idea that morality can be generalized for all rational beings. The categorical imperative holds for all reasonable beings because it is "objective" and "necessary." These kind of claims may be appropriate for some forms of ethics, for example legal codes and human rights laws that cannot, and should not, take into account individual differences—I will discuss this more in detail later. Ethics, however, should not be confined to a legislative exercise that conceives of the will in purely general terms. Morality must provide some method of negotiating between our need to make personal choices—which stems from our innate desire for self-determination—and our responsibility to the community as a whole. Furthermore, Kant's categorical imperative does not present us with a sure-fire way of determining whether or not our reason is aligned with that of other rational beings. It would seem that the very criterion of "that which could hold for the will of all rational beings" involves a subjective element, because we would have to imagine the consequences of making one's maxim a moral law. We conceive of consequences on the basis of our personal experience or our personal

understanding of human nature. Either way the process involves a subjective element.

Kant's categorical imperative supplies the building blocks for his whole ethical system. The fundamental law of pure practical reason says that one should act on the maxim of the will that could be generalized to all rational beings. Granted that we have free will, which means that as intelligible beings we are no longer subject to the natural law, Kant says that the legislative form of a maxim is the only sufficient determining ground of the will. Only the law giving form of a maxim can completely determine the will as free, and so any other type of maxim, for example one that holds only for oneself, cannot completely determine the will as moral. The concept of the categorical imperative depends on the assumption that insofar as we have reason we are all the same. The concept of pure reason a priori, which Kant ties to the concept of freedom, establishes that human reason can operate on a plane devoid of all sensory and psychological input.

The will, if it is to be properly determined, must exclude from its determining grounds all objects or what Kant terms "materials of the faculty of desire." All principles that make objects the basis of their actions are empirically conditioned and thus violate the autonomy of the will. For the law to be objective and necessary it must be physically unconditioned.

Kant includes happiness under the category of "material of the faculty of desire." "The principle of one's own happiness," he says, "however much reason and understanding may be used in it, contains no other determinants for the will than those which belong to the lower faculty of desire" (23). Kant wants to tie the higher faculty of desire to our reason, and through reason it is connected to the will. The lower faculty of desire is a "pathologically determinable faculty" that encompasses most pleasures from the sensual to the intellectual and spiritual. Of this faculty Kant says, "...even the slightest admixture of its impulses impairs the strength

and superiority of reason,” and he adds later, “just as taking anything empirical as the condition of a mathematical demonstration would destroy its strength and value” (24).

This low regard for pleasure and human sensuality reinforces the separation of the body and the mind that emphasizes the intelligibility of human nature at the expense of its embodiment. Kant equates sensuality with disorder and corruption: “The sensuous nature of rational beings in general is their existence under empirically conditioned laws, and therefore it is, from the point of view of reason, heteronomy” (44). Necessarily, when we limit define human nature in terms of the “intelligible order,” we disregard the aspects that do not fit neatly into the schema that we construct in our minds. The essential psychological, social, and spiritual elements of our natures are made completely subordinate to our “rational” nature. This reductive view proposes the equivalent of converting human nature into a blank slate on which our reason can write as it pleases; it attempts to conceive of morality in the context of a vacuum. An ethical system that promotes the full flourishing of the human being must address how the sensuous and irrational aspects of our nature into fit into the moral life rather than merely dismissing them altogether. On this score, Aristotle and the Stoics, who felt that passions can be aligned with the higher function of reason, are more sympathetic to the human condition than Kant.

Kant’s suspicion of the irrational aspect of human nature relates to the motivation behind the moral law. We must dismiss all objects of the will, whether they are actions or effects, as grounds upon which we determine the will as moral because doing so bring in contingent factors that violate the criterion of necessity. Heteronomy, which violates the autonomy of the will by bringing in conditions only contingently related to it, occurs whenever we posit any object for the will or appeal to any source outside of our reason as the basis for the moral law. This includes God, whom Kant defines as “the

supreme perfection in substance” (42) and whom he makes external to the human will. (God, the knowledge of whose existence Kant relegates to a postulate, is only necessary on subjective grounds). Our autonomy rests solely in the exercise of our pure practical reason and should seek its motivation for morality from the moral law itself.

