of the lower part. Nevertheless, the feet are just as necessary as the hands, and the lower part of the body is just as necessary as the upper part. They are not only not replaceable by each other, but one cannot function normally without the other. The general principle of organization is realized in particulars, and the particulars are permeated by the principle of unity, but a concrete diversity and a unitifying pattern of organization are also needed. It is this way in Church life too: the general principle, love, lives not only agapically but also philically, and creates a form for itself—not only the communal liturgy but also the adelphopoiesis of friends.

But here the question naturally arises, What power assures the understandability of heterogeneous phenomena? What maintains the equilibrium of the principle of the particular and the principle of the general? What spiritual activity, without preventing particular philic phenomena from being pan-ecclesial, at the same time protects their particularity? It is unquestionable that there must be such an activity; otherwise, the church would not have spiritual equilibrium. This is clearly seen in connection with the following examples: Since the wife of a brother must, for every man, be the wife of a brother, but only the wife of this particular other and not the wife of every man, there must be some kind of spiritual activity that places her in a wholly particular relation to her husband and continuously assures the uniqueness of this relation.

In the same way, since, for each member of the Church, the friend of a other must be the friend of a brother, but only the friend of this particular brother, not the friend of everyone, there must necessarily be a force at orders and maintains the individuality of the union of friends. Together with a uniting force that takes one outside individual existence, we must be an isolating force, which sets a limit to diffuseness and impersonality. Together with a centrifugal force, there must be a centripetal one. This force is jealousy, and its function is to isolate, separate, delimit, differentiate. If this force did not exist, there would be no concrete church with its specific order. Instead, we would have protestant, anarchistic, unmunist, Tolstoyan, etc., mixing of all with all. We would have total messliness and chaos. The force of jealousy is alive in both friendship and marriage, in an eparchy as well as in a local parish or a monastery. It live everywhere. It is everywhere necessary to have definiteness of actions and constancy of unions, be it with a friend, a wife, a starets, a sire, a bishop, a metropolitan, or a patriarch. In other words, everywhere there must be not only love but also jealousy. There must be jealousy toward friend, wife, congregation, brothers, eparchy, or local rich. We must now get a deeper insight into this concept, which is so oart but usually so little explored.

xiii. Letter Twelve: Jealousy

It seems to me that it has become undeniable that the discussion of love in general and of friendship in particular, and of the two in their concrete vitality, almost inevitably raises the question of a phenomenon intimately connected with them: jealousy. It is scarcely disputable that, in practice, this question is of primary importance. But I doubt whether the majority of thinkers are sufficiently conscious of its theoretical importance. In the philosophical literature, the concept of jealousy has been swept far away, and rarely does one deign to glance at it. That is why I think it is necessary to probe more deeply into the concept of jealousy. On the basis of what was said at the end of the last letter, I suggest that the clarification of this concept will, in turn, serve to clarify the concept of friendship and love.

And so, what is jealousy?

In the well-worn usage of the intelligentsia, jealousy is understood to be a vice or, at least, unquestionably a moral deficiency, something shameful and worthy of ridicule. The intelligentsia is accustomed to seeing pride, vanity, self-love, suspiciousness, and mistrust as the basis of jealousy, in a word, anything at all except a moral advantage. This view of jealousy especially characterizes the century that was the century of the revolutionary intelligentsia par excellence: the eighteenth. And jealousy was especially condemned where enlightenment rationality reigned more intolerantly than anywhere else: Paris.

"Pride and vanity make as many people jealous as love," said Boist. "The love of the jealous resembles hate," testifies Molière. "Jealousy
comes more from vanity than from love,” affirms Madame de Stael. “In jealousy there is often more vanity than love,” indicates La Rochefoucauld. “Crude jealousy is mistrust of the loved object; delicate jealousy is mistrust of oneself,” argues someone else. “The most jealous of all lovers are those who love glory,” observes Trubet. “A jealous person is an infant who is frightened by monsters created in the darkness of his imagination,” opines Boiste. “A jealous person spends his life searching for a key to a mystery whose revelation destroys his well-being,” notes Oxenstierna. Schleiermacher or Grillparzer clothes this thought in a play on words: “Die Eifersucht mit Eifer sucht, was Leiden schiebt,” that is, “jealousy zealously seeks what gives suffering,” or “what is passion,” for what one hears is “Leidenschaft.” Thus, a pun is formed which can be conveyed roughly by “jealousy zealously seeks what is passion.” “Of the ailments of the mind, jealousy is that whose food is the greatest number of things but whose medicine is the least number of things,” affirms Noël. “Jealousy has a lynx’s eyes,” says Bellamy. Thus, love and jealousy are incompatible. “When self-love predominates over jealousy, love has lost its power,” affirms Lengret. “Jealousy extinguishes love as ash extinguishes a fire,” says the Queen of Navarre. “Strong passions are above easouly,” we read in La Rochefoucauld.

