The Metaphysical Moralist
EDITORIAL PREFACE

In July 1675 Oldenburg wrote nervously to Spinoza to inquire about the prospect of publication of the *Ethics*:

From your reply of 5 July I understand that you intend to publish that five-part Treatise of yours. Permit me, I beg you, to advise you, out of your sincere regard for me, not to include in it anything which may seem in any way whatever, to overthrow the practice of religious virtue. . . . I shall not decline to receive copies of this Treatise; I would only ask that when the time comes, they be sent by way of a certain Dutch merchant, resident in London, who will see that they are soon forwarded. There will be no need to mention that such books have been sent to me. . . . (Letter 62, IV/273)

Oldenburg need not have worried. Some time later Spinoza sent him the following reply:

When I received your letter of 22 July, I was on the point of leaving for Amsterdam, to see to the printing of the book I wrote you about. While I was occupied with this, a rumor was spread everywhere that a book of mine about God was in the press, and that in it I strove to show that there is no God. Many people believed this rumor. So certain theologians—who had, perhaps, started the rumor themselves—seized this opportunity to complain about me to the Prince and the magistrates. Moreover, the stupid Cartesians, who are thought to favor me, would not stop trying to remove this suspicion from themselves by denouncing my opinions and writings everywhere.

When I learned this from certain trustworthy men, who also told me that the theologians were everywhere plotting against me, I decided to put off the publication I was planning until I saw how the matter would turn out. . . . But every day it gets worse, and I am uncertain what to do. (Letter 68, IV/299)

Thus was the world deprived, within Spinoza’s lifetime, of one of the great classics of modern philosophical thought, a work, ironically, that begins by arguing at length for God’s existence, and ends with the conclusion that the knowledge and love of God are man’s greatest good.

When Spinoza died, a year and a half later, his work could be published, and the slow process of recognition could begin. But not until he had been taken up by leading figures of the German enlightenment—by Lessing, Goethe, and Herder, among others—did his work receive much sympathetic attention. Since then the *Ethics* has always had a wide audience, particularly—and in view of its technical difficulty and forbidding form, surprisingly—among people not them-

1 On this process see Pollock, chap. 12, and Vernière.
selves professional philosophers, but poets, dramatists, and novelists. Much of this interest no doubt stems from the psychology and morality of the latter parts of the *Ethics*, from its serene, but remorseless dissection of human nature, and its (apparent) attempt to establish an acceptable ethic on the unpromising foundation of subjectivism, egoism, and determinism. But in part the interest must come also from fascination with the difficult question whether we can really regard as religious a thinker who has rejected so forcefully so much of what has usually been regarded as essential to religion in the West.

This is not the place to try to solve the perennial problems of Spinoza's philosophy. But some attempt must be made here to disarm the resistance which the axiomatic form of his masterwork seems, inevitably, to arouse. The topic is one on which quite divergent views have been expressed.

Sometimes, for example, it is suggested that Spinoza's philosophy required axiomatic exposition, that conceiving the world as he did, as a tightly knit deterministic system, he could not properly have expressed this conception in any other way; or that conceiving knowledge as he did, he would have regarded deduction from self-evident premises as the only suitably scientific way of presenting his philosophy. At the opposite extreme, it is sometimes held that the axiomatic exposition is merely a literary device designed to conceal the author's personality, to capitalize on the prestige of geometry, or even to avoid the temptation to quote Scripture—but having no further significance.

The truth, I suggest, is that Spinoza's choice of the axiomatic method represents nothing more, and nothing less, than an awesome commitment to intellectual honesty and clarity. Spinoza wishes to use no important term without explaining the sense in which it is to be understood, to make no crucial assumption without identifying it as a proposition taken to require no argument, to draw no conclusion without being very explicit about why that conclusion is thought to follow from his assumptions. This can be very tedious, as he well realizes (cf. E IVP18 S). But the serious reader who is prepared to use those terms as Spinoza does, and who shares Spinoza's assumptions, is forced to ask himself why he should not also accept Spinoza's conclusions. And it is only fair to point out that many of Spinoza's contemporaries

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4 For an interesting discussion of typical views, see Mark,
did share those assumptions and did use those terms in a way very close to the way Spinoza used them.\(^1\)

Again, it is a mistake to suppose that, when Spinoza designates something as an axiom, he really thinks that no one could question it, and is not willing to listen to argument about it. The history of his experiments with axiomatic exposition shows clearly enough that he is prepared to be flexible, and that what at one stage is treated as an axiom, may at a later stage be treated as a theorem, if experience shows that his readers resist the assumption.\(^2\) He does, of course, think that some propositions are more suited to be axioms than others. But he is not extravagantly optimistic about the ability of his readers to see what they should see, and this gives him a strong incentive to reduce his assumptions to a minimum (cf. II/49/26 ff.). And any serious attempt at argument must make some assumptions which, for the time being, at least, are not questioned.

But while this line of defense may be sound enough, as far as it goes, it does not go far enough. The difficulty for the modern reader of Spinoza's *Ethics* is not so much that he finds flaws in the demonstrations (though he may, of course), nor even that he rejects the axioms (though, again, he may), but that much of the language in which the axioms and demonstrations are framed has by now fallen into disuse, so that its very meaning is quite obscure to him. The clarity the axiomatization seemed to promise is not easy to find. A glossary-index may provide a partial solution to this difficulty. But unless it is very argumentative it cannot deal with the really fundamental problem.

It must be recognized that some of the terms which are central to Spinoza's philosophy are not merely out of fashion in twentieth-century philosophy, but would be rejected by many philosophers of our time as meaningless. The term 'substance' is a good example. For many people these days it is axiomatic that the empiricist critique of this concept demonstrated its bankruptcy. (By "axiomatic" I under-

\(^{1}\) As Mark emphasizes, in Mark, 277-280. However, the qualification "very close" is essential. Cf., for example, the discussion of the definitions of "substance" and "mode" in Curley 3, 4-28.

\(^{2}\) Cf., for example, the first appendix to the *Short Treatise*, and the early correspondence with Oldenburg. This theme is emphasised both in Mark and Hubbeling. More recently Bennett (2, 20) has recommended viewing the *Ethics* as a hypothetico-deductive system ("something that starts with general hypotheses, deduces consequences from them, and checks those against the data"). Bennett would concede, of course, that Spinoza did not regard his axioms and definitions as mere hypotheses. "Spinoza could—and I think would—say that although his system must work on uneducated minds in a hypothetico-deductive manner, when the tutoring is completed the reader will see the starting point to be certain" (21). That seems to me exactly right.
THE METAPHYSICAL MORALIST

stand here something we learned when we were first introduced to
philosophy.)

And yet it is arguable that this rejection has been too hasty: that
the traditional use of the concept of substance was too complex to have
been disposed of so simply; that there are two distinguishable strains
in that use—the concept of an unknowable subject of predicates, and
the concept of an independent being; that the empiricist critique touches
only the first of these strains; and that only the second is of much
importance for the understanding of Spinoza. If this is correct and if
other contentious concepts can be similarly rehabilitated, Spinoza’s
philosophy may once again be ripe for reevaluation.

These reflections may do something to diminish the resistance many
readers have to the form of the Ethics. But there remains the practical
problem of how even the reader of good will is to cope with a proce­
dure that makes great demands on his patience.

On a first reading it is probably advisable to concentrate on the
propositions, corollaries, scholia, prefaces, and appendices, leaving the
demonstrations till later. This will make it easier to grasp the structure
of the work, and give the reader some feeling for what is central and
what is subsidiary. ‘Corollaries’ are often more important than the
proposition they follow, and the scholia often offer more intuitive ar­
guments for the propositions just demonstrated, or reply to what Spi­
noza regards as natural and important objections. The longer scholia,
prefaces, and appendices tend to punctuate major divisions within the
work and to sum up key contentions.

On a second reading, of course, it is essential to study the demon­
strations carefully. Seeing how a proposition is argued for is often a
useful way of clarifying its sense. It is also helpful to check the steps
of a demonstration against the citations. For when Spinoza cites an
axiom, definition, or proposition in a subsequent demonstration, he
sometimes paraphrases it in a way that illuminates what has gone be­
fore. And in any case, it is instructive to see what Spinoza takes the
implications and significance of a proposition to be. But the best ad­
vise is Spinoza’s own—to proceed slowly and to abstain from judg­
ment until everything has been read through (IIIP11CS). This is not
easy. Spinoza’s philosophy, is not easy. But as he also says, all things
excellent are as difficult as they are rare (VP42S).

I close with a few observations on the probable date of composition

7 So I have argued, at any rate, in Curley 3, chap. 1. While much of what is offered
in that book as an interpretation of Spinoza is admittedly quite speculative, the conclu­
sion relevant here seems to me almost certain. I am happy to note that Gueroult reaches
a very similar conclusion in the first volume of his commentary on the Ethics.
of the *Ethics* and the status of our text. As we have seen, Spinoza took steps to publish this work in 1675, though it did not appear until 1677 and may have undergone some revision even after 1675. On that ground we might regard the *Ethics* as a late work, or at any rate, later than the *Theological-Political Treatise*, published in 1670. On the other hand, we can see from the early correspondence with Oldenburg that Spinoza was circulating drafts of the material for Part I as early as 1661. So we might conclude that Spinoza was occupied with writing this work, off and on, for most of his adult life.

Nevertheless, it now seems possible to be more precise than that about the composition of our text. We know from Letter 28 that toward the middle of 1665 Spinoza was near the end of a first draft of the *Ethics* (i.e., near the end of the third part of what was probably, at that stage, conceived as a three-part work). Recent research on the relation between the OP and NS versions of the *Ethics* also suggests certain conclusions about the extent of the revision the first two parts may have undergone after 1665.

Gebhardt had noted (II/315-317, 340-345) that divergences between the OP text and NS translation were much more common in the first two parts of the *Ethics* than they were in the last three, and that frequently the NS seemed to have more text than the OP had. He inferred from this that the NS translation of E I-II was done from a manuscript that represented an earlier draft of the *Ethics* and that in revising Spinoza had deliberately omitted certain passages, sometimes to avoid giving unnecessary offense. He therefore incorporated many passages from the NS translation into his text. Occasionally he translated his additions into Latin. One might question whether the editor of a critical edition should interfere with the text in this way, but Gebhardt believed that the practice of modern editors of Kant’s first *Critique* provided a precedent for indicating (as he thought) the differences between earlier and later drafts.

I believe that Akkerman (2, 77-176) has definitively refuted this theory and shown the correctness of an alternative account of the variations: that the NS translation of E I-II is essentially the work of Balling, while the NS translation of E III-V is by Glazemaker; and that

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8 The most plausible example of this occurs at II/81/20, but as the annotation will suggest, Gebhardt is probably wrong in his interpretation of the significance of the variation.

9 But not usually, not on any principle that I can discern, and not, in my view, always correctly. The Latin additions he makes at 92/8, 10 seem to me to repose too much confidence in the accuracy of the marginalia.

10 Though Glazemaker may have made some revisions in Balling’s translation and probably added the marginalia. Akkerman also does not exclude the possibility that
THE METAPHYSICAL MORALIST

the tendency of the NS version of E I-II to show more text than the NS version of E III-V stems from Balling's different style of translating, in particular his willingness to take greater liberties with the text than Glazemaker would take. Akkerman makes his case for this via a meticulous examination of the translating styles of the two men in other works they are known to have translated, noting differences in prose style, in the kinds of license they allow themselves, in the kinds of mistakes they are apt to make, and in the way they treat key terms. One hesitates to speak of demonstration in any matter such as this, but Akkerman's argument is very impressive.

The principal implication of his research, as far as the establishment of the text is concerned, is that where the NS seems to have more text than the OP, this is almost invariably because the translator has amplified the text to make it clearer, or used a pair of Dutch terms to render one Latin term, in the hope of better capturing the implications of the Latin, and not because the text he was translating varied from the OP text.

But Akkerman's research also, it seems to me, has implications for the study of the development of Spinoza's thought. If Balling was the author of the translation of E I-II used by the editors of the NS, and if no significant changes were made in that text after Balling translated it, then Balling's death would provide a date after which Spinoza did not significantly revise Parts I and II. We do not know precisely when Balling died. Clearly it was not before July 1664 (the date of Letter 17) and pretty certainly it was not later than 1669 (cf. AHW, 45), Akkerman (2, 152-153) thinks Balling must have died before June 1665, by which date Spinoza was writing to Bouwmeester about the possibility of his translating Part III. If this is correct, then the metaphysical and epistemological portions of the *Ethics* would have been in their final form some twelve years before they were published.