The moral law, as wholly independent of our desires, imposes an obligation so that it constrains one to action. This obligation is characterized by an “ought to” rather than the “thou shalt not” that we typically encounter in moral ethics. This alters the traditional reward and punishment dynamic that tends to be emphasized in certain ethical theories. Because our drive to be moral can no longer be anything external or contingently related to the will, such as Divine law or the desire for personal fulfillment, Kant must identify something originating in pure reason itself as an incentive to the moral law. The incentive or drive to the law that Kant allows is respect. Kant describes respect as “...a feeling produced by an intellectual cause, and this feeling is the only one we can know a priori and the necessity of which we can discern” (77). The moral law, in checking self-esteem, humiliates or strikes down our “self-conceit” and engenders in its place respect for the moral law. Kant explains the nature of respect: “Thus respect for the law is not the drive to morality; it is morality itself, regarded subjectively as a drive, inasmuch as pure practical reason, by rejecting all rival claims of self-love, gives authority and absolute sovereignty to the law” (79). Respect, as Kant explains it, we feel involuntarily as a check on our inclinations, and we can connect this to the concept of duty as a constraint to action. Morality involves a continuous struggle against our inclinations, and so we cannot depend on a vague or fortuitous “moral” disposition that contributes nothing to the moral law.

Kant takes pains to show that respect is a non-pathological phenomenon and that it is “insepa-

rably bound with the Idea of the moral law in every finite rational being” (83). Earlier, he attacks the concept that there can be a moral sense that acts as an internal moral guide. Aristotle, who says, “...the end appears to each man in a form answering to his character” (973), is certainly vulnerable to this critique. For Kant, “unrest cannot be felt prior to the knowledge of obligation,” which we only encounter from the moral law. In sum, the moral law is to be wholly objective and non-pathological both in its form and its effect on the human consciousness. This dissociates morality completely from the individual personality, in so much as it is subjectively determined, and dismisses claims to supersensory intelligence that can lead to unfair truth claims. The idea of respect as the drive to the moral law also guards against fanaticism and mysticism, both of which Kant abhors. Furthermore, the concept of acting from duty (or from the law), rather than merely according to the law, reinforces the integrity of the moral law as something impersonal.

The legislative nature of Kant’s ethics does provide us with a tangible method for creating universal principles that cannot (and should not) take into account individual differences. For example, to ensure the equal treatment of all citizens, the written law cannot negotiate between individual circumstances. By and large, all people should be presupposed to be equal, and thus what holds for one person should hold for the next. The categorical imperative promotes internal consistency and intends to promote the lawful concordance of all rational beings. When an individual asks, “Could this hold for the will of all rational beings?” or “If this were the law and not the exception, would the system as a whole work?” one tries to envision how an action contributes to the preservation of the system as a whole. This is what a good legal code or constitution does: it tries to ensure the preservation of peace and justice in society. The categorical imperative gives us an impersonal (not objective) formula for examining the viability of universal legislation. Human rights and

medical ethics are areas of ethical legislation that can benefit from Kantian ethics. In the post-modern era, cultural difference is stressed more than universal values and the development of genetic engineering threatens to change our understanding of what it means to be human. For Kant, it is reason that connects all human beings, and while I do not think that is the only thing, in a secular and technological age one should heed his eloquent words about human dignity:

This condition [the holiness of the law and the rational being] thus requires that the person never be used as a means except when he is at the same time treated as an end. We may rightly attribute this condition even to the divine will with respect to the rational beings in the world as its creatures, since the condition rest on the personality of these beings, whereby alone they are ends in themselves. (91)

In an increasingly global and pluralistic world, we can no longer lay claim to a common moral foundation in God and empire. Provided that we retain the dignity of all human beings as its fundamental assumption, Kant’s legislative ethics provides us with a basis from which to create humane laws.

When we admit that Kant’s legislative approach to morality fails to satisfy our individual need for interpersonal relationships, we are better equipped to appreciate Aristotle’s holistic approach. Aristotle incorporates psychology and common opinion into his inquiry. In his conception, ethics is a branch of political philosophy that deals with how we cultivate virtue and make good and responsible citizens. As we stated before, Aristotle begins the discussion by saying that we cannot expect the same precision in ethics that we can in other areas. He treats the human subject as the composite of reason and an irrational principle that encompasses our passions and emotions. This provides us with a more integrative approach to morality, because

unlike Plato or Kant, Aristotle does not dismiss the passions as an obstacle to the virtuous life, but to his credit he incorporates them as essential to our moral development. His distinction between moral and intellectual virtue allows him to negotiate between the management of our passions and emotions on the one hand and the calculative and contemplative powers of the human mind on the other.

Experience matters for Aristotle, and when it comes to moral virtue he says that we develop virtue through training and the cultivation of habits. “We feel anger and fear without choice, but the virtues are modes of choice or involve choice” (957), he says. This mode of choice involves the mediation of a rational principle that helps us to locate the mean or “right rule” with respect for our passions and emotions. Our emotions and passions are not bad in and of themselves, far from it: “...both fear and confidence and appetite and pity and in general pleasure and pain may be felt both too much and too little,” Aristotle says. He cannot prescribe a universal mean because, as he admits, the right rule differs for each individual according to one’s personality. This, as it involves a subjective element, requires the individual to acquire self-knowledge and develop a personal code of conduct. This is by no means wholly or even mostly objective, however; for the fact that Aristotle defines virtue as a mean between two vices indicates that he has an ideal in mind. For he says that “...it is possible to fail in many ways...while to succeed is possible only in one way” (958). Moreover, not all passions or actions admit of a mean, he is careful to point out; the words for some actions imply that they are bad unconditionally.