This somewhat diffuse and popular understanding of jealousy found a more precise and psychologically motivated form in the lapydary definition of easouly given by Spinoza: Jealousy is love full of hate for the loved object and envy toward another who is loved by the loved object. Here, Spinoza aptly uses the figure of the mixing of two liquids, when, interpreting, they become turbulent and turbid, which is designated by the term fluctuatio. So it is with jealousy: Love and hate, in mixing, fluctuatio, a “turbulence” of the self, owing to which the consciousness becomes turbid and opaque.

Jealousy, according to Spinoza, is precisely such a fluctuatio of the soul, occurring from both love and hate, accompanied by the idea of a bond of whom the soul is envious: “Hoc odium etsque amatum Initae junctum Zelotyphia vocatur, quae proinde nihil aliud est, quam animi fluctuatio oris ex Amore et Odio simul, concomitante idea alterius, cui videret.”

Here are the arguments by which Spinoza arrives at his classic definition of jealousy: Love, he says, strives to achieve reciprocity, and even the obst perfect reciprocity. Every diminution and every loss experienced by this regard are felt to be a self-diminution, to cause great pain. The obst perfect reciprocal love is all-engulfing love: we wish to possess it fully, it is our supreme happiness, which we do not wish to share with another. If a loved being loves someone more than us, we feel ourselves to be unhappy without limit. The cause of our unhappiness is the object of our hate. We will therefore hate the loved one, because he deprives us of his reciprocity, and we will envy the one who enjoys this reciprocity. A love therefore arises that simultaneously hates and envies, and this love is jealousy. This passion is particularly powerful if our happiness has been usurped by another. And the more powerful is the past happiness, the more intense will be the jealousy, and the latter, if it is not tamed by some other force, will darken our entire soul. The power of hate for a loved object is directly proportional to the power of the preceding love.

Here are the most important relevant theorems:

Prop. XXXV. “Si quis imaginatur rem amatum sedem vel arctiore vinculo Animitiae quo ipse eadem solus potiebatur, alium sibi jungere, Odio erga ipsum affieiebatur, et ilii alteri invidebat.” That is: “If one imagines that the thing he loves is found with someone else in the same or a closer relation of friendship than that by virtue of which he possessed it alone, then he will be possessed by hate toward the loved thing and envy toward the other individual.”

Prop. XXXVI. “Qui rei, quam semel delectatus est, recordatur, caput eadem cum isdem potiit circumstantiis, ac cum priob ipsa delectatus est.” That is: “One who remembers a thing from which he once received pleasure will desire to possess it under the same circumstances as when he enjoyed it the first time.”

Prop. XXXVII. “Cupiditas, quae praeced Tristitia vel Laetitia, praebet Odio vel Amore oritur, eo est major, quo affectus major est.” That is: “A desire arising as a result of dissatisfaction or displeasure, as a result of hate or love, is the stronger, the greater these affects.”

Prop. XXXVIII. “Si quis rem amatum odio habere inciperit, ita ut Amor plane abolatur, eadem majore odio, ex pari causa, prosequatur, quam si ipsam nunquam amavit, et eo majoe quam Amor antea maiore fuerat.” That is: “If one has begun to hate a thing that he loved, so that love is completely destroyed, then, for the same reason, he will feel toward it a greater hate than if he had never loved it, and the greater his former love, the greater the hate felt now.”