Gebhardt's additions to the text from the NS create a problem for the translator. Shirley's policy is to ignore them when they are in Dutch and to translate them when Gebhardt has translated them into Latin, but without indicating that what he is translating is an addition from the NS. But this seems to assume that Gebhardt has followed some defensible principle in deciding what to add in Dutch and what to add in Latin, an assumption I see no reason to make. In one way or another I have translated everything that Gebhardt adds from the NS (as well as some variations that Gebhardt does not seem to have

other friends in the Amsterdam Spinoza circle may have had some hand in Balling's translation of E I-II.
noticed). Where it has seemed to me that an addition, even though it probably came originally from the NS translator, was pretty certainly correct and useful, I have generally followed Gebhardt in adding it to the text. I assume that a translator may take liberties that the editor of a critical edition may not. Where one of Gebhardt’s additions has seemed to me doubtfully correct, I have relegated it to a footnote. Wherever a bracketed addition comes from the NS, I have indicated that fact. There is some evidence that Spinoza may have had Balling’s translation of E I-II at his disposal, and indeed, that the copy of that translation used by the NS editors may have been Spinoza’s own (cf. Akkerman 2, 167-168). So additions made from the NS, even if they do originate from a translator, may have been seen and approved by Spinoza.

References to definitions, axioms, propositions, etc., that do not contain an explicit reference to an earlier part of the Ethics are to be understood as referring to the part in which they occur.
Ethics

DEMONSTRATED IN GEOMETRIC ORDER
AND DIVIDED INTO FIVE PARTS,
WHICH TREAT

I. Of God
II. Of the Nature and Origin of the Mind
III. Of the Origin and Nature of the Affects
IV. Of Human Bondage, or of the Powers of the Affects
V. Of the Power of the Intellect, or of Human Freedom

First Part Of the Ethics
On God

Definitions

D1: By cause of itself I understand that whose essence involves existence, or that whose nature cannot be conceived except as existing.

D2: That thing is said to be finite in its own kind that can be limited by another of the same nature. For example, a body is called finite because we always conceive another that is greater. Thus a thought is limited by another thought. But a body is not limited by a thought nor a thought by a body.

D3: By substance I understand what is in itself and is conceived through itself, i.e., that whose concept does not require the concept of another thing, from which it must be formed.

D4: By attribute I understand what the intellect perceives of a substance, as constituting its essence.¹

¹ The titles of the five parts are given differently in the NS: "I. Of God, II. Of the Human Mind, III. Of the Nature and Origin of the Affects, IV. Of Human Bondage, V. Of Human Freedom." Akkerman (2, 263) suggests that the order of the title of Part III in the OP is wrong (by analogy with the title of Part II), though probably the order of Spinoza's ms., and that the NS reflects Jelles's emendation of the ms.

² OP: "Per attributum intelligo id, quod intellectus de substantia percipit, tanquam
ETHICS

20 D5: By mode I understand the affections of a substance, or that which is in another through which it is also conceived.

D6: By God I understand a being absolutely infinite, i.e., a substance consisting of an infinity of attributes, of which each one expresses an eternal and infinite essence.

II/46 Exp.: I say absolutely infinite, not infinite in its own kind; for if something is only infinite in its own kind, we can deny infinite attributes of it [NS: (i.e., we can conceive infinite attributes which do not pertain to its nature)]; but if something is absolutely infinite, whatever expresses essence and involves no negation pertains to its essence.

D7: That thing is called free which exists from the necessity of its nature alone, and is determined to act by itself alone. But a thing is called necessary, or rather compelled, which is determined by another to exist and to produce an effect in a certain and determinate manner.

D8: By eternity I understand existence itself, insofar as it is conceived to follow necessarily from the definition alone of the eternal thing.

Exp.: For such existence, like the essence of a thing, is conceived as an eternal truth, and on that account cannot be explained by duration or time, even if the duration is conceived to be without beginning or end.

ejusdem essentiam constituens. The meaning of this definition is much disputed. One important question of translation is whether tantum should be rendered 'as if' or 'as.' The former would favor those who hold the 'subjective' interpretation, according to which the differences between the attributes are illusory, all the attributes being identical in substance. Cf. Wolfson 1, chap. 5. The latter would be more congenial to those who think the attributes are really distinct and not merely constructions of the intellect. I think Gueroult, 1 (1: app. 3) has provided us with a definitive refutation of the subjective interpretation. But it is unclear whether his own interpretation is acceptable. See Donagan 1 and Curley 6.

Arguably the intellect referred to in this definition is the infinite intellect, not the finite (see Haserot). Note also that the NS supplies a definite article for substantia. Practice among modern translators and commentators varies; but I agree with Gueroult (1, 1:52) that the indefinite article is to be preferred.

The gloss Gebhardt adds from the NS may be the work of the translator, as Akkerman thinks is often true in such cases, or it may be an addition by Spinoza, as Akkerman (1, 161) thinks possible here. In any case, if the NS translation of E I-II was done by Balling in the period 1663-1665, then it seems likely that Spinoza would have seen it and had an opportunity to reject any alterations he did not approve of.

4 Parkinson (171n) suggests that while 'the essence of a thing' is possible, 'the essence of the thing' is preferable, so as to imply only that the essence of substance is eternal (anticipating E 1P52), not that all essences are eternal. But the NS have the indefinite article. And Spinoza does not maintain that all essences are eternal only in suspect works like the Metaphysical Thoughts. Cf. for example, the Treatise (II/36-37). In any case the attributes seem to provide us with a plurality of eternal things (cf. P19).

5 NS: "expressed."
THE METAPHYSICAL MORALIST

Axioms

A1: Whatever is, is either in itself or in another.

A2: Whatever cannot be conceived through another, must be conceived through itself.

A3: From a given determinate cause the effect follows necessarily; and conversely, if there is no determinate cause, it is impossible for an effect to follow.

A4: The knowledge of an effect depends on, and involves, the knowledge of its cause.

A5: Things that have nothing in common with one another also cannot be understood through one another, or the concept of the one does not involve the concept of the other.

A6: A true idea must agree with its object.

A7: If a thing can be conceived as not existing, its essence does not involve existence.

P1: A substance is prior in nature to its affections.

Dem.: This is evident from D3 and D5.

P2: Two substances having different attributes have nothing in common with one another.

Dem.: This is also evident from D3. For each must be in itself and be conceived through itself, or the concept of the one does not involve the concept of the other.

P3: If things have nothing in common with one another, one of them cannot be the cause of the other.

11/47

* NS: de zelfstandigheid, the substance, or simply, substance. But as Appuhn says, it does not emerge until later, after the properties of substances have been established, that there is only one substance. Spinoza will continue to speak as if there could be more than one substance until P1+C1.

* The punctuation in both the OP and the NS, which puts commas around the participial phrase, may suggest a claim that two substances, if they are indeed two, will have to have different attributes. It seems to me not to be Spinoza's intention to claim this at this point (cf. P5). I take the force of the phrase to be conditional: "If two substances have different attributes...." Leibniz's objection (I, 141), that two substances might have some attributes in common and others which were distinctive of each one (e.g., substance A has attributes C and D, substance B has attributes C and E), rests on the assumption that a substance may have more than one attribute. But (in spite of D6 and P10S) I take it that Spinoza begins with the Cartesian assumption (cf. Principles I, 53) that each substance has one attribute that constitutes its nature or essence, and that anything else that might be called an attribute would be improperly, or only loosely, so-called.

410
ETHICS

Dem.: If they have nothing in common with one another, then (by A5) they cannot be understood through one another, and so (by A4) one cannot be the cause of the other, q.e.d.

P4: Two or more distinct things are distinguished from one another, either by a difference in the attributes of the substances or by a difference in their affections.

Dem.: Whatever is, is either in itself or in another (by A1), i.e. (by D3 and D5), outside the intellect there is nothing except substances and their affections. Therefore, there is nothing outside the intellect through which a number of things can be distinguished from one another except substances, or what is the same (by D4), their attributes, and their affections, q.e.d.

P5: In nature there cannot be two or more substances of the same nature or attribute.

Dem.: If there were two or more distinct substances, they would have to be distinguished from one another either by a difference in their attributes, or by a difference in their affections (by P4). If only by a difference in their attributes, then it will be conceded that there is only one of the same attribute. But if by a difference in their affections, then since a substance is prior in nature to its affections (by P1), if the affections are put to one side and [the substance] is considered truly, i.e. (by D3 and A6), considered truly, one cannot be conceived to be distinguished from another, i.e. (by P4), there cannot be many, but only one [of the same nature or attribute], q.e.d.

P6: One substance cannot be produced by another substance.

Dem.: In nature there cannot be two substances of the same attribute (by P5), i.e. (by P2), which have something in common with each other.

* Elwes, White and Shirley all omit the comma after "attributes," thereby suggesting that substance is being identified with its attributes and affections. But the comma appears both in the OP and the NS. On the identity of substance and attribute see Gueroult 1, 1:47-50; Curley 3, 16-18.

* Both the OP and the NS omit the bracketed phrase, but this is clearly only an ellipsis. Akkerman (2, 80) points out that one of the most common differences between the OP and the NS occurs at the end of demonstrations, particularly when the proof is indirect (e.g., E IIP10D) or given in two parts (e.g., E IIP18D). He infers (2, 176) that, rather than constantly repeat the proposition to be demonstrated, Spinoza probably gave very summary indications of the conclusions in his mss., "which were worked out in various ways by the editors and translators."

The OP and NS also read "D3 and D6" in I. 13, but Van Vloten-Land and Gebhardt emend to "D3 and A6." Hubbeling (66) suggests that the reference may be to the principle that every definition, or clear and distinct idea, is true (cf. IV/13/12-13).

The proposition is an extremely important one, since it is the first truly radical theorem Spinoza derives from his first principles. Note the alternative demonstration in P8S2.
other. Therefore (by P3) one cannot be the cause of the other, or cannot be produced by the other, q.e.d.

Cor.: From this it follows that a substance cannot be produced by anything else. For in nature there is nothing except substances and their affections, as is evident from A1, D3, and D5. But it cannot be produced by a substance (by P6). Therefore, substance absolutely cannot be produced by anything else, q.e.d.

Alternatively: This\textsuperscript{11} is demonstrated even more easily from the absurdity of its contradictory. For if a substance could be produced by something else, the knowledge of it would have to depend on the knowledge of its cause (by A4). And so (by D3) it would not be a substance.

\textit{P7: It pertains to the nature of a substance to exist.}\textsuperscript{14}

Dem.: A substance cannot be produced by anything else (by P6C); therefore it will be the cause of itself, i.e. (by D1), its essence necessarily involves existence, or it pertains to its nature to exist, q.e.d.

\textit{P8: Every substance is necessarily infinite.}\textsuperscript{14}

Dem.: A substance of one attribute\textsuperscript{11} does not exist unless it is unique (P5), and it pertains to its nature to exist (P7). Of its nature, therefore, it will exist either as finite or as infinite. But not as finite. For then (by D2) it would have to be limited by something else of the same nature, which would also have to exist necessarily (by P7), and so there would be two substances of the same attribute, which is absurd (by P5). Therefore, it exists as infinite, q.e.d.

Schol. 1: Since being finite is really, in part, a negation, and being infinite is an absolute affirmation of the existence of some nature, it follows from P7 alone that every substance must be infinite. [NS: For if we assumed a finite substance, we would, in part, deny existence to its nature, which (by P7) is absurd.\textsuperscript{13}]

Schol. 2: I do not doubt that the demonstration of P7 will be

\textsuperscript{11} The NS reads: "This Proposition ... " Gebhardt infers that the translation reflects an earlier draft. But Akkerman points out (2, 154) that the reference must be to the corollary, and concludes that the NS reading merely reflects the translator's disposition to eliminate ambiguities, a disposition which in this case leads him astray.