Choice and deliberation play major role in Aristotle’s understanding of ethics. This is implied in his definition of virtue. “Virtue,” he says, “is a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i.e. the mean relative to us, this being determined by a rational principle, and by that principle by which the man of practi-

cal wisdom would determine it” (959). Aristotle sees ethics in terms of a life-long process that involves training, political and philosophical education, and wisdom gained through experience. Because Aristotle establishes happiness as the end of all human action, the ethical process concentrates on choosing between means and creating a healthy context for securing that end. The end does not justify all means, however, because happiness presupposes virtue and virtue requires the pursuit of the good. Choice, for Aristotle, relates only to things within our power. We can only wish for the impossible, but choices always relate to action or anticipate the end toward which we aim.

The process by which we choose among different means is deliberation. Deliberation is an essential step in moral decision-making because it is the process that precedes our commitment to one course of action. Choice occurs in the space between deliberation and action; but a choice can be an action, too. Most choices are irreversible, that is they can be considered finite points of convergence between the will and the field of forces pulling one to take one course of action or another. There is a ‘before’ and ‘after’ in relation to choice: deliberation constitutes the ‘before.’ For this reason, I think the wise person would spend most of his or her time in deliberation, or in choosing between separate courses of action.

Deliberation has an existential aspect because it forces one to recognize (on some level) one’s finitude as a time-bound being. Furthermore, deliberation confronts us with our freedom to choose between actions whose consequences are indeterminate. Aristotle says, “Deliberation is concerned with things that happen in a certain way for the most part, but in which the event is obscure, and with things in which it is indeterminate” (970). According to this definition, reliance on the categorical imperative would diminish the role that choice and deliberation play in morality because one has to conceive of all moral action as an objective duty, as a constraint to action.

Kant does not adequately explain how one can determine whether something could or could not be made into a natural law without recourse to experience, and furthermore, how one can make maxims about actions whose ends are indeterminate. Many of our moral dilemmas, however, come at times of inexperience, at crossroads or crises that we had never before envisioned. Aristotle is not speaking lightly when he says that “by choosing what is good or bad we are men of a certain character...” (968). Even when we envision an object of the will, at critical moments of choice our nakedness in the face of the future consequences tends to strip us of our self-assurance and force us to choose solely on the strength of our moral character. At these moments, our reason—especially in the Kantian sense of one with which we can hold up the natural law as a schema—fails us; in heightened self-consciousness we choose not as rational beings but as individuals alone before the cosmos.

This existentialist reading does not intend to elucidate Aristotle’s understanding of choice so much as to suggest why love of the good or the commitment to the highest good does not necessarily violate the autonomy of the will. Kant’s observation that using “external” forces such as the Divine Law or the highest good as the grounding for the moral law offends the autonomy of humans is valid, and certainly true in some cases, but I do not think that it is necessarily so. (Of course, my concept of freedom is closer to Aristotle’s than to Kant’s, because, as I understand it, Aristotle has no problem claiming that we are free and at the same time embedded, and inseparable, in this life, from the natural order). My point is that as we come closer and closer to making a choice, the more distant the concepts of “law,” “God’s will,” “reason,” and “the highest good” become. We therefore have to act out of a commitment to the law, God, or good without having these concepts, as the ground of the will, securely in one’s mind. At critical moments all truly external grounds of choice disappear; we are left with only our conscience.

We either subsume them in the act of choice or we abandon them at the moment of crisis.

Insofar as we are human, there is always a cloud of uncertainty that will hang over all of our moral decisions, whatever we allege the grounds of those choices to be. Reason, powerful faculty that it is, does not remove that difficulty altogether. Undeniably, Kant’s *Critique of Practical Reason* offers us a formidable vision of the morally practical reason. His insights into an ethical system that does not appeal (directly) to personal benevolence or religious belief are certainly relevant in an increasingly scientific and technological society that lacks a cohesive ethical vision. The limits of this vision, however, lie in its failure to recognize the individual and our need for intersubjective relationships. Aristotle does well to acknowledge that ethics cannot escape uncertainty, and that deliberation and choice require that we confront this reality. This approach has its shortcomings too; for one, it exposes the possibility that there may be no objective standard as such. We can perhaps agree that his use of Pericles as a model citizen does little to address the problem. Nevertheless, the open-ended nature of ethics may serve as an inspiration for the kind of ceaseless searching that no system can satisfy.

The advantage of deliberation, with the end of human flourishing as its goal, over the categorical imperative may be only that it allows that while we make mistakes in the very process that leads to choice, these mistakes are an inevitable part of becoming a moral being.