According to the popular conception, jealousy is a harmful and ugly growth on love. The causes of jealousy are alien to the essence of love, and therefore it is usually believed that jealousy can be eliminated from love. Spinoza sees a closer connection between love and jealousy. For him, jealousy is not an accidental companion of love but a faithful shadow that appears on the screen of the soul’s life every time love is illuminated by the loved one’s betrayal. Or, more precisely, jealousy, according to Spinoza, is a necessary equivalent of love, appearing when relations take a turn for the worse. Love does not disappear but is transformed into jealousy. Nevertheless, a love without jealousy is conceivable in Spinoza’s analysis. The condition for this is perfect reciprocity, so that jealousy, although it is necessary psychologically under certain conditions, acquires in Spinoza’s eyes a negative valuation as animi fluctuatio,
a darkening of consciousness, an untameable passion. For Spinoza, jealousy in love is not love. Therefore, as heterogeneous with respect to love, as non-love (although it is in a causal relation, a relation of equivalence with love), jealousy is condemnable. Thus, Spinoza too, in sum, agrees with the well-worn, popular understanding of jealousy. How did this happen?

To answer this question, let us remember the lifeless and reified character of Spinoza's entire philosophy. Not having the category of the person, Spinoza cannot distinguish between love for a person and desire for a thing. He confuses love and desire, or, more precisely, he replaces the former with the latter. Everywhere in Spinoza we see the impersonal *res amata*, which must be translated as “a thing desired,” for a thing cannot be loved. Yes, *res amata*. But nowhere is there mention of a loved person: only to a person can the epithet “loved” be applied. True, in contemporary society, we frequently hear “I love jam,” “I love cigars,” “I love to play cards,” and so forth, but for any healthy person it is clear that this is either a perversion and darkening of consciousness or a violence done to language. “Jam,” “cigars,” “cards,” and so forth cannot be loved; they can only be desired. But the correlate of desire is hate with envy, which is why Spinoza, in the original notion of love, places such a stress on this condemnable element of hate with envy. However, as love is not desire, so the combination of hate with envy is not jealousy, although true jealousy does have the same relation to what Spinoza thinks jealousy is as true love has to desire. To understand jealousy in its proper nature, one must even connect it more intimately with love. One must introduce it into the very heart of love, and, having underscored the personal nature of love, one must disclose that jealousy is love itself, but in love’s “alter-being.” One must disclose that jealousy is a necessary condition and inevitable side of love, but a side that is turned toward sorrow, so that to destroy jealousy would be to destroy love. In the same way, desire always contains hate with envy.

To demonstrate this, one must first remove from jealousy the element of condemnation that burdens it. Jealousy has so often been confused with certain reprehensible forms of its manifestation, that even the words “jealousy” and “jealous” have become words of condemnation.

To see the essence of jealousy in suspiciousness, petty self-love, mistrust, ill will, malice, hate with envy, and so forth is just as wrong as to posit the essence of love in the deprivation of freedom, in partiality, injustice, and so forth, or to see the essence of justice in coldness, hardness of heart, cruelty. Suspiciousness, hate with envy, and so forth are all bad, reprehensible, egotistical manifestations of jealousy, produced by the infusion of love with desire. Meanwhile, two series of historical data int at the neutral character or even the positive, good, necessary character of jealousy. First, the nation with the purest God-consciousness, the chosen Jewish nation, knowing and understanding the love of God more clearly than any other nation, insistently, constantly, and unhesitatingly speaks of God’s jealousy. The whole Bible is saturated and permeated with God’s jealousy, and it is impossible to ignore this fact.

Second, the nation of the purest humanity, the genius-nation, the Greeks, knowing and understanding human love in all its forms better than any other nation, also has the trait of jealousy as its most fundamental trait, as its most typical and inalienable trait. In his sketches for the meditation “We are philologists,” Nietzsche, among three “selected points from antiquity,” indicates for development: “The ennoblement of jealousy, the Greeks are the most jealous nation.” Once again, one cannot ignore this. If both the purest genius and the purest faith posit jealousy as a positive, necessary force in the essence of love, both human and Divine, this means that jealousy is in fact such and that it is in no wise identical with the secondary passions that accompany it.