\textsuperscript{12} From the perspective of Gueroult's interpretation, this phrase is highly significant, as illustrating his contention that the early propositions of Part I of the Ethics (P1-P8) are concerned to demonstrate properties possessed by the elements of God's essence, which are substances constituted by a single attribute, each unique in its kind, existing by itself and infinite. The problem, then, becomes one of seeing how these attributes are united in one being, i.e., how these distinct essences (P10S) can be the essences of one and the same thing.

\textsuperscript{13} Akkerman (2, 161) takes this to be clearly a translator's addition.

\textsuperscript{14} Because this scholium relates more to P7 than to P8, some scholars have thought it a marginal note misplaced by the original editors. But both the NS and the OP put it here, and as Gebhardt notes, it is subsequently referred to by Spinoza as the second
difficult to conceive for all who judge things confusedly, and have not been accustomed to know things through their first causes—because they do not distinguish between the modifications\textsuperscript{15} of substances and the substances themselves, nor do they know how things are produced. So it happens that they fictitiously ascribe to substances the beginning which they see that natural things have; for those who do not know the true causes of things confuse everything and without any conflict of mind feign that both trees and men speak, imagine that men are formed both from stones and from seed, and that any form whatever is changed into any other.\textsuperscript{16} So also, those who confuse the divine nature with the human easily ascribe human affects to God, particularly so long as they are also ignorant of how those affects are produced in the mind.

But if men would attend to the nature of substance, they would have no doubt at all of the truth of P7. Indeed, this proposition would be an axiom for everyone, and would be numbered among the common notions. For by substance they would understand what is in itself and is conceived through itself, i.e., that the knowledge of which does not require the knowledge of any other thing.\textsuperscript{17} But by modifications they would understand what is in another, those things whose concept is formed from the concept of the thing in which they are.

\textsuperscript{15} Gebhardt notes that the NS has 'wijken' with 'moed' in the margin, instead of 'modifications' as in the OP text. There are many such variations in the NS marginalia (e.g., 'affectio' for 'affectus' in l. 36) and Gebhardt takes them as a sign that the NS translation was done from an earlier state of the text. But Akkerman (2, 66–67, 163) has advanced a more plausible hypothesis, that the translator (or rather, the author of the marginalia, who in this case may not have been the translator) may not always have preserved for the Dutch reader the exact Latin word Spinoza used. The author of the marginalia may not always have taken the time to look back from the translation to the text translated, and may have been misled by the translator's (correct) treatment of 'modus' and 'modification' as synonyms. He may also have intended to indicate not so much the exact word, as simply a common Latin term for the Dutch term. The translation seems deliberately to avoid the use of words of foreign origin. The marginalia help to compensate for the loss entailed by that policy.

\textsuperscript{16} Wolfson (2, 242-243) suggests a number of possible targets here: the belief that trees may speak was held by the Sabians and ridiculed by Maimonides (1, 3:29); that men may be made from stones as well as seed is implied in the Greek legend of Deucalion and Pyrrha (Ovid, \textit{Metamorphoses}, 1, 411–413), but also in Matthew 3:9; and that a thing having any one form may be changed into one having any other is illustrated both by many of the legends in Ovid, but also by many Jewish and Christian miracles (cf. Maimonides 1, 2:29, and TDHE §38).

\textsuperscript{17} This passage is interesting partly because it provides a different gloss on the definition of substance from that offered in D3, but also because Spinoza shows clearly here that he does not take his definition of substance to be merely a report of what men ordinarily understand by that term. Cf. Curley 1, 14-16.
THE METAPHYSICAL MORALIST

This is how we can have true ideas of modifications which do not exist; for though they do not actually exist outside the intellect, nevertheless their essences are comprehended in another in such a way that they can be conceived through it. But the truth of substances is not outside the intellect unless it is in them themselves, because they are conceived through themselves.

Hence, if someone were to say that he had a clear and distinct, i.e., true, idea of a substance, and nevertheless doubted whether such a substance existed, that would indeed be the same as if he were to say that he had a true idea, and nevertheless doubted whether it was false (as is evident to anyone who is sufficiently attentive). Or if someone maintains that a substance is created, he maintains at the same time that a false idea has become true. Of course nothing more absurd can be conceived. So it must be confessed that the existence of a substance, like its essence, is an eternal truth.

And from this we can infer in another way that there is only one [substance] of the same nature, which I have considered it worth the trouble of showing here. But to do this in order, it must be noted,

1. that the true definition of each thing neither involves nor expresses anything except the nature of the thing defined.

From which it follows,

18 The NS here has an interesting variation that Gebhardt does not note: "But the object of a true idea of substances can be nothing other than the substances themselves . . . ." Akkerman (2, 166) suggests that the translator wished to eliminate the abstract term "veritas" in favor of "vera idea," which had been discussed above (l. 8). A passage in the CMF/247(4-6) would seem to license the transformation, and that passage would have been fresh in Balling's mind if he did, as Akkerman thinks, translate E 1-H around 1663. Akkerman has shown that this kind of a freedom is characteristic of Balling's work as a translator, but not of Glazemaker's.

19 NS: "If someone maintains that a substance which was not, now begins to be."

Some translators have proposed emending the text so that it would be translated 'a true idea has become false.' Gebhardt rightly rejects the emendation, though his assumption that the NS translation shows that Spinoza twice wrote "a false idea has become true" is probably incorrect. The NS translator's gloss on the beginning of the sentence helps to bring out Spinoza's point. The idea that a substance is created implies that at one time it is false of the substance that it exists and that at a later time it has become true. This is absurd because it involves conceiving an eternal truth as a temporal one.

21 The remainder of this scholium closely parallels Letter 34, the main difference being that in the letter the argument is used to prove that there is only one God. The lost original was written in Dutch. Akkerman conjectures (2, 167-168), on the basis of a comparison of the OP version of P8S2, the NS version of P8S2, and the NS version of Letter 34, that Spinoza may have had Balling's translation of E I-II available to him when he wrote Letter 34 in 1666, and that he may have used it to help draft the letter. If this is right, it is somewhat surprising that Spinoza did not, in writing the letter, correct the NS's mistranslation of 'quod' as 'because' in l. 32.
II. that no definition involves or expresses any certain number of individuals, 1

since it expresses nothing other than the nature of the thing defined. E.g., the definition of the triangle expresses nothing but the simple nature of the triangle, but not any certain number of triangles. It is to be noted,

III. that there must be, for each existing thing, a certain cause on account of which it exists.

Finally, it is to be noted,

IV. that this cause, on account of which a thing exists, either must be contained in the very nature and definition of the existing thing (viz. that it pertains to its nature to exist) or must be outside it.

From these propositions it follows that if, in nature, a certain number of individuals exists, there must be a cause why those individuals, and why neither more nor fewer, exist.

For example, if 20 men exist in nature (to make the matter clearer, I assume that they exist at the same time, and that no others previously existed in nature), it will not be enough (i.e., to give a reason why 20 men exist) to show the cause of human nature in general; but it will be necessary in addition to show the cause why not more and not fewer than 20 exist. For (by III) there must necessarily be a cause why each [NS: particular man] exists. But this cause (by II and III) cannot be contained in human nature itself, since the true definition of man does not involve the number 20. So (by IV) the cause why these 20 men exist, and consequently, why each of them exists, must necessarily be outside each of them.

For that reason it is to be inferred absolutely that whatever is of such a nature that there can be many individuals [of that nature] must, to exist, have an external cause to exist. Now since it pertains to the nature of a substance to exist (by what we have already shown in this Scholium), 23 its definition must involve necessary existence, and consequently its existence must be inferred from its definition alone. But

[NPS: by individuals are understood particulars which belong under a genus.]

22 NS: "een stellige oorzaak/causa positiva," a positive cause. Perhaps, as Akkerman suggests (2, 163), this variation is to be accounted for as translator's license (cf. above at II/49/29). But it is interesting that the same variation occurs in Letter 34 (IV/179/29). If Akkermans theory (cf. above at II/50/21) is correct, then Spinors may have made the alteration in writing the letter, changed the NS version of P8S2 accordingly, but not taken the trouble (or remembered) to make the alteration in the Latin original.

23 NS: "at the beginning of this scholium."
from its definition (as we have shown from II and III) the existence of a number of substances cannot follow. Therefore it follows necessarily from this, that there exists only one of the same nature, as was proposed.

P9: *The more reality or being each thing has, the more attributes belong to it.*

Dem.: This is evident from D4.

P10: *Each attribute of a substance must be conceived through itself.*

Dem.: For an attribute is what the intellect perceives concerning a substance, as constituting its essence (by D4); so (by D3) it must be conceived through itself, q.e.d.

Schol.: From these propositions it is evident that although two attributes may be conceived to be really distinct (i.e., one may be conceived without the aid of the other), we still can not infer from that that they constitute two beings, or two different substances. For it is of the nature of a substance that each of its attributes is conceived through itself, since all the attributes it has have always been in it together, and one could not be produced by another, but each expresses the reality, or being of substance.

So it is far from absurd to attribute many attributes to one substance. Indeed, nothing in nature is clearer than that each being must be conceived under some attribute, and the more reality, or being it has, the more it has attributes which express necessity, or eternity, and infinity. And consequently there is also nothing clearer than that a being absolutely infinite must be defined (as we taught in D6) as a being that consists of infinite attributes, each of which expresses a certain eternal and infinite essence.

But if someone now asks by what sign we shall be able to distinguish the diversity of substances, let him read the following propositions, which show that in Nature there exists only one substance, and that it is absolutely infinite. So that sign would be sought in vain.

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24 The usual way of rendering this into English was challenged by Bennett, who argued that *constituere* should be rendered, not by 'constitute,' but by 'characterize.' Donagan (2) replied, with reference to EID4, that 'constitute' was correct, since it might be understood as elliptical for 'constitute the essence of.' My own view is that 'constitute' is defensible without our needing to regard it as elliptical, because of the tendency in both Descartes and Spinoza to identify substance and attribute. Cf. here Spinoza's note to IP7 of his *Descartes' Principles* (1/1635). It is true that even here Spinoza uses language apt to suggest that the attributes are properties of substance and distinct from it. But in the end I think that is only misleading.

25 NS: "a certain kind of essence, which is eternal and infinite." Gebhardt conjectures that the variation reflects the existence of an earlier draft, Akkerman (2, 163), a free translation.
ETHICS

P11: God, or a substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses eternal and infinite essence, necessarily exists.

Dem.: If you deny this, conceive, if you can, that God does not exist. Therefore (by A7) his essence does not involve existence. But this (by P7) is absurd. Therefore God necessarily exists, q.e.d.

Alternatively: For each thing there must be assigned a cause, or reason, as much for its existence as for its nonexistence. For example, if a triangle exists, there must be a reason or cause why it exists; but if it does not exist, there must also be a reason or cause which prevents it from existing, or which takes its existence away.

But this reason, or cause, must either be contained in the nature of the thing, or be outside it. E.g., the very nature of a square circle indicates the reason why it does not exist, viz. because it involves a contradiction. On the other hand, the reason why a substance exists also follows from its nature alone, because it involves existence (see P7). But the reason why a circle or triangle exists, or why it does not exist, does not follow from the nature of these things, but from the order of the whole of corporeal Nature. For from this [order] it must follow either that the triangle necessarily exists now or that it is impossible for it to exist now.26

These things are evident through themselves, but from them it follows that a thing necessarily exists if there is no reason or cause which prevents it from existing. Therefore, if there is no reason or cause which prevents God from existing, or which takes his existence away, it must certainly be inferred that he necessarily exists.

But if there were such a reason, or cause, it would have to be either in God's very nature or outside it, i.e., in another substance of another nature. For if it were of the same nature, that very supposition would concede that God exists. But a substance which was of another nature [NS: than the divine] would have nothing in common with God (by P2), and therefore could neither give him existence nor take it away.27

Since, then, there can be, outside the divine nature, no reason, or, cause which takes away the divine existence, the reason will necessarily have to be in his nature itself, if indeed he does not exist. That is, his nature would involve a contradiction [NS: as in our second Example]. But it is absurd to affirm this of a Being absolutely infinite and supremely perfect. Therefore, there is no cause, or reason, either

26 The NS omits "now" in both cases.
27 Gebhardt, following the OP, reads habere in l. 19, i.e.: 'a substance of another nature could have nothing in common with God.' But the NS suggests that we should read haberet.
in God or outside God, which takes his existence away. And therefore, God necessarily exists, q.e.d.