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2003 SENIOR ESSAY TITLES

Meghan Anderson	Changing Our Conception of Freedom Through the Classroom: From License to Social Responsibility	Alven Neiman Fabian Udoh
David P. Arch	Plato's <i>Symposium</i> and the New Poetry	Mark Shiffman
Clifford S. Arnold	Machiavelli the Monomaniac	Stephen Fallon
Brendan F. Barker	Emerson as Apostle: The Redemptive Quality of Emerson's Writing	Steven Affeldt
David A. Baroni	Emerson: The Divine Breath of Inspiration	Steven Affeldt
Matthew B. Barr	Filling the Pews: Four Models for Success within Religious Denominations	Matthew Dowd
Andrew Benavidez	Our Lady of Guadalupe and the Evangelization Of the Americans	Virgilio Elizondo Fabian Udoh
Bryan P. Boll	A Moment's Notice—The Agency of Conversion: Kierkegaard's Moment of Eternity and the Conversions of C. S. Lewis and St. Augustine	Matthew Dowd
Sarah E. Brook	The Humility of Seeing the Whole: Responsible Economic Practice in the Global Market	Fr. Michael Baxter Fabian Udoh
Matthew M. Bunda	"If God Didn't Exist...": Dostoevsky, Kierkegaard, and Christian Existentialism	Henry Weinfield
Gina M. Cora	Vice and Virtue in the Victorian Era: <i>Vanity Fair</i> , <i>The Eustace Diamonds</i> , "Goblin Market," and <i>Phoebe Junior</i>	Kathy Psomiades
Clay A. Cossé	Immanuel Kant: An Ethical History?	Gretchen Reydam-Schils
Charles W. Cullen	A Study of <i>King Lear</i>	Stephen Fallon
Brock W. Domin	Ode to Alex: Beethoven and the Human Spirit in Stanley Kubrick's <i>A Clockwork Orange</i>	Edmund Goehring
John D. Donnelly	The Necessity of Grace in Flannery O'Connor's "Greenleaf"	Stephen Fallon
Erin P. Dowe	L.O.B.O.M. (Twining It Together)	Henry Weinfield

Meghan K. Finnerty	Emerson's Reform: The Appeal of Universal Language in the Debate over Slavery	Steven Affeldt
Stephanie A. Gannon	Catching the Madness of the Prince: Several Characters' Perspectives on the "Observed of all Observers"	Stephen Fallon
Cecilia A. Hadley	The Attempt to Represent Man Fully: Catholicism in Evelyn Waugh's <i>Brideshead Revisited</i>	Charles Gordon Matthew Dowd
Anne C. Hainley	'Only the Trying': an Exploration of T. S. Eliot's <i>Four Quartets</i>	Lawrence Cunningham Kent Emery, Jr.
Julie M. Hansen	Genius and Strategy on the Battlefield: Clausewitz, Tolstoy, and Foundations for Modern Military Philosophy	Phillip Sloan
David P. Harman	The Normativity of Nature and Evolutionary Ethics: An Analysis of Darwinian Evolution and Ethical Norms	Phillip Sloan
Brian C. Hartman	Feuerbach and Marx: Two Theories of Consciousness Transformation	Ivy Wilson Walter Nicgorski
Nicholas Holovaty	William Tecumseh Sherman vs. Tenzing Norgay	Rev. Jeffrey Schneibel, C.S.C.
Brian L. Kenney	Mozart's <i>Don Giovanni</i> As Political Allegory	Edmund Goehring
Allison L. Kitchner	Hermeneutic of Folly	Gretchen Reydam-Schils
Megan L. Kovac	Locating the Savage in the Chadogya Upanisad: Orientalism and Penetrating the Aesthetic of Indian Rationality	Rev. Jeffrey Schneibel, C.S.C.
James P. Krueger	The University of Notre Dame <i>du Lac</i> —Imperfect Vision on the Journey to Perfection: A Study of Dante's Use of Blindness in the <i>Divina Commedia</i>	Kent Emery, Jr.
Katherine Kuras	The Consequences of a Paradox	G. Felicitas Munzel
Paul F. Lakofka	Masonic Images of Love and Friendship in <i>The Magic Flute</i>	Edmund Goehring

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|----------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|
| Patrick B. Lynch | The Development of Substance in Aristotelian Metaphysics | Michael Loux
Gretchen Reydams-Schils |
| Evan Maher | Immigration in Europe: Challenges to Citizenship in Germany, France, and the European Union | Gretchen Reydams-Schils |
| Kathleen McKeown | The Paradox of Hope in Wordsworth's <i>Prelude</i> | Henry Weinfield |
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| Carolyn E. Sweeney | "It is enough": Fleeting Moments of Harmony in Virginia Woolf's Novels <i>To the Lighthouse</i> and <i>The Waves</i> | Henry Weinfield |

ALUMNI NEWS

The editorial staff of Programma welcomes contributions and reserves the right to edit them for publication. For information about becoming a class correspondent, please see this issue's editor's column.