But what, in this case, is jealousy itself? It is one of the aspects of love, the foundation of love, the background of love, the primordial darkness in which the ray of love shines. Love is free choice. From many persons, I, by an act of inner self-determination, choose one person and to that person, one of many, I establish a unique relation, become attached in my soul to this person. I wish to view this person, who is ordinary, as extraordinary. I wish to view this person, who is gray and drab, as festive. I wish to view this quite average person as a triumph. This person stands in a crowd, but I summon him and, from the city square, I lead him into the cozy room of my heart. I inscribe this person’s image on a gold medallion. And this is just, for this image is not a caricature, such as people draw in the majority of cases. It is not even a portrait painted by sages. It is rather an image of the Divine image, an icon. Violating the “validity” of the law of identity, I, by a metaphysical act of self-determination (not by the rational mind, but by my whole being), decide to see in the chosen person (one of many) an exclusive person, who stands out from others. In other words, I make myself in relation to the chosen person such that this person becomes Thou for me. Friendship, I repeat, is exclusive just as conjugal love is exclusive. “Multiple” is a sign of the imperfection of the object of love as such, a sign of the incompleteness of Thou as Thou. Both multiple marriage and multiple friendship are false in their very idea and must inevitably either pass into something personal (the first into single marriage, the second into single friendship) or become corrupt and decay utterly, the first in lust, the second in greed (that is, from semi-personal they must become thinglike). Aristotle says: “One cannot be a friend to many when one has in view perfect friendship, just as one cannot at a single time be in love with many. This kind of friendship appears to be perfection and, as such, can be directed at only one person.”
But even if one were to say here that there are “many” such beloved Thou’s, nevertheless, toward each one the relation, in the case of love, would be as to a unique one. Every love, in essence, has a selective, a selecting power, is *dilectio*. The loved one is therefore always a selected one, a unique one. It is this that constitutes the personal nature of love, without which we would be dealing with desire whose object is a thing and with indifference as to whether the desired thing is replaced by a thing equal to it. The demand for a numerical identity with the beloved person (even in the absence of a generic identity, i.e., faithfulness to a person even when this person changes\(^{822}\) characterizes both love and the violation by love of the law of identity. On the other hand, the demand for a generic identity with the desired thing (in the case of indifference to numerical identity, even when this identity is not understood), and therefore the observance of the law of identity, characterize desire. Awareness of uniqueness is the condition of love, even in its most imperfect manifestations. Moreover, even the illusion of love requires, if not uniqueness, at least the illusion of uniqueness, unrepeatability, exclusiveness, even if the loving one’s belief that the beloved is unique is as ungrounded as every first love’s belief that it is unique in the world and history, as ungrounded as the belief of each of Kant’s “uniquely legitimate” heirs and interpreters that he is in fact Kant’s unique heir and interpreter, or as ungrounded as the belief of Stirner’s “Unique one” that he is unique. Otherwise, even the illusion of love would be absolutely impossible, and only greed, dirt, and death would exist in relationships. The very thought of the possibility of the replacement of one person by another, a thought grounded in the acceptance of homoeousia, i.e., thingness, is a sinful thought, leading to death.

By an incomprehensible act of choice, a person is made unique, is called to the high, or royal, rank of Thou. This person has agreed to this election. He has said “Yes” and placed upon his own head the crown of greatness. What do I want now? Only one thing: that which I desired, i.e., my own love. I affirm the act of my own love as eternal in value, and therefore demand that it abide, that it not be voided. This inner conviction expresses itself as the zeal or jealousy that aspires to embody in time its eternal act of the election of the beloved Thou. My wish is that Thou not hinder me in my love, that with respect to me it really be Thou. Let the beloved Thou behave as unique; let it not step down from its pedestal of uniqueness, of chosenness. It makes no difference if the chosen Thou is the most ordinary person in a crowd and for the crowd. But, for me, for the one who chooses, the chosen Thou must be precisely Thou and nothing but Thou. Otherwise, love itself would be impossible; otherwise, the very act of election could not be embodied in time. Otherwise, the “time” of love would not be “the mobile image of eternity,”\(^{822}\) of election. With respect to me, Thou must act as Thou, not as one of many. Thou must wear a royal crown, not a night cap. The consciousness that this is needed from Thou for the very possibility of love entails the desire of realizing this chosenness and then affirming and protecting it. All this taken together will be jealousy.