Alternatively: To be able not to exist is to lack power, and conversely, to be able to exist is to have power\(^{28}\) (as is known through itself). So, if what now necessarily exists are only finite beings, then finite beings are more powerful than an absolutely infinite Being. But this, as is known through itself, is absurd. So, either nothing exists or an absolutely infinite Being also exists. But we exist, either in ourselves, or in something else, which necessarily exists (see A1 and P7). Therefore an absolutely infinite Being—i.e. (by D6), God—necessarily exists, q.e.d.

Schol.: In this last demonstration I wanted to show God’s existence a posteriori, so that the demonstration would be perceived more easily—but not because God’s existence does not follow a priori from the same foundation. For since being able to exist is power, it follows that the more reality belongs to the nature of a thing, the more powers it has, of itself, to exist. Therefore, an absolutely infinite Being, or God, has, of himself, an absolutely infinite power of existing. For that reason, he exists absolutely.

Still, there may be many who will not easily be able to see how evident this demonstration is, because they have been accustomed to contemplate only those things that flow from external causes. And of these, they see that those which quickly come to be, i.e., which easily exist,\(^{29}\) also easily perish. And conversely, they judge that those things to which they conceive more things to pertain are more difficult to do, i.e., that they do not exist so easily.\(^{30}\) But to free them from these prejudices, I have no need to show here in what manner this proposition—what quickly comes to be, quickly perishes—is true, nor whether or

\(^{28}\) OP: “Posse non existere impotentia est, & contra posse existere potenter est.” Some earlier translators thought this should read: “Non posse existere . . .” (e.g., White: “Inability to exist . . .”). Meijer: “Niet te kunnen bestaan . . .”). Gebhardt pointed out that the NS confirm the OP: “Te kunnen niet zijn/Non existereis wederijck onvormogen: in tegendeel, te kunnen zijn/Existeren is vermogen.” But since some persist in amending the text (e.g., Chilois, “Ne pouvoir exister . . .”) it is worth observing that this makes nonsense of the following argument. Spinoza wishes to compare the power of what can exist (but cannot not exist) with the power of finite existents which (since they do in fact exist) must be able to exist, but which are also able not to exist.

Admittedly, Spinoza makes his point (that being able not to exist is not a sign of power) somewhat more difficult to grasp by speaking in the next sentence of “what . . . necessarily exists,” which may suggest that these finite beings are not able not to exist. But Spinoza does not mean that their existence is an eternal truth. Considered in themselves, they are able not to exist. It is only when they are considered in relation to an external cause that their existence is necessary. This is the force of speaking of “what now necessarily exists.” As at 539-10, the NS omits the “now.”

\(^{29}\) NS: “which are easily able to exist.”  
\(^{30}\) NS: “are not so easily able to exist.”
not all things are equally easy in respect to the whole of Nature. It is sufficient to note only this, that I am not here speaking of things that come to be from external causes, but only of substances that (by P6) can be produced by no external cause.

For things that come to be from external causes—whether they consist of many parts or of few—owe all the perfection or reality they have to the power of the external cause; and therefore their existence arises only from the perfection of their external cause, and not from their own perfection. On the other hand, whatever perfection substance has is not owed to any external cause. So its existence must follow from its nature alone; hence its existence is nothing but its essence.

Perfection, therefore, does not take away the existence of a thing, but on the contrary asserts it. But imperfection takes it away. So there is nothing of whose existence we can be more certain than we are of the existence of an absolutely infinite, or perfect, Being—i.e., God. For since his essence excludes all imperfection, and involves absolute perfection, by that very fact it takes away every cause of doubting his existence, and gives the greatest certainty concerning it. I believe this will be clear even to those who are only moderately attentive.

P12: No attribute of a substance can be truly conceived from which it follows that the substance can be divided.

Dem.: For the parts into which a substance so conceived would be divided either will retain the nature of the substance or will not. If the first [NS: viz. they retain the nature of the substance], then (by P8) each part will have to be infinite, and (by P7) its own cause, and (by P5) each part will have to consist of a different attribute. And so many substances will be able to be formed from one, which is absurd (by P6). Furthermore, the parts (by P2) would have nothing in common with their whole, and the whole (by D4 and P10) could both be and be conceived without its parts, which is absurd, as no one will be able to doubt.

But if the second is asserted, viz. that the parts will not retain the nature of substance, then since the whole substance would be divided into equal parts, it would lose the nature of substance, and would cease to be, which (by P7) is absurd.

Following Meijer: Both the OP and the NS have P6. But Gebhardt's argument that this must be right is unconvincing. The apparently gratuitous assumption that the parts would be equal has prompted various emendations. Gebhardt is probably right to suggest that Spinosa assumes that if substance can be conceived to be divided at all, then it can be conceived to be divided into equal parts. So the case of an equal division is the only one that need be considered.
P13: A substance which is absolutely infinite is indivisible.

Dem.: For if it were divisible, the parts into which it would be divided will either retain the nature of an absolutely infinite substance or they will not. If the first, then there will be a number of substances of the same nature, which (by P5) is absurd. But if the second is asserted, then (as above [NS: P12]), an absolutely infinite substance will be able to cease to be, which (by P11) is also absurd.

Cor.: From these [propositions] it follows that no substance, and consequently no corporeal substance, insofar as it is a substance, is divisible.

Schol.: That substance is indivisible, is understood more simply merely from this, that the nature of substance cannot be conceived unless as infinite, and that by a part of substance nothing can be understood except a finite substance, which (by P8) implies a plain contradiction.

P14: Except God, no substance can be or be conceived.

Dem.: Since God is an absolutely infinite being, of whom no attribute which expresses an essence of substance can be denied (by D6), and he necessarily exists (by P11), if there were any substance except God, it would have to be explained through some attribute of God, and so two substances of the same attribute would exist, which (by P5) is absurd. And so except God, no substance can be or, consequently, be conceived. For if it could be conceived, it would have to be conceived as existing. But this (by the first part of this demonstration) is absurd. Therefore, except for God no substance can be or be conceived, q.e.d.

Cor. 1: From this it follows most clearly, first, that God is unique, i.e. (by D6), that in Nature there is only one substance, and that it is absolutely infinite (as we indicated in P10S).

Cor. 2: It follows, second, that an extended thing and a thinking thing are either attributes of God, or (by A1) affections of God's attributes.

P15: Whatever is, is in God, and nothing can be or be conceived without God.

Dem.: Except for God, there neither is, nor can be conceived, any substance (by P14), i.e. (by D3), thing that is in itself and is conceived through itself. But modes (by D5) can neither be nor be conceived without substance. So they can be in the divine nature alone, and can be conceived through it alone. But except for substances and modes there is nothing (by A1). Therefore, [NS: everything is in God and] nothing can be or be conceived without God, q.e.d.

NS: "insofar as one conceives it as substance."

On the propriety of applying this term to God, see Gueroult 1, 1:156-158.
ETHICS

Schol.: [I.] There are those who feign a God, like man, consisting of a body and a mind, and subject to passions. But how far they wander from the true knowledge of God, is sufficiently established by what has already been demonstrated. Them I dismiss. For everyone who has to any extent contemplated the divine nature denies that God is corporeal. They prove this best from the fact that by body we understand any quantity, with length, breadth, and depth, limited by some certain figure. Nothing more absurd than this can be said of God, viz. of a being absolutely infinite.

But meanwhile, by the other arguments by which they strive to demonstrate this same conclusion they clearly show that they entirely remove corporeal, or extended, substance itself from the divine nature. And they maintain that it has been created by God. But by what divine power could it be created? They are completely ignorant of that. And this shows clearly that they do not understand what they themselves say.

At any rate, I have demonstrated clearly enough—in my judgment, at least—that no substance can be produced or created by any other (see P6C and P8S2). Next, we have shown (P14) that except for God, no substance can either be or be conceived, and hence [in P14C2] we have concluded that extended substance is one of God’s infinite attributes. But to provide a fuller explanation, I shall refute my opponents’ arguments, which all reduce to these.

[II.] First, they think that corporeal substance, insofar as it is substance, consists of parts. And therefore they deny that it can be infinite, and consequently, that it can pertain to God. They explain this by many examples, of which I shall mention one or two.38

38 Wolfson’s discussion of the historical background of this scholium (1, 1:262-295) is instructive, provided it is read cautiously. It should be stressed that the main theme of the scholium is the defense of the doctrine that extended substance is an attribute of God; that extended substance is infinite is a subordinate theme, relating only to the first objection Spinoza discusses (sections II, IV, and V), not to the second (sections III and VI). See also Letter 12 and Gueroult’s discussion of it in Greene.
THE METAPHYSICAL MORALIST

[i] If corporeal substance is infinite, they say, let us conceive it to be divided in two parts. Each part will be either finite or infinite. If the former, then an infinite is composed of two finite parts, which is absurd. If the latter [NS: i.e., if each part is infinite], then there is one infinite twice as large as another, which is also absurd. [ii] Again, if an infinite quantity is measured by parts [each] equal to a foot, it will consist of infinitely many such parts, as it will also, if it is measured by parts [each] equal to an inch. And therefore, one infinite number will be twelve times greater than another [NS: which is no less absurd]. [iii] Finally, if we conceive that from one point of a certain infinite quantity two lines, say AB and AC, are extended to infinity, it is certain that, although in the beginning they are a certain, determinate distance apart, the distance between B and C is continuously increased, and at last, from being determinate, it will become indeterminable. Since these absurdities follow—so they think—from the fact that an infinite quantity is supposed, they infer that corporeal substance must be finite, and consequently cannot pertain to God's essence.

[III.] Their second argument is also drawn from God's supreme perfection. For God, they say, since he is a supremely perfect being, cannot be acted on. But corporeal substance, since it is divisible, can be acted on. It follows, therefore, that it does not pertain to God's essence.

[IV.] These are the arguments which I find authors using, to try to show that corporeal substance is unworthy of the divine nature, and cannot pertain to it. But anyone who is properly attentive will find that I have already replied to them, since these arguments are founded only on their supposition that corporeal substance is composed of parts, which I have already (P12 and P13C) shown to be absurd. And then anyone who wishes to consider the matter rightly will see that all those absurdities (if indeed they are all absurd, which I am not now disputing), from which they wish to infer that extended substance is finite, do the form in which Spinoza undertakes to refute them. For Descartes' attempt at compromise, see Principles of Philosophy I, 26-27. On the whole issue, see Koyré 1.

39 This argument seems to require that the division be into two equal parts. Probably it is taken for granted that if any division is possible, division into equal parts is possible (cf. P12D).

40 Descartes is generally identified as the opponent here (cf. Principles 1, 23). Wolston's argument to the contrary (1, 1:268) is unconvincing, but it is fair to say that Spinoza's version of the Cartesian argument in Descartes' Principles (IP16, I176-177) is closer to what Descartes actually says than the argument given here. Descartes gives no reason for saying that divisibility involves imperfection. The objection Spinoza considers here makes it an imperfection because it entails the possibility of being acted on.
not follow at all from the fact that an infinite quantity is supposed, but from the fact that they suppose an infinite quantity to be measurable and composed of finite parts. So from the absurdities which follow from that they can infer only that infinite quantity is not measurable, and that it is not composed of finite parts. This is the same thing we have already demonstrated above (P12, etc.). So the weapon they aim at us, they really turn against themselves.

If, therefore, they still wish to infer from this absurdity of theirs that extended substance must be finite, they are indeed doing nothing more than if someone feigned that a circle has the properties of a square, and inferred from that the circle has no center, from which all lines drawn to the circumference are equal. For corporeal substance, which cannot be conceived except as infinite, unique, and indivisible (see P8, 5 and 12), they conceive to be composed of finite parts, to be many, and to be divisible, in order to infer that it is finite.

So also others, after they feign that a line is composed of points, know how to invent many arguments, by which they show that a line cannot be divided to infinity. And indeed it is no less absurd to assert that corporeal substance is composed of bodies, or parts, than that a body is composed of surfaces, the surfaces of lines, and the lines, finally, of points.