Class of 1954

Added by the PLS Office:
We are sorry to report the loss of **James Cannon**. Please keep his family in your thoughts and prayers.

Class of 1955

(Class Correspondent: George L. Vosmik, 21151 Lake Rd., Rocky River, OH 44116-1217, e-mail: flyty@apk.net)

Class of 1956

The Charles E. Sheedy Award for Excellence in Teaching is bestowed annually at a ceremony during the Arts and Letters Advisory Council weekend. The award is named for Rev. Charles E. Sheedy, C.S.C., a much-beloved, former dean of the College of Arts and Letters. The 2004 co-honorees are Professor **William H. Leahy**, Department of Economics and Policy Studies, and Professor A. Peter Walshe, Department of Political Science. The ceremony and reception will take place on Friday, September 24, 2004, at 4:00 p.m., in the McKenna Hall Auditorium.

Class of 1957

Class of 1958

(Class Correspondent: Michael J. Crowe, PLS, U. of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN 46556)
Bill Griffith has been teaching philosophy at The George Washington University since 1964, where he chaired the Department of Philosophy for a dozen years, and has been a long-time member and sometimes chair of the Faculty Senate. He and his wife live at 1215 Geranium St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20012, and he has no immediate plans to retire.

Class of 1959

Class of 1960

(Class Correspondent: Anthony Intintoli, Jr., 912 Georgia St., Vallejo, CA 94590-6239)

Class of 1961

Class of 1962

(Class Correspondent: John Hutton, Box 1307, Tybee Island, GA 31328)

Added by the PLS Office:
Joe Georges, Director of the California Virtual Campus Professional Development Center, communicated to us news of the death of **Richard Kienast**, GP/PLS 1962. Richard became a county sheriff in Aspen Colorado. An obituary on his interesting life from the Aspen Daily News can be obtained from (http://neutrino.phys.washington.edu/~berns/WALTA/ADN_010718.htm). We send our best wishes and prayers to all his family and friends.

Class of 1963

Class of 1964

Class of 1965

(Class Correspondent: Lee Foster, P.O. Box 5715, Berkeley, CA 94705)

Class of 1966

(Class Correspondent: Paul R. Ahr, P.O. Box 1248, Fenton, MO 63026-1248)

Class of 1967

(Class Correspondent: Robert W. Mc Clelland, 584 Flying Jib Ct., Lafayette, CO 80026-1291)

Class of 1968

Class of 1969**Class of 1970**

(Class Correspondent: William F. Maloney, M.D., P.O. Box 8835, Rancho Santa Fe, CA 92067-8835/2023 West Vista Way, Suite A Vista, CA 92083 619/941-1400 ph 74044.2361@compuserve.com)

Class of 1971

(Class Correspondent: Raymond J. Condon, 4508 Hyridge Dr., Austin, TX 78759-8054)

Class of 1972

(Class Correspondent: Otto Barry Bird, 15013 Bauer Drive, Rockville, MD 20853 e-mail: BarryBird@hotmail.com)

Gary Raisl received a Doctorate of Education from the University of Pennsylvania in 2003 in Higher Education Management. Dr. Raisl's dissertation on endowment management has been nominated for an international award by the Council for the Advancement and Support of Education. Gary is currently Vice President for Finance and Administration at the University of the Sciences in Philadelphia.

Class of 1973

(Class Correspondents: John Astuno, 16 Meadowview Lane, Greenwood, CO 80121, and John Burkley, 200 Law Road, Briarcliff Manor, NY 10510, burkley@optonline.net)

Class of 1974

(Class Correspondent: Jan Waltman Hessling, 5613 Frenchman's Creek, Durham, NC 27713-2647 (919) 544-4914 hessling@mindspring.com)

Class of 1975

(Class Correspondent: David Miller, 4605 Aberdeen Avenue, Dublin, OH 43016)

Class of 1976**Class of 1977**

(Class Correspondent: Richard Magjuka, Department of Management, Room 630C, School of Business, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47501)

Class of 1978**Class of 1979**

(Class Correspondent: Thomas A. Livingston, 517 Fordham Ave., Pittsburgh, PA 15226-2021)

Class of 1980

(Class Correspondent: Mary Schmidlein Rhodes, #9 Southcote Road, St. Louis, MO 63144)

Class of 1981

(Class Correspondent: Tom Gotuaco, World Marketing Alliance, 2234 A Westborough Blvd., S. San Francisco, CA 94080-5405)

Class of 1982

(Class Correspondent: Francis D'Eramo, 1131 King St., Suite 204, Christiansted, USVI 00820, ithaka@earthlink.net)

Kevin Bauer lives in a farming community in rural Nova Scotia, Canada, with Mary Anne and two children: Rebecca, twelve; and Michael, ten. He works for a multinational information technology company, Unisys, creating and operating electronic government services. After joining the minority of PLS graduates who didn't study law after graduation, he now manages a number of services used primarily by, you guessed it, lawyers. Karma. He along with Francis D'Eramo attended last year's Alumni seminars, one of two members of our class to do so.