But what if Thou does not want this? What if Thou stubbornly betrays its freely accepted rank and position? What if Thou, after having said “Yes” to the proposal of a new essence for it (i.e., Thou), shows with its life, shows through frivolousness, stubbornness, or insufficient sincerity in the acceptance of this high rank, that, for it, I am not? What if, wishing to be Thou, it does not wish to recognize me as me? Then I cannot and should not remain without counteraction. This counteraction is the manifestation of jealousy, jealousy toward my love, i.e., concern about the purity, genuineness, and preservation of my love. The fact that I demand this from Thou in the name of the very possibility of love entails the desire to realize this chosenness, to strengthen and protect it. All this taken together, I repeat, will be jealousy. One of two must hold: Either Thou must recognize this counteraction to itself, this struggle for love, this jealousy—and change. Or Thou must renounce its high rank, recognize that it is ordinary, and return from its throne into the gray crowd, from triumph to drab averageness. For me, it is impossible to love and not to be jealous when Thou stops being Thou. That is, I cannot fail to attempt again to make it Thou. Therefore, if my right and duty of jealousy are not recognized, (my only recourse is to cast Thou from its throne) I must forget about Thou, stop loving Thou, for only in this way can Thou be freed from the demand of requited love. But Thou has grown into me, has become part of me. To stop loving is to lose a part of myself. To forget is to cut a piece of living flesh from myself. This is what happens when, respecting the freedom of another, one finds it necessary to tear love from one’s breast (together with one’s heart).

Love is boundless. It is limited neither by place nor by time. It is universal. But this universality of love not only does not exclude but even presupposes isolatedness and separateness.\(^{824}\) For the holiness in one’s soul is love’s root, and love is possible only insofar as this holiness is alive. To protect the pearl of the soul is to protect love itself. Not to care about the holiness in one’s soul is not to care about love. Love is not only universal; it is also limited. Love is not only boundless; it is also bounded. What the Lord said about this is now considered unacceptable; it is thought to be harsh and cruel. But what is most remarkable is that in the “mother of all books,” the Gospel, this speech of the Lord’s comes right after what He said about not judging one’s neighbor and the parable of the beam and the mote in the eye: “Thou hypocrite, first cast out the beam out of thine own eye; and then shalt thou see clearly to cast out the mote out of thy brother’s eye” (Matt. 7:5). This thought is met by the antithetical thought, as if a knife blade were directed against a knife blade: “Give not
that which is holy unto the dogs, neither cast ye your pearls before swine, lest they trample them under their feet, and turn again and rend you” (Matt. 7:6). As if clarifying this saying, St. Seraphim of Sarov teaches us: “What is best in the heart we should not reveal without need. Do not reveal the mysteries of your heart to all.”

Thus, on the one hand, “do not judge,” but, on the other hand, consider dogs and swine those who are not worthy of having the mysteries of the heart revealed to them. Reveal these mysteries only to certain chosen ones, who are separated from the swine herd. This is an antinomy, and this antinomy is roughly equivalent to the love-jealousy antinomy.

For a rough clarification of what I have said, let me present several more fragments from the previously cited diary. This is the record of some real or imagined conversation with a friend:

“You behave yourself in such-and-such a way. You hide; you are secretive; you desire complete self-sufficiency; you are oppressed by confessions, both your own and that of your friend.”

“Yes, but do you not know that I act this way always and everywhere?”

“That’s not completely true; you scarcely act this way with everyone, always and everywhere. But even if that were the case, for me that is not an answer. ‘Friendship’ is friendship precisely because something is transmitted to me from another person and something is transmitted to another person from me. Therefore, ‘relationships’ are relationships precisely because they relate someone to someone else, because they lead one out of the self-enclosedness of egotism and the heart’s narrowness, because they extend the being of a person,” Spinoza said.

“But—understand me—what if my nature, my very essence, is like that?”

“What of it? Everyone’s nature is like that, egotistical and narrow. But friendship precisely opens a path to an influx of new reality. The purpose of friendship is that we should not be ‘cold eunuchs of the heart.’ After all, the state of being a eunuch of the heart is the worst of vices, the most terrible thing that can befall a man.”

“But what if I am always a ‘eunuch’?”

“In love, our person stops being as it is ‘always,’ ‘everywhere,’ and ‘with everyone.’ The old age, the decrepitude, of the soul passes. The soul is renewed and becomes young.”

“But do we not have a relationship? We do manage to stay together somehow.”