All those who know that clear reason is infallible must confess this—particularly those who deny that there is a vacuum. For if corporeal substance could be so divided that its parts were really distinct, why, then, could one part not be annihilated, the rest remaining connected with one another as before? And why must they all be so fitted together that there is no vacuum? Truly, of things which are really distinct from one another, one can be, and remain in its condition, without the other. Since, therefore, there is no vacuum in nature (a subject I discuss elsewhere), but all its parts must so concur that there is no vacuum, it follows also that they cannot be really distinguished, i.e., that corporeal substance, insofar as it is a substance, cannot be divided.

[V.] If someone should now ask why we are, by nature, so inclined to divide quantity, I shall answer that we conceive quantity in two ways: abstractly, or superficially, as we [NS: commonly] imagine it,

41 OP: *de quo alias*. This is not specific as to time, but Appuhn is probably right to see a reference here to Descartes' *Principles* (1/188), since the topic is not mentioned again in the *Ethics*. Gueroult (1, 1:216) casts doubt on this, but on the inaccurate ground that *Descartes' Principles* is nothing more than an exposition of a philosophy Spinoza rejects. Spinoza certainly regards some of the arguments of that work as sound. Cf. E IP19S.

42 NS: "abstracted from matter." The phrases incorporated from the NS in this sentence are perhaps no more than examples of translator's liberties.
or as substance, which is done by the intellect alone [NS: without the help of the imagination]. So if we attend to quantity as it is in the imagination, which we do often and more easily, it will be found to be finite, divisible, and composed of parts; but if we attend to it as it is in the intellect, and conceive it insofar as it is a substance, which happens [NS: seldom and] with great difficulty, then (as we have already sufficiently demonstrated) it will be found to be infinite, unique, and indivisible.

This will be sufficiently plain to everyone who knows how to distinguish between the intellect and the imagination—particularly if it is also noted that matter is everywhere the same, and that parts are distinguished in it only insofar as we conceive matter to be affected in different ways, so that its parts are distinguished only modally, but not really.

For example, we conceive that water is divided and its parts separated from one another—insofar as it is water, but not insofar as it is corporeal substance. For insofar as it is substance, it is neither separated nor divided. Again, water, insofar as it is water, is generated and corrupted, but insofar as it is substance, it is neither generated nor corrupted.

[VI.] And with this I think I have replied to the second argument also, since it is based on the supposition that matter, insofar as it is substance, is divisible, and composed of parts. Even if this [reply] were not [sufficient], I do not know why [divisibility] would be unworthy of the divine nature. For (by P14) apart from God there can be no substance by which [the divine nature] would be acted on. All things, I say, are in God, and all things that happen, happen only through the laws of God's infinite nature and follow (as I shall show) from the necessity of his essence. So it cannot be said in any way that God is acted on by another, or that extended substance is unworthy of the divine nature, even if it is supposed to be divisible, so long as it is granted to be eternal and infinite. But enough of this for the present.

P16: From the necessity of the divine nature there must follow infinitely many things in infinitely many modes, i.e., everything which can fall under an infinite intellect.

\[^1\] It is unclear whether \textit{modus} should be translated here as a technical term (Appuhn, Caillois), or as a nontechnical one (White, Elves, Meijer, and Auerbach). The NS cannot resolve this since they use \textit{wijz} both for technical and nontechnical uses of \textit{modus}; but they do give the Latin in the margin, which suggests that they took it as a technical term. Gueroult (1, 1:260) suggests that it may be translated either way. For a context where the policy adopted here seems awkward, see II P18.

\[^2\] NS: "that can be conceived by an infinite intellect." Similarly at II. 29-30, and 32-
ETHICS

20 Dem.: This Proposition must be plain to anyone, provided he attends to the fact that the intellect infers from the given definition of any thing a number of properties that really do follow necessarily from it (i.e., from the very essence of the thing), and that it infers more properties the more the definition of the thing expresses reality, i.e., the more reality the essence of the defined thing involves. But since the divine nature has absolutely infinite attributes (by D6), each of which also expresses an essence infinite in its own kind, from its necessity there must follow infinitely many things in infinite modes (i.e., everything which can fall under an infinite intellect), q.e.d.

Cor. 1: From this it follows that God is the efficient cause of all things which can fall under an infinite intellect.

II/61 Cor. 2: It follows, secondly, that God is a cause through himself and not an accidental cause.45

Cor. 3: It follows, thirdly, that God is absolutely the first cause.

5 P17: God acts from the laws of his nature alone, and is compelled by no one.

Dem.: We have just shown (P16) that from the necessity of the divine nature alone, or (what is the same thing) from the laws of his nature alone, absolutely infinite things follow, and in P15 we have demonstrated that nothing can be or be conceived without God, but that all things are in God. So there can be nothing outside him by which he is determined or compelled to act. Therefore, God acts from the laws of his nature alone, and is compelled by no one, q.e.d.

Cor. 1: From this it follows, first, that there is no cause, either extrinsically or intrinsically, which prompts God to action, except the perfection of his nature.46

Cor. 2: It follows, secondly, that God alone is a free cause. For God alone exists only from the necessity of his nature (by P11 and P14C1), and acts from the necessity of his nature (by P17). Therefore (by D7) God alone is a free cause, q.e.d.

Schol.: [I.] Others47 think that God is a free cause because he can (so they think) bring it about that the things which we have said follow from his nature (i.e., which are in his power) do not happen or are not produced by him. But this is the same as if they were to say that God

33. The NS's indefinite article is confirmed by the OP when Spinoza refers back to this proposition at II/83/31-32.

45 On this corollary, cf. Wolfson 1, 1:307, with Gueroult 1, 1:253.

46 Instead of "except the perfection of his nature," the NS have: "but he is only an efficient cause from the force of his perfection." Gebhardt adds this to the text, creating a certain redundancy. This is probably a translator's gloss, rather than a passage omitted in revision.

47 On the medieval background of this scholium see Wolfson 1, 1:308-319, and Gueroult 1, 1:272-295.

425
THE METAPHYSICAL MORALIST

can bring it about that it would not follow from the nature of a triangle that its three angles are equal to two right angles; or that from a given
cause the effect would not follow—which is absurd.

Further, I shall show later, without the aid of this Proposition, that neither intellect nor will pertain to God's nature. Of course I know there are many who think they can demonstrate that a supreme intellect and a free will pertain to God's nature. For they say they know nothing they can ascribe to God more perfect than what is the highest perfection in us.

Moreover, even if they conceive God to actually understand in the highest degree, they still do not believe that he can bring it about that all the things he actually understands exist. For they think that in that way they would destroy God's power. If he had created all the things in his intellect (they say), then he would have been able to create nothing more, which they believe to be incompatible with God's omnipotence. So they preferred to maintain that God is indifferent to all things, not creating anything except what he has decreed to create by some absolute will.

But I think I have shown clearly enough (see P16) that from God's supreme power, or infinite nature, infinitely many things in infinitely many modes, i.e., all things, have necessarily flowed, or always follow, by the same necessity and in the same way as from the nature of a triangle it follows, from eternity and to eternity, that its three angles are equal to two right angles. So God's omnipotence has been actual from eternity and will remain in the same actuality to eternity. And in this way, at least in my opinion, God's omnipotence is maintained far more perfectly.

Indeed—to speak openly—my opponents seem to deny God's omnipotence. For they are forced to confess that God understands infinitely many creatable things, which nevertheless he will never be able to create. For otherwise, if he created everything he understood [NS: to be creatable] he would (according to them) exhaust his omnipotence and render himself imperfect. Therefore to maintain that God is perfect, they are driven to maintain at the same time that he cannot bring about everything to which his power extends. I do not see what could be feigned which would be more absurd than this or more contrary to God's omnipotence.

[II.] Further—to say something here also about the intellect and will which we commonly attribute to God—if will and intellect do pertain to the eternal essence of God, we must of course understand by each

* The NS here adds a gloss on "omnipotence": "through which he is said to be able to do everything."

* It must be emphasized that Spinoza does not himself think that either intellect or

426
ETHICS

of these attributes something different from what men commonly understand. For the intellect and will which would constitute God’s essence would have to differ entirely from our intellect and will, and could not agree with them in anything except the name. They would not agree with one another any more than do the dog that is a heavenly constellation and the dog that is a barking animal. I shall demonstrate this.

If intellect pertains to the divine nature, it will not be able to be (like our intellect) by nature either posterior to (as most would have it), or simultaneous with, the things understood, since God is prior in causality to all things (by P16C1). On the contrary, the truth and formal essence of things is what it is because it exists objectively in that way in God’s intellect. So God’s intellect, insofar as it is conceived to constitute God’s essence, is really the cause both of the essence and of the existence of things. This seems also to have been noticed by those who asserted that God’s intellect, will and power are one and the same.

Therefore, since God’s intellect is the only cause of things (viz. as we have shown, both of their essence and of their existence), he must necessarily differ from them both as to his essence and as to his existence. For what is caused differs from its cause precisely in what it has from the cause [NS: for that reason it is called the effect of such a cause]. E.g., a man is the cause of the existence of another man, but not of his essence, for the latter is an eternal truth. Hence, they can agree entirely according to their essence. But in existing they must differ. And for that reason, if the existence of one perishes, the other’s existence will not thereby perish. But if the essence of one could be destroyed, and become false, the other’s essence would also be destroyed [NS: and become false].

So the thing that is the cause both of the essence and of the existence of some effect, must differ from such an effect, both as to its essence and as to its existence. But God’s intellect is the cause both of the essence and of the existence of our intellect. Therefore, God’s intellect, insofar as it is conceived to constitute the divine essence, differs from our intellect both as to its essence and as to its existence,

will should be ascribed to the essence of God (cf. P31). He is only discussing here what follows from a common view. This has been widely misunderstood. See Gueroult 1, 1:277-282.

50 The NS has, for the final clause: “because God’s intellect has conceived [things] as they really are.” This is no doubt a translator’s gloss, and not a very happy one, since it seems to cancel the text’s claim that God’s intellect is prior to the things understood.

51 This passage is extremely puzzling, since it seems to contradict A5. Cf. Gueroult 1, 1:286-295.
and cannot agree with it in anything except in name, as we supposed. The proof proceeds in the same way concerning the will, as anyone can easily see.

P18: God is the immanent, not the transitive, cause of all things.

Dem.: Everything that is, is in God, and must be conceived through God (by P15), and so (by P16C1) God is the cause of [NS: all] things, which are in him. That is the first [thing to be proven]. And then outside God there can be no substance (by P14), i.e. (by D3), thing which is in itself outside God. That was the second. God, therefore, is the immanent, not the transitive cause of all things, q.e.d.

P19: God is eternal, or all God's attributes are eternal.

Dem.: For God (by D6) is substance, which (by P11) necessarily exists, i.e. (by P7), to whose nature it pertains to exist, or (what is the same) from whose definition it follows that he exists; and therefore (by D8), he is eternal.

Next, by God's attributes are to be understood what (by D4) expresses an essence of the Divine substance, i.e., what pertains to substance. The attributes themselves, I say, must involve it itself. But eternity pertains to the nature of substance (as I have already demonstrated from P7). Therefore each of the attributes must involve eternity, and so, they are all eternal, q.e.d.

Schol.: This Proposition is also as clear as possible from the way I have demonstrated God's existence (P11). For from that demonstration, I say, it is established that God's existence, like his essence, is an eternal truth. And then I have also demonstrated God's eternity in another way (Descartes' Principles IP19), and there is no need to repeat it here.

P20: God's existence and his essence are one and the same.

Dem.: God (by P19) and all of his attributes are eternal, i.e. (by D8), each of his attributes expresses existence. Therefore, the same attributes of God which (by D4) explain God's eternal essence at the same time explain his eternal existence, i.e., that itself which constitutes God's essence at the same time constitutes his existence. So his existence and his essence are one and the same, q.e.d.

Cor. 1: From this it follows, first, that God's existence, like his essence, is an eternal truth.

Cor. 2: It follows, secondly, that God, or all of God's attributes, are...
ETHICS

immutable. For if they changed as to their existence, they would also (by P20) change as to their essence, i.e. (as is known through itself), from being true become false, which is absurd.

P21: All the things which follow from the absolute nature of any of God's attributes have always³³ had to exist and be infinite, or are, through the same attribute, eternal and infinite.