Frances DeLaurentis (formerly Coughlan)

lives in Kensington, Maryland with her husband of 18+ years, A.J. They have three children: Caitlin (14), Clare (12) and Brian (9). After practicing law for 12 years with the firm of Verner, Lipfert, Bernhard, McPherson and Hand, she left her partnership to teach. She spent three years at Catholic University of America, Colum-

bus School of Law as an instructor in the Law-
 yering Skills Program. She is now in her fifth
 year at Georgetown University Law Center and
 is an Associate Professor of Legal Research and
 Writing. She has been busily involved in her
 children's school and sports: coaching basket-
 ball, serving as President of the school parent-
 teacher organization; and serving as a member of
 the Church Parish Council.

Francis D'Eramo continues to practice law in
 St. Croix, U. S. Virgin Islands, and is married to
 a Domer, Kimberly (J. D. 1988) who he met on
 St. Croix. They have two daughters, Theodora
 (5) and Antonina (2). Francis also attended last
 year's Alumni seminars and, filled with zeal as a
 result thereof, started a Great Books discussion
 group in St. Croix. He is currently trying to get
 through various works by Leo Strauss. Francis
 is class correspondent for the *Programma*; he
 urges everyone to email him about themselves at
 ithaka1@earthlink.net, and threatens to make up
 things about the people who don't. Those of you
 who remember him know that this is no idle
 threat.

Kevin Yoder and his partner Jeff are living in
 the Hollywood Hills, raising their year old son
 Matthew and a beagle named Francesca. Kevin
 heads Nielsen NRG, Nielsen's strategic consult-
 ing arm for the movie industry. When not
 reciting *The Little Engine That Could* and *One
 Fish Two Fish Red Fish Blue Fish* virtually from
 memory, he's currently in a Southern lit phase,
 reading lots of Reynolds Price and Walker Percy.
 He also strongly recommends Don DeLillo's
Underworld for those who have not discovered
 the author yet, and a great kids book from the
 50's called *The Little Island* (great watercolors).
 Best recent adaptation of literature to film is *The
 Hours*, and favorite Baby Einstein is Baby
 Beethoven.

Added by the PLS Office:

We are saddened to report the death of **Mary
 McCabe Kristl**, after many years of struggle
 with Marfan Syndrome, on January 28 of this

year. She and Ken were one of our PLS matches,
 and Ken was our Bird Award winner for 1981.
 Her father, Sheridan McCabe, taught for many
 years in the Notre Dame Psychology department
 and in the Arts and Letters Core Course in recent
 years. Cards can be sent to Ken at 680 North
 Lakeshore Dr., Chicago, IL 60611 and to her
 parents at P.O. Box 839, 1030 East Village
 Drive, Notre Dame, IN 46556. Donations have
 been requested for the National Marfan Founda-
 tion, 22 Manhasset Avenue, Port Washington,
 NY 11050 (www.marfan.org). We offer Ken,
 Sheridan, her mother Mary Clare, and all the
 family our consolations and prayers. Margaret
 was such a fine student that all of her teachers
 remember her well.

Class of 1983

(Class Correspondent: Patty Fox, 902 Giles St.,
 Ithaca, NY 14850-6128)

Class of 1984

(Class Correspondent: Margaret Smith, P.O. Box
 81606, Fairbanks, AK 99708-1606)

Class of 1985

(Class Correspondent: Laurie Denn, 5725
 Hansen Road, Edina, MN 55436-2404)

Class of 1986

(Class Correspondent: Margaret (Neis) Kulis,
 1350 Coneflower, Gray's Lake, IL 60030)

Class of 1987

(Class Correspondent: Terese Heidenwolf, 49 W.
 Church St., Bethlehem, PA 18018-5821
heidenwt@lafayette.edu)

Class of 1988

(Class Correspondent: Michele Martin, 3106
 Voltaire Blvd., McKinney, TX 75070-4248)

Class of 1989

(Class Correspondent: Coni Rich, 1529 South
 Lake George Drive, Mishawaka, IN 46545,
 (574) 271-0462 conijorich@aol.com)

Added by the PLS Office:

Dear Dr. Sloan,

I am going to be attending Emory in the Fall, in their Institute of Liberal Arts! This was my top choice of programs-you might remember that I applied to it back in 1995. I went on a weekend of interviews in February, and found the program and the people to be fabulous. Even better, they offered me their most prestigious fellowship, which provides \$20,000 each year for 5 years!