“This somehow’ is precisely the problem. If there is no such relationship as the one I talked about, if the relationship does not ‘relate’ anyone, and ‘ties’ do not bind anyone, then there is no relationship at all, and the persons concerned are not in a friendship, not one in the other, but in themselves and by themselves, in self-love. If you remain with me ‘as with everyone’ and act in relation to me ‘as always and everywhere,’ this proves better than anything that you know neither friendship nor relationships nor ties. . . . Understand me, it is not your love or not-love that I want, not your friendship or enmity, but simple certainty, so that I would know if it is worth exhausting myself and expending my strength on this field of friendship in hope of a distant harvest, or if I should renounce the thought of a better future, abandon this fruitless, stony field and occupy myself then with my ‘own’ affairs. But you are deaf, ‘attending indifferently to good and evil.’ You are silent. How long will this last?”

A heart wounded by a Friend will not be healed by anything, except by Time, and Death. Time removes the heart’s wounds, cutting away the stricken part of the heart; it kills in part. But Death annihilates the whole man. To the extent that a man is alive, the wounds that friendship causes in him are unhealable and festering. And he will bear them until he is able to present them to the Eternal Judge.

Look at the Lord’s parable about those who are “called” and those who are “chosen” (Matt 22:2–14; Luke 14:16–24). How much hidden bitterness there is in this parable: the infinite bitterness and pain of a heart wounded in its very love. There are those who are loved, who are called, those whom the Lord Himself loved jealously, for whom He did everything, what He did not do for any other people. And what happened? They do not desire to be chosen. They do not desire their own salvation. They do not even desire to show simple delicacy, to answer the call of Love, which is giving them Its supreme gift, making them Its friends. They are indifferent to the love of Love. But then: “Go out quickly into the streets and lanes of the city, and bring in hither the poor, and the maimed, and the halt, and the blind” (Luke 14:21). And when there were still places to be filled: “Go out into the highways and hedges, and compel them to come in, that my house may be filled” (Luke 14:23). A banquet of love which no one will attend, which was prepared for those dear to one’s heart, but which turned out to be filled with passers-by from the street!

One should be doing everything, should do everything in friendship to overcome the wall standing between persons. One should not spare one’s strength; one should fight strenuously for communion—unto the blood of the martyr, unto death. One should lay down one’s life for one’s friends,
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rv-a-ti has the sense of eniti, while rv-a-ti se has the sense of certare. Here one can note a relationship with the Sanskrit ar-v-an, running headlong, hurrying, and auro, rapid, on horseback; with the Greek orepont, they hurried, o-roue, to hurry, to rush; with the Latin rv-i-t; with the Old Saxon aru and the Old Nordic ör, rapid, ready, on horseback.

Both “to be zealous” and “to be jealous” signify, according to their root, the presence of force, power, a powerful movement toward something. This is the opposite of flaccidity, impotence, weakness. That is why revnovat’ is often used in the sense of “forcefully and energetically moving toward something,” of “being energetic in some endeavor.” Revnovat’ chego, according to Dal’, signifies “to strive zealously toward something.” Thus, one hears: revnuiu znani, revnuii nebesnogo tsarstva, revnuit e dagovani bolshikh (I ardently wish to learn, I aspire to the kingdom of heaven, zealously desire high gifts). Revnovat’ komy (to be jealous of someone) has the sense of competing, of imitating, of following, or striving ahead headlong, without conceding. Thus, Lomonsov used the locution “revnuiu nashemiu primeriu” (be jealous of our example). And in the same way, one hears: ia usedga revnoval uspekham ego (I have always been jealous of his successes), and so on. Hence we can conclude decisively that revnost’ primarily signifies, as Dal’ indicates, ardor, zeal, and even, essentially, zeal directed toward some “work.” In this sense one hears the expressions revnost’ po sluzhbe (zeal of service) and revnost’ ne po razumu (unreasonable zeal). In addition, revnostnyi signifies “most assiduous, diligent, one who takes great care, who gives himself with all his soul to the work.” Thus we get the expression: revnostnyi pobornik prady (ardent champion of the truth).828

In the same way, the Greek zeloi or, in the Doric form, zalos, signifies ardor, zeal, also rivalry, hate, and only finally jealousy in the sense that the word commonly has in the language of the intelligentsia, a sense that no nation attributes to it. Accordingly, the verb zeloo signifies to seek ardent, to desire strongly. As far as the etymology of these words is concerned, there is such an abundance of hypotheses (all of them artificial) here that it would be perilous to say anything definite.830 Let us only indicate that, according to Prellwitz, zalos derives from the root jâ, i.e., to be ardent, heftig sein, just as the verb zetoe signifies to seek to attain some object.