Dem.: If you deny this, then conceive (if you can) that in some attribute of God there follows from its absolute nature something that is finite and has a determinate existence, or duration, e.g., God's idea⁴⁴ in thought. Now since thought is supposed to be an attribute of God, it is necessarily (by P11) infinite by its nature. But insofar as it has God's idea, [thought] is supposed to be finite. But (by D2) [thought] cannot be conceived to be finite unless it is determined through thought itself. But [thought can] not [be determined] through thought itself, insofar as it constitutes God's idea, for to that extent [thought] is supposed to be finite. Therefore, [thought must be determined] through thought insofar as it does not constitute God's idea, which [thought] nevertheless (by P11) must necessarily exist. Therefore, there is thought⁵⁵ which does not constitute God's idea, and on that account God's idea does not follow necessarily from the nature [of this thought] insofar as it is absolute thought (for [thought] is conceived both as constituting God's idea and as not constituting it). [That God's idea does not follow from thought, insofar as it is absolute thought] is contrary to the hypothesis. So if God's idea in thought, or anything else in any attribute of God (for it does not matter what example is taken, since the dem-

³³ It is sometimes suggested that it is inappropriate for Spinoza to characterize any mode (even an infinite one) as eternal, and so the use of temporal language here has been taken to show that the infinite modes exist at all times, but not (strictly speaking) eternally. Cf. for example, Appuhn, 1:347; Wolfson 1, 1:376-377; Curley 3, 107 and 116; and Donagan 3.

⁴⁴ OP: idea Dei; NS: bet denkbeelt van God (but at 1.21, and subsequently, Gods denkbeelt). The idea of God referred to here is generally taken to be, not the idea of God existing as a finite mode of thought in, say, some human mind, but the (infinite) idea which God has (cf. HP3 and P7), and hence an infinite mode. I use “God's idea” and “the idea of God” to mark the distinction between the subjective and objective readings of idea Dei. But it must be understood that it is often very uncertain which meaning is intended.

There is disagreement as to whether God's idea should be regarded as an immediate infinite mode (Wolfson 1, 1:238ff.; Gueroult 1, 1:314ff.) or a mediate infinite mode (Pollock, 176; Joachim 1, 94). It must be realized that any interpretation of Spinoza's doctrine of infinite modes has very little evidence to work from. For example, it is usually thought that there will be one immediate infinite mode and one mediate infinite mode for each attribute. But in none of the scanty references in the Ethics (IP21-23), the Short Treatise (1, 8, 9) and the Correspondence (Letter 64) is this actually stated.

⁵⁵ The NS has an indefinite article here, but deletes it in the errata. Two lines later it has “an absolute thought,” which is left unaltered.

429
onstration is universal), follows from the necessity of the absolute na-
vature of the attribute itself, it must necessarily be infinite. This was the
first thing to be proven.

Next, what follows in this way from the necessity of the nature of
any attribute cannot have a determinate [NS: existence, or] duration.
For if you deny this, then suppose there is, in some attribute of God,
a thing which follows from the necessity of the nature of that attri-
bute—e.g., God's idea in thought—and suppose that at some time [this
idea] did not exist or will not exist. But since thought is supposed to
be an attribute of God, it must exist necessarily and be immutable66 (by
P11 and P20C2). So beyond the limits of the duration of God's idea
(for it is supposed that at some time [this idea] did not exist or will
not exist) thought will have to exist without God's idea. But this is
contrary to the hypothesis, for it is supposed that God's idea follows
necessarily from the given thought. Therefore, God's idea in thought,
or anything else which follows necessarily from the absolute nature of
some attribute of God, cannot have a determinate duration, but through
the same attribute is eternal. This was the second thing [NS: to be
proven]. Note that the same is to be affirmed of any thing which, in
some attribute of God, follows necessarily from God's absolute nature.

P22: Whatever follows from some attribute of God insofar as it is modified by
a modification which, through the same attribute, exists necessarily and is
infinite, must also exist necessarily and be infinite.57

Dem.: The demonstration of this proposition proceeds in the same
way as the demonstration of the preceding one.

P23: Every mode which exists necessarily and is infinite has necessarily had to
follow either from the absolute nature of some attribute of God, or from some
attribute, modified by a modification which exists necessarily and is infinite.

Dem.: For a mode is in another, through which it must be con-
ceived (by D5), i.e. (by P15), it is in God alone, and can be conceived
through God alone. So if a mode is conceived to exist necessarily and
be infinite, [its necessary existence and infinitude] must necessarily be
inferred, or perceived through some attribute of God, insofar as that
attribute is conceived to express infinity and necessity of existence, or
(what is the same, by D8) eternity, i.e. (by D6 and P19), insofar as it

56 NS: "It must be necessarily and eternally immutable."
57 NS: "Whatever follows from one of God's attributes, insofar as it is affected with
a mode that by the power of that attribute is infinite and eternal, must also be neces-
sarily eternal and infinite." Akkerman thinks it possible that Spinoza altered the text
slightly after it had been translated, but equally possible that Balling is being free with
the text (licensed by the equation of eternity and necessary existence in ID8, cf. 1/67/4).
Backward references to IP22 vary, cf. 69/21-22 with 94/26.
is considered absolutely. Therefore, the mode, which exists necessarily and is infinite, has had to follow from the absolute nature of some attribute of God—either immediately (see P21) or by some mediating modification, which follows from its absolute nature, i.e. (by P22), which exists necessarily and is infinite, q.e.d.

P24: The essence of things produced by God does not involve existence.
Dem.: This is evident from D1. For that whose nature involves existence (considered in itself), is its own cause, and exists only from the necessity of its nature.
Cor.: From this it follows that God is not only the cause of things' beginning to exist, but also of their persevering in existing, or (to use a Scholastic term) God is the cause of the being of things. For—whether the things [NS: produced] exist or not—so long as we attend to their essence, we shall find that it involves neither existence nor duration. So their essence can be the cause neither of their existence nor of their duration, but only God, to whose nature alone it pertains to exist [can be the cause] (by P14C1).

P25: God is the efficient cause, not only of the existence of things, but also of their essence.
Dem.: If you deny this, then God is not the cause of the essence of things; and so (by A4) the essence of things can be conceived without God. But (by P15) this is absurd. Therefore God is also the cause of the essence of things, q.e.d.
Schol.: This Proposition follows more clearly from P16. For from that it follows that from the given divine nature both the essence of things and their existence must necessarily be inferred; and in a word, God must be called the cause of all things in the same sense in which he is called the cause of himself. This will be established still more clearly from the following corollary.
Cor.: Particular things are nothing but affections of God's attributes, or modes by which God's attributes are expressed in a certain and determinate way. The demonstration is evident from P15 and D5.

P26: A thing which has been determined to produce an effect has necessarily been determined in this way by God; and one which has not been determined by God cannot determine itself to produce an effect.
Dem.: That through which things are said to be determined to produce an effect must be something positive (as is known through itself). And so, God, from the necessity of his nature, is the efficient cause both of its essence and of its existence (by P25 & 16); this was the first thing. And from it the second thing asserted also follows very clearly.
THE METAPHYSICAL MORALIST

For if a thing which has not been determined by God could determine itself, the first part of this [NS: proposition] would be false, which is absurd, as we have shown.

P27: A thing which has been determined by God to produce an effect, cannot render itself undetermined.

Dem.: This proposition is evident from A3.

P28: Every singular thing, or any thing which is finite and has a determinate existence, can neither exist nor be determined to produce an effect unless it is determined to exist and produce an effect by another cause, which is also finite and has a determinate existence; and again, this cause also can neither exist nor be determined to produce an effect unless it is determined to exist and produce an effect by another, which is also finite and has a determinate existence, and so on, to infinity.

Dem.: Whatever has been determined to exist and produce an effect has been so determined by God (by P26 and P24C). But what is finite and has a determinate existence could not have been produced by the absolute nature of an attribute of God; for whatever follows from the absolute nature of an attribute of God is eternal and infinite (by P21). It had, therefore, to follow either from God or from an attribute of God insofar as it is considered to be affected by some mode. For there is nothing except substance and its modes (by A1, D3, and D5) and modes (by P25C) are nothing but affections of God’s attributes. But it also could not follow from God, or from an attribute of God, insofar as it is affected by a modification which is eternal and infinite (by P22). It had, therefore, to follow from, or be determined to exist and produce an effect by God or an attribute of God insofar as it is modified by a modification which is finite and has a determinate existence. This was the first thing to be proven.

And in turn, this cause, or this mode (by the same reasoning by which we have already demonstrated the first part of this proposition) had also to be determined by another, which is also finite and has a determinate existence; and again, this last (by the same reasoning) by another, and so always (by the same reasoning) to infinity, q.e.d.

Schol.: Since certain things had to be produced by God immediately, viz. those which follow necessarily from his absolute nature,

Many commentators have wondered how the finite causality affirmed here could be consistent with the divine causality affirmed in P26 and P27. Idealist interpreters have tended to treat finite causality, and indeed, the very existence of the finite in Spinoza, as an illusion (cf. Joachim 1, 98-122), though Harris (1, 57-69) is an exception. For a realist interpretation see Carley 3, chap. 2. The criticism of this in Harris (2) seems to me to involve a confusion of epistemological issues with metaphysical ones.
ETHICS

and others (which nevertheless can neither be nor be conceived without God) had to be produced by the mediation of these first things,\(^9\) it follows:

I. That God is absolutely the proximate cause of the things produced immediately by him, and not [a proximate cause] in his own kind, as they say.\(^{60}\) For God's effects can neither be nor be conceived without their cause (by P15 and P24C).

II. That God cannot properly be called the remote cause of singular things, except perhaps so that we may distinguish them from those things that he has produced immediately, or rather, that follow from his absolute nature. For by a remote cause we understand one which is not conjoined in any way with its effect. But all things that are, are in God, and so depend on God that they can neither be nor be conceived without him.

P29: In nature there is nothing contingent, but all things have been determined from the necessity of the divine nature to exist and produce an effect in a certain way.

Dem.: Whatever is, is in God (by P15); but God cannot be called a contingent thing. For (by P11) he exists necessarily, not contingently. Next, the modes of the divine nature have also followed from it necessarily and not contingently (by P16)—either insofar as the divine nature is considered absolutely (by P21) or insofar as it is considered to be determined to act in a certain way (by P28).\(^{61}\) Further, God is the cause of these modes not only insofar as they simply exist (by P24C), but also (by P26) insofar as they are considered to be determined to produce an effect. For if they have not been determined by

\(^9\) The text of the OP is corrupt in this sentence. Gebhardt rightly emends on the basis of the NS (though it would be better Latin to supply et quandum). Even with the emendation, however, this scholium is open to various interpretations. Some have taken "certain things" to refer to the immediate infinite modes of P21 and "others" to refer to the mediate infinite modes of P22 (Gebhardt, II/352-353; Wolfson, 1, 1:390). Others (Gueroult 1, 1:342; Curley 3, 70-71) take "certain things" to refer to all the infinite modes, and "others" to refer to the finite modes. In favor of the latter interpretation (which is certainly not the most natural without reflection) it may be pointed out that (a) Spinoza's own gloss on "things produced immediately by God" is "things which follow from his absolute nature" (which applies to all the infinite modes), (b) at II. 11-12 he apparently regards the latter phrase as more accurate, and (c) this reading is confirmed by the Short Treatise I/16, 118. The point of "nevertheless" (in I. 4) is that although the finite modes are produced by other finite modes, and do not follow from the absolute nature of God, they do still depend on him (i.e., he is not their remote cause in the sense given to that term at II. 13-14).

\(^{60}\) Gueroult's explanation (1, 1:255n) of Heereboom's use of the terms "proximate" and "remote" seems helpful in understanding this passage. See the Glossary-Index.

\(^{61}\) OP, NS: P27. Gebhardt defends that reading against Meijer's proposal to read P22, but Gueroult's suggestion (1, 1:343) that we should read P28 seems right.
God, then (by P26) it is impossible, not contingent, that they should
determine themselves. Conversely (by P27) if they have been deter­mined by God, it is not contingent, but impossible, that they should
render themselves undetermined. So all things have been determined
from the necessity of the divine nature, not only to exist, but to exist
in a certain way, and to produce effects in a certain way. There is
nothing contingent, q.e.d.