I also got into Women's Studies at Emory, and Comp. Lit. at the University of Georgia (and was offered the top fellowship there, too).

Anyhow, I just wanted to update you, share my great news, and thank you again for your help. It seems I am finally going to get a Ph.D after all these years, and I couldn't be more pleased!

Sincerely,
Jere Recob

Dear Editor,

I thought it might be of some interest that I was on campus recently (April 6th) lecturing in the photography classes of the Art Department on the subject of digital imaging. I was part of a lecture series covering photography from a variety of viewpoints.

I am a commercial photographer and manage a large commercial photo studio in Benton Harbor, MI. (It doesn't seem possible, but it is true.) Since graduating PLS in 1989, I have maintained a career in commercial photography that has included stops in Chicago and Bettendorf, IA. My work has appeared in numerous catalogs and retail ads, nationally and internationally; and my current employer, JohnsonRauhoff Photography, does retail advertising photography for several very large companies, including the world's two largest retail stores, WalMart and The Home Depot.

I have, along with JohnsonRauhoff, developed a

small reputation as being a leader in the field of digital photography, and we have been featured in several national trade publications. In addition to lecturing at Notre Dame, I also have been serving as something of a consultant for the photography professors, providing some advice concerning the digital arena.

I often reflect upon the value of the PLS education in my career pursuits. While certainly not directly related to my tasks and assignments on a daily level, my education has allowed me the ability to read, examine, understand, critique, and react to a great deal of information. Most importantly, it has made me unafraid to change my mind and to carry simultaneously incongruous opinions in my head waiting for information or further evaluation. Given the paradigm change in my industry over the last several years, this ability has been crucial. I learned photography the hard way, on my own, but I learned how to learn from the Program.

Poor student that I was, the Program (and Notre Dame in general), had a great impact on the direction and quality of my life. I hope that they continue to impact students, faculty and the campus as a whole in a similar manner.

Sincerely,
Rob Regovich

Class of 1990

(Class Correspondent: Barbara Martin, 45 Westmoreland Lane, Naperville, IL 60540-55817, barbnjohn@wideopenwest.com)

Class of 1991

(Class correspondent: Ann Mariani, 18 Tavern Cir., Sudbury, MA 01776-1064)

Class of 1992

(Class correspondent: Jennifer Adams Roe, 411 Brookside Dr., Columbus, OH 43209
JenRoe@insight.rr.com)

Added by the PLS Office:

John Gleason is working in the Senate for the

Governmental Affairs Committee, doing policy research/writing on Homeland Security issues and also overseeing the Committee's finances. The Committee is chaired by Collins (R-ME) and ranking member Lieberman (D-CT). Prior to this, he worked overseas as a State Department contractor for 5 years.

Class of 1993

(Class correspondent: Anthony Valle, 147-55 6 Ave., Whitestone, NY 11357-1656)

Class of 1994

Class of 1995

(Class Correspondent: Andrew Saldino, 28 Amsterdam Rd., Rochester NY 14610-1007, saldino@excite.com)

Class of 1996

(Class Correspondent: Stacy Mosesso, 351 Ayr Hill Ave. NE, Vienna, VA 22180-4726)

Class of 1997

(Class Correspondent: Brien Flanagan, 1211 SW Fifth Ave., Suite 1600-1900, Portland, OR 97204, bflanagan@schwabe.com)

Class of 1998

(Class Correspondents: Katie Bagley, 1982 Arlington Blvd., Charlottesville, VA 22901 (804) 984-6666, ksbagley@hotmail.com, and Bryce Seki, 28 Fischer Graduate Residence Apt.2C, Notre Dame, IN 46556, Seki.1@nd.edu (219) 634-4486)

Class of 1999

(Class Correspondent: Kate Hibey Fritz, 4213 Dunnel Lane, Kensington, MD 20895-3639 at katefritz@hotmail.com)

Class of 2000

Class of 2001

Added by the PLS Office:

There are an abundance of new things happening in my life. June 14 will be my first wedding anniversary. As you may remember, last June, I married Andrew Herman. He was in Notre Dame's class of 2000, and his brother is Tom Herman, a PLS student in the 2001 class. Andrew continues to work for Accenture doing computer consulting.

In May, I graduated from the Catholic University of America with my MA in Theology. During my time at CUA, I also worked as a research assistant with Professors James Wiseman (on Spirituality as well as Science and Theology) and John Ford (on Newman and Hispanic/Latino Theology). I also continued to work at the US Conference of Catholic Bishops. I moved from the Department of Education to the Secretariat for Family, Laity, Women and Youth. In the new job, I have been working on a forthcoming bishops' document on lay ecclesial ministry. The work on lay ecclesial ministry has certainly contributed to my personal research interests.