Latin does not give us anything new in this case: zelotypia, jealousy, is taken from the Greek, and consequently derives from zalos.

Finally, in Hebrew, both zeal, Efer, and jealousy, Efersucht, are expressed by the same word: gime‘ah, derived from the Semitic root qn’. This trigram does not contain any nuance of the jealousy of the intelligentsia; thus, in Arabic it has the sense of “becoming very red,” bochrot weren, while in Syrian it means “to be of a dark color,” dunkelfarbig
seins. Hence, in Hebrew and in other Semitic languages the root qn' signifies "to be zealous, passionate." The word qine'ab signifies, first of all, the passion of love with ardor, then rivalry, as well as jealousy, God's jealousy for His glory.\(^3\)

Another Hebrew word exists that is considered by some\(^3\) to be the equivalent of the Russian revnost': sheqidah. But even less than qine'ab does this word express the notion of jealousy in the specific sense of the world. In fact, this word is derived from the Semitic ShQD, which in Phoenician corresponds to the notion of "respecting, honoring, appreciating something—auf etwas achten," while in the languages of Mishna and Targums it acquired the sense of "to be zealous—eifrig sein."\(^3\)

Thus, our general conclusion is that the etymology and the usage of the word "jealousy" and its derivatives unquestionably confirm the previously given metaphysical analysis of the concept of jealousy. That is to say, the condemnation hanging over jealousy is removed completely, and jealousy is recognized as only a necessary expression or, more precisely, only a necessary aspect of powerful love. This clarifies why Scripture so often and so stubbornly attributes jealousy to God. Indeed, it would be wholly incomprehensible how a state reprehensible in itself could be an image of something in the Divine life. For no anthropopathisms will ever enable one to attribute sin, lust, or falsehood to God. If jealousy is attributed to Him, however we understand this Divine jealousy, one can affirm in advance that it is something holy. Therefore, human jealousy is not something intrinsically foul and reprehensible. From the clarifications made here, it is evident that, in this attribution of jealousy to God, one must see not a strained anthropopathism but a precise description of the essence of the matter. (For jealousy is an ontological concept, not a psychological or ethical one.)

But more than being a necessary aspect of love, jealousy (according to the generalizing interpretation of St. Isaac the Syrian) is a necessary aspect of all that is good in man. Speaking generally, jealousy is the power that realizes good wishes. "He who has good wishes cannot be prevented from realizing them. . . . This occurs for the following reason. Every thought of a good wish, at the beginning of its movement, is followed by a certain jealousy, which is similar in its hotness to burning coals. And jealousy usually guards this thought and does not allow it to be approached by any resistance, barrier, or obstacle, because this jealousy acquires a great strength and an ineffable power of always protecting the soul from frailty or fear as all kinds of difficult circumstances assault it. And as that thought is the power of a holy wish, planted by nature in the soul's essence, so this jealousy is a thought moved by a stimulating power in the soul, a power given to us by God for our use, for the observance of a natural limit, for the expression of the concept of one's freedom by the fulfillment of a natural wish found in the soul. This is the virtue without

which the good is not realized. And this virtue is called jealousy, because it moves, excites, and fortifies us. Someone has called this jealousy 'the dog and protector of the Divine law,' that is, of virtue . . . "\(^3\)

Further, St. Isaac explains that jealousy is composed of the fear of losing the good and of the striving to hold it. That is why the weakening of jealousy is a bad sign, determined either by a spiritual cooling or by self-reliance and pride, i.e., by a relation to the spiritual good which is not living and personal but proprietary and fleshy, as to a thing that can be placed under lock and key and that, even without being experienced, can be possessed.

Thus, a striving to attain the Pillar and Ground of the Truth is realized and preserved by jealousy, this force of our spirit that is persecuted and held in contempt by the contemporary consciousness.