Schol.: Before I proceed further, I wish to explain here—or rather
to advise [the reader]—what we must understand by *Natura naturans*
and *Natura naturata*. For from the preceding I think it is already es­tablished that by *Natura naturans* we must understand what is in itself
and is conceived through itself, or such attributes of substance as ex­press an eternal and infinite essence, i.e. (by P14C1 and P17C2), God,
insofar as he is considered as a free cause.

But by *Natura naturata* I understand whatever follows from the ne­cessity of God's nature, or from any of God's attributes, i.e., all the
modes of God's attributes insofar as they are considered as things
which are in God, and can neither be nor be conceived without God.

P30: *An actual intellect, whether finite or infinite,* 62 must comprehend God's
attributes and God's affections, and nothing else.

Dem.: A true idea must agree with its object (by A6), i.e. (as is
known through itself), what is contained objectively in the intellect
must necessarily be in nature. But in nature (by P14C1) there is only
one substance, viz. God, and there are no affections other than those
which are in God (by P15) and which can neither be nor be conceived
without God (by P15). Therefore, an actual intellect, whether finite
or infinite, must comprehend God's attributes and God's affections,
and nothing else, q.e.d.

P31: *The actual intellect, whether finite or infinite, like will, desire, love,
etc., must be referred to Natura naturata, not to Natura naturans.* 63

Dem.: By intellect (as is known through itself) we understand not
absolute thought, but only a certain mode of thinking, which mode
differs from the others, such as desire, love, etc., and so (by D5) must
be conceived through absolute thought, i.e. (by P15 and D6), it must
be so conceived through an attribute of God, which expresses the
eternal and infinite essence of thought, that can neither be nor be

62 The text here has been variously translated, but a consensus seems to have de­veloped in favor of this rendering. Cf. Gueroult 1, 1:354n.
63 I.e., though thought is an attribute of God, and he is a thinking thing (IIP1), he
has neither intellect, nor will, desire nor love. This doctrine goes back to the *Short
Treatise* (cf. 1/45/21ff.).
ETHICS

conceived without [that attribute]; and so (by P29S), like the other
modes of thinking, it must be referred to Natura naturata, not to Na-
turn naturans, q.e.d.

Schol.: The reason why I speak here of actual intellect is not be-
cause I concede that there is any potential intellect, but because, wish-
ing to avoid all confusion, I wanted to speak only of what we perceive
as clearly as possible, i.e., of the intellection itself. We perceive noth-
ing more clearly than that. For we can understand nothing that does
not lead to more perfect knowledge of the intellection.

P32: The will cannot be called a free cause, but only a necessary one.

Dem.: The will, like the intellect, is only a certain mode of think-
ing. And so (by P28) each volition can neither exist nor be determined
to produce an effect unless it is determined by another cause, and this
cause again by another, and so on, to infinity. Even if the will be
supposed to be infinite, it must still be determined to exist and pro-
duce an effect by God, not insofar as he is an absolutely infinite sub-
stance, but insofar as he has an attribute that expresses the infinite
and eternal essence of thought (by P23). So in whatever way it is
conceived, whether as finite or as infinite, it requires a cause by which
it is determined to exist and produce an effect. And so (by D7) it
cannot be called a free cause, but only a necessary or compelled one,
q.e.d.

II73 Cor. 1: From this it follows, first, that God does not produce any
effect by freedom of the will.

Cor. 2: It follows, secondly, that will and intellect are related to
God's nature as motion and rest are, and as are absolutely all natural
things, which (by P29) must be determined by God to exist and pro-
duce an effect in a certain way. For the will, like all other things,
requires a cause by which it is determined to exist and produce an
effect in a certain way. And although from a given will, or intellect
infinitely many things may follow, God still cannot be said, on that
account, to act from freedom of the will, any more than he can be
said to act from freedom of motion and rest on account of those things
that follow from motion and rest (for infinitely many things also follow
from motion and rest). So will does not pertain to God's nature any
more than do the other natural things, but is related to him in the
same way as motion and rest, and all the other things which, as we

44 This is only a provisional way of speaking. Cf. IIIP49C. For the transition from
"will" to "volition," cf. IIIP48.

45 Though the preceding sentence does not say explicitly that the will is there sup-
posed to be a finite mode, this is implied by the reference to P28 and probably by the
adjective "certain" as well. Cf. Gueroult 1, 1:362 (and contrast Wolfson 1, 1:407).

435
have shown, follow from the necessity of the divine nature and are determined by it to exist and produce an effect in a certain way.

P33: Things could have been produced by God in no other way, and in no other order than they have been produced.

Dem.: For all things have necessarily followed from God's given nature (by P16), and have been determined from the necessity of God's nature to exist and produce an effect in a certain way (by P29). Therefore, if things could have been of another nature, or could have been determined to produce an effect in another way, so that the order of Nature was different, then God's nature could also have been other than it is now, and therefore (by P11) that [other nature] would also have had to exist, and consequently, there could have been two or more Gods, which is absurd (by P14C1). So things could have been produced in no other way and no other order, etc., q.e.d.

Schol. 1: Since by these propositions I have shown more clearly than the noon light that there is absolutely nothing in things on account of which they can be called contingent, I wish now to explain briefly what we must understand by contingent—but first, what [we must understand] by necessary and impossible.

A thing is called necessary either by reason of its essence or by reason of its cause. For a thing's existence follows necessarily either from its essence and definition or from a given efficient cause. And a thing is also called impossible from these same causes—viz. either because its essence, or definition, involves a contradiction, or because there is no external cause which has been determined to produce such a thing.

But a thing is called contingent only because of a defect of our knowledge. For if we do not know that the thing's essence involves a contradiction, or if we do know very well that its essence does not involve a contradiction, and nevertheless can affirm nothing certainly about its existence, because the order of causes is hidden from us, it can never seem to us either necessary or impossible. So we call it contingent or possible.66

Schol. 2: From the preceding it clearly follows that things have been produced by God with the highest perfection, since they have followed necessarily from a given most perfect nature. Nor does this convict God of any imperfection, for his perfection compels us to affirm this. Indeed, from the opposite, it would clearly follow (as I have just shown), that God is not supremely perfect; because if things

66 This is only provisional. Later (II/209) Spinoza will distinguish between the contingent and the possible.
ETHICS

had been produced by God in another way, we would have to attribute to God another nature, different from that which we have been compelled to attribute to him from the consideration of the most perfect Being.

Of course, I have no doubt that many will reject this opinion as absurd, without even being willing to examine it—for no other reason than because they have been accustomed to attribute another freedom to God, far different from that we have taught (D7), viz. an absolute will. But I also have no doubt that, if they are willing to reflect on the matter, and consider properly the chain of our demonstrations, in the end they will utterly reject the freedom they now attribute to God, not only as futile, but as a great obstacle to science. Nor is it necessary for me to repeat here what I said in P17S.

Nevertheless, to please them, I shall show that even if it is conceded that will pertains to God’s essence,\(^6\) it still follows from his perfection that things could have been created by God in no other way or order. It will be easy to show this if we consider, first, what they themselves concede, viz. that it depends on God’s decree and will alone that each thing is what it is. For otherwise God would not be the cause of all things. Next, that all God’s decrees have been established by God himself from eternity. For otherwise he would be convicted of imperfection and inconstancy. But since, in eternity, there is neither when, nor before, nor after, it follows, from God’s perfection alone, that he can never decree anything different, and never could have, or that God was not before his decrees, and cannot be without them.

But they will say that even if it were supposed that God had made another nature of things, or that from eternity he had decreed something else concerning nature and its order, no imperfection in God would follow from that.

Still, if they say this, they will concede at the same time that God can change his decrees. For if God had decreed, concerning nature and its order, something other than what he did decree, i.e., had willed and conceived something else concerning nature, he would necessarily have had an intellect other than he now has, and a will other than he now has. And if it is permitted to attribute to God another intellect and another will, without any change of his essence and of his perfection, why can he not now change his decrees concerning

\(^6\) Again it must be emphasized that (as in P17S) Spinoza is here discussing only what follows from an assumption of his opponents which he rejects. (Curley 3, 138, requires correction on this point, as De Dijn noted.) Apparent passages to the contrary in the Metaphysical Thoughts (e.g., I/261, 264) must be counted among those in which Spinoza is merely expounding Descartes. Cf. the note to II/7/32.
created things, and nevertheless remain equally perfect? For his intellect and will concerning created things and their order are the same in respect to his essence and his perfection, however his will and intellect may be conceived.

Further, all the Philosophers I have seen concede that in God there is no potential intellect, but only an actual one. But since his intellect and his will are not distinguished from his essence, as they all also concede, it follows that if God had had another actual intellect, and another will, his essence would also necessarily be other. And therefore (as I inferred at the beginning) if things had been produced by God otherwise than they now are, God's intellect and his will, i.e. (as is conceded), his essence, would have to be different [NS: from what it now is]. And this is absurd.

Therefore, since things could have been produced by God in no other way, and no other order, and since it follows from God's supreme perfection that this is true, no truly sound reason can persuade us to believe that God did not will to create all the things that are in his intellect, with that same perfection with which he understands them.

But they will say that there is no perfection or imperfection in things; what is in them, on account of which they are perfect or imperfect, and are called good or bad, depends only on God's will. And so, if God had willed, he could have brought it about that what is now perfection would have been the greatest imperfection, and conversely [NS: that what is now an imperfection in things would have been the most perfect]. How would this be different from saying openly that God, who necessarily understands what he wills, can bring it about by his will that he understands things in another way than he does understand them? As I have just shown, this is a great absurdity.

So I can turn the argument against them in the following way. All things depend on God's power. So in order for things to be able to be different, God's will would necessarily also have to be different. But God's will cannot be different (as we have just shown most evidently from God's perfection). So things also cannot be different.

I confess that this opinion, which subjects all things to a certain indifferent will of God, and makes all things depend on his good pleasure, is nearer the truth than that of those who maintain that God does all things for the sake of the good. For they seem to place something outside God, which does not depend on God, to which God attends,

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44 Cf. Aquinas, I, 3, 1, and Descartes, Third Meditation, AT VII, 47.
45 NS: "on account of which they are called perfect or imperfect, good or bad."
46 Cf. Descartes, Sixth Replies, AT VII, 435-436, and the Short TREATISE (I38/11).
as a model, in what he does, and at which he aims, as at a certain goal. This is simply to subject God to fate. Nothing more absurd can be maintained about God, whom we have shown to be the first and only free cause, both of the essence of all things, and of their existence. So I shall waste no time in refuting this absurdity.

P34: God's power is his essence itself.

Dem.: For from the necessity alone of God's essence it follows that God is the cause of himself (by P11) and (by P16 and P16C) of all things. Therefore, God's power, by which he and all things are and act, is his essence itself, q.e.d.

P35: Whatever we conceive to be in God's power, necessarily exists.

Dem.: For whatever is in God's power must (by P34) be so comprehended by his essence that it necessarily follows from it, and therefore necessarily exists, q.e.d.

P36: Nothing exists from whose nature some effect does not follow.

Dem.: Whatever exists expresses the nature, or essence of God in a certain and determinate way (by P25C), i.e. (by P34), whatever exists expresses in a certain and determinate way the power of God, which is the cause of all things. So (by P16), from [NS: everything that exists] some effect must follow, q.e.d.

Appendix

With these [demonstrations] I have explained God's nature and properties: that he exists necessarily; that he is unique; that he is and acts from the necessity alone of his nature; that (and how) he is the free cause of all things; that all things are in God and so depend on him that without him they can neither be nor be conceived; and finally, that all things have been predetermined by God, not from freedom of the will or absolute good pleasure, but from God's absolute nature, or infinite power.

Further, I have taken care, whenever the occasion arose, to remove prejudices that could prevent my demonstrations from being perceived. But because many prejudices remain that could, and can, be a great obstacle to men's understanding the connection of things in the way I have explained it, I considered it worthwhile to submit them here to the scrutiny of reason. All the prejudices I here undertake to expose depend on this one: that men commonly suppose that all natural things act, as men do, on account of an end; indeed, they maintain as certain that God himself directs all things to some certain end,
for they say that God has made all things for man, and man that he
might worship God.