In July, Andrew and I are moving to Boston. I am starting the PhD program in systematic theology at Boston College. It should be about 5 years and I will have ample teaching and research opportunities. I am greatly looking forward to it. At this point, I am interested in the theology of the laity, the role of the laity and particularly women in the church, the relationship between the lay and ordained, etc. I am also interested in Christology and Trinitarian theology. Yet, the future remains open for dissertation topics! Even though it is still a few years away, if you have any ideas, please pass them my way!

Carolyn Weir Herman

carolynherman14@yahoo.com

Class of 2002

Class of 2003

MANY THANKS TO CONTRIBUTORS

Contributions Received at the PLS Office for Support of Programma
and the Program of Liberal Studies since the Last Issue

Contributions to the University Designated for PLS since the Last Issue

These contributions provide the department funds for the many faculty and student functions (Opening Charge, Christmas Party, Senior Dinner, Senior Brunch), office equipment, and much more. They also provide us the means to send Programma to over 1,800 alumni/ae all over the world

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Contributions to the Otto A. Bird Fund

This is a tribute to the faculty member who worked with Mortimer Adler in founding the General Program. Otto A. Bird started the department in 1950. This award recognizes the graduating senior who wrote the year's outstanding senior essay. The announcement of this award is keenly anticipated each year at the Senior Dinner, when students and faculty gather to celebrate the completion of the final requirement for graduation.

Mark Kromkowski
Gary Raisl

Contributions to the Susan Clements Fund

Susan was an extraordinary student and a remarkable young woman who graduated in 1990 and met an early and tragic death in 1992. Her classmates hope to memorialize her with a named scholarship to be awarded annually to a Program student. We have many worthy students in financial need. The PLS faculty has been able to establish an endowed “Spirit of Susan Clements” Award to be given to the graduating senior who most embodies the combination of scholarship, industry, and spirit that Susan possessed.

Wendy Chambers Beuter
Mr. & Mrs. Robert Clements
David Glenn
Professor John Lyon

Contributions to the Edward J. Cronin Fund

The Cronin Fund both honors a legendary teacher and helps to reward (and thus to encourage) undergraduate efforts to write lucidly and gracefully. The Award is for the finest piece of writing each year by a student in the Program of Liberal Studies. This is a distinct honor; it constitutes the Program’s highest prize for writing in the course of ordinary course work. Your gift will help us to recognize Program students who meet the high standards for writing set by our invaluable senior colleague.

Charles G. Bragg
Dr. David Carlyle
Peter R. Frank
Dennis O’Connor

Contributions to the Willis D. Nutting Fund

The Willis Nutting award was established to memorialize one of the great teachers in the Program.

Those who taught with or studied under Willis remember his gentle style, his clever wit, and his deep faith. The Willis Nutting tree outside the Art Department bears this motto from Chaucer: “And gladly wolde he lerne, and gladly teche.” This was his style, and we hope that it will always be yours as well. The Award is for “that senior who has contributed most to the education of his or her fellow students and teachers.”

Robert Dini
Robert W. McClelland

**Contributions to the
Program of Liberal Studies
Center for the Homeless Project**

In 1998 the Program of Liberal Studies began a community outreach seminar with students from the South Bend Center for the Homeless. The World Masterpieces Seminar runs for the entire academic year. Contributions help defray the cost of the books and outings to plays, concerts, and operas.

Jerry Murphy

Contributions to the Stephen Rogers Memorial Fund

Stephen Rogers graduated from our department in 1956. He later became a remarkable asset to our department faculty. Steve was physically challenged; he was blind. In 1985, Steve died during the final portion of senior essay time. We can't think of a better way to keep Steve's ideals alive than to fund a scholarship in his name. The Stephen Rogers Fund helps us to assist worthy students facing unexpected financial difficulties. The fund is given to the PLS student with the most financial need. On more than one occasion, the Fund has allowed students to remain in school when otherwise they would have had to withdraw.

Dr. David Carlyle
Thomas Flemming
Eric Fredrickson
Patrice Horan
Prof. John Lyon
Maureen Loiello McElroy
Gary Raisl
John S. Rogers
Gregory St. Ville
Daniel W. Smith
Dr. Richard Spangler
Jeffrey Toner
Mary Elizabeth Wackowski Wittenauer

Contributions to the James B. McCormick PLS Laboratory Fund

Katherine M. Hogan

SAVE THE DATE:

**2005 ANNUAL SUMMER SYMPOSIUM
FOR GP/PLS ALUMNI AND FRIENDS
JULY 3 TO JULY 8, 2005**

**FEATURING
WEEK LONG SEMINAR ON
PARADISE LOST
LED BY PROFESSOR STEPHEN FALLON
AND RELATED SEMINARS BY PLS FACULTY**

LIMITED ENROLLMENT

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION
AND REGISTRATION CONTACT:**

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