So I shall begin by considering this one prejudice, asking first [I]
why most people are satisfied that it is true, and why all are so in-
clined by nature to embrace it. Then [II] I shall show its falsity, and
finally [III] how, from this, prejudices have arisen concerning good and
evil, merit and sin, praise and blame, order and confusion, beauty and ug-
liness, and other things of this kind.71

[I.] Of course this is not the place to deduce these things from the
nature of the human mind. It will be sufficient here if I take as a
foundation what everyone must acknowledge: that all men are born
ignorant of the causes of things, and that they all want to seek their
own advantage, and are conscious of this appetite.

From these [assumptions] it follows, first, that men think themselves
free, because they are conscious of their volitions and their appetite,
and do not think, even in their dreams, of the causes by which they
are disposed to wanting and willing, because they are ignorant of [those
causes]. It follows, secondly, that men act always on account of an end,
viz. on account of their advantage, which they want. Hence they seek
to know only the final causes of what has been done, and when they
have heard them, they are satisfied, because they have no reason to
doubt further. But if they cannot hear them from another, nothing
remains for them but to turn toward themselves, and reflect on the
ends by which they are usually determined to do such things; so they
necessarily judge the temperament of other men from their own tem-
perament.

Furthermore, they find—both in themselves and outside them-
selves—many means that are very helpful in seeking their own advan-
tage, e.g., eyes for seeing, teeth for chewing, plants and animals for
food, the sun for light, the sea for supporting fish [NS: and so with
almost all other things whose natural causes they have no reason to
doubt].72 Hence, they consider all natural things as means to their own
advantage. And knowing that they had found these means, not pro-
vided them for themselves, they had reason to believe that there was
someone else who had prepared those means for their use. For after
they considered things as means, they could not believe that the things

71 Wolfson’s discussion of medieval doctrines concerning final causes (1, 1:422-440) is
useful background to this appendix. But Gueroult is surely right to argue (1, 1:398-400)
that Spinoza’s antifinalism, while owing much to Descartes, is, in the end, directed
against him as well as the scholastics.

72 What Gebhardt adds here from the NS, Akkerman (2, 161) regards as a translator’s
gloss, though it seems to me to go beyond the sort of thing one would expect from
Balling.
had made themselves; but from the means they were accustomed to prepare for themselves, they had to infer that there was a ruler, or a number of rulers of nature, endowed with human freedom, who had taken care of all things for them, and made all things for their use.

And since they had never heard anything about the temperament of these rulers, they had to judge it from their own. Hence, they maintained that the Gods direct all things for the use of men in order to bind men to them and be held by men in the highest honor. So it has happened that each of them has thought up from his own temperament different ways of worshipping God, so that God might love them above all the rest, and direct the whole of Nature according to the needs of their blind desire and insatiable greed. Thus this prejudice was changed into superstition, and struck deep roots in their minds. This was why each of them strove with great diligence to understand and explain the final causes of all things.

But while they sought to show that nature does nothing in vain (i.e., nothing which is not of use to men), they seem to have shown only that nature and the Gods are as mad as men. See, I ask you, how the matter has turned out in the end! Among so many conveniences in nature they had to find many inconveniences: storms, earthquakes, diseases, etc. These, they maintain, happen because the Gods [NS: (whom they judge to be of the same nature as themselves)] are angry on account of wrongs done to them by men, or on account of sins committed in their worship. And though their daily experience contradicted this, and though infinitely many examples showed that conveniences and inconveniences happen indiscriminately to the pious and the impious alike, they did not on that account give up their long-standing prejudice. It was easier for them to put this among the other unknown things, whose use they were ignorant of, and so remain in the state of ignorance in which they had been born, than to destroy that whole construction, and think up a new one.

So they maintained it as certain that the judgments of the Gods far surpass man's grasp. This alone, of course, would have caused the truth to be hidden from the human race to eternity, if Mathematics, which is concerned not with ends, but only with the essences and properties of figures, had not shown men another standard of truth.

And besides Mathematics, we can assign other causes also (which it is unnecessary to enumerate here), which were able to bring it about that men [NS:—but very few, in relation to the whole human race—]
THE METAPHYSICAL MORALIST

II/80 would notice these common prejudices and be led to the true knowledge of things.

[II.] With this I have sufficiently explained what I promised in the first place [viz. why men are so inclined to believe that all things act for an end]. Not many words will be required now to show that Nature has no end set before it, and that all final causes are nothing but human fictions. For I believe I have already sufficiently established it, both by the foundations and causes from which I have shown this prejudice to have had its origin, and also by P16, P32C1 and C2, and all those [propositions] by which I have shown that all things proceed by a certain eternal necessity of nature, and with the greatest perfection.

I shall, however, add this: this doctrine concerning the end turns nature completely upside down. For what is really a cause, it considers as an effect, and conversely [NS: what is an effect it considers as a cause]. What is by nature prior, it makes posterior. And finally, what is supreme and most perfect, it makes imperfect.

For—to pass over the first two, since they are manifest through themselves—as has been established in PP21-23, that effect is most perfect which is produced immediately by God, and the more something requires intermediate causes to produce it, the more imperfect it is. But if the things which have been produced immediately by God had been made so that God would achieve his end, then the last things, for the sake of which the first would have been made, would be the most excellent of all.

Again, this doctrine takes away God's perfection. For if God acts for the sake of an end, he necessarily wants something which he lacks. And though the Theologians and Metaphysicians distinguish between an end of need and an end of assimilation, they nevertheless confess that God did all things for his own sake, not for the sake of the things to be created. For before creation they can assign nothing except God
for whose sake God would act. And so they are necessarily compelled to confess that God lacked those things for the sake of which he willed to prepare means, and that he desired them. This is clear through itself.

Nor ought we here to pass over the fact that the Followers of this doctrine, who have wanted to show off their cleverness in assigning the ends of things, have introduced—to prove this doctrine of theirs—a new way of arguing: by reducing things, not to the impossible, but to ignorance. This shows that no other way of defending their doctrine was open to them.

For example, if a stone has fallen from a roof onto someone's head and killed him, they will show, in the following way, that the stone fell in order to kill the man. For if it did not fall to that end, God willing it, how could so many circumstances have concurred by chance (for often many circumstances do concur at once)? Perhaps you will answer that it happened because the wind was blowing hard and the man was walking that way. But they will persist: why was the wind blowing hard at that time? why was the man walking that way at that same time? If you answer again that the wind arose then because on the preceding day, while the weather was still calm, the sea began to toss, and that the man had been invited by a friend, they will press on—for there is no end to the questions which can be asked: but why was the sea tossing? why was the man invited at just that time? And so they will not stop asking for the causes of causes until you take refuge in the will of God, i.e., the sanctuary of ignorance.

Similarly, when they see the structure of the human body, they are struck by a foolish wonder, and because they do not know the causes of so great an art, they infer that it is constructed, not by mechanical, but by divine, or supernatural art, and constituted in such a way that one part does not injure another.  

Hence it happens that one who seeks the true causes of miracles, and is eager, like an educated man, to understand natural things, not to wonder at them, like a fool, is generally considered and denounced as an impious heretic by those whom the people honor as interpreters of nature and the Gods. For they know that if ignorance is taken

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76 As Wolfson points out (1, 1:434-436), the argument of this paragraph goes back at least as far as Cicero's *De Natura Deorum* and was used in the Middle Ages by Maimonides (1, III, 19).

77 Gebhardt here adds a phrase from the NS which would be translated: "or rather, stupidity." He takes it that Spinoza had omitted this phrase when revising his first draft, in order to avoid unnecessary offense. But as Akkerman (2, 97) points out, it is more likely that the translator was offering a double translation of a single Latin term, to heighten the effect of lines that strongly appealed to him. The translator uses other
THE METAPHYSICAL MORALIST

away, then foolish wonder, the only means they have of arguing and defending their authority is also taken away. But I leave these things, and pass on to what I have decided to treat here in the third place.

III. After men persuaded themselves that everything that happens, happens on their account, they had to judge that what is most important in each thing is what is most useful to them, and to rate as most excellent all those things by which they were most pleased. Hence, they had to form these notions, by which they explained natural things: good, evil, order, confusion, warm, cold, beauty, ugliness. And because they thought themselves free, those notions have arisen: praise and blame, sin and merit. The latter I shall explain after I have treated human nature; but the former I shall briefly explain here.

Whatever conduces to health and the worship of God, they have called good; but what is contrary to these, evil.

And because those who do not understand the nature of things, but only imagine them, affirm nothing concerning things, and take the imagination for the intellect, they firmly believe, in their ignorance of things and of their own nature, that there is an order in things. For when things are so disposed that, when they are presented to us through the senses, we can easily imagine them, and so can easily remember them, we say that they are well-ordered; but if the opposite is true, we say that they are badly ordered, or confused.

And since those things we can easily imagine are especially pleasing to us, men prefer order to confusion, as if order were anything in nature more than a relation to our imagination. They also say that God has created all things in order, and so, unknowingly attribute imagination to God—unless, perhaps, they mean that God, to provide
for human imagination, has disposed all things so that men can very easily imagine them. Nor will it, perhaps, give them pause that infinitely many things are found which far surpass our imagination, and a great many which confuse it on account of its weakness. But enough of this.

The other notions are also nothing but modes of imagining, by which the imagination is variously affected; and yet the ignorant consider them the chief attributes of things, because, as we have already said, they believe all things have been made for their sake, and call the nature of a thing good or evil, sound or rotten and corrupt, as they are affected by it. For example, if the motion the nerves receive from objects presented through the eyes is conducive to health, the objects by which it is caused are called beautiful; those which cause a contrary motion are called ugly. Those which move the sense through the nose, they call pleasant-smelling or stinking; through the tongue, sweet or bitter, taste or tasteless; through touch, hard or soft, rough or smooth, etc.; and finally, those which move the ears are said to produce noise, sound or harmony. Men have been so mad as to believe that God is pleased by harmony. Indeed there are Philosophers who have persuaded themselves that the motions of the heavens produce a harmony.

All of these things show sufficiently that each one has judged things according to the disposition of his brain; or rather, has accepted affections of the imagination as things. So it is no wonder (to note this, too, in passing) that we find so many controversies to have arisen among men, and that they have finally given rise to Skepticism. For although human bodies agree in many things, they still differ in very many. And for that reason what seems good to one, seems bad to another; what seems ordered to one, seems confused to another; what seems pleasing to one, seems displeasing to another, and so on.

I pass over the [other notions] here, both because this is not the place to treat them at length, and because everyone has experienced this [variability] sufficiently for himself. That is why we have such sayings as “So many heads, so many attitudes,” “everyone finds his own judgment more than enough,” and “there are as many differences of brains as of palates.” These proverbs show sufficiently that men judge things according to the disposition of their brain, and imagine, rather than understand them. For if men had understood them, the things would at least convince them all, even if they did not attract them all, as the example of mathematics shows.

We see, therefore, that all the notions by which ordinary people are accustomed to explain nature are only modes of imagining, and do not
indicate the nature of anything, only the constitution of the imagination. And because they have names, as if they were [notions] of beings existing outside the imagination, I call them beings, not of reason, but of imagination. So all the arguments in which people try to use such notions against us can easily be warded off.

For many are accustomed to arguing in this way: if all things have followed from the necessity of God’s most perfect nature, why are there so many imperfections in nature? why are things corrupt to the point where they stink? so ugly that they produce nausea? why is there confusion, evil, and sin?

As I have just said, those who argue in this way are easily answered. For the perfection of things is to be judged solely from their nature and power; things are not more or less perfect because they please or offend men’s senses, or because they are of use to, or are incompatible with, human nature.

But to those who ask “why God did not create all men so that they would be governed by the command of reason?” I answer only “because he did not lack material to create all things, from the highest degree of perfection to the lowest;” or, to speak more properly, “because the laws of his nature have been so ample that they sufficed for producing all things which can be conceived by an infinite intellect” (as I have demonstrated in P16).

These are the prejudices I undertook to note here. If any of this kind still remain, they can be corrected by anyone with only a little meditation. [NS: And so I find no reason to devote more time to these matters, etc.]

Second Part of the Ethics
On the Nature and Origin of the Mind

I pass now to explaining those things which must necessarily follow from the essence of God, or the infinite and eternal Being—not, indeed, all of them, for we have demonstrated (IP16) that infinitely many things must follow from it in infinitely many modes, but only those that can lead us, by the hand, as it were, to the knowledge of the human Mind and its highest blessedness.

This concluding formula, which Gebhardt adds from the NS, Akkerman (2, 161) attributes to the translator.